F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision29 March 2018
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 29 March 2018,
in the following composition:
Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman
Roy Vermeer (The Netherlands), member
Alexandra Gómez (Uruguay), member
Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member
Joel Talavera (Paraguay), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player A, from country A
as Claimant
against the club,
Club B, from country B
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute
between the parties
I. Facts of the case
1. On 15 February 2016, the country A player, Player A (hereinafter: the player or Claimant) and the country B club, Club B (hereinafter: the club or Respondent) concluded an employment agreement (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from 16 February 2016 until 30 June 2017.
2. According to article 9 of the contract, the player is inter alia entitled to receive the following amounts:
a monthly salary of EUR 8,500, due on the 25th day of the following month;
a sign-on fee of EUR 39,000, to be paid in three instalments as follows:
- EUR 13,000 on 20 February 2016;
- EUR 13,000 on 7 July 2016;
- EUR 13,000 on 20 January 2017;
a monthly payment of EUR 250 ‘for the rent’;
‘two round trip plane tickets country B – country A per year’.
3. Furthermore, based on article 3 of the contract, the player is inter alia entitled to the following bonus payments, due ‘at the end of the season on July 10 (each year)’:
For the season 2015/2016:
a bonus payment of EUR 500 per point won by the club in the ‘First Liga (season 2015-2016)’, with the following conditions:
- ‘100% start the game in’;
- ‘75% on the bench – come in min. 1’;
- ‘50% on the bench – not played’;
- ‘15% out of 18 players’;
For the season 2016/2017:
a bonus payment of EUR 500 per point won by the club in the ‘First Liga (play off season)’, a bonus payment of EUR 300 per point won by the club in the ‘First Liga (play out)’ and a bonus payment of EUR 400 per point won by the club ‘in the regular season’, with the following conditions:
- ‘100% start the game in’;
- ‘75% on the bench – come in min. 1’;
- ‘50% on the bench – not played’;
- ‘15% out of 18 players’.
In addition, article 3 of the contract stipulates the following: ‘The player will receive these bonuses if he will get at least 1 minute in 20 Liga I games. Otherwise, the bonus will be proportional to the number of games played’.
4. Article 17.2 of the contract holds the following: ‘In case the plaintiff chooses sporting jurisdiction, after the case has been heard by CSJ/The Chamber for Solving Litigations/The Commission of Appeal, the party that is not thus satisfied my bring the action before the Confederation’.
5. Article 18.1 of the contract holds the following: ‘The applicable football regulations for this contract are the statutes, the regulations and the decisions issued by FIFA; UEFA, Football Association of country B or the National League of country B, as case may be’.
6. On 25 January 2017, the player lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA, requesting the payment of the total amount of EUR 137,900 by the club, as follows:
Outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 66,640, as follows:
EUR 45,240, as outstanding remuneration, related to the unpaid salaries for the period between July and November 2016 in the amount of EUR 8,500 each, as well as an amount of EUR 2,740 related to the period between 1 December and 10 December 2016 (i.e. EUR 8,500/31 x 10);
EUR 13,000 as outstanding part of the sign-on fee, due on 7 July 2016;
EUR 5,200 as outstanding bonus payments related to the period between 1 May and 21 August 2016, specified as follows:
- EUR 500 for a 1-1 draw against Club 1 on 1 May 2016;
- EUR 1,500 for a 3-1 win against Club 2 on 9 May 2016;
- EUR 1,200 for a 3-1 win against Club 3 on 22 July 2016;
- EUR 1,200 for a 1-3 win against Club 4 on 7 August 2016;
- EUR 400 for a 1-1 draw against Club 5 on 14 August 2016;
- EUR 400 for a 0-0 draw against Club 6 on 21 August 2016.
EUR 2,700 as outstanding bonus payments related to the period between 3 October and 1 December 2016, according to the player due on 25 November 2016, specified as follows:
- EUR 300 for a 0-0 draw against Club 7 on 3 October 201
- EUR 900 for a 2-1 win against Club 8 on 15 October 2016;
- EUR 1,200 for a 0-3 win against Club 9 on 25 October 2016;
- EUR 60 for a 2-2 draw against Club 4 on 18 November 2016;
- EUR 180 for a 0-1 win against Club 5 on 28 November 2016;
- EUR 60 for a 1-1 draw against Club 6 on 1 December 2016.
EUR 500 as unpaid rental allowance for the months of October and November 2016.
Compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of EUR 71,260, as follows:
EUR 71,260 as residual value of the contract in the period between 11 December 2016 and 30 June 2017, broken down as follows:
- EUR 56,760 as salaries related to the period between 11 December 2016 and 30 June 2017 (i.e. 6 x EUR 8,500 + EUR 8,500/31 x 21);
- EUR 13,000 as outstanding part of the sign-on fee, due on 20 January 2017;
- EUR 1,500 as rental allowances in the period between January and June 2017.
Furthermore, the player requested to be awarded 5% interest p.a. on the abovementioned amounts as from the respective due dates, as well as to impose sporting sanctions on the club.
7. In his claim, the player explains that on 9 November 2016, he put the club in default for the total amount of EUR 43,700. The player explains that this amount corresponds to EUR 25,500 as outstanding salaries for July, August and September 2016, the unpaid amount of EUR 13,000 due on 7 July 2016 as well as the outstanding bonuses in the amount of EUR 5,200. According to the player, the club did not pay him the requested amounts until 10 December 2016.
8. On 10 December 2016, the player unilaterally terminated the contract with the club, due to the outstanding amount of EUR 52,450. In this respect, the player explains that in addition to the amount of EUR 43,700, also the salary for October 2016 in the amount of EUR 8,500, as well as the rental allowance for October 2016 in the amount of EUR 250.
9. In its reply to the player’s claim, the club contests FIFA’s competence to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, the club argues that based on article 17.2 of the contract, the player should first have submitted his claim to the ’The Chamber for Solving Litigations, after the Commission of Appeal of the Football Association of country B’ or to the ‘Confederation’, if he would not have been satisfied with the outcome of the procedure at first instance.
10. As to the substance, the club explains that the player terminated the contract on 10 December 2016 and that on 13 January 2017, the Club X, from country X (hereinafter: Club X) requested for the issuing of a “TPO”, as on 5 January 2017, the player had signed a contract with said club.
11. Subsequently, the club argued that it is suffering serious financial difficulties and that as from 19 October 2016, it is undergoing an insolvency procedure. In this respect, the club submitted an untranslated document, allegedly from the Tribunal in country B, confirming that the insolvency procedure started on 19 October 2016, is on file. As a result of the foregoing circumstances, the club holds that the player ‘has been written in the statement of assets and liabilities’ with the amount of 194,593 (corresponding to EUR 43,236), representing ‘outstanding financial rights until 19/10/2017, which is the date of the opening of the insolvency procedures’ and submitted documentary evidence is this respect. In this respect, the club states that the amount of EUR 43,236 shall be paid in instalments ‘up to 31/03/2017, according to the reorganising plan and payments schedule’.
12. Furthermore, the club argues that for the period between 19 October 2016 and 10 December 2016, it owes the player an amount of 75,645 or EUR 16,810, which amount shall be paid to the player ‘over the following period’.
13. In relation the compensation for breach of contract claimed in the amount of EUR 71,260 by the player, the club argues that according to the country B law, ‘the club does not owe any additional amounts to him any longer’, especially because the player terminated the contract on his own initiative and signed a new contract with the Club X, from country X.
14. In his response to the club’s arguments that FIFA is not competent to deal with the matter at hand, the player explained that his claim has an international dimension and that thus, FIFA is competent. Furthermore, the player explains the contract is ‘lacking a clear reference to one country B NDRC or body/chamber with similar name, as it refers to three different bodies/chambers, one of which is not indicated properly at all in the said employment contract’.
15. What is more, the player argues that the club failed to provide evidence that the Football Federation of country B has founded an independent arbitration tribunal that guarantees fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.
16. In addition, the player addresses the arguments of the club that under country B (insolvency) law, is does not owe any amounts to him. In this respect, the player refers to article 18.1 of the contract, and argues that club’s references to the country B law cannot be upheld, as ‘FIFA and UEFA Regulations’ prevail over country B law.
17. After having been requested to do so, the player informed FIFA that on 5 January 2017, he signed an employment contract with the country X club, Club X, valid as from 5 January 2017 until 31 December 2017, according to which he is entitled to receive a monthly salary of USD 26,666. For the period between 5 January 2017 and 30 June 2017, this corresponds to USD 159,996 (approximately EUR 153,388 on 5 January 2017).
II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 25 January 2017. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).
2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player and a club.
3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the club contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of the alleged fact that ’The Chamber for Solving Litigations, after the Commission of Appeal of the Football Federation of country B’ or to the ‘Confederation’ (hereinafter: the country B NDRC) are competent to deal with the matter at hand.
4. In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the player rejected such position and insisted that FIFA is competent to deal with the present matter highlighting, inter alia, that the contract does not contain a specific and clear arbitration clause, as well as that the club did not prove that the country B NDRC meets the requirements of independent arbitration and that the principle of equal representation of players and club is respected.
5. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the members of the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.
6. In relation to the above, the members of the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC (or the DRC judge) can settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, first and foremost, is that the jurisdiction of said other organ derives from a clear and specific jurisdiction clause, included in the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute.
7. While analysing whether it was competent to decide on the matter, the Chamber first referred to art. 17.2 of the employment contract, on the basis of which the club contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. Said article stipulates that if the parties are not able to find an amicable agreement, the dispute should be submitted to the ‘CSJ/The Chamber for Solving Litigations/The Commission of Appeal’ or ‘Confederation’. The members of the Chamber outlined that the content of art. 17.2 of the contract cannot be considered as a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause as it is rather vague and does not explicitly refer to one specific national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that its jurisdiction could not be set aside on these grounds, as the jurisdiction of the country B NDRC does not derive from a clear reference in the employment contract.
8. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that, after FIFA had requested the club to submit additional documentation, proving that the country B NDRC should be competent, the club did not submit any further documentation.
9. As a consequence of the above-mentioned elements (cf. point II.6 to II.8 above), the Chamber concluded that – based on the documents on file – the contract did not contain a clear and specific arbitration clause, supporting the alleged competence of the country B NDRC to deal with the present dispute and that it could not be concluded that the country B NDRC was indeed an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, as the club failed to submit any corroborating evidence. Consequently, this objection of the club cannot be upheld and the DRC would in principle be competent to deal with the present case as per art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations.
10. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the members of the Chamber noted that the club equally contested FIFA’s competence to deal with the matter at hand, because of the existence of insolvency proceedings involving the player and the club before a country B court.
11. In this respect, the members of the Chamber stressed that in accordance with the jurisprudence of both the DRC and the Court of Arbitration for Sport, bankruptcy/insolvency procedures in principle do not affect procedures in front of the DRC as long as the relevant club remains affiliated to its respective association. What is more, the members of the Chamber noted that in accordance with the information provided by the Football Federation of country B, the club is still affiliated to the Football Federation of country B.
12. However, the members of the Chamber noted that the club was also of the opinion that the Dispute Resolution Chamber has no competence to deal with the claim at stake, because of the fact that the player was already registered in the ‘statement of assets and liabilities’ before a local country B insolvency court, with respect to any outstanding rights of the player due until 19 October 2016.
13. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the club provided documents, in particular, a non-translated version of a decision of the country B Tribunal dated 19 October 2016, according to which ‘the opening of general insolvency procedure towards the club’ was ordered, as well as an undated ‘consolidated list of creditors’ of said court. Bearing in mind these documents, the club alleges that the player’s outstanding receivables until 19 October 2016 are already registered in the consolidated list of creditors, which indicates that the amount of 194,593 (approximately EUR 43,426). As a result, the club deems that the player already submitted a request for registration of his receivables in front of said country B insolvency court, and that it intends to pay the registered amount by no later than 31 March 2017. Thus, his claim in front of the DRC would be affected by lis pendens.
14. At his point the DRC went on to analyse the documentation provided by the club in support of its lis pendens allegation. In this respect, the members of the Chamber on the one hand noted that the club was not able to provide a duly translated version of the decision of the country B Tribunal dated 19 October 2016 and, consequently, this document could not be taken into account, in accordance with art. 9 par. 1 lit. e) of the Procedural Rules, which stipulates that all documentation provided in the context of a dispute in front of FIFA should be presented in the original version and, if applicable, translated into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, Spanish and German).
15. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the jurisdiction of the country B Tribunal to deal with the outstanding salaries until 19 October 2016 between the club and the player, was not contested by the player at any time during the procedure in country B or before the proceedings currently pending before FIFA’s DRC. In continuation, from the documents on file, especially the duly translated ‘consolidated list of creditors’, the members of the Chamber noted that player’s receivables until 19 October 2016, were duly registered on said list and in the insolvency estate of the club. These circumstances are not contested by the player in front of the DRC.
16. At this point, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to briefly recall that on the basis of the principle of lis pendens, a decision-making body is not in a position to deal with the substance of a case, which has already been brought before and is still pending at another deciding body. In continuation, the Chamber noted that the principle of lis pendens is applicable if cumulatively and necessarily the parties to the disputes and the object of the matter in dispute are identical.
17. Moreover, the Chamber recalled that the criterion of the identity of the parties is given if the parties to the disputes are the same. Having said this, the Chamber noted that both the club and the player were the parties in the country B proceedings as well as in the dispute at stake in front of the DRC. As a consequence, the Chamber came to the conclusion that the condition of the identity of parties is given. The Chamber then turned its attention to the criterion of the object of the matter in dispute.
18. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber reminded the parties that the identity of the subject matter is given if the requests of the two claims are similar. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber went on analysing and comparing the proceedings before the country B Tribunal and the player’s claim against the club before the Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA.
19. From the information and documentation on file, the Chamber could verify, on the one hand, that from the information provided by the club the player’s receivables due until 19 October 2016 as per the contract signed between the parties were in fact registered on the list of creditors by the country B Tribunal up to an amount of 194,593 or approximately EUR 43,426. On the other hand, from the player’s statement of claim, the members of the Chamber duly noted that in the proceedings before the DRC, the player requested that the club be condemned to pay him outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 66,640 (related to the period between July 2016 and 10 December 2016), because in the player’s opinion, the club failed to pay him these amounts which were due as per the employment contract without valid reason.
20. From the contents of the aforementioned documentation and considerations, the DRC assumed that the player’s receivables due until 19 October 2016, as per the contract signed between the parties on 15 February 2016, were duly registered as outstanding remuneration to be paid by the club in front of the country B Tribunal. In this respect, the Chamber held that both the proceeding in country B as well as the proceeding before FIFA’s DRC were based on the same employment contract and in part deal with the same object, i.e. the player’s outstanding remuneration due until 19 October 2016.
21. On account of the above, the Chamber determined that the object of the matter in both disputes - as far as it concerns the player’s outstanding salaries until 19 October 2016 - is identical and, therefore, the condition of identity of the object of (a part of) the matter in dispute is also given.
22. As a result, the Chamber deemed that it is not in a position to deal with the matter at hand insofar as it concerns the player’s outstanding salaries which had fallen due until 19 October 2016, as this specific part of the claim of the player has already been brought before a local court in country B and is apparently still pending at the country B Tribunal, having consequently been affected by the principle of lis pendens. Thus, this part of the player’s claim is inadmissible. However, for the remaining amounts claimed by the player before the DRC, the Chamber deemed that the club’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and it is, for this part of the claim, competent on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.
23. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter, regarding the player’s claim related to the allegedly outstanding salaries fallen due after 19 October 2016 and the compensation for breach of contract, considered as admissible. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 25 January 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
24. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter, insofar as it concerns the allegedly outstanding payments due after 19 October 2016 as well as the compensation claimed by the player. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
25. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the player lodged a claim against the club, maintaining that he had terminated the employment contract with just cause on 10 December 2016, after previously having put the club in default, since the club allegedly failed to pay the player’s remuneration. In this respect, the player submits that on 9 November 2016, he put the club in default for the amount of EUR 43,700, consisting of three outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 8,500 each, an unpaid amount of EUR 13,000, as well as outstanding bonuses in the amount of EUR 5,200. However, he claims said amount remained unpaid until 10 December 2016 and therefore on said date he terminated the employment contract. Consequently, the player asks to be awarded his outstanding dues, as well as the payment of compensation for breach of the employment contract.
26. Subsequently, the DRC observed that the club, as to the substance, argued that it owes the player for the period between 19 October 2016 and 10 December 2016, the amount of 75,645 or EUR 16,810. Further, the club argues that as per country B law, it does not owe the player any compensation for breach of contract, because the player terminated the contract on his own initiative.
27. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute was to determine whether the contract had been terminated by the player on 10 December 2016 with or without just cause, and subsequently, to determine the consequences of the early termination of the contractual relationship by the player.
28. In accordance with the employment contract, and taking into account the player’s statements that the club failed to pay him the remuneration he was entitled to until 10 December 2016, the DRC could establish that at the time the contract was terminated, i.e. on 10 December 2016, the club had failed to pay the player the monthly salaries for the period between July and November 2016, as well as a sign-on fee, several match bonuses – for which the player submitted evidence of entitlement, consisting of several match reports – and rental allowances. Further, the members of the Chamber noted that said circumstances remained uncontested by the club, which even partially acknowledged the amounts in relation to the period between 19 October 2016 and 10 December 2016, claimed by the player.
29. On account of the aforementioned, the Chamber established that the club, without any valid reason, failed to remit to the player, until 10 December 2016, the date on which the player terminated the contract, four monthly salaries of EUR 8,500 each due from July to October 2016 (considering that the monthly salaries were payable on the 25th day of the following month), a sign-on fee of EUR 13,000 due on 7 July 2016, match bonuses in the total amount of EUR 7,900 as well as EUR 500 as unpaid rental allowances for October and November 2016.
30. Consequently, and considering that the club had repeatedly and for a significant period of time been in breach of its contractual obligations towards the player, the Chamber decided that the player had just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment contract on 10 December 2016 and that, as a result, the club is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact with just cause by the player.
31. In continuation, having established that the club is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the player, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination.
32. In this regard, prior to establishing the consequences of the breach of contract with just cause by the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that it had to address the issue of any unpaid remuneration at the moment the contract was terminated by the club.
33. In his statement of claim, the player alleges that his remuneration, up to a total amount of EUR 66,640 and relating to the period between 1 July and 10 December 2016, was to be considered outstanding. However, taking into account the considerations under points II./13. to II./22. above, it can established that only the part of the player’s claim referring to remuneration due after 19 October 2016 is admissible. Said outstanding amounts, for the period between 20 October and 10 December 2016, correspond to a total of EUR 31,650, consisting of the monthly salaries for the period between September and November 2016 (due on the 25th day of the following month) of EUR 8,500 each, as well as match bonuses for the 2016/2017 season in the amount of EUR 5,900 and the rental allowance for November 2016 in the amount of EUR 250 (due on 1 November 2016). In particular with regard to the match bonuses, the Chamber noted that the bonuses due for the 2016/2017 season were, as per the contract, payable on 10 July 2017. However, it considered it reasonable to include in the outstanding remuneration the match bonuses for which the right was acquired before the termination, for matches played between 22 July 2016 and 1 December 2016, which were all supported by substantial evidence. The club, for its part, did not contest as to the substance that said amounts remained outstanding. As a result, the Chamber established that the club had to pay the aforementioned amount of EUR 31,650 as outstanding remuneration to the player.
34. Consequently, the members of the Chamber determined that the club has to pay to the player as outstanding remuneration the amount of EUR 31,650, as well as, considering the player’s claim for interest and also taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows:
a. 5% p.a. as of 26 October 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
b. 5% p.a. as of 26 November 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
c. 5% p.a. as of 2 November 2016 on the amount of EUR 250.
d. 5% p.a. as of 26 December 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
e. 5% p.a. as of 11 July 2017 on the amount of EUR 5,900.
35. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is entitled to receive from the club compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding salaries on the basis of the relevant employment contract. For the sake of completeness, in relation to the club’s argument that based on country B law it does not owe any further amounts to the player after the unilateral termination of the contract by the player on 10 December 2016, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law. In this regard the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to the (consequences of a) termination of the contract but rather the FIFA Regulations, general principles of law and, where existing, the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.
36. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the player by the club in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.
37. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.
38. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the club to the player had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.
39. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the player, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract between December 2016 and 30 June 2017. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the player’s remuneration due as from December 2016 until 30 June 2017, as well as the second part of the sign-on fee, due on 20 January 2017 and the rental allowances for the period between December 2016 and June 2017 was to be considered as the residual value of the contract. Taking into account the foregoing as well as the claim of the player for compensation, limited to EUR 71,260, the members concluded that such amount serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.
40. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the player had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.
41. Indeed, on 5 January 2017, the player found employment with the country X club, Club X. In accordance with the pertinent employment contract, which was made available by the player, and which was valid until 31 December 2017, the player was entitled to receive a total amount of USD 159,996 (approximately EUR 153,388) for the period between 5 January 2017 and 30 June 2017, whereas the basis of the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract amounted to EUR 71,260 (cf. point II./39. above) .
42. Consequently, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that, even though the Respondent is considered liable for the breach of the relevant employment contract, the player did not suffer any financial loss from the violation of the contractual obligations by the club in the period between January and June 2017 and, therefore, can only be awarded compensation for breach of contract related to the month of December 2016, in which he remained unemployed.
43. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the club must pay the amount of EUR 8,500 to the player, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.
44. Moreover, taking into account the player’s request as well as its longstanding jurisprudence, the Chamber decided that the club must pay to the player interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 25 January 2017, until the date of effective payment.
45. In conclusion, the Chamber decided that, in view of all the above mentioned reasons, the claim of the player is partially accepted, insofar as it is admissible.
III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted, insofar as it is admissible.
2. The Respondent, Club B, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 31,650, plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows:
a. 5% p.a. as of 26 October 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
b. 5% p.a. as of 26 November 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
c. 5% p.a. as of 2 November 2016 on the amount of EUR 250.
d. 5% p.a. as of 26 December 2016 on the amount of EUR 8,500;
e. 5% p.a. as of 11 July 2017 on the amount of EUR 5,900.
3. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 8,500, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 25 January 2017 until the date of effective payment.
4. In the event that the aforementioned amounts plus interest are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: info@tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
_____________________________
Omar Ongaro
Football Regulatory Director
Encl: CAS directives