F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – indennità di formazione – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Ivan Gazidis (England), member on the claim presented by the club, Club Z, from country G as Claimant against the club, Club K, from country U as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the player D

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - indennità di formazione – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Ivan Gazidis (England), member on the claim presented by the club, Club Z, from country G as Claimant against the club, Club K, from country U as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the player D I. Facts of the case 1. According to the player passport issued by the country G Football Federation the player, player D (hereinafter: the player), born in May 1989, was registered with the Club Z, from country G (hereinafter: the Claimant), as from 30 August 2005 until 1 January 2012 as a professional. 2. The football seasons in country G during the period of time the player was registered with the Claimant ran as follows: - from 31 July 2005 until 9 May 2006; - from 29 July 2006 until 20 May 2007; - from 10 August 2007 until 20 May 2008; - from 14 September 2008 until 23 May 2009 - from 2 August 2009 until 20 May 2010; - from 15 August 2010 until 22 May 2011; - from 7 August 2011 until 20 May 2012. 3. The Football Federation of country U confirmed that the player was registered with its affiliated club, Club U (hereinafter: the Respondent), on 1 March 2012 as a professional. Also, the Football Federation of country U confirmed that the player signed a contract with the Respondent on 29 February 2012. 4. Equally, the Football Federation of country U confirmed that the Respondent belonged to the category II (indicative amount of EUR 60,000 per year) at the time the player was registered with it. 5. On 29 May 2012, the Claimant contacted FIFA claiming the payment of training compensation from the Respondent, on the ground that the player, on 1 January 2012, was transferred as a professional from the Claimant to the Respondent before the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. 6. The Claimant stated that the player had signed a pre-contract with the Respondent in August 2011, which would come into force on 1 January 2012. However, according to the Claimant, it was the Club K, from country U, which signed an employment contract with the player on 10 February 2012 and requested the issuance of an ITC for the player from the country G Football Federation in February 2012. The Claimant argued that the Respondent and Club K had, subsequently, on 29 February 2012 signed an agreement for the loan of the player from Club K to the Respondent for a loan fee of EUR 575, without the player ever having attended a match or a training session with Club K. In this respect, the Claimant referred to a decision of the CAS (2009/A/1757 Club B v Club I) in which the parties had used a similar construction to circumvent the payment of training compensation, and stated that the Respondent should be considered the player’s new club which is liable to pay training compensation. 7. In order to corroborate its position, the Claimant submitted an extract of the Respondent’s website dated 20 August 2011 indicating that the player had signed a 4-year contract with the Respondent as well as various internet extracts which indicated that the player had been on a training camp with the Respondent in January 2012. Furthermore, it submitted a letter from the Respondent in which the latter indicated that it was “obviously not refusing the obligation to pay the training compensation (…)” but merely disputed the amount of training compensation due. 8. In particular, the Claimant is claiming EUR 380,000 plus compensation for damages. 9. On 27 August 2012, the Respondent stated in its reply that it had indeed discussed the terms of a potential employment contract with the player, but the parties had not reached an agreement or signed any pre-contract. The Respondent confirmed that it transferred the player on loan from Club K, but denied the existence of any “direct relationship” with Club K. The Respondent stated that Club K is to be considered the player’s new club and is therefore responsible for the payment of training compensation. 10. With regard to the CAS jurisprudence referred to by the Claimant, the Respondent stated that such case is different from the case at hand, since the Respondent did not enter into negotiations with the Claimant regarding the transfer of the player, the player in the present case was already a professional and he was only transferred on loan, as opposed to the referred CAS case. 11. Finally, in case FIFA decides that the Respondent is liable to pay training compensation, the Respondent stated that the calculation of training compensation made by the Claimant is erroneous, since the player was never registered with the Claimant for a full season (12 months). Additionally, the Respondent argued that the player had already completed his training at the end of the 2007/2008 season when he was 19, since the player played 10 matches for the Claimant in that season and was called the best player of country G in the 2010/2011 season. In this respect, the Respondent referred to CAS jurisprudence (2003/O/527, 2006/A/1029). 12. According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the player was “engaged out of contract, free of payment” by the instructing club, Club K. The ITC was delivered on 24 February 2012 and received by Club K on 5 March 2012. 13. On 10 June 2011, Club K’s category was changed in TMS from category IV to category III. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 29 May 2012. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the 2008 and 2012 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. (d) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake relating to training compensation between clubs belonging to different associations. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2012), and considering that the player was registered with the Respondent on 1 March 2012, the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts of the case as well as the documentation on file. 5. In continuation, the DRC took note that the Claimant maintained that it is entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 380,000, indicating that the player was transferred as a professional from the Claimant to the Respondent before the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. 6. Likewise, the DRC took note of the Claimant’s argument that the player had signed a pre-contract with the Respondent in August 2011, which would come into force on 1 January 2012. 7. Furthermore, the DRC noted that the Claimant stated that the country U club, Club K, had signed an employment contract with the player on 10 February 2012 and requested the issuance of an ITC for the player from the country G Football Federation in February 2012. Subsequently, on 29 February 2012 the Respondent and Club K had signed an agreement for the loan of the player from Club K to the Respondent for a loan fee of EUR 575, without the player ever having attended a match or a training session with Club K. In view of this, the Claimant stated that the Respondent should be considered the player’s new club which is liable to pay training compensation. 8. The DRC went on to consider the Claimant’s submissions in this respect. By doing so, it took due note that the Claimant provided a copy of the employment agreement signed between the player and Club K on 10 February 2012, as well as a copy of the loan agreement signed between the Respondent and Club K on 29 February 2012. 9. Moreover, the DRC took note of the Claimant’s statements that the player participated in a training camp with the Respondent in January 2012, and that the Respondent informed the Claimant that it would pay training compensation for the transfer of the player. Furthermore, the DRC took note of the Claimant’s reference to a decision of the CAS (2009/A/1757 MTK Clbu B v Club I) and its statement that in said case the parties had used a similar construction to circumvent the payment of training compensation. 10. Furthermore, the DRC noted that the Respondent rebutted the claim of the Claimant, stating that it had indeed discussed the terms of a potential employment contract with the player, but that the parties had not reached an agreement or signed any pre-contract. The Respondent confirmed that it transferred the player from Club K, but denied the existence of any “direct relationship” with said club. 11. Equally, the DRC noted that the Respondent argued that the abovementioned decision of the CAS is not applicable to the present case, since the Respondent did not enter into negotiations with the Claimant regarding the transfer of the player, the player in the present case was already a professional and he was only transferred on loan, as opposed to the referred CAS case. 12. Finally, the DRC took note of the Respondent’s submission that in case it decides that the Respondent is liable to pay training compensation, the Respondent stated that the calculation of training compensation made by the Claimant is erroneous, since the player was never registered with the Claimant for a full season (12 months). Additionally, the Respondent argued that the player had already completed his training at the end of the 2007/2008 season when he was 19, since the player played 10 matches for the Claimant in that season and was called the best player of country G in the 2010/2011 season. 13. After having carefully examined the parties’ positions, taking into consideration all the aforementioned arguments, the Chamber held that it first had to establish which club, i.e. the Respondent or Club K, is to be considered the new club of the player in light of the provisions regarding training compensation. 14. In this context, the Chamber referred to the evidence provided by the Claimant, more in particular the extract of the Respondent’s official website dated 20 August 2011, from which it could be established that the player was, at least, in contact with the Respondent since August 2011. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the player participated in a training camp with the Respondent in January 2012, and that the Respondent informed the Claimant in a letter dated 7 February 2012 that “as a conclusion, training compensation is due to [the Claimant] for the seasons 2005/2006, 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 only”. Moreover, the DRC considered in particular that the Respondent confirmed that it had discussed the terms of a potential employment contract with the player. 15. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to the employment contract signed between the player and Club K, dated 10 February 2012, and to the loan agreement signed between the Respondent and Club K, dated 29 February 2012. 16. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that there was a very short period of time between the moment that the player was transferred to Club K and when he was loaned to the Respondent. Furthermore, the player was transferred from Club K to the Respondent for a very low amount of money, i.e. 6,000 currency of country U (approximately EUR 575). 17. In addition, the Chamber considered that the Respondent and Club K are from the same city, that Club K belonged to a lower club category than the Respondent, and that the player has been playing for the Respondent ever since his loan transfer from Club K to the Respondent and did not play a single match for Club K. 18. In view of all the above, taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances of this specific matter as well as the documentation presented during the present proceedings, the DRC concluded that there were numerous elements speaking in favour of a situation of circumvention of the Regulations regarding the payment of training compensation by the Respondent. Indeed, the Chamber emphasised that the fact that the Respondent, according to its own website, had already signed a contract with the player in August 2011, the fact that the player went on a training camp with the Respondent in January 2012, that there was only a very short period of time between the moment that the player was transferred to Club K and when he was loaned from Club K to the Respondent for a very low amount, can lead to no other conclusion than that the Respondent was the new club of the player in the sense of the Regulations. Therefore, the Chamber held that the Respondent should be considered the player’s new club. 19. The aforementioned having been established, and hereby referring to the rules applicable to training compensation, the Chamber stated that, as established in art. 1 par. 1 of Annexe 4 in combination with art. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21 when a player is registered for the first time as a professional before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday or when a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday. In case the latter occurs, art. 3 par. 1 sent. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations sets forth that training compensation will only be owed to the player’s former club for the time he was effectively trained by that club. 20. In continuation, the Chamber referred to art. 1 par. 1 sent. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations which stipulates that training compensation shall be payable, as a general rule, up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his training period before the age of 21. In this respect, the DRC emphasised that cases involving a possible early completion of a player’s training period have to be analysed on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all the specific circumstances and all the evidence produced. Thus, several factors and indications have to be considered in order to establish whether a particular player’s training has indeed been completed before the age of 21, as the Respondent stated. For the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber stressed that both the DRC and the CAS have adopted a strict approach in establishing the early completion of the player’s training before the age of 21, so as to not jeopardize the right of training clubs to, in principle, receive training compensation. 21. In this regard, the Chamber noted, once more, all the specific circumstances of the present matter as well as all the evidence produced by the parties. According to the Respondent, the player completed his training period at the end of the 2007/2008 season, since he had played 10 matches with the Claimant’s first team in that season and he was called the best player of country G in the 2010/2011 season. However, from the evidence produced by the Claimant, it can be established that the player had also played 5 matches for the Claimant’s second team during the 2007/2008 season. Hence, contrary to the opinion of the Respondent, the Chamber considered that it could not be established that the player was a regular first team player during the 2007/2008 season with the Claimant. The Chamber also held that the fact that the player was voted the best player of country G in the 2010/2011 season does not imply that his training period had been completed. 22. In light of the above, the Chamber concurred that, taking into account all the above-mentioned elements and circumstances, it could not be established that it was evident that the player had indeed completed his training period before his 21st birthday. Consistently with all the above, the Chamber concluded that training compensation is due. 23. On account of the above considerations, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay training compensation to the Claimant. 24. Turning its attention to the calculation of training compensation, the Chamber referred to art. 5 par. 1 and par. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which stipulate that as a general rule, to calculate the training compensation, it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself. 25. In continuation, the Chamber recalled that the player was born in May 1989 and was registered with the Claimant as from 30 August 2005 until 1 January 2012 as a professional. 26. In this respect and in relation to the argument of the Respondent that the player had never been registered with the Claimant for the duration of 12 months during a particular season, the Chamber found it vital to point out that it bases its calculation on the effective time of registration with the training club as per the information received by the association where the training club is affiliated. The Chamber further stressed that it is an established and incontestable principle and fact that the training of a player occurs during the entire cycle of a year, i.e. already prior to and after the first and last match of the season (national league championship). Consequently, if the player was registered during a specific season for a club, a period of 12 months, and not only the period during which the national championship is being played, has to be taken into account when calculating the training compensation due. 27. Therefore, the DRC considered that the Claimant is, thus, entitled to receive training compensation for the period as from 30 August 2005 until 31 July 2010, i.e. for a period of 59 months between the seasons of his 17th and 21st birthday. 28. Moreover, the DRC took into account that the Respondent belonged to the category II (indicative amount of EUR 60,000 per year). 29. In view of all of the above, the DRC decided to partially accept the claim of the Claimant and held that the Respondent is liable to pay the amount of EUR 295,000 to the Claimant as training compensation in relation to the registration of the player with the Respondent. 30. Lastly, the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the DRC relating to disputes regarding training compensation, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25’000 are levied. It is further stipulated that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and that, in accordance with Annex A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. 31. In respect of the above, the Chamber held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 380,000 related to the claim of the Claimant. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 25,000 (cf. table in Annex A). 32. As a result, and taking into account the particularities of the present matter, the complexity of the case as well as the degree of success, the Chamber determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 20,000, of which currency of country H 15,000 shall be borne by the Respondent and currency of country H 5,000 by the Claimant. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club Z, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club K, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of EUR 295,000. 3. In the event that the aforementioned sum is not paid within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the stipulated time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 20,000 are to be paid within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows: 5.1. The amount of currency of country H 10,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no. : 5.2. The amount of currency of country H 5,000 by the Claimant to FIFA. Given that the Claimant has already paid the amount of currency of country H 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, no additional amount has to be paid by the Claimant. 6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 2. above is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Enclosed: CAS directives