F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 26 March 2020

Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed on 26 March 2020,

in the following composition:

Clifford Hendel (USA), Deputy Chairman

Michele Colucci (Italy), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Marco Ibraim De Sousa Airosa, Portugal

represented by Mr Loizos Hadjidemetriou

as Claimant

and the club,

AEL Limassol, Cyprus

represented by Mr Christoforos Florou

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 16 and 17 May 2017, the Portuguese player, Marco Ibraim De Sousa Airosa (hereinafter: the player of Claimant) and the Cypriot entity AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD, concluded an employment contract as well as an “additional employment agreement”, both valid as from 16 May 2017 until 31 May 2019. According to both documents, the entity AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD is also referred to as “the club”. Furthermore, both documents contain a stamp of the Cypriot club AEL Limassol.

2. The employment contract provides, inter alia, as follows:

As to remuneration: EUR 8,824 gross (EUR 6,000 net) per month as from 31.08.2017 until 31.12.2017;

EUR 8,029 gross (EUR 6,000 net) per month as from 31.01.2018 until 31.05.2018;

EUR 8,029 gross (EUR 6,000 net) per month as from 31.08.2018 until 31.12.2018;

EUR 6,941 gross (EUR 6,000 net) per month as from 31.01.2019 until 31.05.2019.

“All taxes payable to the Tax Department, as per the applicable legislation, shall be paid by the club”.

Other conditions:

“The club engages the player as a professional footballer for, as a minimum, the club’s first team, unless the player shall agree to play for some other team of the club […]”

3. The “additional employment agreement” provides the following regarding remuneration:

“The player will receive […] the additional amount of”:

EUR 4,000 net per month as from 31.08.2017 until 31.05.2018;

EUR 4,000 net per month as from 31.08.2018 until 31.05.2019.

4. In addition, according to art. 2.1. of the employment contract, “the present Contract is regulated by the provisions of the Standard Employment Contract, as these have been agreed between the Cyprus Football Association (CFA) and the Cyprus Footballer’s Union (PASP) and as these provisions have been codified in Annex 1 of the CFA Registration and Transfer of Players Regulations”.

5. Furthermore, art. 2.2. of the employment contract stipulated the following: “The terms of the Standard Employment Contract constitute an integral part of the present Contract having full and direct implementation.”

6. Moreover, according to art. 2.3 of the employment contract, “In case of conflict, the terms of the Standard Employment Contract shall take precedence over the terms of the present Contract”.

7. Pursuant to art. 13 of the Standard Employment Contract, the parties agreed that “any employment dispute between the Club and the Player shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the CFA and shall be resolved according to the applicable regulations of the CFA.”

8. On 12 September 2018, following long written exchanges between the parties via their respective legal representatives, the player’s legal representative sent the club a termination notice, in which he mentioned the following: “a non-registration of a player rendering him ineligible to compete constitutes breach of the employment agreement and the player’s personality rights, giving him the right to unilaterally terminate his [employment contract] with just cause”.

9. On 21 January 2019, the player lodged a claim against the club for outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract.

10. The Claimant requested the following:

a) To order the Respondent to pay the following amounts:

o EUR 4,000 as outstanding salaries, plus 5% interest as from 12 September 2018;

o EUR 86,000 as compensation for breach of contract, plus 5% interest as from 12 September 2018;

o Additional compensation and/or aggravated damages up to 6 months’ salaries due to the abusive and/or unsporting/egregious behaviour of the Respondent;

b) To order the Respondent to pay to the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus all applicable taxation and social security contributions for the player’s due payables and compensation;

c) To impose a transfer ban for two registration periods on the Respondent.

11. In support of his claim, the Claimant sustained that he was in a position to terminate the employment contract with just cause (art. 14 and 14bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players) since the Respondent failed to register him on the list of the players eligible to compete in the 2018-2019 Cyprus football Association’s competitions. Furthermore, the player alleged that, after the end of the 2017-2018 season, the Respondent never informed him of the training’s starting date for the 2018-2019 season. The Claimant received this information from team mates and managed to be present at the first training session of the new season.

12. Following his return to Cyprus, the Claimant alleges that he was prohibited from participating in the trainings of the first team and submits the following elements:

a. The Respondent informed him that he had the permission to be absent from the trainings from 4 July 2018 until 11 July 2018. However, the Claimant never requested such permission and formally contested this mandatory leave;

b. The Respondent ordered the Claimant to train from 15.30 until 17.00, i.e. at a different time than the first team’s scheduled training. The Claimant formally contested this expulsion from the first team and indicates that he could then train with the first team from 4 until 11 July 2018;

c. The Claimant was not invited to take part in the pre-season preparation camp abroad but had instead to train with 5 other players during the team’s absence. In particular, the Claimant points out that the training conditions were totally unprofessional and without the supervision of a competent coach (no UEFA PRO diploma). The claimant once again formally contested his exclusion from the first team;

d. Despite two warnings sent to the Respondent, the Claimant was not added to the list of eligible players for the 2018-2019 season. The Claimant emphasises that players who are not registered on the said list are not eligible to compete in any of the Cyprus Football Association’s competitions, in accordance with competition rules at national level;

13. In light of the foregoing, the Claimant sent a notice of termination on 12 September 2019, whereby he accused the Respondent of violating his basic rights as a football player.

14. In reply to the player’s claim, the club first of all contested the competence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber to deal with the present matter, arguing that the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Cyprus Football Association (hereinafter: the Cypriot NDRC) is competent. In this context, the Respondent held that the employment contract clearly states that the “terms of the standard employment contract constitute an integral part of the present contract having full and direct implementation” (art. 2.2). Furthermore, art. 2.3 of the employment contract indicates that “in case of any conflict the terms of the standard employment contract shall take precedence over the terms of the present Contract”.

15. Additionally, the Respondent pointed out that art. 13 of the standard employment contracts provides that “any employment dispute between the Club and the Player shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the CFA and shall be resolved according to the applicable regulations of the FCA”.

16. The Respondent claims that both parties fully accepted the terms of the aforementioned contract at the time of the signature of the employment contract.

17. As to the substance of the matter, the Respondent claims that the Claimant terminated the employment contract without just cause. Indeed, the Respondent held that it had never acted in breach of its contractual obligations. In particular, the Claimant was provided with all the necessary facilities to train, under the supervision of a staff composed of a coach, a trainer, physiotherapist and a caretaker. Furthermore, the Claimant was training with other players of the first team.

18. The Respondent denied the Claimant’s allegations that he had to train at 15.30 until 17.00. In this regard, the Respondent argued that the Claimant was training at the same time and with the rest of the players of the first team.

19. Equally, according to the Respondent, the fact that the Claimant was not registered on the list of the eligible players for the first half of the season does not mean that it breached the employment contract. Indeed, the Claimant was duly receiving his salary and followed a professional training under the direction of the coach’s first team.

20. Finally, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s allegation regarding bad treatment during the two last months of his contract. The Respondent considered that the Claimant had failed to prove his allegations in this regard.

21. In light of the forgoing, the Respondent believes that the Claimant failed to prove that the requirements of art. 15 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players – termination of contract with sporting just cause – were fulfilled.

22. Given that the Claimant should be held liable for terminating the employment contract without just cause, the Respondent considers that it should be entitled to compensation from the Claimant in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. The Respondent claims the remaining value of the employment contract amounting to EUR 86,000 as compensation.

23. In his replica, the Claimant submitted that the Cypriot NDRC does not fulfil the principle of independence and impartiality as set out in art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. Therefore, the Claimant considers that the FIFA DRC’s jurisdiction cannot be excluded.

24. As to the substance of the Respondent’s reply, the Claimant maintained that he was training with 4-5 other players of the first team but this group of players was not training together with the rest of the first team.

25. The Claimant recalled that according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), should a club deregister a player and render him ineligible to compete, the player has then the right to unilaterally terminate the employment contract with just cause and thus without even putting the club in default. Nevertheless, the Claimant stressed that he had requested the Respondent to put him on the list of eligible players before the expiration of the registration period.

26. Finally, the Claimant clarified that contrary to the Respondent’s allegations, he terminated the employment contract with just cause in accordance with art. 14 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and not with sporting just cause.

27. In its duplica, the Respondent claimed that the employment contract contains a clear arbitration clause in favour of the Cypriot NDRC which is independent and impartial. Whilst referring to the It pointed out once again that the Cypriot NDRC fulfils the requirements of art. 22 b) of the RSTP since it respects the principles of parity (equal representation), fair hearing, contentious proceedings, equal treatment and access to justice.

28. Consequently, FIFA is not competent to hear the present claim as it should be the Cypriot NDRC.

29. Furthermore, the Respondent raised a second issue as to the present claim’s admissibility, namely that the employment contract was concluded between the claimant and the company AEL Podosfairo Dimosia LTD, and not with the club AEL Limassol FC. In this regard, the Respondent argued that AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD is a legal entity and a “register member of the Cyprus Football Association” and that the Respondent and AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD are two separate legal entities.

30. In light of the above, the Respondent considered that the claim should be inadmissible since the Claimant failed to sue the correct respondent, namely AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD, instead of the club AEL Limassol FC.

31. In addition to its initial response, the Respondent underlined that the Claimant was trained by qualified staff members at the same time and date of the rest of the first team. Furthermore, the claimant failed to prove that the staff was not duly qualified.

32. According to the Respondent, the fact that the Claimant was following a different training programme than the rest of the team for a specific period does not mean that his fundamental rights as a football player were violated.

33. Finally, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant did not properly put them in default since the correspondence dated 5 September 2018 received from the Claimant did not give a clear meaning of default as provided by the jurisprudence of FIFA. Moreover, the Claimant should have put the Respondent in default repeatedly before terminating the employment contract with just cause.

34. On 30 September 2018, the player concluded an employment contract with the Angolan club Clube Recreativo E Desportivo Do Libolo, valid for two seasons as of 1 October 2018. According to this contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of 850,000 Kwanzas per month.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 21 January 2019 and decided on 26 March 2020. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.

2. Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment–related dispute with an international dimension between a Portuguese player and a Cypriot club.

3. At this point, the Chamber noted that the Respondent first objected to the admissibility of the present claim, alleging that according to art. 13 of the agreement as well as to art. 22 of the national regulations for the status and transfer of players the Cypriot NDRC is competent to adjudicate in the present matter, arguing that the conditions set out in art. 22 b) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players are met.

4. In this regard, the DRC noted that the Claimant asserted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter since the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA allegedly does not meet the relevant prerequisites of the FIFA Circular no. 1010.

5. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contains a jurisdiction clause.

6. Having said this, the DRC turned its attention to art. 13 of the contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. According to said art. 13, “Any employment dispute between the Club and the Player shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the CFA and shall be resolved according to the applicable regulations of the CFA.”

7. In view of the aforementioned clause, the DRC was of the opinion that art. 13 of the employment contract makes clear reference to a national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. Therefore, the DRC deemed that said article constitutes an exclusive arbitration clause.

8. However, the Chamber wished to stress that, even if the contract at the basis of the present dispute includes an arbitration clause in favour of a national dispute resolution body, the Respondent was unable to prove that, in fact, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA meets the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations.

9. In this respect, the DRC referred to the general principle of equal representation of players as well as of clubs, and underlined that this principle was one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such.

10. Indeed, this prerequisite is not only mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, but also in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives […]; b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives […].” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal […].

Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list.”

11. Subsequently, the Chamber acknowledged receipt of the Regulations of the CFA, provided by the Respondent, and began to analyse their content. In this context, the DRC noted that, according to art. 22.4 of the aforementioned Cypriot Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA, is composed of 5 members, as follows: a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, one member appointed by the Executive Committee of the CFA and two members appointed by the Pancyprian Football Players’ Association.

12. In view of the aforementioned and taking into account the pre-requisites for the recognition of the jurisdiction of a Dispute Resolution Chamber at a national level stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 and the FIFA NDRC Regulations, the DRC considered that, in light of the documentation provided by the CFA and the Respondent, the relevant national deciding body does not appear to be composed of an equal number of players’ and clubs’ representatives, since the representation of the clubs, if any, is not evident.

13. Therefore, the DRC concurred that the Respondent was unable to prove that the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA had met the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals, as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the above-mentioned Regulations, in FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA NDRC Regulations.

14. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter – in favour of the Cypriot NDRC – has to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

15. Having established that it is competent to entertain the present dispute, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the said Regulations and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 12 August 2019, the June 2019 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

16. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the DRC emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

17. The Chamber, first of all, duly noted that the Respondent had raised the issue of its standing to be sued in the present matter, arguing that namely that the employment contract was concluded between the Claimant and the company AEL Podosfairo Dimosia LTD, and not with the club AEL Limassol FC. In this regard, the Respondent argued that AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD is a legal entity and a “register member of the Cyprus Football Association” and that the Respondent and AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD are two separate legal entities.

18. In light of the above, the Respondent considered that the claim should be inadmissible since the Claimant failed to sue the correct respondent, namely AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD, instead of the club AEL Limassol FC.

19. In this regard, the Chamber, after carefully studying the documents on file, in particular the employment contract and the “additional agreement”, decided that the Respondent’s argument with respect to its standing to be sued in the present matter cannot be sustained. Indeed, the aforementioned refer to AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD as “the club”. Moreover, the two documents in question bear the stamp of AEL Limassol. It is evident that the entity AEL Podosfero Dimosia LTD is the company owning the club AEL Limassol and as such the two entities, although being legally separate, must be considered as one and the same in the context of the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent.

20. In view of the above, the Chamber unanimously established that the Respondent has standing to be sued in the present matter.

21. Reverting to the facts of the present dispute, the Chamber recalled that the parties had concluded two agreements, the employment contract and the “additional agreement”, both valid as from 16 May 2017 until 31 May 2019.

22. The dispute between the parties appears to have started towards the end of the season 2017/2018, when the Claimant complained that he was excluded from the first team, that he was never informed of the start of the training sessions with the first team for the start of the season 201/2019 and that he was sent training separately, together with several other team mates, in unprofessional conditions.

23. Furthermore, the Claimant sent two warnings to the Respondent in order to be added to the list of eligible players for the 2018-2019 season. Since these warnings remained unanswered, the player decided to terminate the employment relationship on 12 September 2019, after the CFA had confirmed to him that he had not been registered amongst the 22 players of the Respondent for the season 2018/2019.

24. In reaction to the player’s claim, the club essentially denied all accusations made against it, in particular with regard to the fact that the player was excluded from the first team, that he was sent to train in unprofessional conditions or that he had been poorly treated by the club. With respect to the issue of the player’s registration for the new season, the Respondent held that, although the player was not registered at the start of the season, this did not imply that he would stay unregistered for the second half of the season. Moreover, the Respondent underlined that it was still honouring its contractual obligations towards the Claimant, in particular with regard to the payment of his salary.

25. Having duly taken note of the parties’ respective positions in the present dispute, the Chamber acknowledge that the main question to be addressed is whether the player had a just cause to terminate the employment relationship on 12 September 2019 and what are the potential consequences of this early termination.

26. In this context, the Chamber recalled that there are two fundamental reasons put forward by the Claimant as to why he deems having terminated the employment relationship with just cause; i. the issue of his alleged exclusion from the first team / first team trainings and ii. the one of his deregistration at the start of the season 2018/2019.

27. With regards to the first issue, the Chamber, referring to the principle of burden of proof mentioned under art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations, came to the conclusion that the Claimant did not provide sufficient evidence that he was systematically excluded from the first team activities. The evidence provided consists in default notice letters, which were, in turn, contested by the Respondent in writing. It is impossible for the Chamber to determine with certainty the facts which transpired between the start of the season and the date on which the player terminated the employment relationship. Therefore, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s argumentation in this regard.

28. As to the second issue, the Chamber duly noted, first of all, that the Respondent confirmed that it had not registered the player as part of the team at the start of the season 2018/2019. The Claimant, furthermore, provided an exchange of emails between himself and an employee of the CFA, whereby the latter had confirmed to him that he was not amongst the list of registered players.

29. At this point, the Chamber was eager to recall its well-established jurisprudence, according to which among a player’s fundamental rights under an employment contract, is not only his right to a timely payment of his remuneration, but also his right to access training and to be given the possibility to compete with his fellow team mates in the team’s official matches. In fact, by de-registering a player, even for a limited period of time, a club is effectively barring, in an absolute manner, the potential access of a player to competition and, as such, is violating one of his fundamental rights as a football player. For this reason, the Chamber could not support the Respondent’s argument that the player could have been registered for the second half the season, as this would entail him to be deprived from an access to competition for approximately six months.

30. In light of the above, the Chamber unanimously decided that the non-registration of the player at the start of the season 2018/2019 manifestly constituted a breach of contract which entitled the player to terminate the employment relationship with just cause.

35. As a conclusion, the Chamber held that the player terminated the employment relationship with the Respondent on 12 September 2019 with just cause. As a consequence of such finding, the Chamber first clarified that the counter-claim of the Respondent is rejected.

36. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the DRC went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant.

37. First of all, the DRC noted the Claimant’s request regarding the outstanding salaries at the time of the unilateral termination of the contract; indeed the Claimant claimed the amount of EUR 4,000 as part of the month of September 2019. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that the salary of September 2019 was not yet due at the time the player terminated the contract, and that, consequently, the month of September 2019 must be taken into account for the calculation of the compensation for breach of contract.

38. In continuation, the DRC decided that, taking into consideration the Claimant’s respective claim and art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding salaries on the basis of the relevant employment contract.

39. In this context, the DRC outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

40. In application of the relevant provision, the DRC held that he first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC judge established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

41. Subsequently, the Chamber noted that the remaining value of the employment contract as from the date of the termination until the original expiry of the employment contract amounted to EUR 90,000 i.e. nine monthly salaries amounting to EUR 10,000 each. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

42. In continuation, the DRC remarked that the Claimant had concluded a new employment contract with the Angolan club, Clube Recreativo E Desportivo Do Libolo, valid for two seasons as of 1 October 2018. According to this contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of 850,000 Kwanzas per month, i.e. EUR 1,510 per month. Bearing in mind the provision of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations and in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber as well as the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account for the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

43. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 87,920 to the Claimant, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a., as from 13 September 2018 until the date of effective payment.

44. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./3. above, the Chamber referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

45. In this regard, the Chamber established that, in virtue of the aforementioned rovision, it has competence to impose a sanction on the club. More in particular, the DRC pointed out that, against clubs, the sanction shall consist in a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

46. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that, in the event that the club does not pay the amount due to the player within 45 days as from the moment in which the player, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the club, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the club in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

47. The Chamber recalled that the above-mentioned sanction will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

48. The DRC concluded his deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim of the Claimant is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Marco Ibraim De Sousa Airosa, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, AEL Limassol, has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 87,920, plus 5% interest p.a., as from 13 September 2018 until the date of effective payment.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount mentioned under point 2 above.

6. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with point 2 above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

7. In the event that the amount due in accordance with point 2 above is not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

8. The ban mentioned in point 7 above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.

9. In the event that the aforementioned sum is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

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Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note related to the appeal procedure:

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer