F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 August 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach F, from country G as “Claimant / Counter-Respondent” against the club Club A, from country U as “Respondent / Counter-Claimant” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 August 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach F, from country G as “Claimant / Counter-Respondent” against the club Club A, from country U as “Respondent / Counter-Claimant” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 6 January 2009, Coach F, from country G (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter- Respondent or simply: the Claimant) and Club A, from country U (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant or simply: the Respondent) concluded a first employment agreement (hereinafter: the first agreement) that was valid from the date of its signature until 5 June 2010. 2. According to the first agreement, the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of EUR 44,117 net,“ by the 1st week of each month”, as well as several bonuses depending on the Respondent’s results. Furthermore, the first agreement specified that in case of early termination by one of the parties, the party in question would have “to pay full amount for the remaining period of the contract, as well as bonuses earned till that moment” (hereinafter: the first penalty clause). Finally, it was stated that “end of service entitled is one and half month equal to (66,000).” 3. On 26 September 2009, the Claimant and the Respondent signed another agreement (hereinafter: the second agreement), valid from 6 June 2010 until 5 June 2012, by means of which the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive from the Respondent the following amounts “free of taxes”: - “Signing Fee is (100,000) (..) euro. (200,000) (..) euro, on 1/7/2010. (300,000) (..) euro on 1/7/2011; - a monthly salary of EUR 50,000 payable “by the 1st week of each month, From 6/6/2010 till 5/6/2011”; - a monthly salary of EUR 58,333 payable “by the 1st week of each month, From 6/6/2011 till 5/6/2012”; - “(250,000) (..) currency of country U per year housing allowance, and (30,000) (..) currency of country U furniture allowance once during the contract period”; - “a 4X4 car includes premium insurance and maintenance”; - “medical insurance (..) for him and family if presented”; - “an annual paid leave for (45) days each year”; - “(8) Business class air tickets, every year”; - various bonuses depending on the Respondent’s results. 4. Finally, in case of early termination of the second agreement by the Respondent, the latter would have to “pay all remaining costs of the contract” and in case of early termination by the Claimant the latter “shall pay all costs for one year” (hereinafter: the second penalty clause). 5. On 6 May 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent alleging that the latter had breached the first as well the second agreements and consequently requesting the payment of EUR 2,296,585, as well as interests as from 3 March 2010, as follows: - EUR 286,585 in accordance with the first agreement, corresponding to EUR 220,585 as salary for the period between January 2010 and May 2010 (i.e. monthly EUR 44,117 x 5) plus EUR 66,000 as bonuses at the end of the contract; - EUR 2,010,000 in accordance with the second agreement corresponding to: • EUR 500,000 as “Signing fee”, i.e. EUR 600,000 - EUR 100,000 which the Respondent apparently already paid; • EUR 1,300,000 as salary for the period between June 2010 and May 2011 (i.e. 50,000 x 12 for June 2010-May 2011, plus EUR 58,333 x 12 for June 2011-May 2012); • EUR 100,000 as “House Allowance” for two years, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 500,000; • EUR 6,000 as “Furniture Allowance”, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 30,000; • EUR 20,000 as “Car Allowance” for two years, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 100,000, i.e. currency of country U 50,000 x 2; • EUR 36,000 as “Medical Insurance” for two years, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 180,000, i.e. currency of country U 90,000 x 2; • EUR 48,000 corresponding to 8 business class flight tickets country U - country G per year. As to that, the Claimant specified that, on average, a country U- country G tickets costs EUR 3,000, and provided FIFA with a printout from Lufthansa. • winning bonuses “pro memoriam”; • payment of the relevant taxes in country G. 6. In this respect and as to the facts of the case, the Claimant explained that after having lost a match against “Club E” in February 2010, the Respondent had replaced him with his assistant coach and had suspended the payment of his salary. In this connection, the Claimant provided FIFA with a copy of two press articles dated 7 February 2010 as well as a copy of a bank statement dated 2 March 2010 for the period 13 December 2009 - 5 February 2010 in accordance with which the only payment received from the Respondent, i.e. EUR 44,092, was dated 11 January 2010. 7. Furthermore, the Claimant alleged having been asked to be on hand in the Respondent’s offices during the training of the team without, however, receiving a new concrete task, while the Respondent tried to convince him to sign a termination agreement that did not comply with his financial entitlements. 8. In continuation, the Claimant held that, following an unsuccessful attempt to settle the dispute in an amicable way, the Respondent had terminated the contractual relationship in writing on 21 February 2010 explaining that it considered him responsible for the bad results of the team. According to a translation in English of the termination letter in question provided by the Claimant (hereinafter: the first translation), the Respondent specified that “The contract signed on 06/01/2009 is ended and there is no desire from Club A to continue implementing the contract conditions” and “the contract signed on 29/09/2010” is cancelled “as a result to the cancelation of the first contract signed on 06/01/2009”. 9. Besides, the Claimant mentioned that, on 3 March 2010, the Respondent had requested the reimbursement of EUR 100,000 arguing that the amount in question had been loaned to him on 15 October 2009. In this context, the Claimant explained that the relevant sum corresponded to the first part of the signing fee due to him in accordance with the second agreement and stressed that, as a consequence, the Respondent was not entitled to receive it back. 10. In addition, the Claimant maintained having left country U on 5 March 2010 after having been threatened by the Respondent and pointed out that, nevertheless, the latter had sent him further correspondence while he was already in country G, informing him about his “official Working Hours” and inviting him to “attend the work according to the official schedule (..)”. 11. As a consequence of all the above, the Claimant considered that the Respondent had terminated their contractual relationship prematurely and without just cause and that, consequently, the latter had to pay him compensation in the amount of EUR 2,296,585, plus the requested winning bonuses, as per the first and second agreements. 12. In addition, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the payment of EUR 2,076,196.8 arguing that this sum corresponded to the amount payable to the tax authorities in country G on the net amount of EUR 2,296,585. Finally, the Claimant held that the amount due to the tax authorities in country G on the winning bonuses had also to be paid by the Respondent without, however, specifying the amount in question. 13. In its response dated 17 June 2010, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and lodged a counterclaim against the latter. 14. In this respect, the Respondent explained that, following “a series of bad results” of the team, it had sent to the Claimant a “written notice” informing the latter of its “intention to terminate the contractual relation by the end of the current contract period expiring on 05/06/2010, and to continue with the team till the end of the sports season 2009/2010, which means till the last game of the championship dated 14th May 2010 and before expiry of validity of current contract (..)”. As to that, the Respondent referred to the same termination letter already mentioned by the Claimant in his claim (cf. point I.8. above) but provided FIFA with a different translation in English, drafted and signed by a “sworn legal translator” (hereinafter: the second translation). In accordance with the second translation, the club had complained about the poor results of the team and mentioned that it considered the Claimant responsible “for drop in team’s technical standard in general and specially individual skills (..)” and specified that “Therefore, I, Mr M - Manager of Club A Notify you as follows: 1- Termination of Employment Contract dated 06/01/2009 on expiry date on 05/06/2010 and not to continue with the Club (..) thereafter. 2- Non-execution of Employment Contract dated 26/09/2009 as its effective date not due yet and has been cancelled as a result of termination of the first Contract dated 06/01/2009”. Finally, the second translation included a list of the alleged misbehaviours of the coach. 15. Because of the aforementioned, the Respondent considered having “respected the contract terms in its procedures regarding the provisions of not renewing the contract (..)”. 16. In continuation, the Respondent accused the Claimant of having committed “illegal acts” by having “stopped attending his job since 01/03/2010” and by having left the country without its knowledge “leaving the club without a Head Coach” although he had been warned “on March 6th 2010 (..) of the necessity of committing to the official working hours (..)” (cf. point I.10. above). 17. Furthermore, the Respondent blamed the Claimant for having breached “other contractual obligations” such as “not delivering the keys of the furnished house and car (..) and leaving them to another person (..)” without its knowledge as well as for not having provided any information with regard to “what happened to the furniture which the club put in the house” and which were “owed by the club. Whereas the coach has received a cheque of (currency of country U 39,952), which equals (€ 8,841)”. In addition, the Respondent accused the Claimant of having breached “some technical obligations” while coaching the team and of having caused “technical damages” by leaving the country without notice. 18. Likewise, the Respondent alleged having suffered “moral damages” as a consequence of the Claimant’s sudden departure and maintained having lent to the latter the amount of EUR 100,000 on 15 October 2009 “to be deducted from his monthly entitlements”. In addition, the club held having “issued a cheque for currency of country U 82,411 (..) equivalent to € 15848” to the coach after the latter had “demanded ticket value in cash for his needs.” In this context, the Respondent provided FIFA with a check for the amount of currency of country U 82,411, dated 1 October 2010 which does not bear the name of the Claimant. 19. In conclusion, the Respondent considered being entitled to receive from the Claimant the amount of EUR 741,192 corresponding to: - EUR 100,000 “which is the value of the loan the defendant received on 15/10/2009”; - EUR 132,351 “which is the salaries of March, April, and May of the contract that he didn’t carry out his job”; - Currency of country U 39,000, “equivalent to (€ 8,841) which is the value of furniture”; - EUR 500,000 as “reimbursement for the moral, ethical, and sports damages.” 20. In his replica, the Claimant adhered to his claim and rejected the Respondent’s allegations as well as the counterclaim of the latter. In particular, the Claimant insisted on having been already dismissed by the Respondent at the beginning of February 2010, i.e. after the match against “Club E” (cf. point I.6. above) and stressed that, subsequently, the Respondent had prevented him from resuming his work. In this context, the Claimant provided FIFA with a printout from the Internet homepage of the Respondent as well as with the statements of several former employees. 21. Furthermore, the Claimant pointed out that there had not been reason for him to leave the Respondent and renounce to receive his salary considering that, at the time of his dismissal, he had not received any better job offer and, afterwards, he had been unemployed during one year. Besides, the Claimant maintained having originally only received the termination letter dated 21 February 2010 in language of country U, a language which he does not understand. 22. In continuation, the Claimant insisted on having been threatened by the Respondent. As to that, the Claimant provided FIFA with an extract from his assistant’s coach diary as evidence of the Respondent’s “methods”, according to which the Respondent would have inter alia tried to convince the mentioned assistant coach into talking badly about the Claimant in exchange for financial compensation. 23. In addition, the Claimant stressed that, by handing out the keys to his apartment to the concierge of the building he had not breached any agreement. Besides, the Claimant pointed out that, in accordance with the first agreement, he was entitled to receive a “furnished villa”. Consequently, in the Claimant’s opinion, the Respondent should not be reimbursed for the costs incurred in relation to the furnishing of his apartment. Moreover, the Claimant pointed out that since the Respondent had already hired a new head coach on 20 February 2010, his departure had not damaged the team. The Claimant further emphasized that because he had not received his salary of January and February 2010, he would have been entitled to terminate his contractual relationship with the Respondent or at least he could have stopped providing his services to the latter. 24. Finally and as to the amount of currency of country U 82,411 mentioned in the Respondent’s response (cf. point I.18. above), the Claimant recalled that, as per the first agreement, he was entitled to receive 8 business class flight tickets per year. 25. In its final statement dated 23 February 2011, the Respondent reiterated the content of its first submission and in particular denied having terminated the first and second agreements on 4 February 2010. Furthermore, the Respondent insisted on having requested the Claimant to “continue his work until the end of Contract on 05.06.2010 and to continue supervision of the team until the end of Sports season 2009-2010 (..)”. In addition, the Respondent contested having ever threatened the Claimant and denied having hired a new coach while still employing the Claimant. 26. In his last position on the counterclaim of the Respondent, the Claimant mainly reiterated the content of his previous statements. 27. By correspondence dated 16 April 2012, the Claimant informed FIFA that he had been unemployed since 3 March 2010. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 6 May 2010, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at sake which concerns an employment-related dispute of an international dimension between a country G coach and a club affiliated to the country U Football Association. 3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2009 and 2010 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 6 May 2010. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2009 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance. 4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. 5. In doing so and first of all, the Single Judge noted that, on 6 January 2009, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment agreement (hereinafter: the first agreement) which was originally valid from the date of its signature until 5 June 2010. 6. Likewise, the Single Judge took note that, on 26 September 2009, a second agreement (hereinafter: the second agreement), valid from 6 June 2010 until 5 June 2012, was concluded between the parties to the dispute. 7. In continuation, the Single Judge acknowledged that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had inter alia accused the Respondent of having prematurely terminated their contractual relationship without just cause at the beginning of February 2010 and had consequently requested from the latter, as compensation, the payment of his whole remuneration in accordance with the first and second agreement, i.e. the total amount of EUR 2,296,585, as well as EUR 2,076,196.8 allegedly corresponding to the amount of taxes he would have to pay in country G over the net amount of EUR 2,296,585. 8. Furthermore and in the same context, the Single Judge observed that, for its part, the Respondent had denied having already terminated the first and second agreements at the beginning of February 2010 and had maintained having had just cause to put an end to its contractual relationship with the Respondent. Besides, the Single Judge took note that, in the Respondent’s opinion, it had been the Claimant who, by stopping to work as well as by leaving the country without its consent in March 2010, had breached the agreements in question and should consequently be condemned to pay compensation to it in the total amount of EUR 741,192. 9. In addition to the above, the Single Judge noticed that a letter of termination of the employment relationship had undisputedly been issued by the Respondent on 21 February 2010 (hereinafter: the termination letter) but that the parties disagreed on its exact contents. In this connection, two different translations into English of the same termination letter (which was drafted in language of country U) had been provided to FIFA by the parties. 10. In light of all the above, the Single Judge considered that, in the present matter, it had to be established when exactly the Respondent had terminated its contractual relationship with the Claimant and whether such termination had occurred with or without just cause. 11. To this end and to begin with, the Single Judge analysed the various documents made available by the parties as evidence in support of their respective allegations. In doing so, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant had provided several press articles and printouts from the internet as well as the statements of certain former employees of the Respondent attesting that he had already been dismissed by the Respondent at the beginning of February 2010, while the Respondent had based its assertion on the termination letter. 12. In view of the above, the Single Judge, referring to the principle of burden of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules) recalled that while the termination letter had undisputedly been issued by Respondent and received by the Claimant towards the end of February 2010, the documentary evidence provided by the Claimant in support of the allegations that his dismissal had taken place beforehand, mainly consisted of third party evidence, the authenticity of which could not be verified with certitude and which, consequently, could not amount to a comparable proof of an alleged fact as the termination letter itself. Therefore, the Single Judge resolved that it had to be assumed that the contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent had not ended before the issuance of the termination letter, i.e. before 21 February 2010. 13. In continuation and turning his attention to the two translations of the termination letter provided by the parties, the Single Judge emphasised that the one made available by the Respondent (hereinafter: the second translation), contrary to the one enclosed to the Claimant’s claim (hereinafter: the first translation), had been drafted by a sworn translator. In addition, a discrepancy between the dates mentioned in page four of the original version of the termination letter and the dates included in the first translation, where “2010/6/5” seemed to be missing, caught the attention of the Single Judge. In particular and in this context, the Single Judge observed that such a discrepancy could not be seen in the second translation. 14. As a consequence of the above and, in particular, taking into account that only the second translation seemed to be have been issued by a sworn translator and was therefore of an official nature, the Single Judge resolved that the second translation had to be considered as more reliable than the first one and should therefore prevail while assessing the outcome of the present dispute. 15. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge reasoned that, while it is uncontested that the Respondent had cancelled the second agreement prior to the start of its execution, the parties, however, disagree on the question as to who is responsible for the termination of the first agreement. 16. In view of the aforementioned, the Single Judge first turned its attention to the question of the termination of the first agreement and, more specifically to the question of whether said agreement had been prematurely terminated by the Respondent as alleged by the Claimant. 17. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that the first agreement was originally valid from 6 January 2009 until 5 June 2010. Furthermore, the Single Judge pointed out that, in accordance with the second translation, the Respondent had informed the Claimant on 21 February 2010 that it intended to terminate the first agreement on 5 June 2010, i.e. on the last day of its contractually agreed validity. Hence, in view of the clear wording of the termination letter, which by no means indicated that the Respondent intended to terminate the first agreement prior to its expiry date, the Single Judge concluded that the first agreement had not been prematurely terminated by the Respondent. 18. With this being established and given that the Claimant had admitted having left the country shortly after having received the termination letter, i.e. apparently at the beginning of March 2010, the Single Judge reasoned that the next question to be addressed in the present matter was whether, as alleged by the Respondent, the Claimant had been the one who had breached the first agreement. 19. In doing so, first and foremost, the Single Judge took into account that, in the Claimant’s opinion, because his salaries of January and February 2010 had never been paid by the Respondent, regardless of whether the latter had prematurely terminated their contractual relationship or not, in March 2010 he had had just cause to stop or at least to suspend rendering his services to the Respondent. 20. Bearing in mind the above, the Single Judge recalled that, as provided for in a bank statement dated 2 March 2010 enclosed to the Claimant’s claim, the latter had received from the Respondent, on 11 January 2010, the amount of EUR 44,092. Furthermore, the Single Judge stressed that, in accordance with the first agreement, the Claimant was supposed to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of EUR 44,117 “by the 1st week of each month”. For this reason, considering the Claimant’s financial entitlement as per the first agreement and taking into account that, at the beginning of January 2010, the latter had received from the Respondent an amount very similar to the one due as salary, in accordance with the agreement, as well as in absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Single Judge determined that the Claimant’s salary of January 2010 had been duly paid by the Respondent. 21. Nevertheless and in the same context, the Single Judge added that, in accordance with the same bank statement dated 2 March 2010, the Claimant had never received any payment from the Respondent past 11 January 2010, a fact which was never contested by the Respondent itself. Accordingly, the Single Judge established that the Claimant’s salary of February 2010 was therefore still outstanding. 22. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, the Single Judge, referring to his well-established jurisprudence, but also taking into account the specificities of the present matter, pointed out that failure to pay only one salary over more than one year of contract did not justify a premature and unilateral termination of the employment contract by the employee. As a result and inasmuch as, at beginning of March 2010, the Respondent seemed to have only failed to pay only one salary to the Claimant, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that, at the time the latter had left the country, he had had no just cause to terminate the first agreement. Therefore, in the Single Judge’s opinion, the Claimant, by stopping performing his duties at the beginning of March 2010, had breached the first agreement. 23. Notwithstanding the above and in light of the fact that it remains uncontested that the Respondent did not pay the Claimant’s salary of February 2010 in the sum of EUR 44,117 although the contractual relationship between the parties to the dispute had only ended at the beginning of March 2010, the Single Judge referred to the principle of Pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, and decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration corresponding to the salary for the month of February 2010 in the amount of EUR 44,117 together with 5% interest per year on the said amount as from 3 March 2010 until the date of effective payment. 24. In addition to the above and as to the remaining requests of the Claimant related to the first agreement, i.e. his claim for payment of EUR 242,468, corresponding to his salary of January, March, April and May 2010 plus EUR 66,000 as bonuses due at the end of the contract, the Single Judge, stressed once again that the latter’s salary of January 2010 had not been proven to be outstanding, while the Claimant had had no just cause to terminate the first agreement, thus not entitling him to any further amounts beyond the date of termination of said agreement. Hence, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant’s claim related to the payment of his salaries of January, March, April and May 2010 plus the bonuses at the end of the contract had to be rejected. 25. In continuation, the Single Judge turned to the question of the cancellation of the second agreement and recalled once again that the latter agreement had been concluded on 26 September 2009 for a period of two years starting on 6 June 2010 and ending on 5 June 2012, and that it had been cancelled by the Respondent with the termination letter of 21 February 2010 on the grounds of its alleged dissatisfaction with the services of the Claimant. In this connection, the Single Judge further mentioned that while the Claimant considered the aforementioned cancellation as abusive, the Respondent was confident on having had just cause to put an end to the second agreement as it considered the Claimant responsible for the poor performances of its team. 26. In light of the above, the Single Judge was eager to emphasize that, in line with his well-established jurisprudence, the absence of sporting results of a team cannot, as a general rule, constitute a valid reason for a club to terminate a coach’s employment since the assessment of performance by a coach is a subjective perception which cannot be measured on an objective scale and therefore has to be considered as inadmissible grounds for a termination of the employment relationship. 27. Consistently with the above and taking into account that the Respondent had undisputedly cancelled the second agreement because it considered the Claimant responsible for the bad results of its team, the Single Judge determined that the relevant cancellation had not been based on just cause and, therefore, was unjustified. As a result, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent had breached the second agreement. 28. Having determined all of the above-mentioned, the Single Judge went on to assess the potential financial consequences of the breach by the Claimant of the first agreement and of the breach by the Respondent of the second agreement. As a preliminary remark, the Single Judge found it worthwhile to recall that, according to the respective well-established jurisprudence, the party in breach of contract shall pay compensation to the party having suffered from said breach. 29. In this context and as to the breach by the Claimant of the first agreement without just cause, the Single Judge noted that in its counterclaim the Respondent had inter alia requested from the Claimant the payment of compensation for breach of the first agreement in the amount of EUR 132,351, corresponding to the Claimant’s salary of March, April and May 2010. 30. In continuation, the Single Judge referred to the compensation clause which was included in the first agreement and stressed that it clearly stipulated that in case of early termination by one of the parties, the party in question would have “to pay full amount for the remaining period of the contract, as well as bonuses earned till that moment”. The Single Judge pointed out that such clause, being reciprocal and proportional, and thus concluded that such clause must be applied when assessing the amount of compensation due to the Respondent for the breach of the first agreement by the Claimant. 31. In light of the above, bearing in mind the Respondent’s specific request as well as taking into account the unmistakable wording of the aforementioned compensation clause, the Single established that the Respondent is entitled to receive from the Claimant the sum of EUR 132,351, corresponding to his salary for March, April and May 2010 (EUR 44,117 x 3), as compensation for breach of contract. 32. Hence, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant has to pay to the Respondent EUR 132,351 as compensation for breach of the first agreement. 33. In addition to the above and with regard to the Respondent’s additional request related to the payment of EUR 500,000 as “reimbursement for the moral, ethical and sports damages” allegedly incurred as a consequence of the Claimant’s early departure, as well as the latter’s claim for the amount of currency of country U 39,000, apparently corresponding to the costs of the Claimant’s furniture, the Single Judge was eager to emphasise that, in principle, where a compensation clause has been agreed upon between the parties, the compensation for breach of contract shall limit itself to the amount stipulated in such clause. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Single Judge observed that in any case such requests had not been accompanied by any documentary evidence attesting of the reality of the alleged damage. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that this part of the Respondent’s counterclaim could not be granted for lack of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 34. Equally and with regard to the Respondent’s request concerning the reimbursement of an alleged loan made to the Claimant in the amount of EUR 100,000, the Single Judge pointed out that no evidence had been provided to FIFA in support of the allegation that such loan had been agreed upon between the parties to the dispute. Moreover, the Single Judge took note of the fact that, for his part, the Claimant had admitted having received the relevant amount from the Respondent but, at the same time, had insisted that the sum in question corresponded to the signing on fee due in accordance with the second agreement and had not been borrowed to him. Ergo, in the Claimant’s opinion, the amount in question should not be reimbursed to the Respondent. In this context, the Single Judge underlined that, in accordance with the second agreement, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent a signing on fee in the amount of EUR 100,000. 35. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, given that the second agreement was concluded on 26 September 2009 and that the amount of EUR 100,000 was paid to the Claimant on 15 October 2009 as well as considering the absence of any documentary evidence which could indicate the existence of a loan having been agreed upon between the Claimant and the Respondent for the sum of EUR 100,000, it appeared to the Single Judge that the sum in question corresponded to the signing on fee payable to the Claimant under the second agreement. As a result and also considering that the second agreement had been breached by the Respondent, the Single Judge was of the opinion that the latter was not entitled to be reimbursed of the amount in question. Consequently, the Claimant ruled that the Respondent’s request for the reimbursement of EUR 100,000 had to be rejected. 36. In continuation, as to the breach by the Respondent of the second agreement, the Single Judge first of all took note that the Claimant was inter alia requesting from the Respondent the payment of his entire remuneration stipulated in the second agreement, i.e. part of the signing on fee due, i.e. EUR 500,000 out of EUR 600,000; his salaries for the period between June 2010 and May 2012 and amounting to the total sum of EUR 1,300,000; the house allowance for two years, i.e. EUR 100,000, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 500,000; the furniture allowance, i.e. EUR 6,000, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 30,000; the car allowance for two years, i.e. EUR 20,000, apparently corresponding to currency of country U 100,000, i.e. currency of country U 50,000 x 2; EUR 36,000 for his medical insurance during two years and apparently corresponding to currency of country U 180,000, i.e. currency of country U 90,000 x 2 as well as EUR 48,000 allegedly corresponding to 8 business class flights country U-country G per year and an unspecified amount of bonuses. 37. In continuation, the Single Judge observed that the second agreement contained a clause related to compensation for breach of contract. However, said clause only referred to compensation being due exclusively in case of termination of the contract by either of the parties without just cause, whereas, in casu, the matter pertains to a cancellation of the second agreement by the Respondent. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the compensation clause could not be applied in the present matter and that the amount of compensation had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria. 38. In view of the above, the Single Judge first of all took note of the fact that, as explained by the Claimant in his correspondence dated 16 April 2012, the latter had apparently been unemployed since 3 March 2010. 39. In addition, the Single Judge considered the Claimant’s entitlement under the second agreement and noted that it did not specify which amount was due to the latter as “medical insurance”, “car allowance” nor as “business class air tickets”. In this regard, the Single Judge stressed that no evidence was on file indicating which had been the costs of his car nor those of his health insurance in country U. Likewise, the Single Judge stressed that, while he was in a position to establish that the average price of one way airplane ticket country U-country G amounted to EUR 1,900, he did not possess any information as to the costs of the health system in the country U. Furthermore and in the same context, the Single Judge acknowledged that no documentary evidence whatsoever was provided by the Claimant in connection with the claimed bonuses. 40. Equally, the Single Judge held that the Claimant’s request related to the payment of the taxes due in country G on the amounts claimed by the latter laid outside his competence and, therefore, had to be rejected. Nevertheless and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge recalled that the aforementioned request of the Claimant had not been accompanied by any official documentation issued by the competent tax authorities in country G. 41. On account of the above, bearing in mind his constant practice and considering that as a consequence of the breach of contract committed by the Respondent, the Claimant had found himself without any employment as of June 2010, but taking into account the general obligation of a coach to mitigate his damages, as well as recalling the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Single Judge concluded that in casu the sum of USD 650,000 in relation to salary, plus the sum of currency of country U 180,000 in relation to house and furniture allowance during two years as per the second agreement as well as the sum EUR 1,900, corresponding to the average price of one one-way airplane ticket country U-country G, constituted a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract. 42. In view of the above, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 651,900 as well as currency of country U 180,000 together with 5% interest per year on the said amounts from 15 August 2012 until the date of effective payment. 43. As a result of all the above, the Single Judge concluded that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the following amounts: - EUR 44,117 as well as 5% interest per year on the said amount from 3 March 2010, as outstanding remuneration; - EUR 651,900 and currency of country U 180,000 as well as 5% interest per year on the said amounts from 15 August 2012, as compensation for breach of contract. 44. Furthermore, the Single Judge concluded that the counter-claim of the Respondent is partially accepted and that the Claimant has to pay to the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 132,351. 45. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 46. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is only partly accepted and that the counter-claim of the Respondent is also partly accepted. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that in view of the circumstances of the present case it would be fair and reasonable that the costs of the current proceedings be proportionally borne by the Claimant and the Respondent on the basis of their respective degree of success in the present matter. 47. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is above currency of country H 200,001, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 25,000. 48. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 25,000. 49. Consequently, the Respondent has to pay the amount of USD 18,000 and the Claimant the amount of currency of country H 7,000 in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, Coach F, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 44,117, as well as 5% interest per year on the said amount from 3 March 2010 within 30 days as from the date of the notification of this decision. 3. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, Coach F, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 651,900 as well as in the amount of currency of country U 180,000 as well as 5% interest per year on the said amounts from 15 August 2012 until the date of effective payment, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 4. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F, are rejected. 5. If the aforementioned sums, plus interest, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F, is directed to inform the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 2. and 3. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. 7. The counter-claim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted. 8. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F, has to pay to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 132,351 within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 9. Any further claims lodged by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, are rejected. 10. If the aforementioned sum is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% per year will apply as of the expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 11. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, is directed to inform the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 8 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. 12. The total costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 25,000 are to be paid, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows: 12.1 The amount of currency of country H 18,000 has to be paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A. Considering that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club A, already paid an amount of currency of country H 5,000 as advance of costs, the latter has to pay the remaining amount of currency of country H 13,000. 12.2 The amount of currency of country H 7,000 has to be paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach F. Considering that the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, Coach F, already paid the amount of Coach F 5,000 as advance of costs, the latter has to pay the remaining amount of Coach F 2,000. 12.3 The above-mentioned amounts of currency of country H 13,000 and currency of country H 2,000 have to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XX-XXXX: Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives