F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the goalkeeper coach Goalkeeper coach X, from country G as “Claimant” against the club Club A, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the goalkeeper coach Goalkeeper coach X, from country G as “Claimant” against the club Club A, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 July 2011, the goalkeeper coach X, from country G (hereinafter: the Claimant) and Club A, from country S (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an agreement (hereinafter: the agreement), valid from the date of its signature until 30 June 2012, by means of which the Claimant was hired as goalkeeper coach of the Respondent and was inter alia entitled to receive from the latter a monthly salary of 70,000, payable “in arrears on or before the last day of each month”. In addition, the Respondent had to provide the Claimant with a fully furnished apartment and to pay for four economy class tickets to country G per season. 2. According to art. 1.5. of the agreement, the Respondent could “make changes to the Goalkeeper-Coach’s responsibilities from time to time and as the requirements of the game of football and Club A change subject to the amendments being limited to those reasonably related to the position.” 3. In continuation, art. 3.1. of the agreement specified that the contractual relationship between the parties could be terminated “on thirty days written notice (..): by either party in the event of breach any of the terms of this contract [cf. art. 3.1.1.]; or by Club A in the event that the Goalkeeper Coach is unable to achieve the goals and objectives set out in clause 7 hereunder dealing with work performance [cf. art. 3.1.2.].” 4. Furthermore, it was agreed in art. 3.2. that in case the relationship between the parties “breaks down for any reason but particularly if the Goalkeeper Coach fails to secure and ensure that the goals and objectives can and will be met termination will be appropriate”. 5. As mentioned in art. 7.1. of the agreement, the Claimant was required to “carry out his responsibilities with the utmost skill and enthusiasm” and to “ensure that Club A remains competitive at all time.” In addition, art. 7.2. of the agreement provided that “a reasonable performance of Club A” was expected by the Claimant and “reasonably achievable by him is a top six finish and a semi final spot in at least one the cup competitions available in each season of his employment”. According to the same article, “failure to ensure a top six position will constitute poor performance and a breach of this employment contract as contemplated in 3.1. above” (cf. point 3 above). 6. As per art. 7.4. of the agreement, the Claimant had to report to the head coach as well as to its chairman and had to maintain an “excellent working relationship with the technical team at Club A and the players. Should the Goalkeeper coach not be in a position to develop such a relationship or should it deteriorate this will constitute adequate grounds for the termination of this contract.” 7. If the Respondent decided to terminate its contractual relationship with the Claimant on the basis of art. 3.1.2. of the agreement (cf. point 3 above), it would have to immediately pay to the latter “the equivalent of one months salary which the Goalkeeper Coach will accept in full and final settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature he might otherwise have had against club A consequent upon the termination of his employment.” 8. No arbitrational clause was included in the agreement. 9. By means of a correspondence dated 1 November 2011 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the Respondent terminated its contractual relationship with the Claimant “summarily and with immediate effect” following the recommendation of the chairperson appointed in connection with a disciplinary meeting (hereinafter: the disciplinary meeting) that had taken place on 26 October 2011. In the same document, the Respondent had informed the Claimant that he could refer “to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the League” should he be “unhappy with the termination of [his] employment”. 10. On 23 January 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract and accused the latter of having terminated the agreement without just cause. In this respect, the Claimant requested the payment of the following amounts: - 70,000, corresponding to his October 2011 salary; - EUR 1,624.53, corresponding to the price of two roundtrip flight tickets country G-country S for his wife, in the amount of EUR 892.23 and EUR 732.30, respectively. In this respect, the Claimant provided FIFA with the relevant “e-Ticket Receipt & Itinerary”. Furthermore and as evidence that club had undertaken to pay two flight tickets for his wife, the Claimant provided a statement of the former head coach of the club Mr M (hereinafter: Mr M); - 560,000, corresponding to his salary between 1 November 2011 and 30 June 2012; - 23,224, corresponding to the rent of his flat for the months of November and part of December 2011. As to that, the Claimant provided FIFA with a copy of the relevant tenancy agreement as well as of its termination; - EUR 48,978.74, corresponding to the taxes apparently payable in country G on the aforementioned claimed amounts. In addition, the Claimant requested the payment of 5% interest as from 23 January 2012. 11. As to the facts of the case and to begin with, the Claimant explained having been employed by the Respondent upon the recommendation of Mr M and alleged that his dismissal had been a direct consequence of the latter’s dismissal on 30 September 2011. In this respect, the Claimant provided FIFA with a statement of Mr M as well as the unofficial minutes of a meeting which had allegedly taken place between him and the club’s chairperson on 14 October 2011. 12. Furthermore, the Claimant specified that in July, August and September 2011, in addition to his task as goalkeeper of the Respondent’s senior team, he had also covered the following areas: stabilisation, mobilisation, coordination and speed coordination of the senior team as well as the training of other goalkeeper coaches, especially those working in the youth sector. As to that, the Claimant provided FIFA with an unsigned draft of an additional agreement with the Respondent. 13. In continuation, the Claimant alleged having been summoned by the club on 20 October 2011 to attend the disciplinary meeting. According to the relevant correspondence, the Respondent had accused the Claimant of having refused to work with its “youngsters who are part of the Club A Development Academy while the Club A first team was being assigned and planning was being conducted by the new head coach, Mr Y” following the dismissal of Mr M. According to the Respondent, “contributing to youth development as a goalkeeper coach is not a variation of your responsibilities or a demotion” and “is essential to the future success of the Club”. In addition, the Respondent had accused the Claimant of having been absent on several occasions without its permission and of having had the “intention to destroy any prospect of an ongoing relationship (..) but at the same time to pretend that you are tendering to work when you are clearly not doing so.” 14. With regard to the aforementioned allegations, the Claimant explained that during a previous meeting (cf. note at point 11 above), the president of the Respondent had tried to force him into accepting the payment of two months’ salary as financial settlement and had threatened to send him to the unguarded training of its youth team as well as to their games in the township of country S where his personal safety would have not been guaranteed, if he had refused. 15. In this respect, the Claimant specified that because the training of the youth team of the club was not part of his contractual duties, the Respondent could not base the termination of the agreement on his refusal to do it. In addition, the Claimant stressed that his work permit was limited to the activity of “Professional Goalkeeper Coach”. Equally, the Claimant insisted on having repeatedly manifested his willingness to continue to work as goalkeeper coach of the senior team of the Respondent and as instructor of the latter’s youth team’s goalkeeper coaches. 16. Finally, the Claimant alleged having been denied the right to have a lawyer present during the disciplinary meeting and provided FIFA with a correspondence of the Respondent dated 24 October 2011. 17. In view of all the above, the Claimant considered having been dismissed without just cause by the Respondent and deemed being entitled to receive from the latter all the amounts claimed. 18. In its response, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and contested FIFA’s competence to decide on the dispute. 19. In this respect and to begin with, the Respondent contested the applicability of art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players arguing the absence of an international dimension. According to the Respondent, the Claimant should have referred the dispute to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S, which “is an independent tribunal contemplated in article 22(c) of the Players’ Status Regulations” and which “is constituted in terms of the National Soccer League of country S Constitution and rules”. In the same context, the Respondent also mentioned that the National Soccer League of country S Constitution and Rules complied “with the Football Association of country S Constitution and Rules, the FIFA DRC Rules, the Players’ Status Regulations (..) and the relevant laws of the Republic of country S” as well as with “the Constitution of the Republic of country S.” 20. In continuation, the Respondent referred to its Employee Handbook (hereinafter: the handbook) and pointed out that it provided for all dispute to be decided by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League in accordance with the National Soccer League Rules. In the Respondent’s opinion, the handbook had been “specifically incorporated” in the agreement “by reference”. To that end, the Respondent particularly referred to art. 10.3. of the agreement which reads “this employment contract and the documents referred to herein and incorporated by reference constitute the entire agreement between the parties and no alteration; amendment; or consensual cancellation (including in relation to this clause) shall have any force or effect whatsoever save and unless it is reduced to writing and signed by or on behalf of the parties hereto”. The handbook is not mentioned in the agreement. 21. In addition, the Respondent referred to art. 18. and 23 of the National Soccer League Constitution respectively, in accordance with which coaches are “subject to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Chamber” and “may not seek recourse in a court or law or administrative tribunal on any issue that may be determined in terms of the constitution or rules of the League or Football Association of country S or the Statutes of FIFA unless all procedures prescribes in these prescripts have been satisfied.” 22. Equally, the Respondent stressed that the Claimant should have referred to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League also in order to comply with the National Soccer League Constitution and Rules. 23. In continuation, the Respondent pointed out that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League was a fully independent tribunal recognised by Football Association of country S, and added that the dispute at stake was to be decided in accordance “inter alia with the law of country S”. 24. As to the substance of the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent first of all admitted that the latter had been hired under the recommendation of Mr M. Nevertheless, the Respondent contested the allegation that Mr M’s dismissal had anything to do with the present dispute. 25. As to the facts of the case, the Respondent explained that, in October 2011, the Claimant had been summoned to take part in a meeting to discuss “the poor performance of the team, the departure of Mr M and the future of Club A” and was instructed to attend the training of “the development teams while Club A and the new Head Coach (..) devised a proper plan for the future (..).” As further mentioned by the Respondent, the Claimant had refused to listen to and to follow the instructions of its Chairperson during the meeting in question showing his “unequivocal unwillingness to work with Club A” and breaching the agreement. 26. The Respondent also accused the Claimant of having failed to attend the training of its development team and of having de facto stopped working under the pretext that his duties only covered the activity of the goalkeeper coach of the senior team. As to that, the Respondent clarified that the latter’s duties as per the agreement were not limited to the senior team and could be amplified. 27. Equally, the Respondent contested the content as well as admissibility of Mr M’s statement as evidence. In addition, the Respondent also contested the minutes provided by the Claimant in relation to a previous meeting with its chairperson (cf. note point 11 above) and denied having ever threatened the Claimant. 28. The Respondent further added that the Claimant’s misbehaviours had led to a disciplinary inquiry chaired “by an Independent Chairman who found goalkeeper coach Mr X guilty of serious misconduct and recommended dismissal as the appropriate sanction in the circumstances”. 29. Similarly, the Respondent stated that, according to the handbook, its employee “may be dismissed with notice or without notice (or payment in lieu thereof) for serious misconduct on the first occurrence thereof, repeated misconduct, continued poor performance or for any misconduct in respect of which the employee has received a written warning during the preceding 12 months.” 30. Hence, the Respondent deemed having been entitled to terminate the agreement without notice and considered that no compensation whatsoever was due to the Claimant. 31. Finally, the Respondent denied owing the coach’s October 2011 salary arguing that the latter had not rendered his services during the month in question. Furthermore, the Respondent contested the coach’s entitlement to be reimbursed for the flight tickets of his wife and for the costs of his accommodation in October and November 2011. 32. On 5 July 2012, FIFA asked the Respondent to provide documentary evidence in support of the allegation that an independent tribunal, competent to deal with disputes involving clubs and coaches and guaranteeing fair proceedings in accordance with art. 22 par. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations), existed at national level. 33. In its response thereto, the Respondent provided a copy of the following documents: the National Soccer League Constitution; the National Soccer League Rules; the Constitution of the National Bargain Chamber of country S for the Sport of Professional Football. 34. Furthermore, the Respondent provided FIFA with a statement of the Premier Soccer League of country S dated 11 July 2012 inter alia confirming the independency of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League. 35. On 15 January 2013, the Claimant provided his response to the Respondent’s reply and insisted on FIFA being competent to take a decision in the present matter. In this respect, the Claimant stressed that no jurisdiction clause was included in the agreement because, before signing the relevant document, he had been advised by Mr M to request the Respondent to remove any clause related to the competence of national tribunals in case of dispute. As documentary evidence, the Claimant provided FIFA with an email apparently drafted by the Players’ Agent licensed by the Football Association of country S, Mr B (hereinafter: Players’ Agent Mr B), related to the conclusion of an employment contract between Mr M and the Respondent. 36. In addition, the Claimant alleged having only received a copy of the handbook on 20 October 2011 and stressed that the document in question was not mentioned in the agreement. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League did not fulfil the requirement of an independent arbitration tribunal in accordance with art. 22 par. c of the Regulations. 37. In continuation, the Claimant reiterated the content of his claim as to the substance and in particular contested the impartiality of the chairman who had led the disciplinary meeting, arguing inter alia that he had not been involved in his electing and alleging that the latter had been paid by the Respondent. 38. Finally, the Claimant accused the Respondent of having already decided to dismiss him before the disciplinary meeting had taken place as a consequence of Mr M’s dismissal and complained that he had only been informed of the relevant meeting a couple of days before it had actually taken place. 39. In its final statement dated 1 February 2013, the Respondent mainly reiterated the content of its previous submissions. 40. In addition, the Respondent alleged having given the handbook to the Claimant after the agreement was concluded and insisted that the latter was dismissed for having refused to “obey the lawful instructions of his employer.” 41. Equally, the Respondent insisted that the disciplinary meeting had taken place to protect the coach’s rights and “afford him an opportunity to be heard” and stressed that the latter was given “adequate time to prepare.” Furthermore, the Respondent insisted once again on the independency of the chairman of the disciplinary meeting although admitting that the latter had been paid by it. 42. Finally, the Respondent provided FIFA with a statement of the Players’ Agent Mr B confirming that “the Standard Procedure relating to disputes within the Premier Soccer League, is for such disputes to be referred to the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) of the Premier Soccer League. In all our dealings related hereto, this process has been applicable, whether or not specifically specified in the contract between the parties.” 43. Asked about his labour situation during the period between November 2011 and June 2012, the Claimant informed FIFA that, as of 1 January 2012, he had been employed by the Club G from country G (hereinafter: Club G) earning EUR 1,000. As to that, the Claimant provided FIFA with a copy of the unsigned contract, which was concluded for an unlimited period of time. 44. In addition, the Claimant specified being employed as goalkeeper coach by the Football Federation of country G and explained that the relevant contract also existed during the validity of the agreement. Finally, the Claimant clarified that while the amounts due under the agreement was net, those payable as per the contract concluded with Club G were gross. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (editions 2012 and 2008). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 23 January 2012, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he shall adjudicate on an employment-related dispute between a club or an association and a goalkeeper coach that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Single Judge would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a goal keeper coach and a club regarding outstanding salaries based on an employment contract. 4. However, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Respondent had contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies arguing that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S was the competent instance to resolve on the dispute in question. 5. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that no arbitrational clause was included in the agreement. 6. In addition, the Single Judge pointed out that no evidence had been provided by the Respondent in support of the allegation that the Claimant would have received a copy of the Handbook before concluding the agreement, nor that the latter would have agreed on its content. Equally, the Single Judge emphasized that the Handbook was not mentioned in the agreement and recalled that the Respondent had even admitted that the document in question was given to the Claimant after the agreement was concluded. 7. Consequently, taking into account that no arbitrational clause was included in the agreement as well as considering that the handbook was undisputedly only given to the Claimant after the conclusion of the agreement, the Single Judge established that the parties had not agreed upon the exclusive jurisdiction of Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S and had not excluded the competence of FIFA to take a decision on a dispute arising from the agreement. 8. As a result of the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee is competent, on the basis of art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 9. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2010 and 2012 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 23 January 2012. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations). 10. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. 11. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 1 July 2011, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an agreement valid from the date of its signature until 30 June 2012, by means of which the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of 70,000 as well as a fully furnished apartment. 12. In continuation, the Single Judge observed that as stated in art. 3.1. of the agreement, the parties could terminate their contractual relationship “on thirty days written notice (..) in the event of breach any of the terms of this contract [cf. art. 3.1.1.]; or by Club A in the event that the Goalkeeper Coach is unable to achieve the goals and objectives set out in clause 7 hereunder dealing with work performance [cf. art. 3.1.2.].” As to that, the Single Judge further remarked that in accordance with art. 3.2. of the agreement, in case the relationship between the parties “breaks down for any reason but particularly if the Goalkeeper Coach fails to secure and ensure that the goals and objectives can and will be met termination will be appropriate”. 13. Equally, the Single Judge acknowledged that, by means of a correspondence dated 1 November 2011, the Respondent had terminated its contractual relationship with the Claimant with immediate effect. 14. Finally, the Single Judge took note that in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had accused the Respondent of having terminated the agreement without just cause as a consequence of Mr M’s departure and had therefore claimed to be inter alia entitled to receive his salary between October 2011 and 30 June 2012 in accordance with the agreement. In this connection, the Single Judge additionally observed that, for its part, the Respondent had insisted that the contractual relationship with the Claimant was terminated with just cause for reasons not linked to the termination of Mr M’s contract as head coach of the team and, in particular, had accused the Claimant of serious misconduct and of having refused to fulfil the new tasks that had been assigned to him. 15. In light of all the above, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was whether the agreement had been terminated by the Respondent with or without just cause. 16. With the above-mentioned considerations in mind and to begin with, the Single Judge pointed out that no evidence had been provided by the Respondent neither in support of the alleged misconduct of the Claimant nor in support of the allegations that an agreement would have been reached between the parties with regard to additional tasks to be fulfilled by the latter for the Respondent. Hence, the Single Judge referred to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules in accordance with which any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and concluded that the relevant arguments of the Respondent could not be taken into account for lack of proof. 17. In addition, the Single Judge pointed out that the Respondent had also not provided any evidence indicating that the Claimant would have ever been warned of his alleged breach of contract before being dismissed. 18. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the dismissal of the Claimant by the Respondent had occurred without just cause. Therefore, the Single Judge held that, in accordance with his constant practice, the Respondent had breached its contractual obligations towards the Claimant and should, as a consequence, compensate the latter accordingly. 19. Notwithstanding the above and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge found it worthwhile to mention that the circumstances surrounding the termination of the Claimant’s contractual relationship with the Respondent seemed to indicate that the latter, after having dismissed the head coach Mr M, had decided to change its entire coaching staff and, therefore, had also de facto proceeded to terminate the employment contract concluded with the Claimant. 20. Having established the above-mentioned, the Single Judge went on to assess the potential financial consequences of the breach of the contractual relationship by the Respondent. 21. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge analysed the first part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for payment of outstanding remuneration in the amount of 70,000, corresponding to his October 2011 salary. 22. In this context, the Single Judge recalled that, according to the agreement, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of 70,000. Furthermore, the Single Judge stressed that it was undisputed that the Claimant had not received his salary of October 2011 although the agreement was only terminated in November 2011. 23. In view of the above, and taking into account the legal principle of Pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, as well as bearing in mind that the Respondent had acknowledged not having paid the Claimant’s salary of October 2011 and has not provided any evidence to corroborate its allegation that the Claimant had not rendered his services during such month, the Single Judge concluded that the Claimant is entitled to receive from Respondent outstanding remuneration in the amount of 70,000, together with 5% interest per year on the relevant amount as from 23 January 2012, as claimed. 24. After having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to deal with the second part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for the reimbursement of EUR 1,624.53, corresponding to the price of two roundtrip flight tickets country G-country S for his wife. 25. In this regard, the Single Judge emphasised that the agreement did not provide for the Respondent to cover the costs of the flight tickets of the Claimant’s wife and consequently, the amount of EUR 1,624.53 could not be reimbursed. 26. In continuation, the Single Judge turned his attention to the third part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request related to the payment of his remaining salary until June 2012, corresponding to the total sum of 560,000. 27. In this context, the Single Judge observed that the agreement did not contain a reciprocal clause related to compensation for breach of contract. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of compensation due to the Claimant had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria. 28. Equally, the Single Judge observed that, as of 1 January 2012, the Claimant was employed by the Club M from country G earning a monthly salary EUR 1,000. In view of this, the Single Judge calculated that, between January and June 2012, the Claimant had earned the total amount of EUR 6,000 with Club G, which corresponded to 90,000. In addition, the Single Judge took note that, at the same time, the Claimant was also employed by the Football Federation of country G). Nevertheless, the Claimant was already working for the Football Federation of country G during the validity of the agreement and his tasks with the Football Federation of country G were even mentioned in the agreement. Hence, the Single Judge deemed that any remuneration earned by the Claimant with the Football Federation of country G after the termination of the agreement should not be taken into account when calculation the compensation payable to the latter by the Respondent for having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause. 29. On account of all the above, and considering, in particular, that according to the contract concluded with Club g, the Claimant had received from the latter club a total amount of 90,000, the Single Judge concluded that it was fair and reasonable to deduct this amount from the amount due to the Claimant by the Respondent as compensation for breach of contract. Hence and in line with his constant praxis, the Single Judge decided that in casu the amount of 470,000, corresponding to the salary of the Claimant between November 2011 and June 2012 under the agreement, i.e. 560,000, minus 90,000, corresponding to the amount earned by the claimant with the Club G between January and June 2012, constituted a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract. 30. In continuation and in addition to the above, the Single Judge recalled that the Claimant had also requested the payment of 23,224, corresponding to the rent of his flat for the months of November and part of December 2011. As to that and considering that in accordance with the agreement, the Respondent had to pay for a furnished flat for the Claimant, the Single Judge established that it was fair and reasonable to add the sum of 23,224 to the compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent for having breached the agreement. 31. As a consequence of all the above, the Single Judge ruled that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 493,224 (i.e. 470,000 plus 23,224) together with 5% interest per year on the relevant amount as from 23 January 2012. 32. Finally and with regard to the Claimant’s request related to the payment of EUR 48,978.74, allegedly corresponding to the taxes payable by the latter on the claimed amounts, the Single Judge pointed out that such request lies outside his competence. Hence, the Single Judge resolved that this last request of the Claimant had to be dismissed. 33. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 34. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 35. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is above CHF 100,000 but less than CHF 150,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 15,000. 36. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 10,000. 37. Consequently, the amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, X, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, X, is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club A, has to pay to the Claimant, X, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of 70,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as from 23 January 2012 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent, Club A, has to pay to the Claimant, X, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 493,224 plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as from 23 January 2012 until the date of effective payment. 5. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, X, are rejected. 6. If the aforementioned sums plus interests are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 10,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, Club A, within 30 days as from the notification of the present decision as follows: 7.1. The amount of CHF 7,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr.: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 7.2. The amount of CHF 3,000 has to be paid to the Claimant, X. 8. The Claimant, X, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club A, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 3., 4. and 7.2. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives