F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2020-2021) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision2 July 2020
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 July 2020,
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Agustin Maximiliano
Rogel Paita
COMPOSITION:
Clifford J. Hendel (USA & France), Deputy Chairman
Michele Colucci (Italy), member
Todd Durbin (USA), member
CLAIMANT:
Agustin Maximiliano Rogel Paita,
Uruguay
Represented by Mr Felipe Vásquez Rivera
RESPONDENT:
FC Krylia Sovetov, Russia
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
1) According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 23 August
2018, the Uruguayan club, Club Nacional de Football, and the Respondent concluded an
agreement for the transfer of the player to the latter, for the amount of EUR 425,000.
2) On 27 August 2018, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment contract
valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2022 (hereinafter: the labour contract).
3) According to clause 6.1 of the contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of EUR
12,000.
4) According to clause 2.1 of the Appendix 1 to the labour contract of 27 August 2018, the
player was entitled to an additional monthly fee of EUR 13,000.
5) On 28 August 2018, the parties concluded an additional agreement (Agreement No1), which
in its introduction refers to the employment contract and the Appendix 1 of 27 August 2018.
The Agreement No1 modifies some clauses of the employment contract and of Appendix 1,
related to the player’s monthly remuneration.
6) On 1 November 2018, the Claimant and the Respondent entered into an Agreement No2,
referring to the employment contract and the Appendix 1 of 27 August 2018, and providing
for the following:
“The duration of the labour contract is extended until 31 December 2022;
The payment of a sign-on fee to the player in the amount of EUR 375,000 on or before 20
November 2018;
In case of a future transfer, the club will calculate first 30% of the transfer fee and then deduct
EUR 800,000 from this amount. The final result will be payable to the player”.
7) On 19 July 2019, the club entered into an agreement for the permanent transfer (the transfer
agreement) of the player to the French club, FC Toulouse, for the amount of EUR 2,500,000,
payable as follows: EUR 1,500,000 from the issuance of the ITC (23 July 2019) and EUR
1,000,000 on 31 December 2019.
8) Both the club and the player agree that on 19 July 2019 they concluded a termination
agreement. Different versions of said document, however, were provided by each party.
9) On 21 August 2019, the legal representative of the player sent a default notice to the
Respondent, indicating the following and requesting a reaction of the club within 10 days:
“a. Give an authentic copy of the transfer agreement signed by the CLUB and the French club
FC Toulouse, in order to see the transfer fee.-
b. The due payment of the 30 % of the transfer fee (extra official, the PLAYER knows that it was
of 2.500.000.oo euros).” The player bases such request on a document named “Additional
Agreement, hereinafter referred to as PRUEBA E.
10) On 30 August 2019, the club sent a correspondence to the player, indicating the following:
“I note that in your letter you refer to an unknown “Additional Agreement” [PRUEBA E] with
relation of the “Labor Contract”», allegedly stipulating that «the CLUB must pay to the player
“30 % (thirty percent) of the positive difference between the amount of transfer fee and all costs
and expenses spent by the Club in relation with the Player (including all acquisition costs). This
30 % share of the Player shall be paid by the club within 15 business days from effective receipt
by the Club of the full amount of respective transfer fee”».
“However, Agreement No2 to the Labour Contract and Appendix No1 to the Labour Contract
stipulates another terms and conditions and FC Krylia Sovetov never changed these terms and
conditions by means of signing of any other «“Additional Agreement(s)” [PRUEBA E] with
relation of the “Labor Contract”».
11) On 17 September 2019, the legal representative of the player sent another correspondence
to the club, requesting the following:
a) The payment of the 30% of the transfer fee in accordance with clause 2 of the “Additional
Agreement” [PRUEBA E],
b) The payment of Euros 201.600 in accordance with the “Termination Agreement to the Labor
Contract dated 27th august, 2018, to which we will refer hereinafter as PRUEBA F.
12) On 3 October 2019, the legal representative of the player sent a new default notice to the
club.
13) On 20 January 2020, the legal representative of the player sent a final default notice to the
club, requesting the amount of EUR 1,086,000.
II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FIFA
A. Position of the Claimant
14) On 17 February 2020, the Claimant lodged a claim against the club and requested the
payment of the following amounts, plus 5% interest p.a.:
a) EUR 958,500, corresponding to the following:
i) EUR 2,500,000 (price paid by Toulouse) minus EUR 425,000 (price paid to Nacional) *
30% = EUR 622,500 (PRUEBA E);
ii) EUR 336,000, corresponding to the amount stipulated in the termination agreement
(PRUEBA F);
or, in the alternative,
b) EUR 336,000, plus “30% of the transfer amount with the deduction of the costs of buyout of
the player”.
c) USD 40,000, as legal costs.
15) According to the player, on 29 August 2018, he concluded a further additional agreement
with the club (“PRUEBA E”), stipulating the following:
“1. The Club shall pay the Player an additional amount in the sum of EUR 375 000 (…). payable
on or before 20 September 2018.
2. In the case of a subsequent permanent transfer of the Player from the Club to any third
football club with the amount of transfer fee equal or exceeding EUR 2 000 000 (…) the Player
shall be entitled to receive 30% of the positive difference between the amount of transfer fee
and all costs and expenses spent by the Club in relation with the Player (including acquisition
costs).
This 30% share of the Player shall be paid by the Club within 15 business days from effective
receipt by the Club of the full amount of respective transfer fee.”
3. This Additional Agreement is made out in two identical copies in Russian and in English. One
copy is to be handed to the Player, while another one shall be kept by the Club”.
16) He also claims to have concluded a termination agreement with the club on 19 July 2019
(PRUEBA F) stipulating, inter alia, the following:
“In this respect, the Parties have agreed that the Labour contract shall automatically be
terminated by mutual consent of the Parties on 22 July 2019 if, by that moment, all the following
conditions are fulfilled:
FC Toulouse has informed the Club in writing that the Player has successfully passed the medical
examination and other physical tests: and
The Transfer Contract between the Club and FC Toulouse for the permanent transfer of the
Player has come into force: and
The Player has entered into respective employment contract with FC Toulouse.
If at least one of the aforementioned pre-conditions is not met by 3PM Samara time on 22 July
2019, the Labour Contract shall remain into full force and the Player shall join the team of the
Club and proceed fulfilling his work duties without delay.
(…)
4. If the Labour Contract is terminated in accordance with clause 2 above, the Club shall pay to
the Player a compensation for premature termination of the Labour Contract and his consent to be transferred, in the gross amount of 336 000 (Three hundred thirty six) Euros. The payment
shall be made in Russian rubles at a currency rate of the Central bank of Russia on the day of
the termination, in two installments as follows:
- EUR 201 600 - by 10 August 2019,
- EUR 134 400 - by 15 January 2020”.
17) In this context, the player referred to his default notices and to the lack of payment by the
club of the amounts due to him in accordance with the aforementioned documents, which
he claims to have been duly concluded between the parties.
B. Position of the Respondent
18) In its reply to the claim, the Respondent first contested the competence of FIFA on the basis
of art. 9 of the club’s version of the termination agreement (referred to in detail below), which
stipulated the following:
“Any disputes relating to or connected with this Termination Agreement, are subject to
resolution by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Union of Russia”.
19) The Respondent argued that there is an independent National Dispute Resolution Chamber
(NDRC) established in Russia within the framework of the Football Union of Russia that
guarantees fair proceedings and respects the principle of equal representation of players and
clubs, and that the Termination Agreement contains an explicit arbitration clause.
20) In this respect, the Respondent referred to a decision of the PSC SJ dated 26 January 2016,
Ref. 14-00677, in which the PSC considered the claim of a coach against a Russian club
inadmissible, since “the Respondent was able to prove that the RFU NDRC meets the minimum
procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals guaranteeing fair proceedings as
laid down in article 22 c) of the Regulations”.
21) In the present case, the Respondent did not provide any evidence of compliance with the
requirements of art. 22 b) of the RSTP or with the FIFA NDRC Regulations.
22) As to the substance, the club disputed the validity of PRUEBA E and PRUEBA F, presented
by the player.
23) In this respect, the club claims that on 19 July 2019 the parties concluded a termination
agreement (club’s version), indicating the following:
“1. As the Player has accepted to be transferred to FC Toulouse on a permanent basis and signed
an employment contract with FC Toulouse, valid from 20 July 2019, the Parties have agreed, on
the basis of sub-clause 1 part one Article 77 of the Labor Code of Russia, to terminate the Labour
Contract by mutual consent of the Parties on 19July 2019
2. This Termination Agreement is made in four original copies. One copy shall be handed to the
Player upon signature, while three other copies may be registered in the RFPL and then
distributed between the Parties.
3. An electronic copy of this Termination Agreement, signed by means of exchange by email,
shall have the binding effect of an original.”
24) In accordance with exhibit 12 of the club’s reply, the document was sent by the club to
Toulouse FC by email on 19 July 2019 for the player to sign and the signed document was
returned by Toulouse to the club on 20 July 2019 also by email.
25) The club claims that the version of the termination agreement as provided by the player
[PRUEBA F] was sent to the player’s agent via WhatsApp on 19 July 2019 to be signed, but
the player never returned it signed and provided no proof of having duly communicated his
acceptance to the club.
26) As to PRUEBA E, the club claims that the “Additional Agreement dated 29 August 2018 is
nothing but a clear fake”. In this respect, the club explains that following the sending of the
draft of (PRUEBA F) via WhatsApp on 19 July 2019, the player’s agent sent a counter-offer
proving that no additional agreement had been signed on 29 August 2018 (PRUEBA E).
27) The aforementioned email of the player’s agent, Mr Krasouki, read as follows:
“Dear Sirs,
In order to terminate the contract with Augustin Rogel the player wants these 2 things to be
present:
l. The Club (Krylia Savyetov) is obliged to pay to the player all debts until July 20, 2019 (Salaries,
bonuses, airplane tickets - roughly around 57.000 €)
The Club is also obliged to pay to the player 30 % of the transfer amount that they receive
deducting 800.000 € that is mentioned in the contract between the club and the player. This
amount should be 510.000 € and should be paid latest 5 working days as the money is received
at the Club's bank account.
II. the Club receives the payment in 2·3 instalments - the same should apply for the Club to pay
the player, every time latest 5 working days”.
28) The club claims that it did not accept such proposal of the player’s agent.
29) Following this, on 19 July 2019, the club concluded the transfer agreement with Toulouse FC
and (its version of) the termination agreement with the player.
30) The club further explained that on 22 July 2019 it received an email originally drafted by the
player’s lawyer but subsequently forwarded to it by the player’s agents which refers to an
attempt to further negotiate the content of [PRUEBA F] despite that the labor contract had at
this point already been duly terminated via the correspondence exchanged with Toulouse FC.
31) In the Respondent’s opinion, “no other documents, but the labour Contract and its Appendix
No l, were regulating the Parties' cooperation on 01 November 2018”.
32) The Respondent further stated that “this dispute does not in fact originate from the player
Augustin Maximilliano Rogel Paita, but is a flagrant fraud of the group of agents, that just use
the player in their own interests” and considered the matter to be “engineered” by the player’s
legal representative.
33) In this respect, the Respondent argued that “As soon as the Claimant left Russia [with the
Respondent’s approval to continue negotiations with Toulouse and pass the medical exams],
a group of agents (namely: Mr Krasouski, Mr Joksimovic and Mr Vincente), allegedly controlling
the Claimant, contacted the Respondent and started blackmailing the Club, asking for 30% of
the transfer fee to be paid to the Player (while to the Respondent's understanding these monies
were in fact intended to the agents) and threatening the Club that they control the Player and
he will reject being transferred and the deal with FC Toulouse will be ruined, unless the
Respondent accepts to pay a share of the transfer fee to the agents (through the Player)”.
34) As a final remark, the Respondent deemed that on top of the inexistence of the litigious
documents [namely, PRUEBA E and PRUEBA F], the Claimant regularly changed his claim
during the present proceedings and “demonstrates that the claims were not initially basing
on any binding agreements, while the agreements presented by the Claimant as PRUEBA "E"
and PRUEBA "F" were fabricated by the Claimant at a later stage, after the Labour Contract
had already been terminated, and just in order to make a weak attempt to substantiate his
groundless claims”.
35) As such, as to the substance, the club requested the DRC to reject the player’s claim and to
order him to present the original versions of “PRUEBA E and F” or the “respective electronic
communications demonstrating that the agreements have ever been signed by the Claimant
and sent to the Respondent.”
C. Original evidence provided by the parties
36) Upon FIFA’s request to provide the original version of “all the documents they may deem to
be necessary in support of their allegations” as well as “a high definition scan of said alleged
originals”, bearing in mind the Covid-19 situation, the parties provided the following
evidence:
37) The Respondent provided the original exemplars as well as high definition scans of the Labour
contract, Appendix 1, Agreement No1 and Agreement No 2, the Termination agreement
(club’s version) dated 19 July 2019.
38) The Claimant provided the high definition scan of PRUEBA E as well as of the transfer contract
of the player from Nacional to the Respondent dated 23 August 2018 and of a letter from the
Respondent to the Claimant dated 22 August 2019 asking it to attest that he has no more
claims towards the Respondent. As to the PRUEBA F, the Claimant referred to the WhatsApp
correspondence allegedly supporting the exchange of the Termination agreement. The
Claimant did not provide the original version of the two documents on which he based his
claim.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER
A. Competence
39) In relation to the competence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to
as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand.
In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 February
2020 and decided on 2 July 2020. Consequently, the June 2020 edition of the Rules governing
the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the
Procedural Rules).
40) Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed
that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in conjunction with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with
employment-related disputes with an international dimension between a player and a club.
B. Admissibility
41) Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber acknowledged that the club contested the
competence of FIFA arguing that pursuant to clause 9 of its version of the termination
agreement, the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Union of Russia (hereinafter: the
Russian NDRC) was the competent tribunal to enter into the substance of this matter.
42) In this context, and without entering at this point the analysis of the validity of the documents
provided by the parties, the Chamber first pointed out that the player’s claim is not based on
the club’s version of the termination agreement, containing the aforementioned jurisdiction
clause.
43) The Chamber deemed it important to remind the parties that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b)
of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players the DRC is competent to deal with a
matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair
proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs has
been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective
bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent
arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005 and to the principles contained in the FIFA National
Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on
1 January 2008.
44) The Chamber further referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which establishes that
“any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”.
45) Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber observed that the club did not provide any
documentation whatsoever related to the composition and functioning of the Russian NDRC.
The club instead relied upon a decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee
passed on 26 January 2016, in the case with Ref. 14-00677, in which the Single Judge
considered the claim of a coach against a Russian club inadmissible, since “the Respondent
was able to prove that the RFU NDRC meets the minimum procedural standards for
independent arbitration tribunals guaranteeing fair proceedings as laid down in article 22 c) of
the Regulations”.
46) In this respect, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that the previous decision referred to
by the Respondent was passed in a coach v. club case, based on art. 22 c) of the Regulations,
which does not foresee the same strict requirements for an NDRC to entertain a labour claim
between a player and a club.
47) As a result of the aforementioned, the Chamber concluded that the club’s objection towards
the competence of FIFA was not sufficiently substantiated and has to be rejected.
48) Thus, the Chamber is competent to consider the present matter as to the substance, on the
basis of art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players and the claim is admissible.
C. Applicable legal framework
49) The Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and
2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the present
claim was lodged on 17 February 2020, the January 2020 edition of said regulations is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
50) The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the
Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The Chamber continued by
acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file
in relation to the substance of the matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the
following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
D. Burden of proof
51) The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of
the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged
fact shall carry the respective burden of proof.
E. Merits of the dispute
I. Main legal discussion
52) The Chamber wished to recall in this respect the main elements that gave rise to the present
dispute.
53) In this respect, the Chamber noted that it remained undisputed by the parties that on 27
August 2018 they signed an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until
31 May 2022, as well as an Appendix 1 to it. It is also not disputed that on 28 August 2018,
the parties signed the Agreement No 1, inter alia modifying the player’s remuneration, and
that on 1 November 2018 they signed the Agreement no 2, by means of which additional
payments were agreed and the duration of the contract was extended until 31 December
2022. The parties also agree that on 19 July 2019 their employment contract was terminated
and subsequently the player was transferred to Toulouse FC.
54) The Chamber however noted that according to the player on 29 August 2018 the parties also
signed an additional agreement [PRUEBA E], by means of which the parties allegedly agreed
upon the payment to the player of an additional amount of EUR 375,000 as well as of a
percentage of the upside of his future transfer to a third club. He further claims that on 19
July 2019, they signed a termination agreement [PRUEBA F] which stipulated inter alia that
“the Club shall pay to the Player a compensation for premature termination of the Labour
Contract and his consent to be transferred, in the gross amount of 336 000 (Three hundred
thirty six) Euros”.
55) Based on these two documents, the player lodged a claim against the club requesting the
payment of EUR 958,500, corresponding to EUR 622,500 as 30% of the upside of his transfer
to Toulouse FC [PRUEBA E] and EUR 366,000 as per PRUEBA F. Alternatively, he requested the
payment of EUR 336,000. The player further requested interest of 5% p.a. on the amounts
claimed as well as EUR 40,000 as legal costs.
56) Subsequently, the Chamber noted that the club claims that the aforementioned documents
upon which the player bases his claim are not valid. While PRUEBA E is allegedly “nothing
but a clear fake”, PRUEBA F was in fact initially sent by the club to the player’s agent via
Whatsapp on 19 July 2019, but the player never returned a signed copy of it or in any other
manner expressed his agreement with its content. He however signed and returned via his
new club Toulouse FC a copy of the termination agreement provided by the club, which does
not stipulate the club’s obligation to pay the player any further amounts upon termination.
Thus, the club claims that the player’s claim must be rejected, due to its lack of contractual
basis.
57) Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber established that the main issue to be analysed
in the present case is the validity of the documents names PRUEBA E and PRUEBA F, upon
which the player bases his claim.
II. Considerations
58) In this context, the Chamber first focused its attention on the issue of the validity of PRUEBA
E and PRUEBA F, contested by the club. Furthermore, the Chamber also deemed it necessary
to have a closer look at the club’s version of the termination agreement, which the club deems
to be the document regulating the end of the contractual relationship between the player
and the club, instead of PRUEBA F.
59) At this stage, the Chamber considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule, FIFA’s
deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon, nor do they have sufficient power and
authority to fully investigate and address, matters of criminal law, such as the ones of alleged
falsified documents. Furthermore, the Chamber indicated that it is not part of its usual practice
to appoint any type of forensic experts and that such questions of allegedly falsified
documents generally must fall into the jurisdiction and expertise of the competent national
criminal authority.
60) The Chamber then recalled that all documentation remitted shall be considered with free
discretion.
61) Having said that, the Chamber noted that, upon FIFA’s request for the parties to provide the
original version of the disputed documentation as well as a high-resolution scan of it, the
player on the one hand failed to remit the originals of PRUEBA E and PRUEBA F, and limited
himself to forwarding a high-resolution scan of such documents. On the other hand, the
Chamber noted that the club was able to provide FIFA with the original version and a highresolution
scan of the entire documentation, which regulated the contractual relationship of
the parties, as well as with substantial evidence of the electronic acceptance and signature by
the player of the club’s version of the termination agreement.
62) Consequently, the Chamber observed that while the club was able to provide substantial
evidence of the documentation it relies upon in its submissions, the player was not able to
discharge his burden of proof and establish that the documents at the basis of his claim,
namely PRUEBA E and PRUEBA F, were indeed validly concluded between the parties.
63) In particular with regard to PRUEBA E, not only the player failed to provide the original version
of it, but he also could not substantiate his allegation regarding the validity of such document
with any other document proving its negotiation, acceptance or conclusion by any of the
parties. Thus, he was not able to overturn the club’s allegation that such document consisted
of a forgery.
64) With respect to PRUEBA F, the club pointed out that even though such document was indeed
sent to the player via his agent per Whatsapp on 19 July 2019, the player did not accept it. In fact, he even explicitly rejected it with the counter-proposal made by his agent on 19 July
2019, listing several conditions to accept the termination of the employment contract, which
include inter alia the payment to the player of “30% of the transfer amount that they receive
deducting 800.000 € that is mentioned in the contract between the club and the player”. This
counter-proposal was not accepted by the club and no evidence of the contrary was provided
by the player.
65) Furthermore, no evidence that the player indeed accepted the content of PRUEBA F in due
time and that he indeed unequivocally communicated his agreement to the club was
provided by the Claimant.
66) What is more, the club was in fact able to discharge its burden of proof and establish that its
version of the termination agreement was indeed accepted by the player. In this respect, the
Chamber referred to the email exchange between the club and Toulouse FC, provided as
exhibit 12 to the club’s reply, which evidences that such document was sent by the club to
Toulouse FC by email on 19 July 2019 for the player to sign and that the signed document
was returned by Toulouse FC to the club on 20 July 2019.
67) Such termination agreement, as indicated by the club, does not establish in any manner that
any amounts are still due by the club to the player.
68) Therefore, the Chamber concluded its deliberations by establishing that based on the
documentation provided and the argumentation raised by the parties, the Claimant did not
succeed in discharging his burden of proof and establishing the validity of PRUEBA E and
PRUEBA F, upon which he bases his claim. Therefore, due to its lack of contractual basis, the
Claimant’s claim must be fully rejected as to the substance.
III. Conclusion
69) As a result of the aforementioned, the Chamber decided that the player’s claim is admissible,
but rejected.
IV.DECISION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER
1. The claim of the Claimant, Agustin Maximiliano Rogel Paita, is admissible.
2. The claim of the Claimant is rejected.
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision (cf. CAS Directives at Legal.FIFA.com).
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a
party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a
redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
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