F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 19 April 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 April 2018,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Takuya Yamazaki (Japan), member

Tomislav Kasalo (Croatia), member

Daan de Jong (The Netherlands), member

Abu Nayeem Shohag (Bangladesh), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 1 July 2017, the chairman (Chairman E) of the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the club), made a contract offer (hereinafter: the offer) via email to the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the player), to conclude a contract based on the following details:

 a monthly salary of EUR 4,500 for the duration of ‘the League of Country D’;

 contract duration of one year, ‘with option of the club for another year (1+1 - 2017/2018 & 2018/2019)’;

 a bonus of EUR 10,000 ‘in case the club will remain and stay in the league at the season 2017/18’;

 a 25% sell-on fee for the player’s agent, in case the club will decide ‘to sell the player to other club’;

 ‘fringe benefits: car, accommodation and fly tickets’.

2. On 5 July 2017, the player and the club signed a document referred to as letter of agreement (hereinafter: the letter of agreement), valid ‘for one year with option of the club for another year’, based on which the player was entitled to receive:

 a yearly salary of EUR 45,000 for the 2017/2018 season;

 a bonus of EUR 10,000 in case the club remains in the League of Country D;

 25% of the transfer fee (payable to the player), in case he is sold to another club;

 a car, accommodation and flight tickets.

3. On 25 September 2017, the player lodged a claim before FIFA against the club, claiming outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract be paid by the club, broken down as follows:

Outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 4,260, as follows:

- EUR 4,260, corresponding to the outstanding part of the salary for the month of August 2017.

Compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of EUR 46,009.31, as follows:

- EUR 35,834.31 as residual value of the contract in the period between September 2017 and May 2018, corresponding to 9 monthly salaries of EUR 4,500 each, i.e. the total amount of EUR 40,500, minus the amount of EUR 4,665.69, the player allegedly earned under his new contract with the club of Country B, Club F;

- EUR 10,000 as bonuses related to the non-relegation clause in the offer and the letter of agreement;

- EUR 175 as costs of the flight tickets for the player himself and his girlfriend, from Country D to Country B.

In addition, the player requested 5% interest p.a. on the above-mentioned amounts. Furthermore, the player requested that sporting sanctions shall be imposed on the club, as well as that the club is obliged to pay procedural costs and his legal fees.

4. In his claim, the player explains that in the period after 5 July 2017, he started rendering his services and participated in the club‘s training sessions and in two unofficial friendly matches, as well as in the club’s training camp between 17 and 24 July 2017 in Country G, where he played in three unofficial friendly games. Moreover, the player explains that after returning to Country D on 25 July 2017, he played in four matches of the club in the Tournament H, ‘which precedes the official start of the League of Country D’.

5. In addition, the player states that on 3 August 2017, he received a part of his salary for the month of August 2017 in the amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D, according to the player, corresponding to EUR 240. In this respect, the player submitted a copy of a declaration of the club, which confirmed that it made a payment in the amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D in relation to the player’s salary for August 2017.

6. Moreover, the player argues that on 14 August 2017, he was contacted by the club, which informed him that it was no longer interested in his services and that he would not be registered for the upcoming sporting season in Country D. According to the player, the club explained him that it was ‘free to take such decision, because there was no contract between the club and the player’. Further, the player states that the club also informed him that, even if there would have been a contract, it would be entitled to terminate the contract, because the player had allegedly missed a training session.

7. As a result of the foregoing, the player explains that on 14 August 2017, he put the club in default, denying the club’s allegations that he missed a training session and requesting the execution of the contract, however to no avail.

8. What is more, the player holds that on 15 August 2017, he was allowed to take part in a training match of the club, but that after said match was played, he found out that the club official’s took the key from his car, as well as the car. Also, the player explains that he was forced to leave the apartment the club had provided him with, and that a teammate was obliged to accommodate him.

9. The player holds to have insisted on the existence of an employment contract and argues that in the period between 16 and 23 August 2017, he reported every morning for duty at the club’s premises, however was denied access every time by the club’s sporting director, Director L. In this respect, the player explains that on 21 August 2017, he went accompanied by a lawyer (Lawyer M) to the club’s premises, in order to find an amicable solution, however to no avail, as the club informed Lawyer M that it had no budget for signing the player.

10. After the aforementioned events occurred, on 21 August 2017, the player put the club in default, asking for his integration in the team and to let him participate in the next club’s training sessions, with the explicit warning that he would unilaterally terminate the contract, if the club would not accept said requests.

11. Finally, after being refused again to join the club’s training sessions, on 23 August 2017, the player unilaterally terminated the contract.

12. The player further points out that on 24 August 2017, he booked a flight for himself and his girlfriend from Country D to Country B, which tickets he had to pay himself.

13. In conclusion, the player argues that he signed a valid and binding contract with the club, which was duly executed by the parties. However, as a result of the club’s non-fulfilment of the obligations laid down in the contract, the player deems that he had a just cause to terminate it on 23 August 2017.

14. In its reply, the club pointed out that as per the registration Regulations of Country D, it can only register 5 foreign players in the highest league of Country D football system and that the player was one of the many foreign players, which came on a trial at the club during the summer of 2017.

15. What is more, the club points out that the offer was made to the player, because his agent requested it. Moreover, according to the club, the offer signed between the club and the player on 1 July 2015 is ‘not a contract, not even a pre-contract and obviously not a binding agreement’. Furthermore, the club deems that the letter of agreement signed on 5 July 2017 is not a valid contract as it is ‘very short and general, and does not hold a single obligation of the player’, but can only be considered as a pre-contract, ‘subject to the decision of the respondent (club) whether to hire the claimant (player) services and claimant’s (player’s) decision to play for the respondent (club)’. Also, the club explains that both documents did not contain all the essentialia negotii, which are necessary to establish a valid and binding contract.

16. In addition, the club explains that it informed the player that in order to enter into a valid and binding employment relationship, they would need to sign the standard employment contract of Country D, as well as a standard annex to said contract. Only if these two documents are approved by the Football association of Country D, the player and the club would have entered into a valid and binding contract.

17. In addition, the club confirmed that the player took part in the unofficial games of the club, as well as the training camp, however that he did not make a decision as to whether he wanted to sign the standard documents from the Football association of Country D. Moreover, the club argues that the four games the player played in the Tournament H are no official games, as based on the definitions laid down in the FIFA Regulations, a season is ‘the period starting with the first official match of the relevant national league championship and ending with the last official match of the relevant national league championship’. Subsequently, the club explains that based on the registration Regulations of Country D, in matches of the Tournament H, even ‘foreign players that are registered in other clubs’ can participate in teams of other clubs.

18. Also, the club explained that the player was never transferred via the Transfer Matching System (TMS) and always remained registered with his former club.

19. Finally, the club states that it decided not to sign an official contract with the player, due to ‘economic and professional constraints’ and that the amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D was only paid to the player for his living expenses. As a result of the foregoing, the club asks for the rejection of all the claims of the player.

20. In his replica, the player denies all the club’s allegations and reiterated that he deems that both the offer as well as the letter of agreement are to be considered as a valid and binding contract. In addition, the player refers to the first sentence of the letter of agreement, which holds the following wording ‘this is the agreement between Club C and the Player A’. The player argues that it follows from this wording that the parties meant to conclude a binding agreement.

21. In relation to the payment of 1,000 in the currency of Country D made on 3 August 2017, the player explains that the declaration of the club even specifically refers to salary, and thus, that said payment was made in the context of an employment relationship. Subsequently, the player argues that the offer signed on 1 July 2017 and the letter of agreement dated 5 July 2017 hold obligations for him as the club even mentions in its reply holds that the offer was made to the player ‘for playing in the club’.

22. Also, the player pointed out that an employment contract cannot be made valid upon the signing of a standard contract and/or the approval of contract by a national sports regulation body.

23. In its duplica, the club insisted on its previous arguments and asked for the rejection of all the player’s claims.

24. After being requested to do so, the player informed FIFA that on 5 September 2017, he signed a contract with the club of Country B, Club F, valid between 25 September 2017 and 20 June 2019, according to which he was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 1,300 in the currency of Country B gross or 1,013.92 in the currency of Country B net, which according to the player corresponds to EUR 518.41.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 25 September 2017. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 25 September 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that, on 1 July 2017, the player and the club signed a document referred to as “official offer”, in which the parties laid down several conditions for a future labour contract. In fact, according to the offer, the parties established, among other details, that the employment would last for the 2017/2018 season with an option for an additional season and that the player would be entitled to receive, inter alia, a monthly salary of EUR 4,500, a non-relegation bonus of EUR 10,000, as well as several other benefits, such as a car, accommodation and flight tickets.

6. What is more, on 5 July 2017, the player and the club signed a document referred to as ‘letter of agreement’, according to which the parties agreed upon the duration of the employment, i.e. 2017/2018 season and that the player would be entitled to receive a yearly salary of EUR 45,000, a non-relegation bonus of EUR 10,000, 25% of the transfer fee in case he would be transferred to a third club, as well as several other benefits, such as a car, accommodation and flight tickets.

7. In this respect, the members of the Chamber took note that the player maintained that by signing the two abovementioned documents, in fact, an employment contract was entered into between him and the club. As such, the player argued that, therefore, the club is to be held liable for its early termination, which took either place on 14 August 2017, the date on which the club informed the player that is was no longer interested in his services and that he would not be registered for the upcoming season, or on 23 August 2017, the date on which the player deems to have terminated the contract with just cause, due to the fact that the club no longer allow him to take part in the training sessions.

8. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the club asserted that no employment contract had been concluded between the parties, as it considered the offer signed on 1 July 2017 not ‘to be a contract, not even a pre-contract and obviously not a binding agreement’, and further explained that the letter of agreement signed on 5 July 2017 can only be considered as a pre-contract, and therefore not a final and binding employment contract.

9. From the outset, the members of the Chamber highlighted that - given the fundamental disagreement between the player and the club – the central issues to the present dispute are (1) whether by signing the offer on 1 July 2017 and/or signing the letter of agreement on 5 July 2017, the parties had established a valid and binding employment contract between themselves, and if so, (2) as to whether said contract had been prematurely terminated by one of the parties, with or without just cause.

10. Regarding the first issue, the Chamber noted that according to the club, as opposed to the player, no legally binding employment contract had come into effect between the player and the club, as the parties merely signed a “pre-contract” (emphasis added) the object of which was simply to set forth the provisions of a prospective employment contract, which was subject to the final decision of the club whether it wanted to hire the player’s services.

11. Consequently, the Chamber, first and foremost, focused its attention on the question as to whether a legally binding employment contract had been concluded by and between the player and the club.

12. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship, the remuneration and the signature of both parties. After a careful study of the offer dated 1 July 2017 as well as the letter of agreement dated 5 July 2018, both presented by the player, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent documents, in particular, the fact that the documents establish that the player is entitled to receive remuneration, including a monthly salary, in exchange for his services to the club as a football player during a specified period of time.

13. In addition, the Chamber deemed it important to analyse the club’s argumentation that no legally binding employment contract had come into effect between the club and the player, as the player did not sign a standard contract and a standard annex, as per the regulations of the Football association of Country D, as well as that the documentation signed on 1 July and 5 July 2017, had not been approved by the Football association of Country D.

14. In this regard, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations and considered it relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no influence. As regards the case at stake, the club acknowledged that no ITC was requested and that the player apparently always remained registered with his previous club. In this regard, the DRC pointed out that it is the responsibility of the engaging club to ensure that the player is properly registered with his new club in order to be able to provide it with his services. Since the club is supposedly interested in acquiring the rights of the player and in benefiting from his services, it is also expected from it that it acts accordingly in view of obtaining the player’s ITC and his subsequent registration. The same goes for the registration and approval of and a contract by the pertinent Football Association, as well as for the use of standard forms, which are also administrative formalities with no influence whatsoever on the validity of an employment contact containing all the essentialia negotii.

15. Furthermore, bearing in mind that according to Annexe 3 of the Regulations an ITC request depends on the new club’s application to the new association to register a professional, the club is actually in the position to prevent the occurrence of the condition precedent of receipt of an ITC by willfully choosing not to proceed with the application for an ITC request. By analogy, the same applies to the finalisation of documents or procedures related to the transfer of a player, e.g. the signature of a transfer agreement or the correct registration of a player at the relevant association. For these reasons, the members of the Chamber decided to reject the club’s arguments in this regard.

16. In addition, the Chamber wished to point out that the club’s argumentation that the player only participated in friendly games are an indication that no valid and binding contract was signed, cannot be upheld. In the Chamber’s view, said circumstances are actually a confirmation that the parties had already started executing the employment contract.

17. On account of all of the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that by having signed the offer dated 1 July 2017 and the letter of agreement dated 5 July 2017, a valid and legally binding employment contract had been entered into by and between the player and the club as from the beginning of July 2017.

18. Having established that a valid and legally binding employment contract had been in force between the player and the club, the Chamber went on to analyse as to whether such contract had been breached and, in the affirmative, which party is to be held liable for breach of contract.

19. To this end, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that the player stated that the club allegedly informed that he was dismissed on 14 August 2017, because of an alleged lack of need of his services, which circumstance is not contested by the club. The Chamber wished to point out that said reason brought allegedly forward by the club, does not clearly explain the legal or factual basis of this decision, as it only refers to an alleged lack of need of the player’s services and the fact that he would not be registered for the upcoming sporting season, only one month after the conclusion of the contract. Already at this point, the Chamber deemed it vital to outline that a legal action, such as the termination of a contract, needs to have a clear legal basis. Furthermore, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect the continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. A premature termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure.

20. In view of the above, the Chamber further observed that according to the player, the club also was of the opinion, that even if there would have been a valid and binding contract, it could still validly terminate said contract on 14 August 2017, as the player allegedly had missed a training session. Said circumstances are again not contested by the club.

21. In this respect, by referring to the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber observed that there was no evidence submitted by the club that the player indeed missed a training session. Furthermore, the cub failed to specify on which date the player had allegedly missed a training session. Further, regardless of the question whether the player indeed missed one training session, on an unspecified date, the Chamber was of the firm opinion that the club did, in any case, not have just cause to prematurely terminate the employment contract with the player, since such alleged breach could not legitimately be considered as being severe enough to justify the termination of the contract, and that there would have been more lenient measures to be taken (e.g., among others, a suspension or a fine) in order to sanction the absence of the player for only one training session.

22. For the sake of completeness of its analysis, the Chamber wished to emphasise that the alleged unsatisfactory performance of a player and/or the lack of need of the player’s services, is a purely unilateral and subjective evaluation made by the club. Said circumstances cannot, by any means, be considered as a valid reason to terminate the contract of a player – namely not to start its execution –, as they are the result of a purely subjective perception, not measurable in objective criteria.

23. Finally, the Chamber analysed the player’s argumentation that on 23 August 2017, after he tried to find a solution for the situation of not being allowed to take part in the club’s training sessions, he terminated the contract with just cause. In this respect, the Chamber deemed that from the information on file, it could be established that already yon 14 August 2017, the club informed that the player that he was no longer welcome at the club, and that said date can be considered as the actual date of termination of the contract. What is more, from all the above- mentioned facts and circumstances, the Chamber deemed that said unilateral termination of the contract by the club on 14 August 2017, was made without just cause.

24. Having established that the club terminated the contract without just cause, the Chamber established that the club is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause on 14 August 2017, and focused its attention on the consequences of such termination.

25. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the club must fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda” and it has to pay all outstanding remuneration due to the player, if any.

26. However, in this respect, the Chamber referred to the fact that from the information on file it appears that the player was entitled to receive 10 monthly salaries of EUR 4,500 during the League of Country D, and that the player acknowledged to have received, on 1 August 2017, an amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D, corresponding to EUR 240, out of the amount of EUR 4,500 due to him for the month of August 2017. In this respect, the Chamber established on the one hand that the club’s argumentation that this amount was only paid as living expenses could not be upheld, as the documentation provided by the player and issued by the club, clearly refers to a salary payment. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that on the day of termination of the contract, i.e. on 14 August 2017, the salary for the month of August 2017 had not yet fallen due. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the salary for August 2017 shall therefore be included in the possible compensation to be awarded to the player and established that, at the moment of the unilateral termination of the contract by the club, no remuneration was outstanding.

27. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is entitled to receive from the club compensation for breach of contract.

28. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the player by the club in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

29. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that first of all, it had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

30. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the club to the player had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.

31. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the player, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until the end of the 2017/2018 season, taking into account that the player was entitled to receive a yearly of EUR 45,000, to be paid in 10 instalments of EUR 4,500 each, in the period between August 2017 and May 2018. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that on 14 August 2017, the day on which the contract was terminated, although the salary for August 2017 had not yet fallen due, the player had received an amount of 1,000 in the currency of Country D, corresponding to EUR 240 out of the monthly salary of EUR 4,500. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUER 44,760 serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

32. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the player had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

33. According to the information brought forward by the player, and which is confirmed in the TMS, on 5 September 2017, the player found employment with the club of Country B, Club F. In accordance with the pertinent employment contract which has been made available by the player, valid between 25 September 2017 and until 20 June 2019, the player was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 1,013.92 in the currency of Country B or approximately EUR 518. Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the player and Club F for the period between 5 September 2017 and 31 May 2018, amounted to approximately EUR 4,665.69, as calculated by the player.

34. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the club must pay the amount of EUR 40,094.31 to the player, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.

35. Furthermore, considering the player’s claim for interest and taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the Chamber ruled that the club must pay 5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 40,094.31 as from 25 September 2017, the date the claim was lodged by the player.

36. Furthermore, as regards the player’s claim pertaining to EUR 10,000 as bonus for the non-relegation of the club, the Chamber concluded that such claim of the player is not backed by any corroborating documentary evidence, and therefore, in line with the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, it decided to reject this part of the player’s claim.

37. Finally, as regards the player’s claim pertaining to air tickets, and taking into account the player’s claim and the documentation provided by him, the Chamber wished to outline that, in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence in this respect, any amount awarded to the player would be due in USD – and not in EUR as per the player’s claim –, as the copy of the air tickets submitted by the player only mention a price in USD and not in EUR.

38. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber decided that - on the basis of the information and documentation provided by the player and referring to the relevant terms of the contract - the club can only be obliged to pay the costs of a flight ticket for the player, and not for the costs of an air ticket for his girlfriend. As a result, the Chamber concluded that the club must pay to the player the amount of USD 104.02 for an air ticket from Country D to Country B.

39. Additionally, taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the Chamber decided that the club has to pay 5% interest p.a. on the amount of USD 104.02 as from 25 September 2017, the date the claim was lodged by the player.

40. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the player are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amounts of EUR 40,094.31 and of USD 104.02, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 25 September 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned number 2. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl: CAS directives