F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2020-2021) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 16 July 2020
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed via videoconference, on 16 July 2020,
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Rodolfo Gilbert Pizarro Thomas
COMPOSITION:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Michelle Colucci (Italy), member Abu Nayeem Shohag (Bangladesh), member
CLAIMANT:
CLUB RAYADOS DE MONTERREY, Mexico
Represented by Mr. Juan Manuel Lopez Ruíz
RESPONDENT 1:
MR RODOLFO GILBERT PIZARRO THOMAS, Mexico
Represented by Mr. Daniel Muñoz Sierra
RESPONDENT 2:
INTER MIAMI CF, USA
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
1. On 5 June 2018, the player and the Claimant club (hereinafter: Claimant or Monterrey) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), in accordance with which the parties agreed, inter alia, upon the following conditions:
Term of the contract: 5 years, as from the tournament “Apertura 2018” until the end of the tournament “Clausura 2023” of the Mexican League (cf. original clause below here below quoted).
“Tercera.- vigencia
El presente contrato tiene vigencia por cinco años, es decir, los torneos de Apertura 2018, Clausura 2019, Apertura 2019, Clausura 2020, Apertura 2020, Clausura 2021, Apertura 2021, Clausura 2022, Apertura 2022 y Clausura 2023 de la liga MX o como estos torneos lleguen a denominarse organizados por la Federación Mexicana de Fútbol Asociación, A.C.”.
Clause related to taxes: All amounts and considerations as per the contract will be net, free of taxes and/or deductions (free translation from the original text in Spanish, displayed below; in addition, it must be noted that the said paragraph was included in the Annexe to the contract where the player’s remuneration is indicated).
“Todas las sumas y conceptos mencionados en virtud del presente acuerdo serán netas, libres de todo impuesto, gravamen y/o retenciones”.
Buy-out clause: USD 11,875,000 payable by the new club for the definitive transfer of 100% of the player’s economic and federative rights. In addition, the last paragraph of said clause stipulates that the said amount can be paid by the player or any club on his behalf and would correspond to a compensation for the early termination of the contract in the sense of art. 17 of the RSTP.
II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FIFA
2. On 15 February 2020, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent I and the Respondent II for breach of contract and an additional compensation. A brief summary of the position of the parties is detailed in continuation.
A. Claim of the Claimant
3. In its claim, Monterrey explained that, on 30 January 2020, Inter sent an offer for the permanent transfer of the player from Monterrey to Inter, offering a transfer fee of USD 9,500,000 for the acquisition of 80% of the player’s economic rights; which was rejected by the Claimant on the very same day (note: offer and rejection on file).
4. On the following day, 31 January 2020, Inter sent another offer for the definitive transfer of the player, offering a transfer compensation amounting to USD 11,875,000 for the acquisition of 100% of the player’s economic rights. On the same day, the Claimant replied thereto, specifying that said amount should be net in order to be considered by Monterrey. Also on the same day, Inter replied to the correspondence of the Claimant, stating that the contract does not specify that said amount shall be net and that, hence, Inter would not pay any higher amount.
5. In this context, the Claimant explained that, since Inter was aware of the content of the contract concluded between Monterrey and the player, it is clear that it was the player who disclosed such content to Inter, within the scope of negotiations held between said parties for the transfer of the player to Inter and without the consent of Monterrey for the player to do so and, hence, contravening art. 18.3 of the RSTP.
6. On the same date, Monterrey replied to Inter, making reference to the contract, which states that all amounts payable as per the contract shall be net. Also on 31 January 2020, Inter informed Monterrey that it would pay the buy-out clause of the contract; circumstance to which the Claimant agreed.
7. By means of his correspondence dated 4 February 2020, the player contacted the Claimant and informed the latter that he was aware of the offer made by Inter and that he agrees on said terms and on his transfer to Inter. On the same date, Inter sent to Monterrey an agreement for the transfer of the player, but the latter refused to sign any agreement and informed Inter that, should the player wish to terminate the contract, he should pay the buy-out clause, as per the contract.
8. On 12 February 2020, the player, Inter and MLS sent a correspondence to the Claimant, communicating to the latter the termination of the contract of the player with Monterrey. In this respect, the Claimant held that the amount of the buy-out clause was only partially paid (not taking into account that the amount to be received by Monterrey shall be net) and that it was paid by the MLS.
9. In its claim, Monterrey stressed that Inter contravened art. 18.3 of the RSTP, since it should have communicated to Monterrey in writing its intention to start negotiations in order to sign the player; and it would be up to Monterrey to grant or not an authorization for Inter to start said negotiations, as long as – at the moment when said negotiations started – more than 6 months remained before the expiry of the contract. In view of the lack of said communication and authorization, according to the Claimant, Inter induced the player to terminate his contract with Monterrey, which, according to the Claimant, occurred without just cause.
10. According to the Claimant, although the amount of the buy-out clause was paid, said event does not discharge Inter from its liability for having induced the player to terminate his contract before the end of the running season and during the protected period.
11. In addition, the Claimant explained that the player was essential for the team, since he was always part of the starting 11, was convoked to play with the national team and played a fundamental role within the team. Moreover, the Claimant explained that, since the transfer window in Mexico closed on 31 January 2020, the departure of the player left the Claimant in a situation where it could not replace him, causing great damage to Monterrey.
12. Finally, the Claimant deems that the player and the Respondent II shall be imposed sporting sanctions in accordance with art. 17 par. 3, 4 and 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
13. The Claimant requested the following relief:
The Claimant requested the Respondent be condemned to pay the amount of USD 5,089,285.71 plus an additional compensation, broken down as follows:
Compensation for breach of contract:
USD 5,089,285.71 corresponding to the difference between the amount paid by Inter for the buy-out clause, i.e. USD 11,875,000, and the gross amount payable – according to the Claimant – in order for Monterrey to receive the USD 11,875,000 net, i.e. USD 16,964,285 (16,964,285 – 11,875,000 = 5,089,285.71).
An additional compensation to be calculated by the DRC in accordance with art. 17 of the RSTP. For this purpose, the Claimant provided a document with a breakdown of the different amounts and expenses paid and payable by Monterrey in relation to the player. According to the Claimant, the amount of USD 14,850,950.41 should be taken into consideration in order to calculate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent (note: document on file).
B. Position of the player / Respondent I
14. In his reply, the player confirms the exchange of correspondence between Monterrey, Inter and him, as mentioned by the Claimant and adds that on 5 February 2020, Inter sent Monterrey a second official offer, referring to the buy-out clause in the contract and offering USD 11,875,000 for 100% of the player’s economic rights. In the offer, Inter requested Monterrey to abide by the employment contract and sign the relevant transfer agreement for the player within the following five days (cf. exhibit 34 of player’s reply).
15. He also explained that on 6 February 2020 Monterrey rejected the second official offer of Inter, explaining that if Inter wanted to acquire the services of the player, the latter would have to exercise his contractual rights under the contract and terminate it after paying the indemnity amount provided therein (cf. exhibit 35 of the player’s reply). Following such letter, on 12 February 202 the player terminated his employment contract with Monterrey in writing and provided together with his termination letter a proof of payment by the MLS of USD 11,875,000.
16. The player claims that he duly and correctly exercised his contractual rights under the employment contract and was free to join Inter, after exercising and paying the relevant amount stipulated in the buy-out clause. He deems that Monterrey’s claim is unfounded and made in bad faith, therefore it should be entirely rejected.
17. The player emphasises that Monterrey “accepted to insert the buy-out clause through which Mr. Pizarro terminated his Employment Contract after the Claimant failed to comply with its obligations under the Employment Contract in relation with the release of the Player. What is more, Monterrey even invited the Player and Inter Miami to enforce the said contractual provision in view of its (unlawful) reluctancy to release the Player for him to join Inter Miami. The Claimant even communicated its bank details to Inter Miami and received the money agreed as price for the buy-out. It should be noted that Monterrey has not given back said payment to this day. Therefore, it is clear that the whole claim as set-up and presented by Monterrey is just an excuse for the Claimant to unlawfully ask for more money in detriment of the Respondents”.
18. The player further pointed out that the contractual clause at stake is a clear buy-out clause and in this respect referred to the appeal CAS 2013/A/3411, which stipulated that: “85. As made clear by such definition, which corresponds to standard practice in international football, the parties, while entering into a contract, may agree that at a certain (or at any) moment one of the parties (normally, the player) may terminate the contract, by simple notice and by paying a stipulated amount. In other words, one of the parties (ordinarily, the club) accepts in advance that the contract may be terminated: as a result, when the contract is effectively terminated, such termination can be deemed to be based on the parties’ (prior) consent. Therefore, no breach occurs, and the party terminating the contract is not liable for any sporting sanction. It is only bound to pay the stipulated amount – which represents the “consideration” (or “price”) for the termination”.
19. As such Monterrey was obliged to transfer the player to Inter and is not entitled to receive any further amount from the player, since it “already received the totality of the amount agreed between the parties as buy-out amount”.
20. The player also rejected Monterrey’s allegation that the amount stipulated in the buy-out clause was net, since “according to the wording chosen by the parties in the drafting of the contractual provision referred above, the amounts were never agreed to be net of taxes for Monterrey. In this sense, there is absolutely no reference as to the net nature of the agreed amounts throughout the whole clause”. The player further claims that “if the agreement of the Parties had been that the agreed amounts were net and therefore, that the applicable tax should be added on top of it “grossing up” the said amount, it should have been clearly and unequivocally stated it in said clause. This is precisely what the Parties did in the Annex 1 of the Employment Contract, in which the remuneration of the Player under the Employment Contract was included. The Parties expressly included that all amounts provided therein were net of any taxes and/or withholdings: ‘Todas las sumas y conceptos mencionados en virtud del presente acuerdo serán netas, libres de todo impuesto, gravamen y/o retenciones’.”
21. Furthermore, the player indicated that Monterrey did not meet the burden of proving that in was indeed obliged to pay the requested amount as taxes in Mexico, and also for this reason its request should be rejected.
22. The player rejected any request of Monterrey for additional compensation and for the application of art. 17 of the RSTP, as the contract was duly terminated by the parties in accordance with the buy-out clause.
23. The player concludes that “it is clear that the only party to the Employment Contract who acted wrongfully and in bad faith in this case was Monterrey, (i) who failed to transfer the Player despite of having received offer in line with what the parties to the contract agreed, (ii) for having requested more money than what the parties agreed to for the offers and for the consideration of the buy-out and (iii) who invited the Player to exercise his contractual rights and enforce the buy-out clause provided in the Employment Contract to then claim against the Player and Inter Miami CF for that same reason”.
C. Position of the Respondent II
24. In its reply, Inter endorses the arguments of the player and fully rejects the claim of Monterrey. In particular, Inter rejects having breached art. 18 par. 3 of the RSTP as Monterrey was always informed of the negotiations for the transfer of the player and points out that, in any case, any breach of such article should be dealt with by FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee.
25. Inter points out that Monterrey rejected twice its offer for the player and by means of its letter dated 6 February 2020 it invited Inter to pay the amount in the buy-out clause into the bank account of which it had provided details to Inter by 10 February 2020, to trigger the termination. Inter claims that in such correspondence (cf. annex 10 to Inter’s reply) “Monterrey threatened to bring a claim against the Player and Miami before FIFA in respect of an alleged termination of the Monterrey Contract ‘without just cause’ if (and only if) the Rescission Clause was not activated by 10 February 2020. This date was arbitrarily set by Monterrey and was prior to the opening of the USSF registration period. Upon the opening of the USSF’s primary transfer registration period on 12 February 2020, a termination notice signed by the Player, Miami and MLS (the ‘Notice of Termination’) was served on Monterrey by a Mexican Public Notary and, at the same time, MLS transferred to the bank account of Monterrey (per Monterrey’s direction) a sum equal to the Termination Fee as set out in the Rescission Clause (i.e. $11,875,000)”.
26. Inter uploaded the instruction for the player’s registration on 19 February 2020, to which Monterrey, via the Mexican FA, failed to reply. Thus on 27 February 2020 a request was filed at FIFA for the player’s provisional registration, which was granted by the Single Judge of the PSC on 28 February 2020.
27. Furthermore, Inter emphasised that in accordance with the buy-out clause, if an offer in the amount of USD 11,875,000 were made for the player at any time Monterrey was obliged to accept it and complete the transfer of the player’s registration to the relevant club within 5 days of receipt of the same. In the event of a failure by Monterrey to comply with the transfer obligation, the player would have the right to unilaterally terminate the contract with immediate effect by paying (whether personally or via a football club on his behalf) the sum of USD 11,875,000 to Monterrey. Upon receipt of the aforementioned fee, Monterrey would be obliged to do all things necessary to procure the release of the player’s ITC by the FMF; and the termination fee was agreed by the parties as the amount which would settle any compensation claim Monterrey could have had under art. 17 of the RSTP if the Player’s unilateral termination of the Monterrey Contract before its expiry had taken place “without just cause”.
28. Inter claims to have acted in strict respect of the buy-out clause and that the termination of the contract with Monterrey was absolutely lawful and “with just cause”, following the DRC and the CAS standard jurisprudence.
29. Inter also rejects Monterrey’s argument that the buy-out clause stipulated a net amount, as this is not stated in said clause and can also not be inferred from the joint interpretation of any other clause of the contract. In particular, Inter points out that had this been the intention of the parties they would have clearly mentioned it in the contract, just as the specific clause inserted in the annex dealing with the player’s remuneration. In any case, Monterrey did not provide any evidence of the additional amount it claims as tax applicable to the buy-out fee.
30. Thus, Inter deems that Monterrey’s claim should be entirely rejected.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER
A. Competence and applicable legal framework
31. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 15 February 2020. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the June 2020 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
32. Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition June 2020), it is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Mexican club, a Mexican player, and an American club.
33. In this respect, the DRC emphasized that the parties do not dispute the competence of FIFA, and as such the Chamber concluded that it is competent to entertain the claim.
34. In continuation, the DRC analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition June 2020), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 15 February 2020, the January 2020 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
35. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file. However, the DRC emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
B. Burden of proof
36. The Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the DRC stressed the wording of art. 12 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider evidence not filed by the parties.
37. In this respect, the Chamber also recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA’s judicial bodies may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in TMS.
C. Merits of the dispute
I. Main legal discussion and considerations
38. The fundamental disagreement between the parties, at the basis of the present dispute, is the interpretation and execution of the buy-out clause, holding the parties different opinions regarding as to the compliance of the Respondents with the requirements therein contained.
39. In this regard, the DRC analysed the wording of the buy-out clause and determined that the clause clearly stipulated that in case an offer USD 11,875,000 is made at any time for the player, the Claimant is obliged to accept it within 5 days as from the presentation of the offer, provided that the player’s previous consent was given, being the Claimant also obliged to sign the transfer contract and execute all necessary actions for his transfer, the FMF being explicitly authorised to confirm the transfer and deliver the ITC. The relevant clause further provided that, should Monterrey fail to act in accordance with the aforementioned provision, the player would be entitled to unilaterally terminate the contract.
40. In this context, the DRC examined the documentation brought forward by the different parties to the proceedings and carefully checked whether the conditions set in the buy-out clause were or were not met. The Chamber firstly noted that, by means of its letter dated 31 January 2020, Inter sent an offer of USD 11,875,000 to Monterrey for the acquisition of 100% of the player’s economic rights, urging the Claimant to sign the corresponding transfer agreement within the following 5 days. Hence, the Chamber concluded that the first of the conditions set in the buy-out clause was indeed complied with by Inter, insofar the amount offered by the latter amounted to the exact amount agreed in the buy-out clause.
41. The above being clarified, the Chamber analysed whether the second condition of the buy-out clause –the player’s consent to his transfer from Monterrey to Inter– was complied with. In this respect, the DRC noted that, by means of his correspondence dated 4 February 2020, the player communicated to the Claimant his express consent to be transferred from Monterrey to Inter. Thus, the Chamber unanimously concluded that both Respondents had duly complied with the conditions set in the buy-out clause.
42. Notwithstanding the above, the DRC noted that the Claimant did not agree to sign the agreement over the transfer of the player from Monterrey to Inter, despite the player and Inter having complied with conditions of the buy-out clause.
43. In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, the DRC noted that, since the Claimant failed to sign the relevant transfer agreement 5 days after the date on which the offer was received by the Claimant, the player could not be transferred in accordance with the terms and conditions of the buy-out clause and, hence, the scenario of the unilateral termination of the contract by the player against payment of the amount of USD 11,875,000 came to place.
44. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that, on 12 February 2020, the player unilaterally terminated the contract in writing, duly notifying the Claimant of his termination and that the MLS proceeded to make the payment of USD 11,875,000 –on behalf of Inter– to the Claimant.
45. In this point, the DRC noted the arguments raised by the Claimant, which stated that, on the one hand, Inter failed to make the entire payment of the amount of USD 11,875,000, since said amount was to be received by the Claimant net; and, on the other hand, that Inter acted in contravention of art. 18.3 of the RSTP, insofar it did not inform the Claimant of its intention to conclude a contract with the player.
46. In view of all the aforesaid arguments and considerations, the DRC determined that, from the documentation on file and the chronology of the facts, endorsed by all parties, Inter and the player indeed followed the strict steps provided for in the buy-out clause. Thus, –continued the Chamber– any claim for compensation or sanctions in accordance with art. 17 must be rejected.
47. Furthermore, as to the argument of the Claimant concerning the infraction committed by the Inter regarding clause 18.3 of the RSTP, the Chamber referred once again to the wording of the buy-out clause, which specifically contemplates the scenario of a third club making an offer for the player in question and concluded that, insofar it was foreseen in the contract that a third club may make an offer to the Claimant for the transfer of the player, said action could not constitute an inducement of Inter to get the player breach his contract with the Claimant, since the Claimant had willingly abided to that possibility when signing the contract. Hence, the request of the Claimant in this regard shall be rejected, since the buy-out clause can be exercised at any time upon the only condition that the relevant fee is paid, which did occur in the present case.
48. Moreover, the Chamber referred to Monterrey’s allegation that the amount due as buy-out fee was net, and determined that, as stressed by the Respondents, insofar no such specification was made in the aforementioned buy-out clause and since the clause included in the annexe concerning the player’s remuneration appears to refer to the latter only. In fact, if the intention of the parties had been to stipulate a net buy-out fee –explained the Chamber–, a similar clause would have been included for such payment obligation.
49. Finally, the Chamber addressed the argument brought by the Claimant regarding the closure of the transfer window in Mexico and the situation of impossibility the Claimant faced when the player left the club. In this respect, the Chamber deemed that, even if the precise moment in which the buy-out clause was exercised could be in detriment of the Claimant’s interest, the buy-out clause did not specify a specific period in which it could be exercised, leaving it open to the will of the player and a third club to exercise such option at any time.
50. In light of the foregoing considerations, the DRC unanimously decided that the Claimant’s claim should be rejected in its entirety.
II. Costs
51. The Chamber referred to article 18 par. 2 of the Procedural Rules, according to which “DRC proceedings relating to disputes between clubs and players in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability as well as international employment related disputes between a club and a player are free of charge”. Accordingly, the Chamber decided that no procedural costs were to be imposed on the parties.
52. Likewise and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, and decided that no procedural compensation shall be awarded in these proceedings.
IV. DECISION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER
1. The claim of the Claimant, Rayados de Monterrey, is rejected.
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this decision (cf. CAS Directives at Legal.FIFA.com).
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland
www.fifa.com | legal.fifa.com | psdfifa@fifa.org | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777
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(Code of Sports-related Arbitration, 2017 edition)
The CAS appeals arbitration procedure is provided by articles R47 et seq. of the Code of Sports-related
Arbitration (2017 edition, hereafter: the Code). This procedure can be summarised as follows:
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accordance with the FIFA Statutes, must file a statement of appeal with CAS within a twenty—onedaytime
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its written submissions, the Appellant shall specify any witnesses, including a brief summary of their
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expected testimony, and experts, stating their area of expertise, whom it intends to call at the hearing
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Within twenty days from the receipt of the appeal brief, the Respondent shall submit to the CAS an
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In case of discrepancy between the present document and the Code, the provisions of the Code shall
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Schedule of arbitration costs in force as of 1 January 2017 (extract)
Administrative costs
The CAS fixes the administrative costs for each case of arbitration subject to Article R64 of the Code in
accordance with the table below, or at its discretion when the amount disputed is not declared or there is
no value in dispute. The value in dispute taken into consideration is the one indicated in the statement of
claim/appeal brief or in the counterclaim, if any, if it is higher. If the circumstances of a given case make
this necessary, the CAS may fix administrative costs at an amount above or below that shown on the table
below.
For a disputed sum
(in Swiss fiancs) Administrative costs
up to 50000 CHF 100.- to CHF 2'000.-
From 50'001 to 100'000 CHF 2000- + 1.50% of amount in excess of 50'000.-
From 100'001 to 500'000 CHF 2'750.- + 1.00% of amount in excess of 100'000.—
From 500'001 to 1'000'000 CHF 6'750.- + 0.60% of amount in excess of 500'000.-
From 1'000'001 to 2'500'000 CHF 9'750.- + 0.30% of amount in excess of 1'000'000.-
From 2'500'001 to 5'000'000 CHF 14'250.- + 0.20% of amount in excess of 2'500'000.-
From 5'000'001 to 10'000'000 CHF 19'250.- + 0.10% of amount in excess of 5'000'000.-
Above 10'000'000 CHF 25'000.-
Arbitrators' costs and fees
The amount of fees to be paid to each arbitrator is fixed by the Secretary General of the CAS on the basis
of the work provided by each arbitrator and on the basis of time reasonably devoted to their task by the
members of each Panel. In principle, the following hourly fees are taken into account:
For a disputed sum
(in Swiss Francs) Fees
Up to 2'500'000 CHF 300.-
From 2'500'001 to 5'000'000 CHF 350.-
From 5'000'001 to 10'000'000 CHF 400.-
From 10'000'001 to 15'000'000 CHF 450.-
Above 15'000'000 CHF 500.-