F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 9 April 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed on 9 April 2020,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England)

Roy Vermeer (The Netherlands)

Daan de Jong (The Netherlands)

on the claim presented by the player,

Elie Junior Akobeto, France

as Claimant

against the club,

1904 FC, USA

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 29 August 2019, the French player, Elie Junior Akobeto (hereinafter: the player or the Claimant) and the US club, Mind Soccer Club, or 1904 FC (hereinafter: the club or the Respondent) signed an employment contract valid for one season as of 1 September 2019 until 30 June 2020 “unless one of the parties notifies the other in writing of intention to terminate this Agreement before the intended end date and subject to the requirements of Articles 14 and 15 herein.”

2. In accordance with the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent, as salary, the sum of USD 20,000 per season “payable in bi-weekly instalments each months”.

3. Art. 1 of the contract inter alia included the following: the “player further agrees that this contract (…) is contingent upon the Club receiving all the required Player’s clearances, including those from the United States Soccer Federation (“USSF”), [FIFA] and, if and when applicable, an [ITC] and the required visa from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).” The “player acknowledges and accepts that failure to provide Club any of the required clearances or inability to obtain prerequisite visa/work authorization immediately renders this offer for employment with Club null and void.”

4. As per art. 9 f) of the contract “the Club shall be responsible for obtaining a valid work visa for any player who is not a citizen of the United States of America, does not have resident alien (US) or landed immigrant (Canada) status prior to paying Player for professional services under this Agreement or utilizing Player before a professional game.”

5. Art 6 of the contract stipulated the following:

“a. Club may terminate this Agreement as a result of material breach of any provision by Player. If Club terminates Player’s contract, it shall provide Player written notice, within (7) days, as to the cause for termination;

b. Club may terminate this Agreement if Player is guilty of gross misconduct. (…);

c. Club may terminate this Agreement if Player is arrested, charged and convicted of any criminal offense.

d. Upon any termination of this Agreement by Club as a result of Club becoming inoperative, Club shall forthwith release Player’s registration.

e. Notwithstanding the language of article 16, herein, player understands and agrees that Club reserves the right to terminate the employment at any time and for any reason, with or without cause.”

6. Art. 7 of the contract provided the following:

“a. in the event of a material breach of this Agreement by Club, Player may terminate the Agreement only after notifying Club in writing, via certified mail, of said breach and Club fails to remedy the breach within fourteen (…) calendar days (“Cure Period”). Upon receiving proper notice, Club shall, during the Cure Period, either: (i) cure such breach; (ii) release Player from this Agreement and registration; or (iii) submit evidence to Player, or his legal representative, disputing that Club is in breach of this Agreement.

b. Termination of the Agreement by Player shall not relieve Club of legal obligation for any past compensation due.”

7. In accordance with art. 18 of the contract the parties agreed to the following:

“a. all disputes relating to or arising out of this Agreement including, but not limited to disputes related to compensation and benefits (…), discipline, or the termination of this Agreement (..) shall first be brought before the Clubs leadership for mediation and resolution.

b. if the dispute brought before Club leadership remains unsolved, either party may serve notice of a demand for binding arbitration on the other party within fourteen days of the original submission date to Club leadership “Period of Notice of Arbitration” before the American Arbitration Association under its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures. Parties agree that the prevailing party in any arbitration shall be entitled to injunctive relief in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award.

c. The parties hereby agree to waive any right to have any dispute between them resolved in a court of law by a judge or jury.

d. This paragraph 19c will not prevent either party from seeking injunctive relief (or any other provisional remedy) from any court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of their dispute relating to obligations under this Agreement or Player’s employment with Club.”

8. Finally, in accordance with art. 20 of the contract, the parties agreed that “this agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California. Player and Club hereby expressly agree that the Dispute Resolution procedures set forth in Paragraph 19 above, including bonding Arbitration if necessary, shall be the sole means of resolving any dispute between Player and Club. Player hereby waives any right to commence an action in law or in equity in any other court or tribunal in the United States, or anywhere else in the world. In the event that the validity of the Arbitration award is challenged, an action on that basis, and only that basis may be brought in applicable court in the state of California (and its directly associated appellate and federal courts) that shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and rule on the validity or enforceability of the Arbitration decision pursuant to Section 19 above.”

9. By means of a document dated 8 November 2019 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the club terminated the contract with immediate effect. In the termination letter, the Respondent mentioned that it had appreciated the Claimant’s “hard work and commitment (…) but as we have discussed your level of play has not met the standards we set for you, and expect from all our players”. In addition, the Respondent informed the Claimant that because their contractual relationship had been terminated it could “no longer sponsor [his] work visa application with United States Citizenship Immigration Services (USCIS).”

10. On 18 November 2019, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA for breach of contract and requested from the latter the payment of the total amount of USD 32,602, corresponding to his salary for one season, i.e. the sum of USD 20,000, plus the value of several expenses in which he had allegedly incurred.

11. In this respect and to begin with, the Claimant argued that, after the contract had been signed, the Respondent had asked him to “launch the visa procedure and to pay all the fees via their immigration lawyer” while promising that it would have paid “half the money of the fees” if his visa petition was successful. The Claimant further alleged that his visa petition was approved on 5 November 2019.

12. According to the Claimant, between 29 August 2019 and 8 November 2019, he had been “attending all training sessions, participated in friendly matches, did public appearances” without however playing “ in official matches” as his visa had not yet been approved.

13. The Claimant added that he had never breached the contract.

14. Furthermore, the Claimant believed that the reason for the termination of contract was that “because [his] visa petition/work authorization has been approved, the are entitled to pay my past and future wages. So they contacted with urgency the USCIS to inform them that they were terminating my contract, which would cancel my work authorization and render me unable to obtain my visa”.

15. Finally, the Claimant argued that he had not received any salary so far from the Respondent “since it is illegal in the United States to be paid without the work authorization.”

16. Equally, the Claimant alleged that while he was in San Francisco “to perform [his] duties with the club” he had entered “into a lease agreement for an accommodation” and had to pay a monthly rent of USD 1,300 as of September 2019, i.e. “$ 3900 USD in total”. The Claimant further maintained that “according to the leasing company” he could not “come out of the lease agreement which means I’ll have to pay that amount for each of the remaining months (9 months left on the lease).”

17. Similarly, the Claimant maintained that in order to travel to the USA for the trial, he had booked a “return flight with XL Airways from Paris to LA which cost [him] 1144.43. Had my trial be unsuccessful, I would have went back to Paris with my return ticket on the 31st of August but it wasn’t the case, so I lost a return ticket now that they want to terminate me.”

18. Lastly, the Claimant stated that, “in order to obtain my visa once my visa petition was approved, I booked a return flight from LA to Paris, which cost me 499.80€, just to find out at the US consulate that the Club had cancelled my work authorization. The price I’ve paid for the visa petition was $ 1685”.

19. In its response on 17 January 2020, the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant and contested FIFA’s competence to decide on the dispute at stake.

20. In this respect, the Respondent referred to art. 18 of the contract arguing that the parties had agreed to “resolve all disputes with the American Arbitration Association”. The Respondent pointed out that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, “parties” may “agree to an independent arbitration tribunal to resolve their employment disputes in the framework if the independent arbitration tribunal respects the principle guaranteeing fair proceedings and equal representation for players and clubs”. The Respondent added that the “standards guaranteeing fair proceedings are set forth in FIFA circular No. 1010.”

21. From the Respondent’s point of view “the American Arbitration Association is a reputable, respected, and long standing arbitration tribunal involved in resolving employment disputes with established and impartial procedures that meet all the criteria set forth in the FIFA Regulations and its Standards providing for fair proceedings.”

22. Hence, the Respondent deemed that the “DRC should rejected [the Claimant’s] claims for lack of jurisdiction and uphold the parties agreement to vest the American Arbitration Association with exclusive jurisdiction to decide their employment dispute.”

23. In continuation, the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant as to the substance.

24. According to the Respondent, a tryout was arranged for the player on 2 August 2019 upon his request for him to train and play “with 1904 FC for approximately 2 months during the club’s preseason schedule so his soccer talent could be evaluated.” The Respondent additionally alleged that the Claimant did not have a visa “to legally work in the United States” yet and that the “deadline for all foreign players to be registered with USSF was August 6. This posed a dilemma for the tryout arrangement”. It was therefore agreed that “any contract submitted to US Immigration or USSF was contingent upon Mr Akebeto making the team following his preseason tryout and obtaining his work visa. If either of these conditions were not met, it was agreed the pro contract was void.”

25. In continuation, the Respondent maintained that the Claimant had agreed “to be responsible for paying all his own travel and living expenses for the tryouts” and added that it had not legally been in the position to pay him “anything while his work visa was pending with US Immigration.”. The Respondent also clarified that the Claimant had agreed to pay for the visa himself and that the cost would have only been reimbursed half if he had made the tryout.

26. Subsequently, the Respondent asserted that the contract was a revised version of two previous agreements concluded between the parties on 4 and 6 August 2019 respectively.

27. Equally, the Respondent explained that at the beginning of September 2019, the Claimant had suffered an injury and “for the next 4-6 weeks [he] was unable to participate in soccer trainings or play in any games, complicating [his] tryout (…)”. The Respondent added that when “he was healthy during his tryout” the player’s play had be “generally poor and not at the level required.”

28. The Respondent further mentioned that it had loaned the sum of USD 2,359 to the Claimant and that the latter never repaid the amount in question.

29. The Respondent contested having dismissed the Claimant in order not to pay his salary and pointed out that the latter had not earned “a roster spot, and was being let go, 3 days before his work visa was preliminary approved.”

30. Because the “conditions to the player contract” had not been met, the Respondent deemed that the “agreement” had become “void and unenforceable” and the claim was therefore to be rejected.

31. The Respondent also deemed that, “even if an enforceable player contract (and jurisdiction) exists” it had had just cause to terminate its contractual relationship with the Claimant pursuant art. “14. (1)” of the “FIFA Regulations”.

32. As a result, the Respondent was of the opinion that, in line with the contract, because the “approvals from the USSF and the visa” were never obtained, the Claimant’s salary for the season had not become due. The Respondent also argued that even “if a basis for wages exists”, the Claimant “is not entitled to the full $ 20,000 value of the contract” as, in accordance with the contract, “the duration of the August 29 was 10 months with the salary paid bi-monthly commencing September 1, 2019. However, the first two months of the contract [the player’s] work visa was pending” and the Claimant “had to travel to France to finalize the visa. [He] was not entitled to any wages for the first 3 months of the contract. (..) at most the value of the (…) contract was $ 14,000, not the $20,000 [the player] seeks.”

33. Similarly, the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant related to the reimbursement of the sum of USD 9,100 in rent expenses pointing out that the latter had agreed to “pay all his personal expenses for his tryout.”

34. With regard to the Claimant’s request related to the reimbursement of the flight tickets, the Respondent underlined that, when the latter travelled to the United States in August 2019, it was not yet clear whether “he had made the team” or nor and therefore, the “unnecessary costs incurred for this airfare” were not its responsibility. As to the “November airfare”, the Respondent added that the Claimant “had to return to Paris either because his temporary visa expired or he was required to visit the US Consulate to finalize his work visa”. Hence he would have “incurred [the costs] not matter what”.

35. The Respondent agreed to reimburse half of the costs of the Claimant’s visa stressing that “at most” the latter was entitled to the sum of USD 842.50 in “related damages” but not the USD 1,685 requested.

36. Finally, the Respondent mentioned that it had “incurred significant training and administrative costs in permitting [the player] an extended tryout (..). this is way [the player] had to agree to cover all his personal expenses for the tryouts (..). However, [the player] did not have the financial means to cover his living expenses (…) and [the Respondent] had to loan him $ 2,359 for this purpose. (..) This any damages must be offset by the amounts [the Claimant] owes the Club.”

37. On 23 March 2020, the Claimant informed FIFA that he had indeed received the sum of USD 427 on 24 August 2019, of USD 160 on 18 Augusts 2019 and of USD 680 on 17 August 2018 by the Respondent but denied that the relevant payments had been part of a loan made to him.

38. According to the Claimant, the Respondent had verbally agreed to pay one third of his accommodation’s fee while he was in the “preseason 2-weeks trial phase”.

39. The Claimant added that the money was solely used for the purpose of paying the hotel room fees where he was staying with three other players.

40. With regard to his employment situation, the Claimant informed FIFA that he was currently unemployed.

41. Finally, in an unsolicited correspondence to FIFA, the Claimant held inter alia that he was being harassed by the Respondent.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analyzed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 November 2019. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the November 2019 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2019) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between an US club and a French player.

3. However, the Chamber further acknowledged that the Respondent had contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 18 of the contract arguing the competence of the American Arbitration Association instead.

4. In this context, the members of the DRC recalled that, in accordance with, art. 22 lit b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, a club and a player may explicitly opt in writing for disputes arisen between them to be decided by an independent arbitration tribunal that has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. The Chamber further recalled that in accordance with the provision in question, any such arbitration clause must be included either directly in the contract or in a collective bargaining agreement applicable on the parties and the independent national arbitration tribunal must guarantee fair proceedings and respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.

5. In this respect, the DRC turned its attention to the documentation provided by the Respondent and pointed out that the American Arbitration Association is not an arbitrational tribunal in the sense of art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations.

6. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

7. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 18 November 2019, the 2019 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

8. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, the DRC continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of the matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

9. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the parties had concluded an employment contract valid for one season as of 1 September 2019 until 30 June 2020 which provided for the Claimant to receive from the Respondent, as salary, the sum of USD 20,000 for the season.

10. Subsequently, the Chamber noted that, in his claim to FIFA the Claimant had accused the Respondent of having terminated the contract without just cause and had therefore inter alia requested from the latter the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 20,000.

11. Equally, the Chamber observed that, for its part, the Respondent had rejected the claim of the Claimant arguing the invalidity of the contract and subsidiarily, alleging that it had had just cause to terminate the document in question as it had not been satisfied with the performances of the latter and the player had not yet obtained his visa.

12. In line with the above, the DRC highlighted that the first issue in the matter at stake would be to determine the validity of the contract and the second issue, to determine as to whether the contract was terminated with or without just cause and to decide on the consequences thereof.

13. With the above in mind, the Chamber proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the present matter, the parties’ arguments as well the documentation on file, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof.

14. In this framework, the Chamber considered relevant to recall art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations as well as its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of administrative formalities, such as, but not limited to, the application for a VISA/work permit, which are of the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no influence.

15. In this context, the members wished to emphasise that the contents of art. 18. par. 4 of the Regulations are of mandatory nature and cannot be contractually amended or circumvented.

16. As a result, the DRC concluded that the allegations of the Respondent with regard to the invalidity of the contract as consequence of the Claimant’s lack of visa were to be rejected.

17. Having established the aforementioned, the DRC turned its attention to the second legal issue at stake in the present dispute, i.e. the question of whether the club had just cause to terminate the contract.

18. In this respect the Chamber recalled that the Respondent had argued having had just cause to terminate the contract in view of the poor performances of the Claimant.

19. In this context, the Chamber was keen to emphasize that, in accordance with its longstanding and well-established jurisprudence, the unsatisfactory performance of a player, in particular if linked to an injury, does not constitute a just cause for a club to prematurely terminate the employment relationship, as this judgement is subjective and unmeasurable. Thus, due to the subjective and arbitrary nature of such grounds for dismissal, the Chamber concluded that this argument of the Respondent in order to justify the unilateral termination of the contract could not be sustained.

20. In view of the aforementioned, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just cause to terminate the contract and therefore the Claimant was entitled to be compensated by the latter.

21. However, before establishing the consequences of said breach, the Chamber wished to recall that the player was first and foremost entitled to receive outstanding remuneration pending at the date of the termination of the contract, if any.

22. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant had requested the reimbursement of several expenses in which he had allegedly incurred.

23. To begin with, the DRC turned its attention to the request of the Claimant related to the reimbursement of the costs incurred in connection with his visa. As to that, the DRC reverted to the content of art. 9 of the contract which indicated that the Respondent was responsible to obtain a valid work visa for the Claimant.

24. In this context and in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Chamber determined that in order to fulfil its obligations as per the contract the Respondent has to reimburse to the Claimant the sum of USD 1,685 corresponding to visa expenses.

25. Hence, the DRC decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the sum of USD 1,685.

26. In continuation and as to the request of the Claimant related to the reimbursement of several flight tickets, the Chamber emphasized that the contract did not include any provision indicating that the Respondent would have had to pay for the flight tickets of the Claimant. The Chamber further added that no evidence had been provide by the Claimant in support of the allegation that some of the flight costs incurred would have been linked to the acquisition of his visa and recalled that in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof.

27. As a result of the aforementioned, the Chamber decided that the claim of the Claimant concerning the reimbursement of the flight tickets was to be rejected as it lacked legal basis.

28. Similarly, the DRC decided to also reject the claim of the Claimant in connection with the reimbursement of his rent in the United States as the contract did not provide for the obligation of the Respondent to pay for the latter’s accommodation and therefore his request lacked legal basis.

29. Subsequently and with regard to the Respondent’s allegation that it would have loaned the sum of USD 2359 to the Claimant, the DRC recalled that although the player had admitted having received a certain amount from the latter, he had contested the allegation that the sum in question would have been a loan, arguing that it had covered the cost of his accommodation in a hotel with other players.

30. Taking into account the aforementioned and considering that no evidence was provided by the Respondent in support of the allegation that it would have loaned the sum of USD 2,360 to the Claimant, the DRC, reverting once again to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations, decided that the sum in question was not to be set off with any amount payable by the Respondent as the latter could not prove that the Claimant had agreed to pay it back.

31. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent for breach of contract in. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. Bearing in mind the aforementioned principles, the Chamber further referred to the contents of art. 17 par. 1 ii of the Regulations, according to which, in case the player signed a new contract by the time of the decision, the value of the new contract for the period corresponding to the time remaining on the prematurely terminated contract shall be deducted from the residual value of the contract that was terminated early (the “Mitigated Compensation”).

32. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the contract at the basis of the present dispute contain a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

33. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasized beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

34. In doing so, the Chamber then observed that, on the basis of the contract signed by the Claimant and the Respondent the Claimant was entitled to receive the total amount of USD 20,000.

35. Thus, the Chamber deemed that the sum of USD 20,000 had to serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

36. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

37. The Chamber noted in this regard that the player had declared having remained unemployed since the contract was terminated.

38. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided the amount of USD 20,000 was to be considered reasonable and proportionate as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

39. As a result, the DRC decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the sum of USD 20,000 as compensation for breach of contract.

40. In view of all of the aforementioned, the DRC concluded that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the sum of USD 1,685 as outstanding remuneration and of USD 20,000 as compensation for breach of contract.

41. Thereafter, taking into account the previous considerations, the Chamber referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

42. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

43. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that, in the event that the Respondent does not pay the amounts due to the Claimant within 45 days as from the moment in which the Claimant, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the Respondent, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

44. Finally, the Chamber recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

45. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the parties are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Elie Junior Akobeto, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, 1904 FC, has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 1,685.

4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of the contract in the amount of USD 20,000.

5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amounts mentioned under points 3 & 4 above.

7. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amounts in accordance with points 3 & 4 above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

8. In the event that the amounts due plus interest in accordance with points 3 & 4 above are not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

9. The ban mentioned in point 8 above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amounts are paid.

10. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)

Avenue de Beaumont 2

CH-1012 Lausanne - Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer