F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach M, from country G as “Claimant” against the club Club L, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2013-2014) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach M, from country G as “Claimant” against the club Club L, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. In June 2011, Coach M, from country G (hereinafter: the Claimant) and Club L, from country S (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an agreement (hereinafter: the agreement), valid from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012, by means of which the Claimant was hired as head coach of the Respondent and was inter alia entitled to receive from the latter a monthly salary of currency of country S 70,000, payable “in arrears on or before the last day of each month”. 2. According to its art. 3.1., the agreement could be terminated “on thirty days written notice (..): by either party in the event of breach any of the terms of this contract [cf. art. 3.1.1.]; or by Club L in the event that the Head Coach is unable to achieve the goals and objectives set out in clause 6.2. hereunder dealing with work performance [cf. art. 3.1.2.].” 3. Furthermore, it was agreed in art. 3.2. that in case the relationship between the parties “breaks down for any reason but particularly if the Head Coach fails to secure and ensure that the goals and objectives can and will be met termination will be appropriate”. 4. As mentioned in art. 6.2. of the agreement, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent different “incentive and/or performance bonuses” if the team “finishes in position 1 or 2 in the Premier Soccer League (“PSL”)” or “wins or finishes runner-up in any Official cup competition under the aspices of the PSL or the Confederation of African Football.” 5. In case the Respondent decided to terminate its contractual relationship with the Claimant on the basis of art. 3.1.2. of the agreement (cf. point 2 above), it would have to immediately pay to the latter “the equivalent of one months salary which the Head Coach will accept in full and final settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature he might otherwise have had against Club L consequent upon the termination of his employment and Club L will provided him with a clearance certificate.” 6. In continuation, art. 7.2. of the agreement specified that “a reasonable performance of Club L” as well as “a top six finish and a semi final spot in at least one of the cup competitions available” during each season of the Claimant’s employment was expected. According to the same article, “failure to ensure a top eight position will constitute poor performance and a breach of this employment contract as contemplated in 3.1. above” (cf. point 2 above). 7. Finally, no arbitrational clause was included in the agreement. 8. On the same day, the parties concluded an addendum to the agreement (hereinafter: the addendum), which provided for the Claimant to receive from the club “for scouting work to be undertaken in Europe” between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2012, EUR 100,000 “at the fixed exchange rate of R 9.70 = Euro 1.00” as follows: EUR 50,000 on or before 31 August 2011 and EUR 50,000 on or before 31 March 2012. Both instalments were only payable if the coach remained employed by the club on their respective due date. 9. By means of a correspondence dated 30 September 2011 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the Respondent terminated its contractual relationship with the Claimant on the basis of art. 3.2. of the agreement (cf. point 3 above) with a thirty days’ notice. In the same document, the Respondent informed the Claimant that he was not required “to continue working during this period but (..) will of course be paid in full until the expiry date.” Besides, the latter was notified that he could refer “to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the League” if he considered having been treated unfairly. 10. On 7 October 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract and requested from the latter the payment of EUR 50,000 as well as currency of country S 630,000, plus 5% interest as from 4 October 2011. 11. In this respect, the Claimant accused the Respondent of having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause for sporting reasons. 12. In addition, the Claimant clarified that the prerequisites of a termination of contract in accordance with art. 3.1.2. of the agreement (cf. point 2 above) had not been met considering that at the time of the termination letter’s issuance, the relevant season in country S had just started. 13. In view of all the above, the Claimant deemed being entitled to receive from the Respondent, as compensation for breach of contract, his salary between October 2011 and June 2012 in accordance with both the agreement and the addendum, i.e. currency of country S 630,000 (currency of country S 70,000 x 9 as per the agreement) and EUR 50,000 (corresponding to the second instalment due as per the addendum). 14. In the alternative and in case FIFA would decide that the contractual relationship between the parties had been terminated with just cause by the Respondent, the Claimant requested the payment of his salary during 6 months as compensation for untimely dismissal. 15. In its response, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and contested FIFA’s competence to decide on the dispute. 16. In this respect and to begin with, the Respondent argued that in accordance with its Employee Handbook (hereinafter: the handbook), the Claimant should have lodged his claim with the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S and not with FIFA. As to that, the Respondent further clarified that the handbook, which was not mentioned in the agreement, had been “specifically incorporated” in the document in question “by reference” and particularly referred in this regard to art. 10.3. which reads “this employment contract and the documents referred to herein and incorporated by reference constitute the entire agreement between the parties and no alteration; amendment; or consensual cancellation (including in relation to this clause) shall have any force or effect whatsoever save and unless it is reduced to writing and signed by or on behalf of the parties hereto”. 17. Equally, the Respondent stressed that by registering with the National Soccer League of country C, the Claimant had undertaken to fully comply with the “National Soccer League of country C Constitution and Rules” which establish that “all participants in professional football are required, and undertake as a condition of membership and/or registration, to refer all and any disputes and differences, other than those of a disciplinary nature as between each other to the Dispute Resolution Chamber rather than to courts or administrative tribunals” (cf. art. 18.1. of the relevant constitution, hereinafter: the National Soccer League of country C Constitution). 18. In the same context, the Respondent also referred to art. 18.2. and 23 of the National Soccer League of country C Constitution respectively, by means of which coaches are “subject to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Chamber” and “may not seek recourse in a court or law or administrative tribunal on any issue that may be determined in terms of the constitution or rules of the League or country S Football Association or the Statutes of FIFA unless all procedures prescribes in these prescripts have been satisfied.” 19. In the Respondent’s opinion, the Claimant, in order to comply with the country S Football Association Constitution, should have referred to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C. 20. In continuation, the Respondent pointed out that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C was a fully independent tribunal recognised by country S Football Association, and added that the dispute at stake was to be decided in accordance “inter alia with country S law”. 21. As to the substance of the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent maintained having terminated its contractual relationship with the latter with just cause following the bad results of the team as well as the “continued deteriorating relationship” between them. In this context, the Respondent accused the Claimant of having failed to produce a comprehensive plan that would improve the team’s performances and of having failed to show any willingness to cooperate with its Chairman. As alleged by the Respondent, during a meeting held on 29 September 2011 to discuss the poor results of the team and the Claimant’s plan for the future, the latter had showed his “unequivocal unwillingness” to keep working for the club. 22. Equally, the Respondent accused the coach of having failed to manifest “the ability to secure and ensure that the goals and objectives of Club L would be met” and added that there was “a real possibility that Club L would face relegation at the end of the season if not action was taken to avert the looming disaster.” 23. Because of the aforementioned, the Respondent deemed having had just cause to terminate the agreement as well as the addendum in accordance with art.3.2. of the agreement (cf. point 3 above) and country S law. 24. The Respondent further added that the agreement and the addendum had not been terminated “primary due to sports performance of the team” and stressed that it had been entitled to dismiss the Claimant “for several reasons and on several grounds in terms of the laws of contract, the contract itself and for reasons specific to the sport of football.” Besides, the Respondent pointed out once again that its relationship with the Claimant “had broken down and it was no longer viable for the parties to continue working together.” 25. On 2 December 2011, FIFA asked the Respondent to provide documentary evidence in support of the allegation that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C was an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings in accordance with art. 22 par. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) as well as FIFA’s Circular no. 1010. 26. In its response thereto, the Respondent contested the applicability of art. 22 par. c) of the Regulations arguing that because the Claimant had come to country S, “took up employment here in accordance with country S law (..), applied to be registered with and agreed to comply with the National Soccer League of country C constitution and rules” there was “no international dimension” and the dispute at stake was a “Country S dispute, to be dealt in country S, according to country S law.” 27. In continuation, the Respondent pointed out that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C was an independent arbitration tribunal “set up in terms of the Constitution and Rules of the National Soccer League of country C” and added that both the Constitution and Rules of the National Soccer League of country C “comply with the Constitution and Rules of country S Football Association (..) and the FIFA Statutes” as well as with country S law. Besides, the Respondent maintained that “all of those who sit on the National Soccer League of country C DRC are independent lawyers (…) subject to the ethical and other rules that govern the practice of law in country S” and are not appointed by clubs. 28. In addition, the Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the following documents: the National Soccer League of country C Constitution; the National Soccer League of country C Rules; Chapter two of the country S Bill of rights; the Constitution of the country S National Bargain Chamber for the Sport of Professional Football; several decisions taken in country S. 29. In continuation and by means of a further correspondence, the Respondent provided FIFA with a statement of the country S Premier Soccer League inter alia confirming the independency of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C. 30. On 8 January 2013, the Claimant provided his response to the Respondent’s reply and insisted on FIFA being competent to take a decision in the present matter. In this respect, the Claimant stressed that no jurisdiction clause had been included in the agreement and maintained that, before signing the relevant document, he had specifically requested the club to remove any clause related to the competence of national tribunals. As documentary evidence, the Claimant provided FIFA with an email allegedly drafted by the Players’ Agent licensed by the country S Football Association, Mr N (hereinafter: Mr N), confirming that he had insisted not to put a clause in the agreement accepting that the local Disciplinary Committee was competent to decide over any dispute between the parties. 31. In addition, the Claimant denied having received a copy of the handbook and stressed that the document in question was not mentioned in the agreement. Furthermore, in the coach’s opinion, the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country C did not fulfil the requirement of an independent arbitration tribunal in accordance with art. 22 par. c) of the Regulations. 32. Equally, the Claimant reiterated the content of his claim as to the substance and in particular contested the applicability of art. 3.2. of the agreement (cf. point 3 above) arguing that the clause in question was not reciprocal. 33. Finally, the Claimant accused the Respondent of having decided to dismiss him even before the meeting of 29 September 2011 had taken place and provided FIFA with a correspondence dated 29 September 2011, apparently received by the chairman of the Respondent, in which the latter inter alia asked him to give “some startling explanation (..) that would restore my confidence, and also that of the team (..).” In the same correspondence, the Claimant was invited to attend a meeting in order to provide his position on several issues. 34. In its final statement dated 21 January 2013, the Respondent mainly reiterated the content of its previous submissions. 35. In addition, the Respondent pointed out that the agreement and the addendum were terminated “due to the irretrievable breakdown in the relationship” with the Claimant and stressed that the latter had not been willing to continue working with it. In the Respondent’s opinion, the coach’s conduct had left it “with no option but to terminate his employment.” 36. Furthermore, the Respondent provided FIFA with a statement of Mr N confirming that “the Standard Procedure relating to disputes within the Premier Soccer League, is for such disputes to be referred to the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) of the Premier Soccer League. In all our dealings related hereto, this process has been applicable, whether or not specifically specified in the contract between the parties.” 37. In continuation, the Respondent pointed out that the meeting of 29 September 2011 was “a genuine opportunity given to Coach M to discuss the burning issues and coming up with possible solutions to these issues” whereas the latter “was very arrogant, confrontational and disrespectful.” Besides, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant had declined to receive more time to prepare for the meeting and “said [that] he was ready to proceed.” 38. Finally, the Respondent asserted that art. 3.2. of the agreement gave both parties the right to terminate their contractual relationship. 39. Asked about his labour situation during the period between October 2011 and June 2012, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 18 January 2012, he had concluded an employment contract with the Club U, from country S (hereinafter: Club U). According to the relevant contract, which was valid until 30 June 2013, the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive “a package in the sum of R 700 000 (..) exclusive of VAT (..) for the period of 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2012” as well as several bonuses depending on the result of the team. In addition, the Claimant specified that while the amounts due under the agreement and the addendum were net, those payable as per the contract concluded with Club U were gross. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (editions 2012 and 2008). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 7 October 2011, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he shall adjudicate on an employment-related dispute between a club or an association and a coach that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Single Judge would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a country G coach and country S club regarding outstanding salaries based on an employment contract. 4. However, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Respondent had contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies arguing that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S was the competent instance to resolve on the dispute in question. 5. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that no arbitrational clause was included in the agreement. 6. In addition, the Single Judge pointed out that no evidence had been provided by the Respondent in support of the allegation that the Claimant would have received a copy of the Handbook and agreed on its content. Equally, the Single Judge emphasized that the Handbook was not mentioned in the agreement and recalled that the Claimant had contested having received the document in question. 7. In view of the above, the Single Judge referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and stressed that any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. Consequently and since the Respondent had not been able to prove that the Claimant had received the Handbook as well as taking into account that no arbitrational clause was included in the agreement, the Single Judge concluded that the parties had not agreed upon the exclusive jurisdiction of Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S and had not excluded the competence of FIFA to take a decision on a dispute arising from the agreement. 8. As a result of the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee is competent, on the basis of art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 9. Notwithstanding the above and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge found it worthwhile to mention that only by registering with the National Soccer League of country S and by undertaking to fully comply with its Rules and Regulations, the Claimant had not yet given up its right to refer any dispute arisen between him and the Respondent to the competent bodies of FIFA in accordance with the Regulations and had not explicitly agreed on the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer League of country S to take a decision on such a dispute. Furthermore and in the same context, the Single Judge was eager to emphasize that, as a general rule, the competence of an arbitrational body needs to be explicitly agreed between the parties by means of a specific agreement in order to be applicable. 10. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2010 and 2012 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 7 October 2011. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations). 11. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. 12. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge acknowledged that, in June 2011, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an agreement valid from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012, by means of which the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of currency of country S 70,000. Furthermore, the Single Judge took note that, on the same day, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded a supplementary agreement which provided for the Claimant to receive from the Respondent the additional amount of EUR 100,000 in two instalments of EUR 50,000 each for his scouting work in Europe between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2012. 13. In continuation, the Single Judge observed that as stated in art. 3.1. of the agreement, the parties could terminate their contractual relationship “on thirty days written notice (..) in the event of breach any of the terms of this contract [cf. art. 3.1.1.]; or by Club L in the event that the Head Coach is unable to achieve the goals and objectives set out in clause 6.2. hereunder dealing with work performance [cf. art. 3.1.2.].” As to that, the Single Judge further remarked that in accordance with art. 3.2. of the agreement, in case the relationship between the parties “breaks down for any reason but particularly if the Head Coach fails to secure and ensure that the goals and objectives can and will be met termination will be appropriate”. Equally, the Single Judge noted that as mentioned in art. 7.2. of the agreement “a reasonable performance of Club L” as well as “a top six finish and a semi final spot in at least one of the cup competitions available” during each season of the Claimant’s employment was expected whereas “failure to ensure a top eight position will constitute poor performance and a breach of this employment contract as contemplated in 3.1. above”. 14. Finally, the Single Judge acknowledged that, by means of a correspondence dated 30 September 2011, the Respondent had terminated its contractual relationship with the Claimant on the basis of art. 3.2. of the agreement with a thirty days’ notice. 15. Subsequently, the Single Judge took note that in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had accused the Respondent of having terminated the agreement without just cause and consequently, had claimed to be entitled to receive his remaining salary in accordance with both to the agreement and its addendum. In this connection, the Single Judge additionally observed that, for its part, the Respondent had insisted that the contractual relationship with the Claimant was terminated with just cause and had accused the latter, in particular, of having been responsible for the bad results of his team and for the “continued deteriorating relationship” between the parties. 16. In light of all the above, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was whether the agreement had been terminated by the Respondent with or without just cause. 17. With the above-mentioned considerations in mind and to begin with, the Single Judge referred to his well-established jurisprudence and pointed out that the absence of sporting results of a team cannot, as a general rule, constitute a valid reason for a club or an association to terminate a coach’s employment contract since the assessment of performance by a coach is a subjective perception which cannot be measured on an objective scale and therefore has to be considered as inadmissible grounds for a termination of the employment relationship. In this context, the Single Judge was eager to emphasize that this principle has to be also applied if the parties have agreed in an agreement that their contractual relationship can be terminated for such reason. 18. In view of the above, the Single Judge determined that the Respondent could not invoke the absence of sporting results as valid reason to prematurely terminate the agreement. 19. In continuation, the Single Judge pointed out that no evidence had been provided by the Respondent neither in support of the alleged misconduct and misbehaviours of the Claimant nor in support of the allegations that the latter would have been responsible for a deteriorating relationship between the parties. Hence, the Single Judge referred once again to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and concluded that the relevant arguments of the Respondent could not be taken into account for lack of proof. 20. In addition, the Single Judge pointed out that the Respondent had also not provided any evidence indicating that the Claimant would have been warned of his alleged breach of contract before being dismissed. 21. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the dismissal of the Claimant by the Respondent had occurred without just cause. Therefore, the Single Judge held that, in accordance with his constant practice, the Respondent had breached its contractual obligations towards the Claimant and should, as a consequence, compensate the latter accordingly. 22. Having established the above-mentioned, the Single Judge went on to assess the potential financial consequences of the breach of the contractual relationship by the Respondent. In doing so, the Single Judge first of all took note that the claimant was inter alia requesting the payment of the remuneration stipulated in the agreement for the period between October 2011 and June 2012, representing a total amount of currency of country S 630,000. 23. In this context, the Single Judge observed that the agreement did not contain a reciprocal clause related to compensation for breach of contract. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of compensation due to the Claimant had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria. 24. Equally, the Single Judge observed that, between January and June 2012, Claimant had been employed by the Club U, from country S earning currency of country S 700,000. 25. Considering the aforementioned and, in particular, taking into account that the remaining value of the agreement amounted to currency of country S 630,000 as well as bearing in mind that the Claimant had received from Club U, from country S until June 2012 the total sum of currency of country S 700,000, the Single Judge reasoned that the Claimant did not seem to have suffered any financial damage as a consequence of the premature termination of the agreement. On the contrary, the Claimant had earned with Club U an higher salary until June 2012 than he would have with the Respondent in accordance with the agreement. As a result, the Single Judged established that the claim of the Claimant relative to the payment of currency of country S 630,000 had to be rejected. 26. After having ruled on the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to deal with the second part of the claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for payment of EUR 50,000 on the basis of the addendum. 27. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that the addendum provided for the Claimant to receive the total amount of EUR 100,000 in exchange for his scouting duties in favour of the Respondent in Europe. 28. In view of the content of the addendum, the Single Judge considered that its nature was clearly not employment-related as its main purpose was not related to the typical activity of a coach. 29. As a consequence of the above-mentioned considerations, the Single held that such an agreement clearly falls outside of the scope of the Regulations and, correlatively, of FIFA’s competence, since it does not per se relate to typical activity of a coach (cf. art. 22c of the Regulations). As a result, the Single Judge concluded that he was not competent to deal with the second part of the Claimant’s claim and that this request had therefore to be considered not admissible. 30. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 31. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is rejected. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 32. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is above currency of country H 100,000 but less than currency of country H 150,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 15,000. 33. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 8,000. 34. Consequently, the amount of currency of country H 8,000 has to be paid by the Claimant to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach M, related to the payment of compensation for breach of contract on the basis of the “Fixed Term Letter of Appointment” is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, Coach M, related to the payment of compensation for breach of contract on the basis of the “Fixed Term Letter of Appointment” is rejected. 3. The claim of the Claimant, Coach M, related to the payment of compensation for breach of contract on the basis of the “Scouting Contract” is not admissible. 4. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 8,000 are to be paid by the Claimant, Coach M. Considering that the Claimant, Coach M, already paid the amount of currency of country H 3,000 as advance of costs, the latter has to pay the remaining amount of currency of country H 5,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision to the following bank account with reference to case nr.: ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives