F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2018-2019) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 24 August 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 August 2018,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member

Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member

Todd Durbin (USA), member

Stefano La Porta (Country F), member

on the claim presented by the club,

Club A, Country B

as Claimant / Counter-Respondent

against the player,

Player C, Country B & Country D

as First Respondent / Counter-Claimant

and the club,

Club E, Country D

as Second Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 7 June 2015, the Player C (hereinafter: the player or Claimant / Counter-Respondent), and the club from Country B, Club A (hereinafter: Club A or First Respondent / Counter-Claimant) signed a contract valid for ‘from (20/06/2015 until 20/06/2016) (one sports season)’ (hereinafter: the first contract).

2. According to the version of the first contract submitted by the player, he was entitled to receive inter alia the following amounts:

- ‘the value of digitally 101,000, in exchange for: an advance payment is part of the total contract value of 185,000, as follows: (31,000 in cash) + (“700,000”);

- a monthly ‘stipend’ of 7,000, due ‘every end of calendar month for a period of twelve months only’;

- 8,000 ‘to cover the expenses of the training camp in Country F, with the deduction of the total contract value of the monthly salary’;

- USD 5,000 for ‘winning the league or the cup or the transfer of advanced ranks in the Asia Cup’;

- advantages in the form of ‘housing allowance, transportation allowance, travel tickets and other features, determined by agreement of the parties)’.

3. According to the version of the first contract submitted by Club A, the player was entitled to receive inter alia the following amounts:

- a ‘third of the transfer fee’;

- a monthly salary of 18,500, due ‘every end of “calendry” month for ten months only’;

- ’10 checks X 7,000 = 70,000, 35,000 cash, 8,000 monthly’;

- a sign-on fee of 15,000;

- EUR 5,000 for ‘winning the league or the cup or for moving to high levels on the Asia Cup’;

- bonuses in the form of ‘housing allowance, transportation allowance, rewards, flight tickets and other bonuses (settled by the two parties)’.

4. Article 6 of the version of the first contract submitted by the player stipulates the following: ‘The first party [the club] shall not be entitled to stop paying the second party’s [the player] salaries or to lose or terminate the contract due to the injury of the player while playing or training or from their offense […]’.

5. Article 6 of the version of the first contract submitted by Club A stipulates the following: ‘The first party [the club] does not have the right to stop paying the salary of the second party [the player] or to reducing it or cancelling the contract because of the player’s injury during playing or training or because of playing and training […]’.

6. On an unspecified date, the player and Club A signed another contract (hereinafter: the second contract). According to the version of the second contract submitted by the player, which does not hold any signatures, said contract was valid as from 20 July 2016 until 20 May 2017. However, according to the version of the second contract submitted by Club A, which holds the signature of the player and the seal of Club A, the second contract was valid as from 8 August 2016 until 20 June 2017.

7. According to the player, based on the second contract, he was entitled to receive inter alia the following amounts:

- ‘the value of digitally 30,000, in return: 1. signing the contract only, 2. or for the full validity of the contract , 3. Part of the salaries’;

- a monthly ‘stipend’ of 15,000, due ‘every end of each calendar month’;

- a monthly ‘stipend’ of 3,000, due ‘every end of each calendar month […] and […] 250 in the case of winning […]’;

- advantages in the form of ‘housing allowance, transportation allowance, travel tickets and other features, determined by agreement of the parties)’.

8. According to the version of the second contract submitted by Club A, the player was entitled to receive inter alia the following amounts:

- a monthly salary of 13,000, due ‘every end of “calendry” month for ten months only’, thus, the total amount of 130,000;

- bonuses in the form of ‘housing allowance, transportation allowance, rewards, flight tickets and other bonuses (settled by the two parties)’.

9. Article 5 of the version of the second contract submitted by the club inter alia holds the following clauses: ‘The commitments of the second party [the player] […] 4. The second party must take in all the sport occasions and events of the first party [the club] when asked to. 5. To avoid negotiating with any other club as long as the contract is in force (except for the last 6 months of the contract and then also according to the accepted procedures). 6. To avoid playing or taking part in any sport activities other than those of the first party unless the first party gives written permission’.

10. Article 10.2 of the version of the second contract submitted by the club, stipulates: ‘The contract cannot be cancelled during the sport season’.

11. Article 12.6 of the version of the second contract submitted by the club holds the following clause: ‘The contract must include the duties of each party in case the contract was cancelled which entails paying the full amount of money to the damaged party including his material and incorporeal damages’.

12. Further, according to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 19 February 2017, the player was provisionally registered with Club E from Country D (hereinafter: Club E or Second Respondent), after the Football Federation of Country B failed to respond within 15 days to the ITC request of the Football Federation of Country D dated 1 February 2017.

13. On 7 June 2017, the player lodged a claim against Club A in front of FIFA, claiming compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 598,000 in the currency of Country D (approximately EUR 149,786), as well as ‘wage delay compensation’, legal expenses and legal fees.

14. On 10 July 2017, after being informed by Club A that it was not at that moment in the position to complete its intention to lodge a formal complaint against the player, the FIFA Administration informed the player that it did not appear to be in a position to deal with his claim. This because based on the information provided by the Football Federation of Country B, the matter appeared to lack an international dimension, as the dispute opposed a player from Country B – registered as such with the club – and a club from Country B.

15. Also on 7 June 2017, Club A informed FIFA for the first time that it intended to lodge a claim against the player and Club E. After completing the claim on 26 October 2017, Club A requested that the player be ordered to pay compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 178,000 (approximately EUR 44,585), plus 5% interest p.a. as from the day of breach of the contract by the player, specified as follows:

- the residual value of the contract in the period between January 2017 and June 2017 in the total amount of 78,000, consisting of 6 monthly salaries of 13,000 each;

- the player’s current value in the amount of EUR 25,000, according to Club A equivalent to 100,000;

- ‘the amounts the player is earning at Club E’, as the player receives a higher salary at Club E, then the salary he was earning at Club A.

16. In addition, Club A requested the DRC to hold Club E jointly and severely liable for the payment of said amount of compensation, as it induced the player to breach his contract. What is more, Club A requested to impose sporting sanctions on the player, as well as that the player has to be held responsible for the payment of procedural costs and the legal fees of Club A in the amount of CHF 15,000.

17. In its claim, Club A explains that, shortly after the signature of the first contract, the player suffered an injury. In order to support the player, Club A holds that it paid for all his medical expenses, such as physiotherapy treatments, orthopaedic specialist and athletic rehabilitation, however, that it refused to pay for a personal trainer allegedly hired privately by the player.

18. Moreover, Club A explains that although the player was not able to provide any services to its club, on 7 June 2016, the parties signed the second contract, valid until 20 June 2017.

19. However, Club A explains that ‘right upon returning from his injury and signing the new agreement’, the player left for ‘unauthorized football trials’ at Club G from Country D and on 2 August 2016, even played a friendly match for said club ‘at the Tournament X in Country D’. After Club A warned the player that such behaviour was not acceptable, according to Club A, the player assured the club that he would not breach the contract again.

20. In continuation, Club A states that the player developed himself as ‘a key player during the first round of the Premier League of Country B 2016/17 season and AFC cup’, but that after a holiday during the winter break, the player failed to return to Club A. Furthermore, Club A explains that it contacted the player by phone, however that the player reported himself sick.

21. After Club A learned that the player was ‘taking new trails on teams of Country D’, on 10 January 2017, it sent a letter to the player, requesting him to ‘report immediately at the team’s activity’.

22. Club A further holds that on 13 January 2017, the player replied to its letter, by stating that he ‘is currently on sick leave’. Further, according to Club A, the player stated that he never received a copy of the second contract, as well as that an amount of 60,000 related to the 2015/2016 season remained outstanding.

23. According to Club A, the player’s allegations are not correct, as it provided him with a copy of the second contract and paid all ‘salary and bonus payments, including his injury and surgery payments’.

24. Furthermore, Club A explains that, ‘shortly after’, it found out that the player signed a new contract with Club E. According to Club A, said circumstances are clearly in violation with article 5 of the second contract, and ‘as the player was still under a binding contract’ with Club A, they constitute a breach of contract without just cause by the player.

25. In addition, Club A points out that the player terminated the contract without just cause, as there were no outstanding payments pending, and because the player never sent a notice to its club, explaining his wishes to terminate the contract. Further, according to Club A, the fact that the player reported himself sick was ‘clearly a behaviour of no good faith’.

26. In his reply to Club A’s claim, the player first of all argued that he had already lodged a claim against Club A on 7 June 2017, however said claim was closed by the Football Federation of Country D based on the alleged registration of the player as a from Country B by the Football Federation of Country B. In this respect, the player explains that this is ‘utterly false’, as he is a player from Country D and citizen of Country D.

27. Further, the player explains that he deems that Club A’s claim should have been ‘rejected’, if Club A assumed that he was a player from Country B, as Club A is also from Country B.

28. As to the substance, the player reiterates the contents of his claim lodged on 7 June 2017 and asks for the rejection of the claim of Club A. In this respect, the player argues that Club A breached the contract without just cause, as it failed to pay him several salaries, despite the several default notices sent.

29. Regarding the first contract, the player explains that said contract was signed on 6 June 2015, and that it was valid for the 2015/2016 season. Further, the player holds that based on the first contract, he was entitled to receive 10 monthly salaries of 18,500, i.e. the total amount of 185,000, payable as follows:

- 31,000 in cash ‘upon signing of the contract’;

- 70,000, according to the player to be paid in 10 checks of 7,000 each;

- 12 monthly payments of 7,000 ‘in cash at the end of each month’.

Further, the player argues that he was entitled to the following amounts:

- a sign-on fee of 15,000 ‘in return: part of the salaries’;

- EUR 5,000 for ‘winning the league or the cup or for moving to high levels on the Asia Cup’;

- ‘advantages, if any, such as housing allowance, transportation allowance, travel tickets and any other features (determined by agreement of the parties)’; - 8,000 ‘to cover expenses of the training camp in Country F with the deduction of the total contract value of the monthly salary’.

30. In addition, the player refers to article 4.6 of the first contract, which stipulates the following: ‘Insurance that covers sickness, therapy, injuries and inability or death for the second party as long as the two parties are contracted. The insurance must include cases in which the effects extend beyond the contract term’.

31. The player explains that he rendered his services to Club A throughout the entire season 2015/2016, despite having suffered an ankle injury on 6 August 2015. According to the player, contrary to article 6 of the first contract, Club A stopped paying his salary and did not pay for his medical treatment. In addition, the player argues that Club A was supposed to cover any costs related to any injuries of its players with a valid insurance, however, that it failed to do so.

32. What is more, the player argues that during the 2015/2016 season, he only received the amount of 115,000 from Club A, and that as a result, an amount of 70,000 related to the 2015/2016 season remained outstanding. In this respect, the player submitted copies of several checks, issued to him in the period between 10 October 2015 and 10 June 2016, containing several untranslated amounts. The player explains that Club A provided said checks to him, but that he could not cash the checks at the local bank.

33. Furthermore, the player explains only on 22 September 2016, he signed the second contract, which included, according to the player upon his request, a handwritten paragraph ‘with the sums and the manner of payment, including the sum total of the team’s debt to the player’, in relation to the 2015/2016 season. In addition, the player explains that he never received a copy of the second contract and that the version of the second contract provided by Club A, as well as his signature on it, are falsified.

34. In addition, the player holds to have put Club A in default on several occasions:

- on 26 November 2016, by sending a WhatsApp-message to Mr J, ‘another manager of the team’, and requesting the payment of 74,500 related to the 2015/2016 season;

- on 13 January 2017, by sending a WhatsApp-message to Mr K, ‘another manager of the team’, requesting for the payment of his outstanding dues, however to no avail;

- on 7 and 27 January 2017, by sending an SMS to Mr L, ‘another manager of the team’, requesting to be paid his outstanding dues and to be released from the contract.

35. Furthermore, according to the player also on 13 January 2017, he replied to Club A’s letter, through which he had been informed that sanctions had been imposed on him, by putting Club A in default for the amounts of 70,000 as outstanding salaries related to the 2015/2016 season and 47,500 related to the 2016/2017 season.

36. Further, the player argues that on 22 January 2017, he again put Club A in default, requesting the payment of 70,000 related to the 2015/2016 season, and 47,500 related to the 2016/2017 season, as well as to be provided with a copy of the second contract, however to no avail.

37. After having allegedly not received the requested amounts, the player explains that he signed a contract with Club E on 25 January 2017. After the Football Federation of Country D had requested the ITC for the player from the Football Federation of Country B on 1 February 2017, said request remained, according to the player, ‘unanswered for 15 days’. As a result, the player was registered provisionally with Club E on 17 February 2017.

38. Finally, the player contests all of Club A’s allegations in its claim, especially the allegation that in August 2016, he allegedly went on trials without permission. In this respect, the player explains that he only signed the second contract on 22 September 2016 and not on 20 July 2016. Therefore, the player concludes that in the period between 20 July and 22 September 2016, he did not have a valid contract with any team.

39. In conclusion, the player points out that Club A only wanted to release him from the second contract, if he would waive all his rights to receive any amounts due to him.

40. In view of all the foregoing, on 28 November 2017, the player lodged a counterclaim against Club A, requesting the payment of the following amounts:

- 74,000 as outstanding remuneration related to the 2015-2016 season, according to the player corresponding to USD 21,142;

- USD 10,000 as bonus payment for ‘reaching the higher ranks in the Asian league’;

- USD 10,000 as bonus payment for ‘winning the tournament in Country B’;

- 300,000 (approximately USD 85,714) as compensation for the breach of article 4.6 of the first contract, as well as the breach of article 6 of the first contract;

- 47,500 as outstanding remuneration related to the 2016-2017 season, according to the player corresponding to USD 13,571;

- a ‘fee for the breach of the contract’ by Club A, amounting to 5 payments of 18,000 each, i.e. the residual value of the second contract in the period between January 2017 and May 2017 in the amount of 90,000, according to the player corresponding to USD 25,714;

- 5,000 (approximately USD 7,857) ‘for not passing the contract on to the player’, in line with article 88 of the rules of the Football Federation of Country B;

- USD 15,000 as legal fees.

41. As a result, the player in total requests USD 188,998 to be paid by Club A, as well as ‘wage delay compensation, legal fees and attorney fees plus VAT’.

42. In its reply, Club E explained that in January 2017, it was contacted by the player (who had played for Club E in the past), with the request to return to said club. In this respect, Club E explains that it was informed by the player that he was a free agent and ‘not bound to any employment contract’.

43. Based on this information, Club E holds that it concluded an employment contract with the player, valid for the period between 1 February 2017 and 31 May 2017. According to said contract, the player was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 8,245, i.e. the total amount of 32,980 (approximately EUR 8,144).

44. Furthermore, Club E holds to have requested the player to sign a document, inter alia confirming that he was indeed a free agent and that he was ‘released from Club A without any conditions’.

45. In addition, Club E points out that in the scope of the transfer of the player from Club A to Club E, it uploaded in the TMS a ‘TPO-form signed by the player and a proof of unilateral termination sent by the player to Club A’ (allegedly referring to the player’s default letter dated 22 January 2017), which documents were provided by the player to Club E.

46. What is more, Club E explains that, as Club A did not reply to the ITC-request, it tried to contact Club A. However, according to Club E, ‘due to the existing Country D-Country B relations’, Club A could only be approached via the Football Federation of Country D. Further, Club E argues that the Football Federation of Country D also could not get in contact with Club A or the Football Federation of Country B and that the ITC-request remained unanswered by the Football Federation of Country B or Club A for 15 days. As a result of all the foregoing, Club E holds that on 17 February 2017, the player was provisionally registered with its club.

47. In addition, Club E argues that it was not aware of any dispute between the player and Club A, that it always acted in good faith and that it collected all information ‘very carefully’. Further, Club E points out that it never received any notice from Club A regarding the player, although it was aware that as of January 2017 the player trained with Club E. Finally, Club E argues that it cannot be considered as jointly liable for the payment of any compensation, as it was the player who hid ’essential information’.

48. In conclusion, Club E requests for the rejection of the claim of Club A against Club E, and to fix a sum of CHF 10,000 ‘to be paid by the player an smaller portion of it’ by Club A, as payment of its legal fees and costs.

49. In reply to the counterclaim of the player, as well as the response of Club E, Club A points out that the player signed the second contract on 20 July 2016 and not only on 22 September 2016. Furthermore, Club A holds that the player could not prove his allegations that the contract was only signed on 22 September 2016. In this respect, Club A deems that the player ‘probably intended to mislead the honorable PSC in relation with the date of signature as he clearly had no explanation for his first fundamental breach of article 5.6 of to the New Agreement, playing on trial on the Tournament X for the club from Country D, Club F’.

50. Furthermore, Club A argues that the player signed the new contract without mentioning, either orally or in writing, any debts that Club A allegedly still owed to him. Further, the player could not submit evidence that any amounts related to the 2015-2016 season remained unpaid and Club A explains that the player’s remuneration for said season was duly paid. As a result of the foregoing circumstances, Club A deems that the player cannot be entitled to the allegedly outstanding amounts related to the 2015-2016 season.

51. Regarding the allegedly falsified version of the second contract, Club A explains that the player received a copy of said contract on 20 July 2016, the day when he and Club A signed it, as well as that the player ‘could easily approach the Football Federation of Country B if he believes newer version exists and receive a copy’. According to Club A, the player did not submit convincing evidence that he indeed officially contacted the Football Federation of Country B. Further, Club A insists that the player could not prove that indeed, another version of the second contract existed.

52. After having been requested to do so by the FIFA Administration, Club A provided the original of the second contract, holding the signatures of the player and Club A, as well as the seal of Club A. Furthermore, the original version of the second contract, on the first page, contains a handwritten paragraph in the language spoken in Country B.

53. In addition, Club A points out that only to the first contract, several amendments were made, and that the second contract did not contain such amendments. Furthermore, Club A argues that the document provided by the player as the second contract, does not contain its stamp or signature. What is more, Club A explains that it wonders ‘how can the player simultaneously claim that he did not obtain a copy of the second agreement (intentionally denied from him by Club A) but at the same time present and translate these documents allegedly indicating that the true version of the second contract, and rely on it as if he already possess the correct version’.

54. Regarding the circumstances of the termination of the contract, Club A explains that the player never sent any termination letter to Club A, as, in the month of January 2017, he only informed the club on several occasions that ‘he was on sick leave’. Further, as the player never informed Club A officially about a potential breach of the contractual obligations by the club, Club A argues that the player did not terminate the contract, and/or made said alleged termination in line with the Labour Law of Country B.

55. Also, Club A argues that the player’s WhatsApp message dated 13 January 2017 was only issued after Club A requested him twice to come back to its club. Further, the correspondence sent per WhatsApp on 26 November 2016 and per SMS on 7 and 17 January 2017, were, according to Club A only sent to persons within its club which were not entitled to settle financial matters.

56. Also, Club A points out that it was never contacted via the Football Federation of Country B about the transfer of the player to Club E, and that it had never agreed on such transfer.

57. In conclusion, Club A argues that the player, by negotiating with another club and participating in its trainings, as well as by not attending Club A’s medical inspection, breached article 5.5, article 5.6 and article 10.2 of the second contract and therefore, terminated said contract without just cause in January 2017. As a result of the foregoing, based on article 12.6 of the second contract, the player should be obliged to pay compensation to Club A.

58. Finally, Club A requested the rejection of the player’s counterclaim as well as to accept its initial claim against the player, ‘plus the amounts the player is earning at Club E’, however not explicitly mentioning that Club E has to be held joint and severally liable for the possible payment of compensation for breach of contract.

59. In his duplica, the player explains that he initiated the legal proceedings in the matter at hand, as he lodged a claim against Club A on 7 June 2017. Further, the player insists that the second contract was only signed on 22 September 2016, which was witnessed by his attorney, Mr T. The player explains that Club A wrote the date of 20 July 2016 on the contract, because ‘the season had already begun and they could not have written the actual date of signing’ and, according to the player, because on 22 September 2016 it was ‘not longer possible to register players in the system’.

60. Further, the player points out that in the period between July and September 2016, Club A never requested him to return to the training sessions, which confirms, according to the player, that he only signed the contract on 22 September 2016.

61. Moreover, the player argues that from the messages exchanged between him and his lawyer, it is ‘obvious’ that he was supposed to receive 70,000 as debt for the 2015/2016 season, in order to sign a new contract for the 2016/2017 season.

62. In addition, the player reiterates that he put Club A in default on several occasions, as well as that the signature on the second contract is clearly different then the signature he put on the first contract.

63. In addition, the player submitted an overview of several checks he allegedly received from Club A and which he was not able to cash, thereby, contesting Club A’s allegations that it paid every amount the player was entitled to for the 2015/2016 season. Also, the player argues that he contacted the Football Federation of Country B on several occasions, but that he was informed on every occasion that they could not provide him with the second contract.

64. Regarding his alleged absence in the months of December 2016 and January 2017, the player explains that in December 2016, he did not train with Club E as he was on sick leave, and that he was only registered with Club E after the confirmation in the TMS. What is more, the player explains that Club A only started sending him notifications after it found out that ‘the player was going to sue the team’.

65. Furthermore, the player argues that when he contacted Mr K, an alleged representative of Club A on 13 January 2017, he was offered a mutual agreement, in order to settle the discussion between the parties, but that he did not agree with waiving certain monies.

66. Finally, the player requests to reject Club A’s claims and to accept all his previous claims.

67. In its duplica, Club E explains that the player participated in its training sessions as from the beginning of January 2017 and that he declared that ‘he had already settled any previous debt and mutually terminated every previous agreement with Club A’. Further, Club E explains that therefore, the player could sign at its club, should he successfully pass the ‘January training trails’.

68. Further, Club E argues that the player explicitly signed the declaration dated 1 February 2017, by means of which he confirmed that he was released from Club A without further conditions. However, Club E deems that the player ‘brutally deceived [Club E] in relation with his contractual status with Club A’, but also Club A, by reporting that he was on sick leave while actually training with Club E.

69. In addition, Club E explains that Club A’s argument that its approval of the transfer of the player to Club E had allegedly never been requested via the Football Federation of Country B cannot be upheld. In this respect, Club E points out that Club A had an own responsibility in checking the TMS, and only because Club A did not reply to Club E’s transfers instructions, on 17 February 2017, the player was provisionally registered with Club E.

70. According to Club E, Club A’s aforementioned behavior was intentional, ‘as it actively knew in real time that the player is misleading [Club E]’. Further, Club E argues that Club A acted ‘negligent’, as it did not reply to the transfer instructions in the TMS and it never replied to Club E by other means of communication. Finally, Club E argues that it always acted in good faith and was not aware of any problems the player was having with Club A.

71. In conclusion, Club E argues that Club A apparently no longer has any claims towards it and that only the player shall be held responsible for the consequences of his actions, as Club E always acted in good faith. What is more, Club E requests that the player shall pay CHF 10,000 as payment of the legal fees of Club E.

72. After being requested to do so, the player informed FIFA that on 25 January 2017, he signed a contract with Club E, valid between 15 February 2017 and 31 May 2017. According to said contract, the player was entitled to 4 monthly salaries of 8,245, i.e. to the total amount of 32,980 (approximately EUR 8,144).

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the claim of Club A was submitted to FIFA on 7 June 2017 and that the counterclaim of the player was submitted to FIFA on 28 November 2017. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is in principle competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns a dispute between a club from Country B and a player from Country B, also holding an passport from Country D, with the involvement of a club from Country D, in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability, where there has been an ITC request.

3. However, the Chamber noted that the player is of the opinion that the Dispute Resolution Chamber has no competence to deal with the claim at stake, as he is from Country B and the club is also based in Country B. As a consequence, according to the player, there is no international dimension in the matter at hand.

4. In view of the player’s objection to the admissibility of Club A’s claim, the Chamber carefully analysed the information on file, and noted that first of all, the player appears to be both from Country B and Country D. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to the fact that the matter at hand concerns a dispute between a player from Country B and Country D and a club from Country B, with the involvement of a club from Country D, in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability, and where the club from Country D had requested the player’s ITC from the club from Country B. Under these circumstances, the members of the Chamber established that the international dimension of the dispute is given.

5. As a result of the foregoing circumstances, all the player’s objections towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected, and the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

6. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), and considering that the claim of Club A was lodged on 7 August 2017, as well as that the player’s counterclaim was lodged on 28 November 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

7. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

8. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the parties disagree about the document at the basis of their contractual relationship, as both provided different versions of the contracts they apparently concluded with each other, holding different start and end dates, as well as different financial conditions.

9. On the one hand, the player was of the opinion that on 6 June 2015, he signed a contract with Club A, valid for the 2015/2016 season, as well as that on 22 September 2016, he renewed his contractual relationship with Club A, by signing a new contract valid for the period between 20 July 2016 and 20 May 2017. Club A, on the other hand, stated that the first contract between the parties was signed on 7 June 2015, and that this contract was valid for a period of one year. In relation to the second contract, Club A argued that said contract was already signed on 20 July 2016, and was valid for the period between 8 August 2016 and 20 June 2017.

10. The members of the Chamber further noted that Club A submitted a copy of both the first and second contract, both containing the signatures of the player and Club A. Moreover, Club A also submitted the original version of the second contract. The player, on the other hand, only submitted copies of the aforementioned contracts which did not contain any signatures of the parties, and furthermore contested the validity of his alleged signature on the second contract, insisting that said signature was falsified.

11. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned contracts, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures of the player in the various documents provided in the present affair and the fact that the original version of the second contract was provided by Club A, the members of the Chamber noted that the signature on the uncontested documents, such as the first contract and the checks the player had received from Club A, whilst not looking exactly the same, contained a constant certain similarity. As a result, the Chamber had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, the signatures on the documents provided by the player and the original of the second contract provided by Club A all appear to belong to the same person.

12. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the player and Club A had validly concluded two contracts, the first one being valid in the period between 20 June 2015 and 20 June 2016, entitling the player to a monthly salary of 18,500 and the second one being valid between 8 August 2016 and 20 June 2017, based on which the player was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 13,000.

13. Entering into the substance of the matter at hand, the Chamber noted that the player apparently rendered his services to Club A in the period between June 2015 and the beginning of January 2017. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that it remained undisputed that as from the beginning of January 2017, the player – after the winter break - did not return to Club A anymore. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the player, on 25 January 2017, signed a new contract with Club E, alleging that he was entitled to do so, because Club A had failed to pay him several salaries, despite having been put in default and provided the chance to remedy its alleged fault.

14. Club A, for its part, submitted that the player, by a signing a new contract with Club E and by not showing up for training sessions as from the beginning of January 2017, unilaterally terminated his contract with Club A without just cause. Club A further explains that it had requested the player several times, the first time on 10 January 2017, to resume work with Club A, however to no avail. Based on these circumstances, Club A deems that the player is obliged to pay to the club compensation for breach of contract.

15. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, in particular, the opposite position of the parties, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, was to first determine on which date and by which party the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated, and whether said termination was made with or without just cause. Subsequently, the Chamber shall determine the consequences of said early termination of the contractual relationship for the party held responsible for it.

16. In this respect, the Chamber wished to emphasize that from the information on file, it appeared that, as from the beginning of the contractual relationship, the parties appear to have had discussions about the timely payment of salaries, eventually leading to the non-return of the player to Club A as from the beginning of January 2017. According to the player, at that moment in time, a substantial amount of salaries related to the 2015/2016 season, as well as an amount corresponding to three monthly salaries related to the 2016/2017 season remained outstanding.

17. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that, as from the beginning of January 2017, Club A started requesting the player to come back to its club. However already before that, on 26 November 2016, Club A had been put in default by the player for the alleged existence of outstanding remuneration, which is acknowledged by the club (cf. point I.55 above). In fact, in reply to Club A’s request for him to return to the club, the player inter alia renewed his default notice on 13 and 22 January 2017.

18. What is more, the Chamber noted that Club A – although explaining that it had paid all the salaries related to the 2015/2016 season to the player - did not contest that the amount claimed by the player for the 2016/2017 season, amounting to at least three monthly salaries remained unpaid, despite the several default notices sent by the player. As a result of that, on 25 January 2017, the player holds to have had no other choice than to resume his career elsewhere and to sign a new contract with another club, in case with Club E.

19. In view of the fact that no written, formal termination document was served by any of the parties, the Chamber deemed that it would have to establish the circumstances of the contractual termination – namely by whom and when the contract was terminated – by analyzing the information and documentation on file. In this respect, with regards to the circumstances occurred on 25 January 2017, the Chamber first of all wished to establish that, at the latest, at the moment when the player signed a new contract with Club E, he clearly expressed his intention to no longer render his services to Club A. As such, the Chamber deemed that the player, by signing a new contract with Club E, unilaterally terminated his contract with Club A on 25 January 2017.

20. Turning its attention to the question as to whether the contract was terminated by the player with or without just cause, the Chamber recalled that according to the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, Club A was obliged to fulfil its contractual obligations towards the player, who apparently was a key player to its club, in particular the main obligation of timely paying him the contractually agreed monthly salaries.

21. When analysing the respective arguments, the Chamber first of all turned its attention to the fact that, after Club A and the player were already bound by a contract, valid for the 2015/2016 season, they renewed said contract for another season, namely the season 2016/2017. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that Club A in this respect explained that it wanted to continue working with the player, since he was apparently a key player to its team.

22. Subsequently, the Chamber focused on the alleged outstanding amounts claimed by the player and noted that he states that, during the course of both contracts, several monthly salaries had apparently remained unpaid by the club. As a result thereof, and because of an alleged sickness, the player did not return to Club A after the winter break. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the player claims that Club A, even after receiving his default notices of 13 and 22 January 2017, instead of solving the issue regarding the outstanding remuneration or getting in contact with him to discuss the situation, rather insisted on the fact that the player had to come back to the club immediately.

23. In this respect, the members of the Chamber noted that it remained uncontested by Club A that it had not paid the salaries for months of October, November and December 2016 to the player. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber first concluded that Club A was in fact in breach of its contractual obligations towards the player, regarding in particular the payment of his remuneration as per the second contract, for a considerable period of time and in a considerable amount.

24. In view of the above, the Chamber concluded that, taking into account the documentation and argumentation presented by the parties to the dispute, it remained uncontested that in the 2016/2017 season at least the three monthly for the months of October, November and December 2016 remained outstanding on 25 January 2017, the date the player signed a new contract with Club E and therefore unilaterally terminated his contract with Club A. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that Club A had failed to comply with one of its most basic obligations, namely paying the player’s remuneration and, as such, it had seriously neglected its financial contractual obligations towards one of its allegedly key players.

25. On account of the above and taking into consideration the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence in this respect, the Chamber came to the conclusion that on 25 January 2017, the player had a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract and that Club A is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract with just cause by the player.

26. Having established that Club A is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided to reject Club A’s claim and established that the player is entitled to receive from Club A an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract, in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract.

27. Along those lines, the Chamber firstly referred to the player’s request regarding the outstanding remuneration at the time of the unilateral termination of the contract. In this respect, the members of the Chamber concurred that Club A must fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”.

28. In this respect, the Chamber deemed it essential to first address the player’s allegation that his salaries related to the 2015/2016 season, in the total amount of 74,000, had remained outstanding and that he had only received some checks from Club A, which he apparently could not cash at a bank. However, the alleged payment arrears in relation to the 2015/2016 season are explicitly contested by Club A, which argued that it paid all the salaries related to said season to the player.

29. In this respect, the members of the Chamber reiterated the contents of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and the basis legal principle of burden of proof, and noted that the player did not submit any corroborating documentary evidence, proving that even though he was in possession of several checks issued by the club, these checks could not be cashed by him. As a result, and in view of the lack of any other documentary evidence, the Chamber had no other option than to conclude that all amounts related to the 2015/2016 season were duly paid by Club A.

30. In relation to the alleged outstanding remuneration for the 2016/2017 season, the members of the Chamber established that Club A did not contest that it failed to pay at least three monthly salaries related to the period between October and December 2016. In this respect, the player explained that the total amount of the three outstanding salaries for the 2016/2017 season amounted to 47,500.

31. Despite taking into account that the player’s allegations remained uncontested by Club A, the Chamber deemed it necessary to take into account that according to the version of the second contract submitted by Club A, which is considered to be the valid and binding version of said contract, the player was only entitled to a monthly salary of 13,000, as a result of which the total of three monthly salaries amounted to 39,000.

32. Consequently, the Chamber established that three monthly salaries, connected to the period between October and December 2016 remained outstanding and decided that Club A is liable to pay to the player the amount of 39,000.

33. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber concluded that the player’s claim for bonuses in the total amount of USD 20,000, an additional fee for the breach of contract by Club A as well as a compensation for not ‘passing the contract on to the player’ had to be rejected, due to the lack of a contractual, legal and/or regulatory basis.

34. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract due to the player by the club in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

35. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

36. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.

37. Bearing in mind the foregoing, as well as the claim of the player, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the second contract until 20 June 2017. Consequently, and taking into account that the player was entitled to ten monthly salaries in the amount of 13,000 for the entire 2016/2017 season, the Chamber concluded that the amount of 52,000 (i.e. the payments due to the player in the period between January 2017 and May 2017) serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

38. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the player had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

39. In this context, the Chamber reiterated the fact that on 25 January 2017, the player singed an employment contract with Club E. In accordance with the pertinent employment contract which has been made available by the player, valid until 31 May 2017, the player was entitled to receive a total amount of 32,980, consisting of 4 monthly salaries in the amount of 8,245.

40. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that Club A must pay the amount of 19,020 to the player, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter.

41. Moreover, the DRC decided to reject the player’s and Club E’s claim pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard, and also decided to reject any further counterclaims lodged by the player, due to a lack of legal or regulatory basis.

42. The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by concluding that the claim lodged by Club A was admissible, but rejected, as it has been established that the player had just cause to terminate the employment contract, and by partially accepting the counterclaim of the player.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Club A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected.

3. The counter-claim of the First Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Player C, is admissible.

4. The counter-claim of the First Respondent / Counter-Claimant is partially accepted.

5. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent has to pay to the First Respondent / Counter-Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of 39,000.

6. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent has to pay to the First Respondent / Counter-Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 19,020.

7. In the event that the amounts due to First Respondent / Counter-Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 5. and 6. are not paid by Claimant / Counter-Respondent within the stated time limits, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limits and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

8. Any further claim lodged by the First Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected.The First Respondent / Counter-Claimant is directed to inform the Claimant / Counter-Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 5. and 6. are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl.: CAS directives