F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2018-2019) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 14 June 2019

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 14 June 2019,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Tomislav Kasalo (Croatia), member

Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the matter between the player,

Player A, Country B,

and the club,

Club C, Country D,

and the club,

Club E, Country B

as Intervening Party

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 7 July 2017, the Country B player, player A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent or the player) and the club of country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant or the club) concluded an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2018 (hereinafter: the contract).

2. According to art. 2, par. 1 of the contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of 12,500, payable on the 15th day of each month.

3. Art. 2 par. 1 of the contract stipulates that the player was also entitled to an additional monthly remuneration of 1,000 “equivalent to washing and using your own clothing and working footwear for the entire duration of the contract, payable to the 15th day of the following month […] paid in the form of reimbursement […] and only being a member of the team and the senior team”.

4. In addition, according to art. 2 par. 3 of the contract, the player was entitled to a “bonus for the 100% attendance on the training, sparring, friendly games, official matches paid up to the 15th of next month in the amount of 2,000”.

5. Art. 1 par. 3 of the contract stipulates that “under this contract player agrees to represent the club to participate in activities of training, meetings, briefings and camps which will be assigned by decision of the club and to represent the club as a professional player in the competition of football (in particular in the national league games, cup or international games) and in friendly matches (including friendly or control matches) in which the club participates”.

6. Furthermore, art. 4 par. 1 of the contract provides that “the club promises to create the best conditions enabling the player to fulfill his duties stated in the contract and to carry on the sport goals specified by the authorities of the club, especially: a) ensuring conditions for optimal development of their level of sports and thus offset the player of training with the first team for reasons other than breach of contract is possible only provided to the player trainings with the second team and when the reserve team is not, player must be able to practice with a team of U-19”.

7. Art. 6 par. 2 of the contract stipulates that “any case which has not been mentioned in the contract will be regulated by civil law regulations and Football Association of Country D and FIFA regulations”.

8. According to art. 6, par. 4, “Any material disagreement will be submitted to amicable Football court of Country D (Football Mediation Court) in Football Association of Country D”.

9. On 31 August 2017, the club sent the player a proposal for the termination of the contract, according to which the contract would terminate on the same day and the club would pay the player the amount of 31,000, in two instalments of 15,500 each, on 15 September and 15 October respectively.

10. On the same date, the club informed the player that the latter was “exempted from trainings on 31.08.2017 in relation to ongoing negotiations for termination of the contract”.

11. Always on 31 August 2017, the player replied to the club stressing that he was “in shock” for the club’s decision to terminate the contract. In particular, the player pointed out that the club provided him with a draft of termination agreement only in country D, language which he did not understand and, what is more, on the last day of the transfer window. Moreover, the player considered the club’s proposal as “totally unacceptable” and counter-offered the following terms for the termination of the contract: payment of 62,000 in 4 monthly consecutive instalments of 15,500 each starting on 15 October 2017.

12. The club replied to the player on the same day, informing that if he does not “accept the rules of training and functioning in the team […] we ask that [the player] undertake training in the second team”.

13. Again on 31 August 2017, the player wrote to the club that he “accept the rules of training and functioning in the team” and pointed out that, according to the contract, he had “to train only with first squad”. Furthermore, the player stressed that he was waiting for an answer to his counter-proposal for the termination of the contract.

14. On the same date, the club replied that the player’s counter-offer was “unacceptable” and insisted on the termination of the contract at the conditions set in the first club’s offer (i.e.: the payment of 15,500 on 15 September and on 15 October 2017). At the same time, the club instructed the player to take part in the club second team’s trainings scheduled at 1 September 2017, in preparation for a match to be played on 3 September 2017.

15. On 4 September 2017, the player sent a letter to the club, whereby he pointed out that he complied with the latter’s instructions and took part in the trainings and match with the club’s second team. Nevertheless, the player stressed that said second team was a youth team, playing at amateur level. As such, the player requested to be immediately reintegrated in the club’s first team.

16. On 7 September 2017, the club rejected the player’s request and considered that the same was “groundless” as, according to the contract, he was not supposed to render his services exclusively for the first team of the club. Moreover, the club added that the player’s presence in the first team depended on his “sports condition and […] motivation”.

17. On 8 September 2017, the player replied to the club, insisting on his previous request and asking again to be immediately reintegrated with the first team.

18. On 11 September 2017, the player sent a further letter to the club, whereby he stated that the second team of the club was composed of amateur players of “about 10/12 years old” and that he was not provided with “normal training conditions” as the trainings with said second team were conducted “without medical person or physiotherapist”. Moreover, the player emphasised that, on 10 September 2017, he played another match with the second team “in a school yard” and argued that his relegation with said team was a disciplinary sanction because he did not accept to terminate the contract by mutual consent. Finally, the player held that the club was breaching the contract as it was preventing him to play at a professional level and requested to be immediately reintegrated with the first team.

19. On 14 September 2017, the player wrote again to the club, reiterating his request of immediate reintegration with the club’s first team.

20. On 18 September 2017, the club informed the player that his performance “deviates from the standard and requirements specified in the contract as well as the rules of the first team” and “lowered the first-team level”. Moreover, the club re-affirmed that the player had to render his services to the club, rather than the first team. Finally, the club denied that the second team was of amateur level, as the “minimum age of competitors is 16 years”. In conclusion, the club confirmed that its position did “not change”.

21. On 19 September 2017, the player sent the club a “final notice before terminating the contract”, rejecting all the club’s previous arguments and insisting on his reintegration with the first team, by no later than “21 September 2017 (ultimate deadline)”.

22. On 22 September 2017, the player terminated the contract with immediate effect, affirming that the club did not reintegrated him with the first team and breached the contract.

23. On 26 October 2017, the player lodged a claim for breach of contract and requested the following:

a) 16,461.66 plus 5% interest, for outstanding remuneration, in particular:

- 5,095 as remainder for August 2017, plus interest as from 16 August 2017;

- 11,366.66 for September 2017 until the date of termination, plus interest as from 16 September 2017;

b) 143,116.62, “or the equivalent in EUR 33,724.47”, as compensation for breach of contract, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 September 2017;

c) Sporting sanctions on the club.

24. In his claim, the player maintained that he terminated the contract with just cause as the club breached the contract, in particular art. 4 par. 1 (cf. point I.6 above), by suspending him as a professional player of the club’s first team and relocating him with the second team as from 31 August 2017.

25. Moreover, the player stressed that, only on the last day of the relevant transfer window, the club informed him about its intention to terminate the contract and forced him to train with the second team as disciplinary sanction as he did not accept the club’s conditions for the termination.

26. Furthermore, the player averred that the club’s second team was composed of amateur players of around 10/12 years old and such circumstance constituted a violation of his right to render his services at professional level and of its rights of the personality.

27. In continuation, the player maintained that, since the starting date of the contract, he received only 22,905 instead of 39,666.66 until the date of termination. In particular, the player considered that his monthly remuneration amounted to 15,500 and concluded that the outstanding remuneration he was entitled to amounted to 16,461.66.

28. Finally, the player averred that, based on an alleged monthly remuneration of 15,500, he was entitled to compensation for breach of contract equivalent to the remaining value of the contract, namely 143,116.62.

29. In its reply to the claim, the club preliminarily argued that FIFA has no jurisdiction to deal with the present dispute as the “Football Mediation Court” of the Country D Football Association [Football Association of Country D] is exclusively competent pursuant to art. 6 par. 4 of the employment contract at the basis of the dispute.

30. According to art. 45 of the Statutes of the Football Association of Country D, submitted by the club, “the judicial bodies of Football Association of Country D shall be:

1) Disciplinary Committee,

2) Association Football Appeal Committee,

3) Club Licensing Committees,

4) Club Licensing Appeal Committee,

5) Sports Dispute Resolution Chamber,

6) Football Association of Country D Football Court”.

31. As to merits of the claim, according to the club, the contract provided the player’s obligation to render his services to the club, being reserved to the latter the decision whether to field him with the first or the second team. In this context, the club stressed that all the players of the club’s first team were also registered as players of the second team before the Football Association of Country D and, thus, could render their services to both teams.

32. Moreover, the Respondent acknowledged that the Claimant played three matches with the club’s second team (namely on 3, 10 and 17 September 2017), but emphasised that also other players from the first team played said matches with him.

33. Furthermore, as to the alleged lack of professionalism of the second team, the club rejected the player’s allegations and affirmed that also said team was conducted as a “professional training team”, receiving the same medical assistance of the first team and taking part in official matches. In addition, the club pointed out that the minimum age of the players of the second team was 16.

34. The club also stated that its decision to move the player to the second team was based on his poor performance, in particular the fact that he had “been three times disciplined by the team of trainers, due to weak performance” in three matches played with the first team (namely on 5, 9 and 13 August 2017) and presented “the form below average team score”. In particular, the club emphasised that, after each of the aforementioned matches, the club’s coaching staff had allegedly warned the player about his poor performance in the matches and trainings, as he “did not actively participate in training sessions at the level of a professional player”. In this respect, the club submitted internal match reports, containing the relevant statistics and comments from the alleged club’s coaching staff on the player’s performance and declaring that the player had been warned.

35. In this context, the club alleged that, on 24 August 2017 (after a further match played on 18 August 2017), the coaching staff had a meeting where it decided to move the player to second team as of 1 September 2017, due to his alleged “lack of any improvement in commitment to trainings and very weak attitude in a league matches”.

36. As to the proposed termination agreement, the club maintained that it offered the player to terminate the contract as the latter “expressed dissatisfaction” with the club’s decision to transfer him to the second team as of 1 September 2017. Moreover, the club alleged it was first the player to propose the club to terminate the contract, as he was aware that “the player form didn’t allow to play with first team”.

37. As to the outstanding remuneration, the club affirmed that, during the month of November 2017, it paid the player the amount of 16,843 and, thus, considered that no remuneration was still outstanding.

38. Moreover, the club argued that the player terminated the contract without just cause as he had been moved to the second team after several warnings and he was however given the opportunity to play at a professional level with the second team in order to gain the necessary physical condition for playing with the first team.

39. Finally, the club lodged a counter-claim against the player and requested the following:

a) 50,000 as compensation for breach of contract in reason of the termination of the contract by the player without just cause;

b) 1,760 corresponding to the value of sports equipment which the player allegedly did not return to the Respondent;

c) Sporting sanctions on the player.

40. In his replica, the player preliminarily rejected the club’s argumentations about the competence of the Football Mediation Court and insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate the matter. In particular, the player argued that art. 6 par. 4 is not an arbitration clause and, what is more, it refers to mediation. Furthermore, the player stressed that the Football Mediation Court does not appear to comply with the procedural minimum requirements provided by FIFA for arbitration tribunals established at a national level.

41. As to the merits of the club’s answer to the claim, and in reply to its counter-claim, the player affirmed that the club never complained about his performance, nor imposed any disciplinary warnings or sanctions on him.

42. The player also argued that, due to the club’s decision to terminate the contract and move him to the second team, he lost confidence that the club “would resume performing its obligations towards him”. In particular, the player stressed that the club moved him to the second team for a period of 23 days, during the pre-season training period (namely since 31 August 2017 until 22 September 2017), and never showed any intention to reintegrate him with the first team.

43. Moreover, the player stressed that his relocation to the second team was illegal as the latter was not of professional level and argued that the club was not interested in his services.

44. Furthermore, the player acknowledged receipt of payment of the claimed outstanding remuneration during the month of November 2017 and, consequently, amended his final request as follows:

a) 143,116.62, “or the equivalent in EUR 33,724.47”, as compensation for breach of contract, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 September 2017;

b) to dismiss the counterclaim as unproven and groundless;

c) Sporting sanctions on the club.

45. Finally, the player informed that, on 9 February 2018, he signed an employment contract with the Country B club, Club E, valid as from the date of signature until 10 June 2020. According to said contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of 1,300.

46. In its final submissions, the club reiterated its previous requests and arguments and pointed out that, pursuant to art. 4 par. 1 of the contract, the player was aware about the possibility that he could be requested to train and play with the second team of the club.

47. Despite having been invited to do so by the FIFA Administration, the club E did not provide any comments on the present dispute.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 October 2017. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2019), the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country B player and a country D club, with the intervention of a country B club.

3. In this context, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that, contrary to the information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 3 May 2019, by means of which the parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member Roy Vermeer refrained from participating in the deliberations of the case at hand due to certain personal circumstances and, in order to comply with the prerequisite of equal representation of the club’s and player’s representatives, also the member Pavel Pivovarov refrained from participating. Thus, the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations.

4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 6 par. 4 of the contract, alleging that any dispute deriving from the relevant employment contract is of the jurisdiction of the Football Mediation Court of the Football Association of Country D.

5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by the player against the club.

6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2019 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008, and in particular to art. 3 of said Standard Regulations, which sets guidelines for the composition of an NDRC.

7. In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant organ derives from a clear reference in the relevant employment contract(s).

8. In this context, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 6 par. 4 of the contract, which stipulates that “Any material disagreement will be submitted to amicable Football Court of Country D (Football Mediation Court) in Football Association of Country D”. After having noted that the aforementioned clause specifically refers to the “Football Mediation Court”, the DRC carefully examined the documentation submitted by the club in respect to the alleged competence of the “Football Mediation Court”. In this respect, the members of the Chamber unanimously came to the conclusion that the “Football Mediation Court” not only does not appear among the judicial bodies as per art. 45 of the Statutes of the Football Association of Country D, but even more the club did not provide any convincing evidence that said body constitutes an independent arbitration tribunal.

9. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

10. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition June 2019), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 26 October 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

11. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

12. First, the Chamber noted that the player and the club entered into an employment contract valid as of 7 January 2017 until 30 June 2018, which entitled the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, inter alia, to a monthly salary of 12,500.

13. In continuation, the DRC deemed essential to emphasise that the following factual circumstances remained undisputed by the parties:

a) on 31 August 2017, the club sent the player a proposal for the termination of the contract. Such proposal was rejected by the player, who made a counter-offer to the club on the same date;

b) as of 1 September 2017, upon the club’s instructions, the player trained and played with the club’s second team;

c) on 19 September 2017, the player sent a final notice to the club, requesting to be reintegrated with the first team;

d) on 22 September 2017, the player terminated the contract due to the alleged club’s refusal to reintegrate him with the club’s first team.

14. After having taken note of the above, the DRC also took note of the position of the parties in the present matter. In this respect, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that he terminated the contract with just cause and requested compensation for breach of contract from the club. In particular, the player held the the club breached the contract by requesting him to train and play with the club’s second team which, in the player’s opinion, was of amateur level.

15. Equally, the Chamber took note of the reply of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, which argued that the contract left to the club to decide whether to field the player with the first or the second team. Moreover, the club maintained that its second team was of professional level.

16. Furthermore, the club argued that the player terminated the contract without just cause and requested compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 50,000, as well as 1,760 corresponding to the value of sport equipment allegedly not returned to the club by the player.

17. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the player and the counter-claim of the club, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, as well as to decide on the consequences thereof.

18. In this respect, in view of the dissenting positions of the parties on this point, the DRC deemed first necessary to ascertain whether the contract at the basis of the dispute provided the club’s obligation to employ the player with its first team only. In doing so, the members of the DRC first turned their attention to the relevant clause of the contract, namely art. 4 par. 1, according to which to “offset the player of training with the first team for reasons other than breach of contract is possible only provided to the player trainings with the second team and when the reserve team is not, player must be able to practice with a team of U-19”.

19. In view of the content of the aforementioned clause, the DRC considered that the contract provided the possibility for the club to employ the player with its second team. The members of the DRC were comfortably satisfied with this conclusion by also taking into account the content of art. 1 par. 3 of the contract, which indeed provided that the player shall “represent the club as a professional player in the competition of football […] and in friendly matches […] in which the club participates”, without making any distinction between the first or the second team.

20. On account of the above, the members unanimously concurred that the contract at the basis of the dispute did not provide the club’s obligation to field the player with the first team of the club only. In continuation, bearing in mind that, pursuant to the aforementioned contractual provision, the player’s obligation consisted in representing the club “as a professional player”, the Chamber went to analyse whether, as alleged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the club’s second team was amateur and, thus, whether the player rendered his services at an amateur level.

21. In this context, the DRC wished to point out that, pursuant to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. As a consequence of said principle, the members of the Chamber concluded that it was up to the Claimant / Counter- Respondent to demonstrate that he rendered his services to the second team of the player at an amateur level.

22. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber were of the unanimous opinion that the player did not substantiate his allegations in this respect, as he did not provide convincing evidence about the alleged amateur level of the club’s second team. In other words, the DRC was of the opinion that the evidence presented by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was not sufficient in order to prove that the second team of the club was amateur and, thus, that the player rendered his services to the club at an amateur level.

23. On account of the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Chamber concluded that, contrary to the player’s argumentations, the club was entitled to request the player to render his services to its second team. In particular, the DRC considered that the fact that the club requested the player to train with the second team is not enough reason, per se, to justify the unilateral termination of the contract. Moreover, the DRC was comforted with such conclusion by the fact that, pursuant to the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber, even when the contract expressly establishes that the player is a professional, the club can still decide to make him train with the reserve team, if necessary for his preparation.

24. In continuation, the members of the DRC were eager to emphasise that, even in the event that the club breached the contract by instructing the player to render his services to the second team, quod non, only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other words, a contract may be terminated prematurely only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit one to expect the continuation of the employment relationship.

Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employee to ensure the employer’s fulfilment of his contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only be an ultima ratio.

25. In this respect, the Chamber wished to emphasise that the player, since the moment the club allegedly asked him to train with the second team, i.e. on 31 August 2017, waited only 23 days before terminating the contract, namely on 22 September 2017. What is more, the DRC stressed that, during the same period, the parties indeed negotiated the terms of a possible settlement agreement, however to no avail.

26. On account, of all the above-mentioned considerations, and taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence in this respect, the members of the Chamber concluded that the player did not have a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract on 22 September 2017. In particular, the DRC concluded that the club’s conduct did not constitute a breach of contract and that the player’s termination was not an ultima ratio.

27. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that, as the player terminated the employment contract without just cause, he is to be held liable for such contractual termination.

28. In light of the foregoing, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant.

29. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period.

30. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the player and the club contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the said employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

31. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

32. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the financial terms of the player’s former contract and the new contract, the value of which constitutes an essential criterion in the calculation of the amount of compensation in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club.

33. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the total value of the contract signed by the player with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, for the remaining contractual period, amounted to 112,500. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that the value of the new contract concluded by the player with his new club, i.e. the intervening party, for the same period, was 11,700, approximately equivalent to 25,700.

34. Subsequently, the members of the DRC took note that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant limited its request of compensation for breach of contract to the amount of 50,000.

35. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations and in view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent shall pay to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of 50,000, which is to be considered a reasonable and justified amount in the case at hand.

36. In addition, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the player’s new club, i.e. the intervening party, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned amount of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the intervening party is independent from the question as to whether the new club has committed an inducement to contractual breach or any other kind of involvement by the new club. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber that was repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

37. Furthermore, as to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s request of 1,760 for allegedly not returned sport equipment, the members of the Chamber considered that said request has no contractual basis and it is not substantiated with convincing evidence. Therefore, the DRC decided to reject such part of the club’s counter-claim.

38. Finally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent / Counter -Claimant are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Player A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected.

3. The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, is partially accepted.

4. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent has to pay to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 50,000.

5. The Intervening Party, Club E, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation for breach of contract.

6. Any further counterclaim lodged by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected.

7. In the event that the aforementioned amount is not paid within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

8. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant is directed to inform the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Intervening Party, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer

Encl.: CAS directives