F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 27 February 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 27 February 2020,

in the following composition:

Clifford Hendel (USA), Deputy Chairman

Roy Vermeer (Netherlands), member

Stefano La Porta (Italy), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Ariel Thierry Ngueukam, Cameroon,

represented by Mr Boat Sity

as Claimant

against the club,

Hapoel Raanana FC, Israel,

represented by Mr Yuval Shadmi

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 5 July 2018, the Cameroonian player, Ariel Thierry Ngueukam (hereinafter: the Claimant or the player) concluded an “Annex to Players Agreement Form” (hereinafter: the 1st contract) with the Israeli club, Hapoel Raanana FC, (hereinafter: the Respondent or the club) valid for the 2018/2019, 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 seasons until 31 May 2021.

2. Pursuant to clause 3 of the 1st contract, the club undertook to pay the player the following:

a) During the 2018/19 season, the player was entitled to receive a total fixed remuneration of NIS 514,800 gross (“equal to USD 110,000 net”), payable in 10 monthly salaries of NIS 51,480 (“equal to USD 11,000 net”) from August 2018 to May 2019;

b) During the 2019/20 season, the player was entitled to receive a total fixed remuneration of NIS 608,400 gross (“equal to USD 130,000 net”), payable in 10 monthly salaries of NIS 60,840 (“equal to USD 13,000 net”) from August 2019 to May 2020;

c) During the 2019/20 season, the player was entitled to receive a total fixed remuneration of NIS 702,000 gross (“equal to USD 150,000 net”), payable in 10 monthly salaries of NIS 70,200 (“equal to USD 15,000 net”) from August 2020 to May 2021.

3. According to clause 7.1 of the 1st contract, “the player grants the team the option, at the end of the first two seasons (option for the team) to cancel and terminate the agreement for the remaining period of the agreement. Such execution of the option shall be done by a notice to the player no later than June 15th, 2019 (if the team wish to cancel and terminate the agreement at the end of the 2018/19 season) and no later than June, 15th 2020 (if the team wish to cancel and terminate the agreement at the end of the 2019/20 season). Such execution of the option for early termination shall not be considered to be a breach of the agreement and the player shall not be entitled to compensation of any kind”.

4. Subsequently, on 10 July 2018, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an “Agreement Form for the Season of 2018/2019” (hereinafter: the 2nd contract), valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2019, i.e. the 2018/2019 season.

5. According to clause 7 of the 2nd contract, the parties agreed that “differences of opinion between the Club and player or between the Player and the Club, in everything relating to the directives of this Agreement, shall be decided by an arbitrator, who will be appointed by virtue of the power of the Association’s Arbitration Institute Codex. The arbitration will be held in accordance with the directives of the Association’s Arbitration Institute Codex”.

6. On 28 April 2019, the club notified the player of its decision “to exercise its option to cancel and terminate the Agreement for the remaining period of the Agreement (paragraph 7.1 of the Agreement)”.

7. In this context, on 16 May 2019, the player replied to the club stating that the unilateral termination by the club was without just cause and informed the club of his intention to start legal proceedings.

8. On 16 May 2019, the player lodged a claim in front of FIFA without just cause and requested the payment of NIS 1,693,400, as follows:

a) NIS 1,328,400 (“equal to USD 372,191”) corresponding to the residual value of the contract;

b) NIS 365,000 (“equal to USD 102,266”) corresponding to an additional compensation of 6 monthly salaries.

9. The player argued that clause 7.1 of the 1st contract upon which the club terminated the employment relationship lacked reciprocity and did not offer any kind of compensation to the player. Therefore, the player, referring to DRC and CAS jurisprudence, stated that the clause was invalid.

10. In addition, the player declared that the unilateral termination was solely based on the above-mentioned clause and that no other reasons were invoked by the club. Thus, the player was of the opinion that the club terminated the employment relationship without just cause.

11. The Claimant further stated that the club decided to terminate the employment relationship due to an apparent illness that the player suffered (malaria) and that, for that reason, the club allegedly put pressure on the player to terminate the contract by excluding him from first team activities.

12. The Respondent, in its response, first challenged FIFA’s competence to deal with this matter on the basis of clause 7 of the 2nd contract (cf. point I.5. above) and alleging any dispute in relation to the contract shall be heard by the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA.

13. Furthermore, the club indicated that the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA is fully independent, and respects the principles of fairness and equal representation of players and clubs, in line with article 22.b) of the FIFA RSTP. As such, the club deemed that the player’s claim is inadmissible.

14. As to the substance, referring to the termination clause of the 1st contract (cf. point I.3. above), the club argued that as from the beginning of the negotiations with the player’s representatives in June 2018, the player was duly informed of the insertion of such clause. In this respect, as per the club, the player accepted and signed the club’s fourth offer in which said termination clause was stipulated.

15. In addition, the club provided copies of the negotiations with the player regarding the draft of the contract and stated that the player never raised any question regarding the termination clause.

16. In continuation, the club stated that the player mislead the club by hiding a sickness that he allegedly contracted prior to signing the contract. In fact, the player was apparently diagnosed with a “flu” on 13 July 2018, and was hospitalised after his arrival to the club’s training camp in Poland on 15 July 2018, where “his medical tests indicated that he [was] suffering from Malaria”. In this context, the club held that it was the Player’s health and medical conditions were “very [suspicious]”, and suggested that the player might had hidden his condition in order to secure employment.

17. As per the club, since the recovery period from malaria is long, it allegedly sought to negotiate an amicable termination on 31 July 2018. However, as per the Respondent, “the Player and his representatives decided - in bad faith and without any reasonable sense - to ignore the Club and not to response to the Club’s calls and emails”.

18. The club indicated that, on 12 August 2018, the player returned to full fitness and participated in the club’s team activities.

19. According to the Respondent, during January 2019 the parties attempted to negotiate a termination. However, as per the club, “none of the offers the Player was provided with were to his satisfaction”.

20. Once again, on 15 April 2019, the parties “returned to discuss about possible settlement […]”. In his response, the player allegedly requested the club to pay him “2.5 salary plus [his] TPO”.

21. On 29 April 2019, the club terminated the player’s contract.

22. As per the Respondent, after having offered the player the possibility to terminate the contract in 3 different occasions prior to the termination letter dated 29 April 2019, it considered that it had just cause to terminate the employment relationship. Furthermore, as per the club, it sent the termination letter in April 2019, “one month before the end of the season” in order to “provide the Player with enough time to prepare himself in advanced and calculate his future steps”.

23. Lastly, in the event that the DRC deemed itself competent and that compensation is due to the player, the club emphasised that the player’s current remuneration shall be deducted from it.

24. In his replica, the player firstly contested the club’s allegations that the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA is competent to deal with the employment-related dispute. In this respect, the player referred to a communication issued by FIFPro on 20 March 2019, and pointed out that the aforementioned tribunal does not meet the equal representation criteria, “as 5 of the 6 members of the Appointments Committee are appointed by the clubs, meaning, the clubs and players do not have equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrators list”. Consequently, the player deemed that the appointment of arbitrators is in complete disagreement with both the FIFA Circular n° 1010 and the FIFA NDRC Standard Regulations.

25. In addition, the player argued that the Mediation Tribunal of the IFA does not meet the minimum standards for fair proceedings, since there is no appropriate balance between player and club representatives, as “the Chairman of the IFA Arbitration Tribunal is not appointed by consensus of the player’s and the club’s representatives”.

26. Finally, the player argued that “the IFA does not have two separate instances, so an appeal to a higher independent instance is not possible. As no separate appeal instance exists at national level, the IFA Tribunal does not meet the standard prescribed in the NDRC Standard Regulations”.

27. In view of the aforementioned, the player considered that “FIFA is competent to hear the dispute”. In this respect, the player further underlined that “the Respondent bears the burden of proof to prove the IFA Arbitration Tribunal satisfies the required criteria, but it has completely failed to do so”,

28. As to the substance, the Claimant underlined that he was “not aware in any way he contracted Malaria and the Club did not produce any evidence to suggest otherwise”. In this context, the Claimant further pointed out that he properly fulfilled all his contractual obligations, as “[he] did not miss any official games due to his illness and returned to full training with the team less than a month after being hospitalised”.

29. In continuation, with regard to clause 7.1 of the 1st contract, and referring to the well- established jurisprudence of the DRC and CAS, the player sustained that said clause is “potestative” and “clearly creates a disproportional repartition of the rights of the parties to the sole benefit of the Club”. Therefore, the player considered that said clause “must be considered invalid”.

30. In addition, considering that the termination letter sent by the Respondent “did not specify any other cause for the termination of the Contract” and “the Club did not point to any breach or misconduct of the Player”, the Claimant highlighted that the club did not have just cause to terminate the contract prematurely.

31. Lastly, the Claimant further underlined that the Respondent excluded him from the training sessions and “continuously pressured [him] to terminate the Contract, including threatening to “freeze” the Player’s registration if he refuse[d] to do so […]”.

32. In this context, considering the alleged “abusive behavior of the Club aimed at pressuring the Player to terminate the Contract prematurely”, the Claimant reiterated his request to received compensation in the amount of NIS 1,693,400 plus 5% interest p.a. as from the due dates until the date of effective payment.

33. In its duplica, referring to clause 7 of the 2nd contract, the Respondent reiterated that the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA has exclusive competence to settle the dispute.

34. In continuation, with regard to the composition of the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA, the club further sustained that “each party has the same influence on the appointment of the arbitrators, as requested in the [FIFA Circular n° 1010]”. In this respect, as per the club, “it is clear that the requirement for fair proceedings is fully met, including the conditions of transparency, and no advantage is given to either side of the disputes”.

35. Furthermore, with regard to the player’s medical condition, the Respondent reiterated its position. In this context, the club pointed out “that the fact the Player trained with the club for few days before he was diagnosed is irrelevant, as it is well known that this kind of disease can “show” its symptoms after weeks since infection”.

36. Additionally, according to the Respondent, in spite of its several attempts to reach a settlement or resolution by mutual agreement, “the Player refused to the Club’s settlement and he remained registered as the Club’s player”. In this respect, due to “the Player’s unwillingness to settle the issue” and his “bad faith” during the negotiations, the Respondent considered having “the right to terminate the relevant contract”.

37. Finally, the Respondent requested the Dispute Resolution Chamber to reject the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and to establish that the Respondent has not breached the contract without just cause. However, in the event that the DRC considered that the player is entitled to receive compensation, the club argued that the amount should “be minor, due to the Player’s and his Agent’s conduct and surly any amount must be ruled after deducting from the basis of such compensation the amount (salary) the Player earn[s] in his new clubs (Kuopion Palloseura FC and SJK Seinäjoki FC […]”.

38. Upon FIFA’s request, the player indicated that he had signed two employment contracts, as follows:

a) A contract with the Finnish club Kuopion Palloseura FC (KuPS) valid as from 24 June 2019 until 30 November 2019, according to which he was entitled to a total fixed remuneration of EUR 30,000;

b) A contract with the Finnish club Seinäjoen Jalkapallokerho FC (SJK) valid as from 1 January 2020 until 30 November 2021, according to which he is entitled to receive EUR 94,700 over the relevant period.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 16 May 2019. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2018 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension. Within this context, the Chamber understood that, in principle, it would be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a Cameroonian player and an Israeli club regarding an employment-related dispute.

3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the club contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 7 of the 2nd contract, alleging that the player should have addressed his claim to the National Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the Israel Football Association.

4. In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA is competent to deal with the present matter highlighting, inter alia, that the Arbitration and Mediation Tribunal of the IFA does not meet the equal representation criteria between players and clubs.

5. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit b) of the Regulations it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations (hereinafter: the NDRC Regulations), which came into force on 1 January 2008.

6. In addition, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that another basic condition that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear and specific jurisdiction clause.

7. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that clause 7 of the 2nd contract stipulated that “differences of opinion between the Club and player or between the Player and the Club, in everything relating to the directives of this Agreement, shall be decided by an arbitrator, who will be appointed by virtue of the power of the Association’s Arbitration Institute Codex”.

8. Having examined the relevant provision, the Chamber came to the conclusion that clause 7 of the 2nd contract does not constitute a clear jurisdiction clause in favour of a specific court of arbitration tribunal in Israel, as it only refers to “an arbitrator”.

9. Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body.

10. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the club’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance and that the claim of the player is admissible.

11. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 16 May 2019, the June 2018 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

12. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

13. The Chamber first acknowledged that the player and the club signed an employment contract on 5 July 2018 which, as per the player, would have expired on 31 May 2021. Moreover, the Chamber recalled that, according to the player, the club terminated the contract with the player on 28 April 2019.

14. In this context, the Chamber firstly focussed its attention on the said clause 7.1 of the 1st contract, which reads as follows: “the player grants the team the option, at the end of the first two seasons (option for the team) to cancel and terminate the agreement for the remaining period of the agreement. Such execution of the option shall be done by a notice to the player no later than June 15th, 2019 (if the team wish to cancel and terminate the agreement at the end of the 2018/19 season) and no later than June, 15th 2020 (if the team wish to cancel and terminate the agreement at the end of the 2019/20 season). Such execution of the option for early termination shall not be considered to be a breach of the agreement and the player shall not be entitled to compensation of any kind”.

15. In this regard, the Chamber took into account that such clause appears to be unilateral and to the benefit of the Respondent only. In the light of such potestative character of the pertinent contractual clause, the members of the Chamber agreed that clause 7.1 of the 1st contract is not acceptable.

16. Therefore, the Chamber concurred that the said clause 7.1 of the 1st contract does not constitute a reason that can be validly invoked nor a legal basis to unilaterally terminate the contract. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the Respondent’s argument in this respect.

17. Having established the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the consequences of the unilateral termination of the employment relationship by the Respondent without just cause on 28 April 2019.

18. In this respect, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract payable by the club to the player in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber first recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

19. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake

20. As a consequence, the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the club to the player had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The DRC recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the DRC emphasized beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

21. In order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the player in the present case, the Chamber first turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to him under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), which criterion was considered to be essential. The DRC deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows it to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract, if any, in the calculation of the amount of compensation.

22. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract as from its date of termination with just cause by the player, i.e. 28 April 2019, until 31 May 2021, and concluded that the player would have received the total amount of NIS 1,361,880, as follows: (i) NIS 51,480, corresponding to the monthly salary for May 2019; (ii) NIS 608,400, corresponding to the salaries for the 2019/2020 season; (iii) NIS 702,000, corresponding to the salaries for the 2020/2021 season. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of NIS 1,361,880 served as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

23. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the player had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for termination of contract with just cause in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

24. Having said this, the DRC noted that according to the information on file, the player signed an employment contract with the Finish club, KuPS, valid as from 24 June 2019 until 30 November 2019, in accordance with which the player was to receive a total remuneration of EUR 30,000. Furthermore, the player signed an employment contract with the Finish club, SJK, valid as from 1 January 2020 until 30 November 2021, in accordance with which the player is entitled to receive a total remuneration of EUR 94,700 over the relevant period. Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contracts for the period as from June 2019 until and including May 2021 amounted to EUR 124,700, approx. NIS 464,870.

25. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand as well as the Claimant’s general obligation to mitigate his damage, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant’s claim and that the Respondent must pay the amount of NIS 897,010, which was considered reasonable and proportionate as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

26. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 16 May 2019, until the date of effective payment.

27. Lastly, the members of the DRC rejected the Claimant’s claim to receive additional compensation. In this respect, the DRC pointed out that additional compensation as per article 17 par. 1 lit. ii) can only be awarded for breach of contract due to outstanding remuneration.

28. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./12. above, the Chamber referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

29. In this regard, the Chamber established that, in virtue of the aforementioned provision, it has competence to impose a sanction on the club. More in particular, the DRC pointed out that, against clubs, the sanction shall consist in a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

30. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that, in the event that the club does not pay the amount due to the player within 45 days as from the moment in which the player, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the club, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the club in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

31. Finally, the Chamber recalled that the above-mentioned sanction will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

32. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that the player’s claim is admissible and partially accepted and that any further claims lodged by the player are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Ariel Thierry Ngueukam, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, Hapoel Raanana FC, has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of NIS 897,010 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 16 May 2019 until the date of effective payment.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the email address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount plus interest mentioned under point III.3. above.

6. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount plus interest in accordance with point III.3. above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

7. In the event that the amount due plus interest in accordance with point III.2. above are not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

8. The ban mentioned in point III.7. above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amounts plus interest are paid.

9. In the event that the amounts due plus interest in accordance with point III.2. above are still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

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Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note relating to the appeal procedure:

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)

Avenue de Beaumont 2

CH-1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer