F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 26 March 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 March 2020,

in the following composition:

Clifford Hendel (France & USA), Vice Chairman

Michele Colucci (Italy), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

on the claim presented by the club,

Aris Limassol, Cyprus

represented by Mr Antonis Paploizou

as Claimant

against the player,

Mathew Boniface, Nigeria

represented by Mr Johnny Precious

as Respondent 1

the club,

KF Skenderbeu, Abania

represented by Mr Lorin Burba

as Respondent 2

the club,

KF Trepca 89, Kosovo

as Respondent 3

and the club,

FK Partizani, Albania

as Respondent 4

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 25 August 2015, the Nigerian player, Mathew Boniface (hereinafter: the player) and the Cyprus club, Aris Limassol (hereinafter: the Claimant or Limassol) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract 1) valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2016.

2. On 12 April 2016, the player and Limassol signed a second employment contract (hereinafter: the contract 2) valid as from 1 June 2016 until 31 May 2017 as well as a supplementary agreement.

3. In accordance with the contract 2, the player was entitled to a monthly remuneration of EUR 800 net, “all taxes payable to the Tax Department, as per the applicable legislation, shall be paid by the club”.

4. In accordance with the supplementary agreement, the player was entitled to “the total net amount of EUR 22,000” for the season 2016/2017 payable in 10 instalments of EUR 2,200 with the first instalment as of 31 August 2016.

5. On 14 April 2016, the player and Limassol signed a second supplementary agreement in accordance with which “the parties hereby agree that in case that the player receives an offer for EUR 100,00 net then the club is obligate to release the player”.

6. Limassol alleged that, at the end of May 2016, the player was allowed to leave on vacation but was told that he should be back by 1 July 2016. After that Limassol informed the player on 23 June 2016 that he should return to the club by no later than 1 July 2016.

7. According to the information currently available on the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 25 June 2016 the Albanian club, KF Skenderbeu (hereinafter: Skenderbeu or the Respondent 2) entered an instruction on the Transfer Matching System (TMS) to engage the player “out of contract free of payment”. The said transfer instruction mentioned the following as reason for the former contract termination: “the contract with the former club has expired”.

8. On 27 June 2016, the player informed Limassol that in order for him to renew the contract 1 for an additional season, he would require a total remuneration of EUR 1,250,000 for the additional season and 12 round trip first class flight ticket from Limassol to Lagos. The player informed the Cyprus Football Association (CFA) of his letter sent to Limassol and underlined that he did not renew the contract 1.

9. On 28 June 2016, Limassol informed the player that he was expected to be back to the club by 1 July 2016.

10. On 1 July 2016, the player informed Limassol that he would be unilaterally terminating the contract “within 7 days of taking notice of this document” arguing that the renewal of the contract 1 was “strictly related to the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the financial conditions” he requested in his letter of 27 June 2016.

11. On 5 July 2016, the player’s agent contacted Limassol to inform the latter club that following the player’s previous letter, on 8 July 2016, the player would be free to sign with any club but that “in order to speed up and facilitating the procedure we (me, my agency) are ready to pay you some reasonable amount of money (around EUR 30,000 plus some thousand) in order to get free documents for [the player] IMMEDIATELY so that we can focus on his future”.

12. On 5 July 2016, Limassol replied to the player’s agent and underlined that the player was under contract with Limassol until 31 May 2017 as per the contract 2 signed on 12 April 2016 and that it was refusing the offer made by the agent but that an amount of EUR 120,000 could be considered as more adequate to release the player.

13. On 5 July 2016, Limassol contacted Skenderbeu and informed the latter club that Limassol had been made aware that the player was training with Skenderbeu and that the player was still tied by a contract with Limassol until 31 May 2017.

14. On 8 July 2016, the player unilaterally terminated the contract.

15. On 12 July 2016, Limassol replied to the player arguing that his termination was not valid, and that he was still bound by the contract 2, which was valid until 31 May 2017, and requested the player’s immediate return to Limassol.

16. According to the information currently available on TMS, on 19 July 2016, the Kosovar club, KF Trepca 89 (hereinafter: Trepca or the Respondent 3), entered an instruction on TMS to engage the player “out of contract free of payment” with a mention that “the contract with the former club has expired” (end date 30.06.2016). On 19 July 2016, the Football Federation of Kosovo (FFK) requested the ITC from the CFA . On 21 July 2016, the CFA rejected the issuance of the ITC with the reason that the contract with Limassol had not expired.

17. On 1 September 2016, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee granted by decision the provisional registration of the player. The player was registered with the Respondent 3 on 7 September 2016.

18. According to the information currently available on TMS, on 30 July 2016, Skenderbeu cancelled the transfer instruction explaining that “the player we wanted to take is under contract with his club. So we are cancelling the request in case to not make any problem”.

19. According to the information currently available on TMS, on 15 January 2016, the player and Trepca signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 July 2017, with a monthly remuneration of EUR 2,000 and a sign on fee of EUR 30,000 payable on 20 July 2016. On 21 December 2016, the player and Trepca signed a termination agreement.

20. According to the information currently available on TMS, on 1 January 2017, the player and the Albanian club, FK Partizani Tirana (hereinafter: Partizani or the Respondent 4) signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2017, in accordance with which, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 3,000.

21. According to the information currently available on TMS, on 4 January 2017, Partizani entered a TMS instruction to engage the player “out of contract free of payment” with a mention that “the player and his former club mutually agreed an early termination. End date 21.12.2016”. The player was registered with the Respondent 4 on 10 January 2017

22. On 18 May 2018, Limassol lodged a claim against the player, Skenderbeu, Trepca and Partizani (hereinafter collectively called “the Respondents”) in front of FIFA for compensation for breach of contract, and requesting the minimum amount of EUR 265,000 arguing that:

 Limassol received offer to acquire the player from Apoel Nicosia for EUR 200,000 plus EUR 65,000 in case of qualification of Apoel Nicosia:

 Conditional fee: in case Apoel participates to the UEFA Champions League Group Stage for the season 2016/2017 or 2017/2018 Limassol is entitled to receive the amount of EUR 50,000;

 Conditional fee: in case Apoel participates to the UEFA Europa League Group Stage for the season 2016/2017 or 2017/2018 Limassol is entitled to receive the amount of EUR 15,000.

 FIFA must take into account the unprofessional behaviour of the Respondents 2,3 and 4;

 Limassol considered that it endured considerable damages since it was unable to replace the player since the decision of provisional registration of the player was rendered by the Single judge after the closure of the transfer window

23. In its claim, Limassol held that the player had breached the contract and that the termination occurred on 19 July 2016 when Limassol received the ITC request from Trepca. Limassol held that the player had been induced by Skenderbeu and Trepca as he allegedly had been in contact with Skenderbeu since June 2016.

24. Moreover, Limassol provided an extract of Skenderbeu’s Facebook page in which the Respondent 2 held that it was interested in the player, but that the player was owned by Trepca and that Skenderbeu and Trepca had reached an agreement whereby Trepca would loan the player to to Skenderbeu.

25. Limassol also held that via Facebook posts of Skenderbeu, it was evident that the player took part in a friendly match with Skenderbeu and scored a goal for the team (Facebook post of 14 September 2016), that Skenderbeu held that the player was owned by Trepca but training with Skenderbeu on behalf of Trepca. Limassol provided a news article according to which the player played a match with Skenderbeu on 21 September 2016.

26. According to Limassol, “it is clear without any doubt that Trepca was acting as a bridge club to facilitate the transfer of [the player] to Skenderbeu as well as to cast away any suspicions that Skenderbeu, with whom [the player] had been training since June 2016, had actually induced him to leave the Claimant”. Limassol added that the Respondent 2 and 3 had close links and often loaned players to each other’s.

27. As to the Respondent 4, Limassol held that since the player had been provisionally registered with Trepca, the Respondent 4 should have been aware of the ongoing dispute and therefore should be jointly and severally liable for the compensation to which the Claimant should be entitled to.

28. In reply to the claim of Limassol, the player acknowledged signing the contract 2 and the supplementary agreement (12 and 14 April 2016), but “was at the time of the signing of the documents of the opinion that he and the club were in agreement that the contracts were not binding until his agent ratifies them hence his insistence that he was not bound by the terms of that contract”.

29. The player further held that although he was contacted by many clubs, he decided to sign with Trepca.

30. The player admitted “his honest mistake in terminating the contract and has since informed the Claimant that he is willing to make amends and return to fulfil the contracts”. The player requested that FIFA be lenient with him.

31. In reply to the claim of Limassol, Skenderbeu held that the player had provided it with a statement dated 8 July 2016 attesting that he had unilaterally terminated the contract with Limassol and therefore was a free agent, declaring “no other party had influenced/induced [him] to terminate the contract”. In his statement, the player further held that should he be found, in a proceeding in front of FIFA judiciary body, to have breached the contract with Limassol, “the new club who signs with me after the issuance of this statement, will not be considered responsible of any disciplinary infringement […] and the attribution of culpability solely to my person”.

32. It further held that the player trained with Skenderbeu as a favour made to the player since, allegedly the player’s representative is close to Skenderbeu’s sports director.

33. Skenderbeu held that it never intended to sign an employment contract with the player “due to his poor technical and physical capacities and due to his unclear and doubtful registration status at the time”.

34. According to Skenderbeu, the player then signed an employment contract with Trepca, but due to the ITC request’s rejection, the player had requested to be allowed to keep on training with Skenderbeu until a decision on his provisional registration.

35. On the inducement allegations, the Respondent 2 held that those were only motivated with press articles which could not constitute “fact nor have a probating force”.

36. As to the allegations that Skenderbeu and Trepca were involved in a bridge transfer scheme, the Respondent 2 argued that the Claimant did not provide any evidence of its allegations In particular, the Respondent 2 pointed out that upon the termination of the contract with Trepca, the player did not go to Skenderbeu but to Partizani. Skenderbeu never had any contractual relationship with the player.

37. Trepca failed to provide its comments as to the claim of Limassol.

38. In reply to the claim of Limassol, Partizani held that it signed the employment contract with the player on 1 January 2017, only after having duly checked his situation, and that it had been provided with the termination agreement signed between the player and Trepca. Furthermore, Partizani statedthat it had not been aware of any “judicial or contractual dispute with the Claimant”.

39. Partizani provided the player’s passport issued by the FFK, which mentioned that the player had been registered with Trepca since 25 August 2016 without any further information.

40. Partizani further held that “only the parties directly involved in a problematic international transfer of a player can be involved in a judicial proceeding regarding its effects, and not clubs involved in subsequent transfers of the player”.

41. Partizani further held that the press documentation provided by the Claimant as evidence are not official documents and that because of the unofficial nature of a press release, Partizani could not have relied on such information.

42. In its replica¸ Limassol reiterated that the player trained, and played friendly matches with, Skenderbeu, from June 2016 to at least 21 September 2016 since he played a friendly match that day with SkenderbeuIt underlined that Skenderbeu intended to sign the player as per the multiple Facebook announcements of of the latter club.

43. Limassol added that “art. 17.2 [of the FIFA Regulations] which says that the obligation to pay compensation lies on the player and his new club should not be strictly interpreted restricting its applicability only on clubs which register a player”. Limassol highlighted that “art 17.2 definition of the term “new club” should not be limited on the club which has actually registered the player. As can be seen in the definitions’ section, page 5 of the FIFA RSTP, this term is defined as the club which the player is joining”. In this regard, Limassol argued that Skenderbeu had the player training with them as of June 2016 until end of September 2016, and intended to sign the player but backed off because of some difficulties with some documentations, and that as such, Skenderbeu had also induced the player into the breach, even if no contract was signed between the player and Skenderbeu in the end.

44. According to Limassol, the player was “induced by Skenderbeu and Trepca acted as an accomplice”.

45. Limassol amended its claim, requesting the total amount of EUR 400,000 plus interest corresponding to:

 EUR 265,000 as loss of chance of transferring the player since allegedly, Apoel offered that amount as transfer fee for the player;

 EUR 30,670 as residual value of the player’s contracts;

 EUR 100,000 as buy-out clause from the second supplementary agreement;

 The importance of the player for Limassol;

 EUR 300,000 as estimation of the value of the player in accordance with sports websites;

 The player’s request for a salary of EUR 90,000;

 EUR 70,000 as transfer fee allegedly offered by Skanderbeu to Limassol for the player;

 EUR 7,500 as intermediary fee allegedly paid by Limassol to acquire the player;

 “in the absence of any evidence on the actual remuneration initially agreed between Boniface and Skenderbeu, as well as his real remuneration by Partizani and Trepca, the FIFA DRC must apply the principle of specificity of sport. To ensure that the Respondents’ omission to disclose to FIFA the player’s true remuneration does not detrimentally affect his right to just compensation and the principle of positive interest”.

46. In his duplica¸ the player reiterated his previous comments.

47. In its duplica, Skenderbeu reiterated that it had no intention on signing the player and held that “the news paper articles submitted in front of your honourable legal body are not corroborated with official documents that would prove the alleged breach”.

48. Moreover, Skenderbeu contested that it had received a letter from Limassol on 5 July 2016 and held that the document provided as evidence lacked a delivery report.

49. In its last comments, Trepca held that when it signed with the player, it was only aware that the player had signed the contract 1, not the contract 2. Equally, it was informed that the player had unilaterally terminated his contract with Limassol and was provided with the statement of 8 July 2016 (same as Skenderbeu). According to Trepca, it is only when it requested the ITC that the CFA made it aware of the contract 2. On this point, Trepca pointed out that the player allegedly claimed that the contract 2 was forged.

50. Trepca acknowledged that the player trained with Skenderbeu while he had already signed the contract with Trepca, but held that it was because the player got injured and that he could get better treatment, “to adopt a sporting program until the full rehabilitation of the player […] until 15 September 2016” and then the player allegedly returned to Trepca.

51. Trepca held that both parties decided to mutually terminate the contract on 21 December 2016.

52. Finally, Trepca held that as per the player’s statement of 8 July 2016, since he declared that he had not been induced, and that if he were to be found to have breached the contract with the Claimant, he would take full responsibility, the player should be the only party liable to pay any compensation for breach of contract.

53. In its last comments, Partizani reiterated its previous arguments and underlined that it is not the club with which the player was first registered after the early termination of the contract with Limassol and as such cannot be held responsible to pay compensation for breach of contract.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 May 2018. Consequently, the 2018 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in conjunction with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2020), it is competent to decide on the present litigation, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Cyprus club, an Nigerian player, an Albanian club, a Kosovar club and another Albanian club.

3. Furthermore, the DRC analysed which edition of the regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2020) and considering that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 May 2018 , the January 2018 edition of said Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the present matter as to the substance.

4. Having established the foregoing, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of the matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in the TMS.

5. In this respect, the DRC first started by recalling that the player and Limassol had signed an employment contract valid as from 25 August 2015 valid until 30 June 2016, and that on 12 April 2016, the player and Limassol signed a second employment contract valid as from 1 June 2016 until 31 May 2017 as well as a supplementary agreement (12 and 14 April 2016).

6. In continuation, the DRC noted that it is undisputed by the parties involved that the employment relationship had been terminated by the player on 1 July 2016.

7. The Chamber then reviewed the claim of Limassol according to which it requested the total amount of EUR 265,000 as compensation for breach of the contract, amount that was then amended to EUR 400,000, as well as the joint liability of Skenderbeu, Trepca and Partiziani and sporting sanctions to be imposed on all the Respondents.

8. The Chamber took note of the argumentation of Limassol according to which the contract had been unilaterally terminated by the player without just cause on 1 July 2016, and that said termination had been induced by the respondents clubs. The DRC noted that according to Limassol, due to the termination of the contract with the player, it had incurred financial losses since some clubs were interested in transferring the player against a transfer fee, and that the supplementary agreement 2 contained a buy-out clause.

9. The Chamber further recalled the argumentation of the player, according to which the latter held having mistakenly believed that he was not bound by the second employment contract. Indeed, the player was under the impression that the contract 2 would only be valid if countersigned by his agent. Furthermore, he alleged that he was still negotiating with the Claimant to raise his remuneration under the second contract. The DRC further recalled that the player had recognized having made a mistake in terminating the contract and requested the Chamber to be lenient in its assessment of the present matter.

10. The Chamber then focused on the replies and argumentation of the respondent clubs. First, Skenderbeu argued that it had believed that the player was a free agent; however, upon realization of the contractual situation of the player, it had cancelled its TMS transfer instruction and allowed, out of professional kindness, the player to train within the club’s facilities without being contractually tied to him.

11. Second, Trepca stated that it had no idea that the player had a valid and binding agreement with Limassol, and believed, as the player informed it, that he was a free agent. Trepca held that it was only upon the ITC being rejected by the CFA that it became aware of the contractual situation of the player.

12. As to Partizani, the DRC took note that it argued that the player and Partizani signed the employement contract upon the mutual termination of the contract between the player and Trepca and that it was not aware of any contractual dispute between the Claimant and the player.

13. In view of the foregoing and of the diverging opinions of the parties, the Dispute Resolution Chamber was of the opinion that the issue at stake was to determine whether or not the player had just cause to terminate the contract with Limassol on 1 July 2016, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract was breached by the player without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences of such contractual breach.

14. In this regard, the DRC noted that player actually admitted that he was mistaken when believing that he was not bound by the contract 2 and that he regretted signing such document. In this regard, the Chamber acknowledged the player’s request for leniency; however, it could not underestimate the damage caused by the player’s mistake to the Claimant, which could legitimately believe that the player would honour his contract. The Chamber was unanimous in its opinion that it could not find any reason to excuse the player’s mistake, as the player had undoubtedly signed the contract 2 as well as the supplementary agreement and that said contract and supplementary agreement contained all essentiali negotii including the player’s remuneration. Furthermore, the Chamber was convinced that to apply leniency in the present matter would go the fundamental principles of contractual stability, according to which employment contracts validly signed between professional players and clubs must be executed.

15. On account of the above, the DRC was of the view that the player unilaterally terminated the contract without any valid reason, and consequently, is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause.

16. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without just cause by the player.

17. As a consequence of the aforementioned conclusion, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay compensation to Limassol. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the new club shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was nonetheless eager to point out that the joint liability of the new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been confirmed by CAS.

18. With regards to the identity of the new club, the Chamber duly considered that the present matter is not a straight forward affair in this respect and required a thorough examination in order to determine the identity of the new club. The DRC especially took note that Limassol held that the term of “new club” should be regarded in a broad manner and that as such Skenderbeu and Trepca were the new club.

19. In this regard, the DRC took into account that in accordance with the FIFA Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, “whenever a player has to pay compensation to his former club, the new club, i.e. the first club for which the player registers after the contractual breach, shall be jointly and severally liable for its payment.”

20. In this context, the DRC found it important to underline that in the matter at hand, the player was in fact never registered with Skenderbeu. Indeed, the DRC took note that Skenderbeu had attempted to acquire the player’s registration but cancelled its TMS instruction on 30 July 2016. The DRC highlighted that the player’s registration was ultimately transferred from Limassol to Trepca on 7 September 2016.

21. Consequently, the members of the DRC concluded that Trepca is to be considered the new club of the player in the sense of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations.

22. Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly pointed out that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and other expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.

23. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber reverted to the two clauses of the contract invoked by the Claimant in support of its claim for compensation.

24. The Chamber recalled that art. 1 of the second supplementary agreement in accordance with which “the parties hereby agree that in case that the player receives an offer for EUR 100,000 net then the club is obligated to release the player”.

25. In this regard, the DRC took note of the argumentation of the Claimant, according to which it must be awarded the amount of EUR 100,000 as compensation for breach of contract, in application of second supplementary agreement, in particular its article 1.

26. In this respect, the Chamber duly analysed the contents of said clause and was of the unanimous opinion that said clause could not be considered as a liquidated damages clause and did not foresee the scenario of a breach of the contract by the player. Additionally, the DRC noted that said clause was not reciprocal. Therefore, the DRC, referring to its well-established jurisprudence in the respect, decided to disregard such clause.

27. In light of the above, the Chamber considered that the aforementioned clause cannot be considered by the DRC when establishing the amount of compensation for breach of contract due to Limassol.

28. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

29. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the Chamber turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the contract and the supplementary agreements, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s).

30. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between Limassol and the player, signed on 12 April 2016, had been set to run as from 1 June 2016 and expire on 31 May 2017. The DRC further established that the player and Limassol had also signed the supplementary agreement on 12 April 2016 entitling the player to a total amount of EUR 22,000. Since the breach occurred on 1 July 2016, the total value of his employment agreement with the Claimant for the remaining contractual period, i.e. 11 months, amounts to EUR 30,800. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that the player signed two new contracts for the overlapping period, the first one with Trepca as from 15 July 2016 until 21 December 2016 for a total amount of EUR 42,000 and another contract with Partizani as from 1 Jaunary 2107 until 30 June 2017, so for the overlapping period until 31 May 2017, EUR 15,000. Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contracts concluded between the player and, respectively, Trepca and Partizani amount to a total EUR 57,000 for the period running from the unilateral termination of the contract by the player until its contractual expiry, i.e. from July 2016 until 31 May 2017. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of remuneration between the contracts concluded by the player respectively with Limassol, Trepca and Partizani over the relevant period amounted to EUR 43,900.

31. The Chamber took note of the request of the Claimant to take into account for the calculation of the compensation several other elements, such as the alleged transfer with Apoel, but determined that since such transfer had remained hypothetical, this element could not be taken into account. The same way, the estimation of the value of the player as per a website, cannot be considered as an objective criteria and has to be rejected.

32. As to the allegation that Skenderbeu was willing to pay EUR 70,000 to acquire the player, this allegation has been contested by Skenderber, and the DRC recalled the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Therefore, the DRC was of the unanimous opinion that the Claimant did not provide conclusive evidence of such an agreement from Skenderbeu. Equally, the DRC took note that the request to take into account intermediary fees in the calculation of the compensation had not been substantiated by Limassol.

33. Finally, the request for damages for the specificity of sport is not contractually provided and not substantiated, and as such has to be disregarded.

34. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the player must pay the amount of EUR 43,900 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, Trepca is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation (cf. point II. 22 above).

35. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the player and Trepca must pay to Limassol interest of 5% p.a. as of 18 May 2018 until the date of effective payment.

36. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period.

37. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not provide the possibility for the deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances.

38. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that the breach of contract by the player had occurred during the applicable protected period. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par3 of the Regulations, the player had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches.

39. Finally, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question of whether, in view of art. 14 par. 4 of the Regulations, the player’s new club, i.e. Trepca, must be considered to have induced the player to unilaterally terminate his contract with the Claimant without just cause during the protected period, and therefore shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods.

40. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with the aforementioned provision, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional player who has terminated his previous contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach.

41. With the above in mind, the members of the Chamber found it pertinent to recall the chain of events leading to the player joining Trepca and especially the fact that the player’s breach of contract, the player had not immediately joined Trepca but had only done so on 7 September 2016, i.e. three months following the breach. The Chamber further recalled that the player had, upon the termination of the contract, trained with Skenderbeu without being registered with it and informed both Skenderbeu and Trepca in writing on 8 July 2016 that he was a free agent and that he was not tied by a contract with Limassol. In light of the aforementioned, the DRC formed the firm belief that Trepca had not induced the player into breaching the employment contract with Limassol.

42. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the claim of Limassol is partially accepted and that the player has to pay to Limassol EUR 43,900 as compensation for the unilateral and premature termination of the contract without just cause during the protected period. In this respect, the DRC also determined that Trepca is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the above-mentioned amount of compensation to Limassol.

43. And finally, the Chamber decided that the player shall be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches.

44. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by Limassol are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Aris Limassol, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent 1, Mathew Boniface, is ordered to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 43,900, plus 5% interest as from 18 May 2018 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent 3, KF Trepca 89, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation.

4. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent 1, and the Respondent 3, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

6. A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the Respondent 1. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and international championships for clubs.

7. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

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Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note related to the appeal procedure:

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio Garcia Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer