F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 18 March 2013, by Chuck Blazer (USA) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on a claim presented by the Players’ agent Players’ Agent, from country B as “Claimant” against the club Club U, from country E as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 18 March 2013, by Chuck Blazer (USA) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on a claim presented by the Players’ agent Players’ Agent, from country B as “Claimant” against the club Club U, from country E as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 24 September 2008, Club U, from country E (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed a representation agreement (hereinafter: the 1st agreement) valid from 24 September 2008 until 31 August 2009, by means of which it authorised the players’ agent licensed by the country B Football Association, Players’ Agent S (hereinafter: the Claimant), to represent the Respondent in all negotiations with the country F regarding the transfer of the player H (hereinafter: the player). The 1st agreement stipulated that the Respondent would “agree your [i.e. the Claimant] remuneration for performing any agency services in respect of the Player on his signing any further contract of employment with us [i.e. the Respondent]”. 2. On 19 January 2009, the Claimant and the Respondent signed another agreement (hereinafter: the 2nd agreement). In this respect, the 2nd agreement provided that “in the event that Club U [i.e. the Respondent] exercise the option contained within paragraphs 6-8 (the “Terms”) of our agreement with Club T dated 1st September 2008 and sign the player on the Terms as set out in the Agreement then we agree to pay to you [i.e. the Claimant] £30,000 payable within 28 days of exercising the option”. 3. On 21 June 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent, requesting from the latter the payment of the total amount of currency of country E 136,875. In this respect, the Claimant argued that the Respondent had concluded a representation agreement with the players’ agent licensed by the country P Football Union, Mr I , on 1 January 2009, by means of which the Respondent had allegedly authorised Mr I to represent it in the negotiations with Club T regarding the definitive transfer of the player. The alleged representation agreement, an unsigned copy of which was provided to FIFA, stipulated that Mr I was allegedly entitled to receive an amount of currency of country E 315,000, payable in five instalments, i.e. first instalment amounting to currency of country E 30,000 and second, third, fourth and fifth instalments amounting to currency of country E 71,250 each. 4. According to the Claimant, the Respondent had informed him that the conclusion of the representation agreement with Mr I would be the only way to compensate him, since Mr I had allegedly been instructed by the Respondent to repay the money to the Claimant after deduction of 10% as commission. Furthermore, the Claimant stated that he had only received the first two instalments according to the representation agreement allegedly concluded by the Respondent and Mr I . Moreover, the Claimant argued that, following a revamp at the Respondent, he had been informed by Mr I that the Respondent would no longer make any payment as the latter was of the opinion that such payments could infringe the regulations on players’ agents of The Football Association. 5. Consequently, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the total amount of currency of country E 136,875, representing currency of country E 106,875 on the basis of the representation agreement allegedly concluded between the Respondent and Mr I as well as currency of country E 30,000 based on the 2nd agreement. According to the Claimant, he was entitled to half of the commission allegedly agreed upon in the representation agreement between the Respondent and Mr I. 6. On 30 November 2011, FIFA informed the Claimant that since he was not a party to the representation agreement allegedly concluded between the Respondent and Mr I, he did not appear to be entitled to this part of his claim. Consequently, on 1 December 2011, the Claimant amended his original claim and requested from the Respondent the payment of the amount of currency of country E 30,000 based on the 2nd agreement. 7. On 17 April 2012, the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant in its entirety, arguing that the current owners of the Respondent “were not personally involved” in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the 1st and 2nd agreements since they had taken over the Respondent in January 2010. 8. Furthermore, the Respondent was of the opinion that the 2nd agreement “was superseded by the representation agreement concluded between the club [i.e. the Respondent] and the players’ agent Mr I” under the terms of which the Respondent had already paid currency of country I 101,250. In this respect, the Respondent stated that as the Claimant had not specified “the precise amount” that he had received and since it was not aware of the financial arrangement concluded between the Claimant and Mr I, it could be well argued that what was paid to the Claimant under the agreement signed by Mr I included the amount that was due to him in the 2nd agreement. 9. Finally, the Respondent alleged that on 16 March 2010, it had concluded another agreement with Mr I under the terms of which the latter would receive a further amount of currency of country I 120,000 and which had replaced the previous agreement it had allegedly signed with Mr I on 1 January 2009. 10. In view of the above, the Respondent “denied any liability of any whatsoever nature to the agent”. 11. On 3 May 2012, the Claimant replied to the allegation of the Respondent by stating that the latter could not exempt itself from any liability on the grounds that the agreements in question had been concluded by the Respondent prior to the arrival of its current owners. Furthermore, the Claimant deemed that the representation agreement allegedly concluded between the Respondent and Mr I on 16 March 2010 could in no way have replaced the obligation of the Respondent to pay his commission as agreed between the parties. 12. On 25 June 2012, in its last comments to the claim, the Respondent reiterated its statements of defence and denied again “any liability of any whatsoever nature to DS [i.e. the agent] (including in respect of the claim of currency of country E 30,000)”. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012). Since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 21 June 2010, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations should be applicable. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 39 par. 1 and 4 of the 2008 edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 21 June 2010, the current edition of the Player’s Agents Regulations (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at stake. 3. This established, the Single Judge pointed out that in accordance with the provisions set out by the Regulations, FIFA has jurisdiction on matters relating to licensed players’ agents, i.e. on those individuals who hold a valid player’s agent license issued by the relevant member Association. 4. The Single Judge continued his deliberations by indicating that the present matter concerned a dispute between a players’ agent licensed by the country B Football Association and an country E club, regarding an alleged outstanding commission. As a consequence, the Single Judge held that he is competent to decide on the present matter which has an international dimension (cf. art. 30 par. 2 of the Regulations). 5. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the present matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts and the arguments of the parties as well as the documentation contained in the file. 6. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge started his analysis of the case by noting that, according to the 2nd agreement dated 19 January 2009 which the Claimant had submitted in his claim, the latter was entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of currency of country E 30,000 as commission in case the Respondent would “exercise the option” stipulated in the “Terms” concluded with the Club T, from country F and transfer the player definitively to the Respondent. Furthermore, the Single Judge underlined that, on the one hand, the Claimant had argued that the Claimant was entitled to receive his commission, whereas, on the other hand, the Respondent rejected the claim lodged against it, based on the argumentation that the current owners of the Respondent “were not personally involved” in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the 1st and 2nd agreements and, therefore, could not be considered to be part of such agreements. 7. Equally, the Single Judge observed that, on the one hand, the Respondent was of the opinion that the 2nd agreement had been superseded by another representation agreement concluded between the Respondent and Mr I on 1 January 2009, representation agreement which was itself allegedly replaced by another agreement on 16 March 2010, whereas, on the other hand, the Claimant argued that the representation agreement concluded with Mr I could not have replaced the obligation of the Respondent to pay his commission as agreed between himself and the Respondent. 8. On the basis of the aforementioned allegations, the Single Judge considered that he would first have to address the question of whether the 2nd agreement concluded by the parties was binding or not and the consequences that such possible binding effect would have on the parties. 9. In this context, the Single Judge recalled the argument of the Respondent according to which the agreement was not binding since the current owners of the Respondent “were not personally involved” in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the 1st and 2nd agreements. 10. In view of the above and taking into account that both the 1st and the 2nd agreements were signed by persons acting on behalf of the Respondent, the Single Judge was keen to underline that it could not reasonably be expected of the Claimant to have known whether the persons in question had the necessary authority to represent and bind the Respondent at the time the agreements were concluded. 11. In light of the above, the Single Judge reached the conclusion that the 2nd agreement signed on 19 January 2009 was fully binding upon the parties. 12. In continuation, the Single Judge went on to deal with the question of whether the representation agreement dated 16 March 2010 and concluded between the Respondent and Mr I had superseded the 2nd agreement signed between the Claimant and the Respondent. 13. In this regard, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that, according to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules which states that “any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”, the Respondent had not provided any documentary evidence which would have indicated that it had indeed concluded a representation agreement with Mr I on 16 March 2010. In addition, and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge stressed that in any case the Claimant was not a party in the representation agreement signed between the Respondent and Mr I and, therefore, could not have been bound by the said representation agreement. 14. Based on all the above-mentioned considerations and taking into account the general legal principle of “Pacta sunt servanda” which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge held that the Respondent has to fulfil its contractual obligations towards the Claimant. Therefore, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided to accept the claim of the Claimant and ruled that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the amount of currency of country E 30,000 pursuant to the 2nd agreement. 15. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the. 16. On account of the above and considering that the complaint of the Claimant has been fully accepted, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is currency of country E 30,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 5,000. 17. In conclusion, and in view of the circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 5,000. Consequently, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided that the amount of currency of country H 5,000 has to be paid by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Players’ Agent S, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club U, has to pay to the Claimant, Players’ Agent S, the total amount of currency of country E 30,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. If the aforementioned amount is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% per year will apply as of the expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 5,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, Club U, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision directly to the Claimant, Players’ Agent S. 5. The Claimant, Players’ Agent S, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club U, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under points 2 and 4 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne - Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives