F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie tra società – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – club vs. club disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 5 June 2013, by Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the club Club W, from country F as “Claimant” against the club Club O, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties and relating to the player V.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie tra società – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – club vs. club disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 5 June 2013, by Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the club Club W, from country F as “Claimant” against the club Club O, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties and relating to the player V. I. Facts of the case 1. On 16 July 2008, the Club W from country F (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club O from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed a document entitled “Private Contract of the Stipulation and Participation on the Financial and Economic Rights of a Soccer Athlete” (hereinafter: the contract), valid from 26 December 2008 and which regulated “the participation between Club W, Club P [i.e. another club P from country F; hereinafter: club P] and club O in the economic and financial rights” of the player V from country F (hereinafter: the player) “in case of eventual national and international” transfer of the latter during the period in which he “will be tied with the club W”. The contract, which was provided by the Claimant, was signed by the latter, the Respondent and the player. 2. In this respect, the second clause of the contract provided that “in negotiation case, to any heading, of the federative rights” of the player “the parties, club W, club P and club O will divide the liquid product of the negotiation in following value: 50% of the value negotiated for the Club P; 50% of the value for club O” and “club O will transfer to club W USD$ 200,000,00 (two hundred a thousand dollars), net”. 3. On 22 July 2008, the Claimant, the Respondent and club P signed another agreement (hereinafter: the agreement) concerning the loan of the player from the Claimant to the Respondent, valid until 15 July 2011, by means of which the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent, as loan fee (hereinafter: the loan fee), the amount of USD 500,000 as follows: USD 200,000 on 25 July 2008, USD 150,000 on 25 September 2008 and USD 150,000 on 25 December 2008. The agreement, which was provided by the Claimant, was signed by the latter, the Respondent and club P. 4. Furthermore, clause 2 of the agreement provided that, in case the Respondent decided to definitively acquire “the federative rights” of the player, “the minimum value” payable to club P was EUR 1,500,000. Clause 3 of the agreement further stipulated that “In such a way, considering the agreements made in the anterior clauses on the economic and financial right, in relation with the total amount of the negotiation, the distribution on an eventual financial benefit, in a future transfer of the CONSENTING one [i.e. the player], it is fixed in the following percentages and value:  Club P 50% (…) at the minimum value of € 1.500.000 (…);  Club W 50% (…)(respecting a private agreement between Club W and the ‘club O’ issued and signed on the 22nd of July 2008)”. 5. In addition, the agreement stated in clause 4.1 that, in case the Respondent received “a new proposal for the acquisition of the Sportive Right” of the player “for a superior value of € 3,000,000 (…) the club W / club O must agree and accept the proposal immediately, communicating the club P”. Besides, according to clause 9 of the agreement, the Respondent and the player “shall not terminate the temporary employment contract before the expiring date without the formal and express (written) consent of the club W”. 6. Finally, clause 12.1 of the agreement provided that “the party which unilateral breach this contract [i.e. the agreement] without just cause shall be responsible to pay a penalty fee of € 1.500.000, to each party damaged”, whereas clause 12.2 of the agreement stipulated that “If club O delays on paying the amount on the previous CLAUSE FIRST [i.e. the loan fee], club O will have to pay an additional fee of US$ 50.000, (fifty thousand dollars), every each week of delay”. 7. On 19 November 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract. 8. In this respect and first of all, the Claimant argued that the second and third instalments due in accordance with the agreement had not been paid by the Respondent on time. As to that, the Claimant explained that it had received from the Respondent the amounts of USD 69,942.50 and USD 79,942.50 “in relation to the second instalment” only on 22 October 2008 and 3 November 2008 respectively, and that the amount of USD 149,942.50 “in relation to the third instalment” was only paid on 2 February 2009. 9. In view of the above, the Claimant calculated that the Respondent had paid the due amount with 10 weeks of delay as follows: five weeks from the due date of the second instalment, (i.e. 25 September 2008) until 3 November 2008 (i.e. date of payment of the amount of USD 79,942.50) plus five more weeks corresponding to the period between 25 December 2008, (i.e. the due date of the third instalment) and 2 February 2009 (i.e. date of payment of the third instalment). 10. Consequently, the Claimant referred to clause 12.2 of the agreement and argued that the Respondent should be asked to pay USD 500,000 (i.e. USD 50,000 x 10 weeks) as penalty. 11. In continuation, the Claimant alleged that, in August 2009, the Respondent had transferred the player to the club X from country R. (hereinafter: club X) for approximately EUR 8,000,000. Hence, the Claimant considered that the Respondent has to pay the additional amount of USD 200,000 in accordance with the second clause of the contract, since the player, at that time, was still registered with the Claimant. 12. In addition, the Claimant held that the player had been transferred to club X without its consent. As a consequence, the Claimant deemed that the Respondent had breached the agreement and should be requested to pay EUR 1,500,000 as penalty under clause 12.1 of the agreement. Moreover, the Claimant further stressed that the Respondent had infringed art. 10 par. 3 of FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and should also be imposed “disciplinary sanction”. 13. As a consequence of all the above, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the payment of USD 500,000 for having paid the loan fee with delay, USD 200,000 for having transferred the player to club X and EUR 1,500,000 for having breached the agreement. In addition, the Claimant requested the payment of 5% interest on the relevant sums and requested FIFA to impose the costs of the proceedings on the Respondent. 14. In its response on 19 July 2011, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim entirely. 15. In this respect, the Respondent admitted having paid the loan fee with delay but, at the same time, stressed that the Claimant had been regularly notified “about the actual dates of the payments” and had implicitly given its “consent for delayed payments” by not requesting the payment of the penalty fee earlier. 16. In continuation, the Respondent argued that the penalty clause was excessive and had an “extortionate nature and as such is invalid and unenforceable”. Furthermore, the Respondent considered that a penalty fee amounting to “USD 50,000 per week would be unjust enrichment” and was “unduly harsh” taking into account that the instalments paid with delay amounted to USD 300,000. 17. In continuation, the Respondent stressed that, in accordance with clause 2 of the agreement, it had “an option to transfer the player on a definitive basis by making a transfer payment to club P amounting to EUR 1,500,000” which it had exercised before the transfer to club X had taken place. Therefore, the Respondent deemed that the Claimant was not entitled to receive any “transfer compensation”. 18. In this context, the Respondent further explained that, on 4 July 2010, it had notified both the Claimant and club P about its intention to exercise “its buy-out option” as per the agreement and acquire 100% “of sportive and economic rights of the player”. 19. With regard to the alleged compensation for breach of contract, the Respondent stated “that the temporary employment contract was not terminated before its ordinary expiration” and that “Without doubt, the pre-existing contractual relationship between the Player and club W was ended when club O exercised its option and transferred the player on a definitive basis”. 20. Furthermore, the Respondent held that the true intention of the parties stipulated under clause 9 of the agreement, was to “inform club W about the continuance and termination of the employment relationship between club O and the player, since the player had a previous contract with club W”. In this respect, the Respondent argued that the aforementioned clause was stipulated in the agreement “because club W had a legal benefit to be informed about the contractual status of the Player. Otherwise, to assume either the Player or club O was required to obtain written consent of club W for termination would be third party influence on a valid employment relationship”. 21. On 15 August 2011, the Claimant presented its comments to the Respondent’s response. In this respect and first of all, the Claimant argued that it had never been notified by the Respondent about the “actual dates of the payments in delay” and underlined that “such hypothetical consent of club W would go strictly in contrary to the dispositions of the Agreement”. 22. In continuation, the Claimant argued that in accordance with clause 3 of the agreement, it was entitled to 50% of the “economic rights” of an eventual transfer of the player on a definitive basis. In this respect, the Claimant emphasised that while club P had been paid the amount of EUR 1,500,000 for the definitive transfer of the player, the Claimant had not received anything. With regard to the abovementioned correspondence sent by the Respondent on 4 March 2010 (cf. par. 18 above), the Claimant argued that this was a “simple notification informing club W of its intention in acquiring the Player on a definitive basis” but that it had at no time “manifested its consent with such transfer and has not received the amount it was entitled to”. 23. As to the transfer of the player to club X, the Claimant emphasised that it took place when the player was still registered with the Claimant and therefore it was entitled to receive the sum of USD 200,000 according to the second clause of the contract. 24. Finally, the Claimant argued that in light of all the above, “it is a crystal clear case of unjustified enrichment for which club O shall be condemned”. 25. On 29 August 2011, the Respondent presented its final comments to the Claimant’s last submission and stated that more than two years had elapsed from the date the second instalment matured and the date the claim was lodged, i.e. “The second payment, due on 25 September 2008, was partially paid on 22 October 2008 and the remaining amount was paid on 3 November 2008 when the claim was lodged on 19 November 2010”. Therefore, the Respondent requested FIFA to disregard this part of the claim and reiterated that the penalty asked in connection with the third instalment was clearly excessive. 26. With regard to the amount claimed in relation to the subsequent transfer of the player, the Respondent argued that by having paid transfer compensation to club P amounting to EUR 1,500,000, the “definitive federative rights of the player had been taken over by club O” before the player was transferred to club X. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 November 2010, thus before the aforementioned rules entered into force (1 December 2012), the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) was applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Furthermore, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 as well as art. 22 f) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he was competent to deal with the present matter since it concerned a dispute between two clubs affiliated to different associations. 3. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2012 and 2010 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and, on the other hand, to the fact that the claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 19 November 2010. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter as to the substance. 4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments provided by the parties and the documentation contained in the file. 5. In this respect, and first of all, the Single Judge noted that the parties to the dispute had concluded a contract on 16 July 2008 which regulated between the parties the “economic and financial rights” over the player in case of a transfer. 6. The Single Judge further took note that the parties had agreed in clause 2 of the contract that “in negotiation case, to any heading, of the federative rights” of the player “during the period where this [i.e. the player] will be registered with club W, the parties, club W, Club P and club O will divide the liquid product of the negotiation in following value: 50% of the value negotiated for the Club P; 50% of the value for club O” and “club O will transfer to club W USD$ 200,000,00 (two hundred a thousand dollars), net”. 7. Furthermore, the Single Judge acknowledged that on 22 July 2008, a loan agreement was concluded between the parties in order to transfer the player from the Claimant to the Respondent for a loan fee of USD 500,000, payable in three different instalments and that clause 12.2 of the agreement provided that in case of late payment of the aforementioned loan fee, the Respondent was obliged to pay to the Claimant “an additional fee of USD 50,000 every each week of delay”. 8. The Single Judge also underlined that clause 9 of the agreement established that the Respondent and the player “shall not terminate the temporary employment contract before the expiring date without the formal and express (written) consent of club W” and that clause 4.1 of the agreement stipulated that in case it existed “a new proposal for the acquisition of the Sportive Right” of the player “for a superior value of € 3,000,000 (…) the club W/ club O must agree and accept the proposal immediately, communicating the club P”. In this context, the Single Judge also acknowledged that clause 3 of the agreement provided that “the distribution on an eventual financial benefit, in a future transfer of the CONSENTING one [i.e. the player], it is fixed in the following percentages and value:  Club P 50% (…) at the minimum value of € 1.500.000 (…);  Club W 50% (…)”. 9. In continuation, the Single Judge turned his attention to the claimed amount of USD 500,000 for late payment of the second and third instalment of the loan fee requested by the Claimant and took note that the Respondent had paid both of the said instalments with a delay of five weeks each. 10. In view of the above and bearing in mind that the Respondent had admitted having paid the loan fee with delay but, at the same time, had stressed that the Claimant had been regularly notified “about the actual dates of the payments” and had implicitly given its “consent for delayed payments” by not requesting the payment of the penalty fee earlier, the Single Judge, after a careful examination of the content of the agreement, in particular clause 12.2 of the agreement, held that a penalty clause amounting to USD 50,000 per week for late payment in relation to a total loan fee of USD 500,000 was manifestly disproportionate and exorbitant, and as such, should not be enforced. 11. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant’s claim for the payment of USD 500,000 as a penalty for the default of the Respondent regarding the late payment of the loan fee had to be rejected. 12. In this context, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that according to the long standing and well-established jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee in similar cases, in the event that the level of interest for late payment agreed between the parties is clearly disproportionate, it is fair and reasonable to reduce the relevant interests. Therefore, the Single Judge decided, in accordance with the aforementioned jurisprudence, that the Claimant should only be entitled to receive from the Respondent an interest rate of 5% per year over the corresponding amounts. 13. In addition, the Single Judge noted that, based on the information received from the Claimant during the course of the present investigation, the second instalment was due on 25 September 2008. Consequently, while referring to art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 November 2010, thus more than two years after the due date of the second instalment, the Single Judge concluded that the claimed amount for late payment of the second instalment has to be considered prescribed. 14. In view of the aforementioned considerations, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant should only be entitled to 5% interest over the amount of EUR 150,000 representing the third instalment and that such interest should be calculated over a period of five weeks. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 729 (i.e. USD 7,500 [5% of USD 150,000] / 360 days * 35 days) as interest for late payment of the third instalment of the loan fee. 15. Furthermore, the Single Judge took note that the Claimant also requested USD 200,000 from the Respondent as “sell-on fee”. In this regard, the Single Judge reverted to the allegations of the Claimant and noted that the latter had claimed that since the Respondent had transferred the player to the club X from country R (hereinafter: club X) in August 2009 for approximately EUR 8,000,000, it should be entitled to receive from the Respondent the amount of USD 200,000 as agreed in clause 2 of the contract. 16. In view of the above, the Single Judge reverted to the submission provided by the Respondent in response to the claim and noted, particularly, that the latter had not denied that the player had been transferred to club X for approximately EUR 8,000,000. The Single Judge further took note of the Respondent’s allegation that according to clause 2 of the agreement it had “an option to transfer the player on a definitive basis by making a transfer payment to Club P amounting to EUR 1,500,000” which it had allegedly exercised before the transfer to club X had taken place and that therefore, the Respondent was of the opinion that the Claimant was not entitled to receive any “transfer compensation”. 17. Equally, the Single Judge observed that the parties disputed the interpretation of the contract and the agreement concluded between them. In this regard, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on the one hand, the Claimant was of the opinion that the player had been transferred from the Respondent to club X when he was still registered with the Claimant and that the latter should therefore be entitled to the amount of USD 200,000 as agreed in clause 2 of the contract, whereas, on the other hand, the Respondent argued that the player had been transferred to club X after the Respondent had acquired “the federative rights” of the player since it had paid EUR 1,500,000 to Club P in accordance with clause 2 of the agreement. 18. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that the parties to the dispute had concluded two different agreements, on the one hand a contract on 16 July 2008 which regulated between the parties their “participation” as to the player’s “rights” in case of a future transfer as well as an agreement on 22 July 2008 for the loan transfer of the player from the Claimant to the Respondent. 19. Based on the above-mentioned considerations and taking into account the documentation available on file, the Single Judge held that the main question to be addressed in the present matter concerning the alleged “sell-on fee” was whether the Respondent had an obligation towards the Claimant in case of a subsequent transfer of the player, and in the affirmative, whether the Respondent had failed to comply with any of its obligations deriving from the contract and/or the agreement it had concluded with the Claimant. 20. In continuation, the Single Judge, first of all, turned his attention to the contract and after a thorough analysis of it, concluded that some of its terms were not absolutely clear and subject to different interpretations. In particular, the Single Judge underlined that the wording of clause 2 of the contract, which stated that “in negotiation case, to any heading, of the federative rights” of the player “during the period where this [i.e. the player] will be registered with club W, the parties, club W, Club P and club O will divide the liquid product of the negotiation in following value: 50% of the value negotiated for the Club P ; 50% of the value for club O” and “club O will transfer to club W USD$ 200,000,00 (two hundred a thousand dollars), net”, was clearly open to interpretation. 21. Therefore, and after having again carefully scrutinised the submissions provided during the present investigation, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the parties’ real intention at the time the contract was signed must have been to establish a “sell-on fee” in case of a subsequent transfer of the player from the Respondent to another club. In this context, the Single Judge was eager to stress that such a clause would only makes sense in case the player in question was transferred on a definitive basis. 22. Having established the abovementioned and for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge reverted to the arguments raised by the Respondent and underlined that the latter deemed that since it had acquired the player’s “federative rights” on a definitive basis according to clause 2 of the agreement before transferring the player to club X, it should not be obliged to pay any “sell-on fee” to the Claimant. 23. In this context, the Single Judge, first of all, focussed his attention to the content of the agreement, in particular clause 3.1 of the agreement, and after a careful examination of it, came to the conclusion that the wording of the aforementioned clause clearly meant that in case of a future transfer of the player, the Respondent would become liable to pay the Claimant a certain amount , irrespective of whether or not the Respondent had exercised its “buy-out option” according to clause 2 of the agreement before. 24. Consequently, in view of all of the above, the Single Judge concluded that clause 2 of the contract as well as clause 3.1 of the agreement have the same goal, i.e. to compensate the Claimant for a subsequent transfer of the player from the Respondent to another club. 25. In view of the above and in accordance with the general principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must fulfil the obligation it voluntarily entered into with the Claimant by means of the agreement as well as the contract signed between the parties, and therefore, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent a “sell-on fee” agreed in clause 3.1 of the agreement and/or clause 2 of the contract upon for the subsequent transfer of the player to club X. 26. In addition, the Single Judge held that the Claimant, while requesting USD 200,000 as “sell-on fee” had based its allegations on clause 2 of the contract only. Consequently, and in view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Single Judge concluded that a “sell-on fee” of USD 200,000 is to be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant for the subsequent transfer of the player from the Respondent to club X based on the aforementioned clause 2 of the contract. 27. Moreover, the Single Judge took note that the Claimant requested interests over the claimed amount of USD 200,000. In this respect, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that the Claimant had not specified as from which date it requested the aforementioned interests. Therefore, and while referring to the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, the Single Judge concluded that the requested interest should be paid by the Respondent as from the date the claim had been lodged (i.e. 19 November 2010) and should amount to 5% per year. 28. In continuation, the Single Judge referred to the argument of the Claimant that the Respondent had breached the agreement without just cause. In particular, the Single Judge observed that the Claimant had argued that the Respondent had transferred the player to club X without its consent and that the Claimant was of the opinion that it should therefore be entitled to receive from the Respondent an additional compensation of EUR 1,500,000 as penalty according to clause 12.1 of the agreement. 29. Based on the above-mentioned considerations and taking into account the documentation available on file, the Single Judge held that the main question to be addressed in relation to the aforementioned claimed compensation of EUR 1,500,000 was whether the Respondent had breached the agreement and, in particular, whether the latter had failed to comply with any of its obligations deriving from the agreement it had concluded with the Claimant. 30. In this respect, the Single Judge focussed his attention on the content of clause 9 of the agreement which provided that the Respondent and the player “shall not terminate the temporary employment contract before the expiring date without the formal and express (written) consent of club W”. On the other hand, the Single Judge took into consideration the content of clause 4.1 of the agreement, which stipulates that in case it existed “a new proposal for the acquisition of the Sportive Right” of the player “for a superior value of € 3,000,000 (…) the club W / club O must agree and accept the proposal immediately, communicating the Club P”. In view of this, the Single Judge was eager to underline that clause 4.1 of the agreement did not leave any discretion to the parties in case of an offer higher than EUR 3,000,000 and since the offer of club X was higher than EUR 3,000,000, the Respondent had no option than accept the offer and terminate the employment contract with the player. 31. In other words, the Single Judge held that the provision in question did not grant the Claimant the right to object to or reject a possible subsequent transfer of the player. According to the Single Judge, clause 9 of the agreement appears to have only been agreed between the parties in order for the Claimant to be kept informed about the player´s career and/or about a potential “sell-on fee” it would potentially be entitled to. 32. On account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Single Judge decided to reject the Claimant´s claim for EUR 1,500,000 as penalty for breach of contract. 33. In view of all of the above, the Single Judge decided to partially accept the Claimant’s claim and held that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 200,000 as sell-on fee agreed upon in the second clause of the contract concluded between the parties on 16 July 2008, plus interest as previously mentioned, as well as the amount of USD 729 as interest for late payment of the third instalment of the loan fee agreed in the agreement concluded on 22 July 2008. 34. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 35. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has been partially accepted, the Single Judge concluded that the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA have to be split between the parties. 36. According to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is over CHF 200,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000. 37. Considering the complexity and the particular circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 25,000. 38. Consequently, and in line with the aforementioned considerations, the Single Judge decided that the amount of CHF 15,000 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings. 39. Finally, the Single Judge emphasised that since the Claimant has already paid the amount of CHF 5,000 as advance of costs at the beginning of the present proceedings, it has to pay the remaining amount of CHF 10,000 to FIFA. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, club W, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club O, has to pay to the Claimant, club W, the amount of USD 200,000 as outstanding sell-on fee plus interest at a rate of 5 % p.a. on the aforementioned amount from 19 November 2010 until the date of effective payment, as well as the amount of USD 729 as interest for late payment, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, club W, are rejected. 4. If the aforementioned total amount of USD 200,729, plus interest as established above, is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The Claimant, club W, is directed to inform the Respondent, club O, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 2 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. 6. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid to FIFA by both parties, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows: 6.1. The amount of CHF 15,000 has to be paid by the Claimant, club W. Given that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of CHF 5,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, club W, has to pay the remaining amount of CHF 10,000 to FIFA. 6.2. The amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, club O, to FIFA. 6.3. The abovementioned two payments have to be paid to the following bank account with reference to case nr. xxxxxxxxxx: ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport, Avenue de Beaumont 2, 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00, Fax: +41 21 613 50 01, e-mail: info@tas-cas.org, www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives