F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision21 September 2017

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 September 2017,

in the following composition:

Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman

John Bramhall (England), member

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

Mohamed Al Saikhan (Saudi Arabia), member

on the claim lodged by the club,

Club A, Country B,

as Claimant

against the player,

Player C, Country B

as Respondent I

and the club,

Club D, Country E

as Respondent II

and the club,

Club F, Country G

as Respondent III

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 31 December 2011, the Player of Country B, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent I), born on 10 November 1996, his father and the Club of Country B, Club A (hereinafter: Club A or the Claimant), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the first contract) valid as from 1 January 2012 until 30 November 2014, “with the possibility to extend until 30/11/2015 if the club exercise the option” (free translation).

2. Pursuant to art. 3 of the first contract, “Club A will pay to the [Respondent I] as remuneration for his services, a net monthly indemnity of 30 000 (…): as well as benefits in kind (food and accommodation) in the value of 30 000 (…). That is a total of 60 000 [approx. USD 120]” (free translation).

3. Art. 5 of the first contract further stipulates that “[m]atch bonuses are set out at the beginning of the season based on the annual budget established by the Direction”.

4. Furthermore, art. 9 of the first contract provides for the following:

“The parties agree to solve amicably the disputes that might arise during the execution of this contract.

Failing that, the dispute will be subject to the arbitration of the Football Federation H, of CAF or FIFA”.

5. Besides, according to Club A, on 25 June 2013, the parties, i.e. the Respondent I, his father and Club A, concluded a second employment contract, valid as from 1 December 2014 until 30 November 2016, “with the possibility to extend until 30/11/2017 if the club exercise the option” (free translation). In support of its assertion, Club A submitted a copy of an employment contract (hereinafter: the second contract) containing the exact same terms as the first contract apart from the clause related to the remuneration and benefits which reads as follows:

“Club A will pay the [Respondent I] as remuneration for his services, a net monthly indemnity of 60 000 (…)”.

6. On 25 November 2013, Club A informed the Football Federation of Country B (Football Federation H) that the Respondent I was absent since October 2013.

7. On 6 December 2013, Club A informed the Football Federation H that the Respondent I had resumed duties and had apologised for his unjustified absence.

8. On 22 April 2014, Club A requested the Football Federation H’s assistance in order for the Respondent I to resume duties. In particular, Club A alleges that the Respondent I had been absent for two months and was allegedly training with Club J.

9. On 5 July 2014, Club A requested once again the Football Federation H’s assistance, pointing out that the Respondent I had been absent for four months and took part in games of the U-20 national team.

10. On 10 November 2014, the Respondent I’s father addressed a correspondence to the club, which, inter alia, reads as follows:

“Since the signature of the employment contract binding you to my son which I concluded on his behalf in 2013, just after the U17 Championship K, I have not received a copy of the contract in order to analyse our respective obligations. You did not deal with diligence the opportunities that were offered to my son. Furthermore, it is impossible to contact you in order to work on the football career of my son (…). The foregoing might be detrimental to his career. Therefore, he informed that he does not want to play with your club any longer.

In view of the above, I herewith inform you of my decision to terminate the employment contract binding us. I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt of said termination. In advance, I thank you (…) for taking the necessary steps for the termination to be effective without delay. If not, I will have to refer the matter to the competent bodies”.

11. On 11 November 2014, Club A rejected the termination, stressing that since the beginning of 2014, the Respondent I had been in breach of his contractual obligations and requesting the latter to resume duties.

12. On the same date, Club A requested the Football Federation H’s assistance in order to amicably solve the dispute between itself and the Respondent I.

13. On 22 November 2014, Club A addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I’s father, requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.

14. On 25 November 2014, the Respondent I’s father addressed a second correspondence to Club A, reiterating the content of his previous correspondence.

15. On 30 November 2014, the Respondent I addressed a correspondence to Club A, which reads as follows:

“Over the last six months I did not receive any payments from your side although I have constantly asked you to proceed with such payments, because of my really precarious financial situation. You have always told that the money will arrive, but this was not true. I am still waiting for these payments. I have unfortunately understood that you will never make these payments to me and this fact really disappoints me, considering that I have rendered my services to you in the same timeframe.

Through this severe and continuous violation of the contract and the breach of your first obligation as an employer, I have lost the confidence in your club to a point that a continuation of our collaboration is not possible any longer. For this reason I do not consider myself bound any longer to your club due to your severe faults and herewith reserves all my rights to proceed against your club for recovering all the damage caused to me”.

16. On 3 December 2014, Club A sent a correspondence to the Respondent I’s father, rejecting the termination and requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.

17. On 30 December 2014, after holding a meeting with the Respondent I and a representative of the Football Federation H, Club A authorised the Respondent I to perform a trial test with Club F (hereinafter: Club F or the Respondent III) as from 1 January 2015 until 1 February 2015.

18. On 1 January 2015, the Respondent I and the Club of Country E, Club D (hereinafter: Club D or the Respondent II) concluded an employment contract, valid until 31 December 2015 and according to which the Respondent I was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 4,600 (approx. 160,000).

19. On 8 February 2015, Club A requested Club F information about the trial tests as well as the whereabouts of the Respondent I.

20. On 11 February 2015, Club A addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I’s father, requesting the Respondent I to resume duties.

21. On 19 February 2015, Club F sent an e-mail to Club A, informing the latter that the trial test was not convincing and the Respondent I had entered into an employment contract with Club D.

22. On 25 February 2015, Club A addressed a correspondence to Club F, requesting the latter to confirm that the Respondent I joined Club F in January 2015 and to provide it with information regarding his signature with Club D.

23. On the same date, Club A requested the intervention of the Players’ Status Committee of the Football Federation H.

24. On 13 March 2015, Club F informed Club A that the Respondent I had actually performed a trial test in January 2015.

25. On the same date, the Football Association of Country E requested the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) of the Respondent I to the Football Federation H.

26. On 16 March 2015, the Football Federation H rejected the issuance of the ITC, based on the fact that the Respondent I had a valid contract with Club A until 30 November 2016.

27. On 15 May 2015, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorised the provisional registration of the Respondent I with Club D.

28. On 23 September 2016, Club A lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent I, Club F and Club D for breach of contract and inducement to the breach respectively. In particular, Club A requests the Respondent I and Club D to be held jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of EUR 500,000 as compensation as well as the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent I, Club D and Club F.

29. In its claim, Club A asserts that following the Respondent I’s good performance during the U17 Championship K and considering the interest of several prestigious European clubs, the parties decided to sign the second contract which would enter into force after the Respondent I’s 18th birthday. In this regard, Club A points out that the second contract contains all the essentialia negotii and that the Respondent I was registered at the Football Federation H with said contract under the status of professional.

30. Nevertheless, Club A states that following the U-17 World Cup, the Respondent I was absent without justification between 4 November and 6 December 2013. Club A further alleges that as from the end of February 2014, the Respondent I was again absent and that thus it legitimately suspended the payment of his salary. In particular, Club A outlines that it found out that in the meanwhile the Respondent I had trained with Club J and Club F. In this respect, Club A emphasises that it addressed several correspondence to the Football Federation H, expressing its concern.

31. Subsequently, Club A explains that at the end of December 2014, it held a meeting with the Respondent I, on occasion of the latter, the Respondent I made clear that he did not want to play any longer for the club. Therefore, in good faith, Club A sustains that it authorised the Respondent I to travel to Club F in order to perform a trial test. In this regard, Club A insists that during the meeting, neither the Respondent I, nor his father challenged the validity or enforceability of the first and second contracts.

32. In continuation, Club A argues that instead of starting his trial period with Club F, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with Club D on 1 January 2015, thereby breaching the second contract.

33. Having established the above, Club A focuses on the calculation of the compensation payable. In doing so, Club A outlines that the following criteria should be taken into consideration by the Dispute Resolution Chamber: (i) the breach occurred within the protected period; (ii) the remuneration received from his new club; (iii) the loss of a chance of receiving a transfer compensation and (iv) the specificity of sport. In view of the above-mentioned criteria, Club A requests to be awarded with the amount of EUR 500,000 as compensation.

34. Club A further asserts that the Respondent I was induced to breach the contract by Club D with the complicity of Club F. In particular, Club A asserts that Club F’s reputation was used in order to ease the Respondent I’s entry in Schengen area and his transfer to Club D. In this respect, Club A stresses on the bad faith of Club F, which maintains that the Respondent I performed the trial test in January 2015 whereas there is evidence that the he had already signed with Club D on 1 January 2015. Consequently, Club A requests the imposition of sporting sanction on both clubs based on art. 17 par. 4 and par. 5 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the FIFA Regulations).

35. In his reply to the claim, the Respondent I first challenges the competence of FIFA to deal with the matter based on art. 9 of the first contract (cf. point 4 above). In particular, the Respondent I asserts that the parties agreed to subject themselves to “arbitration”. Therefore, considering that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA is not an arbitral tribunal and that CAF does not have any competence in employment-related matters, the sole competent body is the arbitral tribunal of the Football Federation H as established in art. 78 of the Statutes of the Football Federation H.

36. Furthermore, the Respondent I explains that in Club A’s perspective, he “repudiated” the contract when he allegedly disappeared in February 2014, or at the latest in April 2014. According to the Respondent I, such disappearance constitutes the event giving rise to the dispute and therefore, Club A’s claim, which was lodged on 23 September 2016, must be deemed time-barred.

37. As to the substance, the Respondent I asserts that he was free to leave Club A since he was deemed as an amateur player pursuant to art. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In this regard, the Respondent I points out that he was living with his parents and therefore did not receive the extra amount of 30,000 as benefits in kind. As a consequence, in accordance with art. 4 of the first contract, the Respondent I argues that his remuneration amounted to 30,000, which is allegedly equivalent to half of the minimum wage in Country B and merely constitutes the reimbursement of his football expenses. The Respondent I further emphasises that the fact that he considered himself as an amateur is reflected by the terms used in his correspondence dated 30 November 2014. In particular, the Respondent I highlights that the words “payment” and “collaboration” rather than “salary” and “employment relationship” are used. Equally, the Respondent I outlines that he did not terminate an employment contract but rather “do[es] not consider [himself] bound any longer”.

38. In continuation, the Respondent I alleges that, aware that the unilateral extension option included in the first contract would be deemed null and void as per art. 18 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations, Club A decided to “fabricate” the second contract. In this regard, the Respondent I firmly denies having ever signed said contract.

39. The Respondent I then explains that the meeting held in December does not constitute a proof that a valid employment relationship was in force. In this regard the Respondent I insists that the reason why he accepted to meet Club A’s representatives at the end of December 2014 was the rule applicable in Country B according to which a player needs the authorisation of the last club where he was registered in order for him to be able to leave the country.

40. Notwithstanding the above, and should the DRC consider it valid, the Respondent I argues that the first contract and the second contract must be deemed a “chain contract”, which de facto bound him for a period running from 1 January 2012 until 30 November 2016, i.e. more than the limitation of three years established in art. 18 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations.

41. The Respondent I further points out that the second contract was allegedly signed on 23 June 2013, i.e. 18 months before its entry into force. In this respect, the Respondent I sustains that the second contract contradicts “the ethical principles of our legal system as well as the moral values of the community and should therefore be deemed null and void” in accordance with art. 20 par. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations in combination with art. 27 par. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code.

42. Subsequently, the Respondent I affirms that he was always at disposal Club A and stresses that the latter never put him in default. In this respect, the Respondent I questions why Club A addressed its letters to the Football Federation H or his father instead of sending them directly to him. Moreover, the Respondent I calls into question the authenticity of the letters sent to the Football Federation H, which oddly remained unanswered by the latter. In continuation, the Respondent I alleges that Club A failed to pay his dues without any valid reason since February 2014. In this regard, the Respondent I argues that on several occasions he requested orally Club A to do so.

43. Furthermore, the Respondent I argues that Club A’s sole concern was to make profit from his sale. In this regard, the Respondent I sustains that Club A obliged him to go abroad in order to perform trial tests, emphasising once again that he would not have been allowed to leave the country without Club A’s permission.

44. The Respondent I further maintains that in any case Club A did not suffer any damage.

45. In its reply to the claim, Club F alleges that on 24 September 2014, it addressed a request to the Consulate of Country G in City L in order to invite the Respondent I for a trial. Following this request, Club F explains that the Respondent I travelled to Country G and was on trials between 1 November and 28 November 2014. Subsequently, Club F states that on 9 December 2014, it requested a second authorisation to the Consulate of Country G in City L. In this regard, Club F insists that it was not aware of any contractual relationship binding the Respondent I, which is the reason why the requests were addressed to the Consulate of Country G and not to Club A. In particular, regarding the second request, Club F points out that it is the Respondent I himself who remitted it to Club A on 30 December 2014.

46. In continuation, Club F contends that the Respondent I arrived in Country G on 10 January 2015 and started to train with the B team. Club F then explains that on or around 20 January 2015, it informed the Respondent I that he would not be retained and authorised the Respondent I to go to Paris for personal and administrative reasons on 25 January 2015. As from that date, Club F alleges that it has not heard from the Respondent I and therefore assumed that the latter had travelled back to Country B.

47. In spite of having been invited to do so, Club D did not reply to the claim.

48. In its replica, Club A insists on the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter. In particular, Club A points out that neither the first nor the second contract contains a clear and exclusive arbitration clause in favour of the NDRC of Country B. Furthermore, Club A outlines that the Respondent I failed to demonstrate that the alleged NDRC guarantees fair proceedings and complies with the principle of equal representation.

49. In continuation, Club A argues that the event giving rise to the dispute is the signature of the contract between the Respondent I and Club D on 1 January 2015.

50. Turning to the substance, Club A insists on the authenticity of the second contract. In this respect, Club A emphasises that in its correspondence dated 10 November 2014, the Respondent I’s father refers to an employment contract signed in 2013 (cf. point 10 above).

51. Club A further states that the first and the second contracts have a different grounds and must therefore be deemed as independent from each other.

52. Having said the above, Club A states that in accordance with both the first and the second contract, the Respondent I had to be deemed as a professional. In support of its assertion, Club A stresses on the link of subordination as well as on the monthly amount of 60,000 which was paid to the Respondent I “as remuneration for his services”. Equally, Club A outlines that the Respondent I received a bonus of 41,000 in December 2013 as well as match bonuses in the amount of 60,000 in January and February 2014. In light of the foregoing, Club A concludes that the Respondent I was paid more than the expenses effectively incurred for his football activity.

53. Besides, Club A firmly challenges the Respondent I’s assertion that he was sent on trials upon its request, outlining the latter’s failure to submit any evidence in this respect.

54. Subsequently, Club A asserts that it decided to contact the Respondent I through the Football Federation H when it realised that the latter Association was able to successfully call him up.

55. In continuation, Club A reiterates its assertions regarding Club F’s involvement in the breach of contract. In particular, Club A questions why Club F terminated the trial after one week and insured the Respondent I until 20 January 2015 only when the trial period was initially planned until 8 February 2015.

56. Furthermore, Club A stresses on the close links existing between the Respondent I’s agent, Agent M, Club F and Club D.

57. In any case, Club A states that Club F lacked diligence and should have requested information about the Respondent I’s contractual situation to the Football Federation H or at least enquired on the web.

58. In his final comments, the Respondent I insists on FIFA’s lack of competence and on the prescription of the claim.

59. As to the substance, the Respondent I reiterates that he was to be qualified as an amateur considering the monies due to him. In this respect, the Respondent I outlines that the status under which he was registered at the Football Federation H is irrelevant.

60. In continuation, the Respondent I challenges once more the authenticity of the second contract. In this regard, the Respondent I points out that he constitutes a legal person independent from his father and is therefore not bound by the statements of the later. The Respondent I further asserts that the correspondence dated 30 November 2014 was sent in order to avoid any issue as regards the unilateral option contained in the first contract.

61. Furthermore, the Respondent I asserts that Club A was at all times aware of his whereabouts and should have directly entered into contact with him instead of going through the Football Federation H.

62. In its final comments, Club F reiterates its previous assertions regarding its lack of involvement in the Respondent I’s alleged breach of contract.

63. Upon request, the Respondent I submitted the alleged original version of the second contract.

64. On 19 August 2015, the Respondent I and the Club of Country N, Club O, entered into an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until 10 June 2016 and in accordance with which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration of 100,000 (approx. 900,000). Subsequently, on 28 July 2016, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with Club P, valid until 30 June 2020 and according to which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration of 18,000 plus USD 10,000.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 23 September 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. The Dispute Resolution Chamber further referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and took note that the Respondent I challenged its competence to deal with the claim of the Claimant. In particular, the Chamber noted that the Respondent considers that the NDRC of Country B should be the competent body pursuant to art. 9 of the first contract.

3. In this regard, the members of the Chamber outlined that the club mistakenly referred to criteria stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, whereas its competence in the matter at stake is actually based on art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) since the matter concerns a dispute between a club and a player as well as, inter alia, his new club in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC and a claim from an interested party regarding the payment of compensation for breach of contract. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that it would, in principle, be competent to deal with the Claimant’s claim.

4. The Chamber then reverted to the argument of the Respondent I, according to whom the present matter is barred by the statute of limitations. In this regard, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), according to which, inter alia, the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall not hear any case subject to the said Regulations if more than two years have elapsed since the event giving rise to the dispute. The present claim having been lodged in front of the DRC on 23 September 2016 and the event giving rise to the dispute being, according to the Claimant, the alleged breach of contract committed by the Respondent I on 1 January 2015, i.e. when he signed with the Respondent II, the members of the Chamber had to reject the respective argument of the Respondent I and confirmed that the present petition was lodged in front of the DRC within said two years’ period of time. The matter is, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations in accordance with art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016).

5. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 23 September 2016, the 2016 version of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

6. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

7. In doing so, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 31 December 2011, the Claimant and the Respondent I concluded an employment contract valid until 30 November 2014. The Chamber further observed that, according to the Claimant, on 25 June 2013, the parties concluded a second employment contract valid as from 1 December 2014 until 30 November 2016. Furthermore, the Chamber also took note of the Claimant’s allegations according to which the Respondent I breached the alleged contractual relationship by signing a contract with the Respondent II.

8. The DRC further noted that the Respondent I, on its part, challenged the authenticity of his signature contained in the second contract. Moreover, the Chamber noticed that according to the Respondent I, the level of remuneration established in the employment contracts does not allow him to be considered as a professional player. Finally, the DRC took note of the Respondent I’s assertion that the alleged signature of the second contract constitutes a circumvention of the prohibition established in art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations regarding the duration of the contracts concluded with players under the age of 18.

9. In view of the above, the Chamber first of all deemed that it has to deal with the issue of the validity of the second contract in view of the allegation of the Respondent I regarding the alleged forgery thereof.

10. At this stage, the DRC considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule, FIFA's deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.

11. In continuation, the DRC recalled that, according to art. 12 par. 6 of the Procedural Rules, all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and, therefore, the Chamber focused its attention on the second contract as well as on the other documents containing the signature of the Respondent I provided by the parties in the context of the present dispute. In this regard, the DRC pointed out that the alleged original version of the second contract was provided by the Claimant.

12. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures, the Chamber had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, it is not possible to establish with certainty if the contract is forged or not. In this regard, the Chamber emphasised that without a decision from a competent authority establishing that the second contract is forged, the DRC must consider the latter contract as valid.

13. What is more, the DRC wished to point out that the content of the letters sent by the Respondent I’s father and the Respondent himself on 10 and 30 November 2014 respectively tend to confirm that the parties had actually concluded the second contract. Equally, the Chamber felt comforted in its finding by the fact that the Respondent I requested the Claimant’s authorisation in order to perform a trial test with the Respondent III in January 2015.

14. In view of the above, the Chamber came to the conclusion that on 25 June 2013, the parties entered into the second contract, in principle valid as from 1 December 2014 until 30 November 2016.

15. After having established the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the status of the Respondent I. In order to do so, the Chamber recalled the content of art. 2 of the Regulations according to which “[a] professional is a player who has a written contract with a club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively incurs”.

16. In this regard, the Chamber recalled its previous considerations and stressed that the parties were indeed bound by a written contract, i.e. the second contract (cf. point II.14 above).

17. Furthermore, the DRC focused on the remuneration established in the aforesaid second contract, emphasising that the latter provides for a monthly remuneration of 60,000. In this regard, and considering that as acknowledged by the Respondent I himself this amount corresponds to the minimum salary in Country B, the Chamber had no other option than to deem the Respondent I as a professional. In the Chamber’s opinion, this consideration is confirmed by the Respondent I’s own statement dated 30 November 2016, in which he acknowledged being “bound” to the Claimant.

18. In continuation, the Chamber turned its attention to the consequence resulting from the signature of the second contract. In particular, the Chamber outlined that by signing the second contract, the parties de facto extended the contractual relationship to five years while art. 18 par. 2 of the Regulations stipulates that players under the age of 18 may not sign a professional contract longer than three years.

19. Along these lines, it is undisputed that the Respondent I was under 18 years old when he first signed a contract with Club A. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber held that the second contract’s period of validity should be reduced to a maximum of three years as from the beginning of the first contract, i.e. as from 1 January 2012. As such, the Chamber concluded that the contractual relationship between the parties effectively expired on 31 December 2014.

20. The foregoing being established, the Chamber turned to the question whether the Respondent I had breached the contract which bound him to the Claimant until 31 December 2014. In this regard, the DRC wished to emphasise that in spite of the Respondent I’s letter of 30 November 2014, the latter maintained discussions with the Claimant during the month of December 2014 and even held a meeting with its representatives on 30 December 2014. In the Chamber’s opinion, by acting in such way, both parties demonstrated that they still considered themselves bound by a contract at the end of December 2014, i.e. the expiry of the contractual relationship.

21. As a consequence, and considering the above, the Chamber came to the conclusion that when the Respondent I signed a contract with the Respondent II on 1 January 2015, the former was free to do so since he was no longer bound to the Claimant.

22. All the above led the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that the claim of the Claimant has to be rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is rejected.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS directives