F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2011-2012) – indennità di formazione – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2011-2012) – training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 7 September 2011, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Michele Colucci (Italy), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Ivan Gazidis (England), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the club, B, as “Claimant” against the club, Z, as “Respondent” regarding training compensation related to the transfer of the player M

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2011-2012) - indennità di formazione – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2011-2012) - training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 7 September 2011, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Michele Colucci (Italy), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Ivan Gazidis (England), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the club, B, as “Claimant” against the club, Z, as “Respondent” regarding training compensation related to the transfer of the player M I. Facts of the case 1. The Football Association A (hereinafter: FAA) confirmed that the player M (hereinafter: player), born on 18 April 1990, was registered with its affiliated club B as from 9 March 2001 until 29 June 2009, always as an amateur football player. 2. The Football Association A confirmed that the sporting season in the country A for amateur players follows the calendar year. 3. The Football Association N (hereinafter: FAN) confirmed that said player was registered as a professional football player on 6 August 2009 with its affiliated club, Z. 4. The Football Association N also confirmed that club Z belonged to the category II (indicative amount of EUR 60,000 per year). 5. On 17 May 2010, club B (hereinafter: B or Claimant) contacted FIFA claiming training compensation related to the international transfer of the player from club B to the club Z (hereinafter: Z or Respondent). 6. In particular, club B is requesting to receive the amount of EUR 250,000 corresponding to the player’s training period between 9 March 2001 and 29 June 2009. 7. In its reply, Z rejected club B’s claim and asserted that during the transfer negotiations, club B orally waived its right to receive training compensation in presence of the player, the player’s father and the players’ agent, and that this fact can be confirmed by the players’ agent. 8. In this respect, Z submitted two documents, one statement and one letter, so as to establish that club B had renounced to its right to claim training compensation from Z. 9. The first document, dated 10 September 2010, originally drafted and signed in language X, and referred to as “statement” (hereinafter: statement), is signed by the player’s father, the players’ agent of the player and Mr. E, who is presented by Z as the contact person from club B. 10. In this statement, its authors expressed their being surprised to learn that club B lodged a claim for training compensation in relation with the player since they all had understood that club B had renounced to its right to claim training compensation for the player before it granted him a “free transfer” (translated as “free transfer” by Z) by means of which it authorised the player to transfer to the club of his choice. The authors also stressed being disappointed and deceived by club B behaviour. 11. The second document submitted by Z is a letter dated 29 June 2009 drafted in the language X, sent by club B to the player, by means of which the latter is granted the “free transfer” by the club, which mentions as well that the player, as from that date, may register and play for the club of his choice without any further intervention from club B. 12. In this regard, Z asserted that since the player was at all time an amateur player with club B, the expression “free transfer” cannot refer to any transfer compensation but can only refer to training compensation. If this would not be the case, Z requested club B to clarify its intention in granting said “free transfer”. 13. Alternatively, Z stated that the amount claimed by club B is disproportionate. Hence, and in case it is considered that training compensation is due by Z, it requested a reduction of the claimed amount. 14. In its duplica, club B pointed out that the “free transfer” granted to the player meant that the latter was out of contract and free of any obligations towards the club B. Consequently, the player was free to register with the club of his choice without any further authorisation or issuance of any document by club B. 15. Club B also underlined that it did not waive any right via this letter and that, in line with the legal principle related thereto, any renunciation to a right by a party has to be clearly expressed and cannot be implicit. 16. Therefore, club B considered that the letter Z is referring to cannot be interpreted as a waiver, otherwise, club B would lose its right to claim training compensation in relation with each amateur player it releases, which would be absurd. 17. Club B also mentioned that the letter at stake is addressed to the player and not to a club. Therefore, and in case the letter was to be considered as a waiver, quod non, the club would only have waived its right to claim against the player but not against any other entity. 18. Furthermore, with regard to the statement presented by Z, club B held that the authors of this statement are simply construing the contents of the abovementioned letter wrongly and maintained that it never waived the right to claim training compensation in relation with the player. 19. In addition to the foregoing, club B held that Mr. E is not representing it, nor is he mandated to make any promise on its behalf. 20. Finally, club B reiterated its position with regard to the claimed amount, asserting that said amount simply results from the application of the Regulations and that Z did not present any element or evidence in support of its allegation that the claimed amount is disproportionate. 21. In its final position, Z reiterated its previous position and asserted that the documents it submitted clearly established that club B waived its right to claim training compensation. 22. In particular, Z explained that club B cannot ignore that the issuance of a “free transfer” for an amateur player is useless, since an amateur player is anyhow entitled to move on to another club if he wishes to do so. 23. Therefore, by granting this “free transfer”, club B waived its right to claim training compensation. Evidently, since the player was an amateur, club B could only waive its right to claim training compensation and not its right to receive a transfer compensation for the player. 24. Furthermore, Z pointed out that without this waiver, which was also agreed upon between the parties, it would not have hired the player and maintained that it considers the explanations given by club B with regard to the nature of the said “free transfer” as unsatisfactory. 25. Finally, in case club B’s right to claim was accepted, it maintained its request to reduce the amount of training compensation to be paid. ** II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it referred to art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Rules) and noted that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 May 2010, thus after the aforementioned Rules entered into force on 1 July 2008. Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Rules, which states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of the art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players (edition 2010). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to decide on the present litigation concerning training compensation between two clubs belonging to two different associations for the training and education of the player. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2008, 2009 and 2010) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the player was registered as a professional football player with the Respondent on 6 August 2009. In view of the aforementioned, the Chamber concluded that the 2008 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts of the case as well as the documentation contained in the file. 5. In this respect, the Chamber firstly recalled that the player, born on 18 April 1990, was registered with the Claimant as from 9 March 2001 until 29 June 2009, always as an amateur football player. 6. Equally, the Chamber acknowledged that it is undisputed by the parties that the player was registered for the first time as a professional football player by the Football Association N on 6 August 2009 with the Respondent who, according to the Football Association N, belonged to category II. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the indicative training costs for a category II club and member of a national association affiliated to the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) amounts to EUR 60,000. 7. In view of the above, the Chamber reverted to the Regulations and held that, as established in art. 1 par. 1 of Annex 4 in combination with art. 2 lit. i of Annexe 4 of said Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21 when a player is registered for the first time as a professional football player before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday. 8. Furthermore, the Chamber also referred to art. 3 par. 1 and par. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, in accordance with which, as a general principle, the club for which the player was registered for the first time as a professional is responsible for paying training compensation to every club with which the player has previously been registered and that has contributed to his training, the aforementioned in accordance with the player’s career history as provided in the player passport. 9. In this respect, the DRC evoked the fact that it was established that the player had been registered for the first time as a professional football player with the Respondent. 10. In continuation, the Chamber reminded that the Claimant asserted that it was entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 250,000 since it trained the player as from 9 March 2001 until 29 June 2009, as per the contents of the player passport. 11. Equally, the Chamber noted that the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim and asserted, in the first place, that the Claimant would have orally waived its right to receive training compensation in presence of various witnesses, which is corroborated by a written statement. 12. In this respect, the Chamber noted that on the other hand, the Claimant denied having ever waived in any ways its right to claim training compensation in relation with the player, and that it had never mandated anyone to hold such position on its behalf. 13. In order to deal with this point, the Chamber reverted to the terms art. 12 par. 3 of the Rules, which stipulates that any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. 14. On this basis, the Chamber considered that the statement at stake was merely consisting in recapitulating a position that the Claimant would have had adopted, which is denied by the latter within the frame of the investigation related to the matter at hand. 15. Additionally, the Chamber noted that the Claimant held that the person presented by the Respondent as the Claimant’s contact person is not entitled to represent the Claimant nor is he allowed to negotiate on its name. The members of the Chamber also deemed it vital to point out that this assertion had not been proven to the contrary by the Respondent. 16. Likewise, and on the basis of the identities of the signees of said statement, which was issued after the investigation related to the matter at hand had started, the Chamber held that it was not impossible to exclude the possibility that said signees could have had an interest in holding such position at the time when the negotiations for the transfer of the player were taking place, as the absence of an obligation for the Respondent to pay training compensation to the Claimant was strengthening the probabilities that the player would join the Respondent. 17. In light of the above, the members found that it could not be considered that said statement was a conclusive evidence of the fact that the Claimant would have had indeed waived its right to claim training compensation. 18. As a consequence thereof, the Chamber rejected the Respondent’s argument in this respect. 19. Following its analysis of the elements brought up by the Respondent to support its argumentation that it was not liable to pay training compensation to the Claimant, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the second document presented by the Respondent and which is referred to as “free transfer”. 20. By doing so, the Chamber firstly wished to point out that said document, signed by the Claimant’s President and Secretary General, was apparently only addressed to the player and not to any other person or entity. 21. After a careful examination of the contents of said document, and without restating its entire contents, the Chamber noted that the general topic developed therein consisted in informing the player that he was free to move on and to join another club so as to continue his career, to confirm his physical capacity to play football, to thank him for his services and to wish him the best for the future. 22. In this respect, the Chamber deemed it important to point out that in the first paragraph of the document, which appears to be of the utmost importance in the situation at hand, the Claimant wrote that the player is free to move on where he prefers to go, without any other intervention from the Claimant’s side (in the language X in the original text:”(…) [Usted] puede registrarse y jugar en el Club de su preferencia, sin otra intervención de nuestra parte.”). 23. By analysing such assertion, the Chamber considered that it is hereby stated that the player can start to look for a new club to register for without the prior consent or authorisation from the Claimant. 24. In continuation, the members of the Chamber unanimously came to the conclusion that no element in that part of the sentence, nor in the entire document, could possibly lead to understand that the Claimant was renouncing to any other right(s) related to the player or which could rise as a result of a change in the player’s situation, such as, for example, a first registration as a professional football player, which theoretically triggers the training club(s) entitlement to claim training compensation to the player new club. 25. The members hence considered that the “free transfer” could not be interpreted as a waiver encompassing training compensation and which could be afterwards usable by the player’s future club. 26. In light of the above, the members considered that the Respondent’s argument based on the document at stake was ungrounded and had to be rejected. 27. What is more, the Chamber wished to stress that in all reasonableness, and so as to act in compliance with its duty of care, the Respondent could have easily contacted the Claimant directly in order to ask for information, or a confirmation, regarding its position with respect to training compensation in relation with the player at hand. 28. Having established that none of the arguments presented by the Respondent were leading to consider that the Claimant would have waived its right to claim training compensation, and bearing in mind that the conditions set in art. 2 par. 1 lit. i of Annexe 4 of the Regulations were met, the Chamber considered that the Respondent was liable to pay training compensation to the Claimant in accordance with art. 20 and Annexe 4 of the Regulations. 29. Turning his attention to the calculation of the amount to be paid as training compensation by the Respondent to the Claimant, the Chamber noted that the Respondent had stated, in case it was found that training compensation was due, that the amount claimed by the Claimant was disproportionate and requested a reduction of the amount to be paid. 30. In this regard, the members recalled that, in accordance with the contents of art. 5 par. 4 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, the Chamber may review disputes concerning the amount of training compensation payable and shall have discretion to adjust this amount if it is clearly disproportionate to the case under review. 31. In the matter at hand, the Chamber considered that no particular fact of the case should lead to review the amount payable in the sense of a reduction compared to the strict application of the provisions regarding the calculation of training compensation. 32. In addition, the members wished to highlight that the Respondent had not presented any documentary evidence in order to uphold its assertion in accordance with which the amount claimed was disproportionate. Consequently, the Respondent failed in this respect to comply with the principle in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof (art. 12 par. 3 of the Rules). 33. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the amount of training compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant shall not be diminished. 34. In continuation, the members of the Chamber proceeded to the calculation of the relevant amount of training compensation to be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant. In this respect, the members acknowledged the fact that the player in question was born on 18 April 1990 and had been registered with the Claimant as from 9 March 2001 until 29 June 2009, always as an amateur football player. 35. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled that in the country A, the sporting seasons for amateurs players follow the calendar years, i.e. taking place as from January to December. 36. As a result, and considering art. 3 par. 1 of Annex 4 of the Regulations, which stipulates that the amount payable is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the period of training that the player spent with each club, the members concluded that the effective period of time to be considered in the matter at stake corresponds to the total period of 90 months comprehended between 1 January 2002 until the end of June 2009, i.e. the entire seasons 2002 until 2008 and six months of the sporting season 2009, which corresponds to the seasons of the player’s 12th up to and including the season of his 19th birthday. 37. Furthermore, the members recalled the specific provisions of art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, according to which, “To ensure that training compensation for very young players is not set at unreasonably high levels, the training costs for players for the seasons between their 12th and 15th birthdays (i.e. four seasons) shall be based on the training and education costs of category 4 clubs.” 38. In view of the above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber ruled that the training costs for the seasons 2002 until 2005, i.e. the seasons of the player’s 12th until 15th birthdays, were to be based on the training and education costs of a category IV club. 39. In this respect, the DRC recalled that according to FIFA circular letter no. 1185 dated 22 April 2009, the indicative amount per season for a category IV club within UEFA was of EUR 10,000. 40. In continuation, and turning its attention to the seasons 2006 until 2009, the DRC referred to art. 5 par. 1 and 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which stipulates that as a general rule, it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself. Therefore, the compensation to be paid is to be calculated based on the training costs of the new club multiplied by the number of years of training with the former club. 41. The Chamber acknowledged that the Football Association N had confirmed that the Respondent was a category II club at the time when the player was registered as a professional, i.e. on 6 August 2009. Consequently, the DRC took into account that the indicative training costs for a category II club and member of a national association affiliated to the UEFA amount to EUR 60,000. 42. In view of the applicable provisions, and having proceeded to the relevant calculation in view of the dates of registration of the player with the Claimant, the Dispute Resolution Chamber came to the conclusion that the Claimant was entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 250,000. 43. Thus, in view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the claim of the Claimant was accepted. 44. In continuation, the members referred to art. 18 par. 1 of the Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Chamber relating to disputes regarding training compensation, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings. 45. In this respect, the DRC reiterated that the claim of the Claimant was accepted. Therefore, the Respondent has to bear the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 46. According to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. 47. The amount in dispute to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings amounts to EUR 250,000 related to the claim of the Claimant. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000 (cf. table of Annexe A). 48. Considering that the case at hand did not allow to be dealt with following a reasonable procedure and that it did involve specific legal complexity, the Chamber determined the final amount of costs of the current proceedings in the amount of CHF 15,000. 49. In this respect, the DRC took into account that the Claimant had paid the advance of costs in the amount of CHF 5,000 in accordance with art. 17 of the Rules. 50. In view of all of the above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the amount of CHF 15,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings. Thereof the amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to FIFA and the amount of CHF 5,000 to the Claimant. ** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, club B, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Z, has to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 250,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. In the event that the aforementioned sum is not paid within the stated time limit by the Respondent, interest at the rate of 5% per year will apply as of expiry of the stipulated time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and formal decision. 4. The costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 15,000 are to be paid by the Respondent within 30 days of notification of the present decision, as follows: 4.1 The amount of 10,000 to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no. XX-XXXXX/xxx: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 4.2 The amount of CHF 5,000 to the Claimant. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00, Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Enclosed: CAS directives