F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – indennità di formazione – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the Player E

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - indennità di formazione – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the Player E I. Facts of the case 1. On 30 March 2010, the club from country B, Club A lodged a claim in front of FIFA against an club from country D named “Club C” for training compensation of the Player E (hereinafter: the player), on the ground of the player’s subsequent transfer as a professional before the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. 2. On 26 April 2012, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) rendered a decision whereby it declared Club A’s claim inadmissible as the DRC considered it barred by the statute of limitations established in art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. Club A appealed the aforementioned decision in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 3. On 24 September 2013, CAS rendered an award deciding, inter alia, as follows: “3. The Decision issued on 26 April 2012 by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of [FIFA] is annulled and the case is remitted back to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of [FIFA] in order to decide the following question: Does Club C, under the management and operation of Club C Pty Ltd, has standing to be sued in the proceedings in respect of the transfer of the Player E from Club A to Club C, and is it liable to pay the amount awarded under point 4 of this decision to Club A?”. 4. Moreover and as to the substance of the matter, CAS ruled that: “[Club A] is entitled to receive as training compensation the amount of USD 200,000, plus interest in a yearly rate of 5% to be calculated as of 18 December 2009. The enforcement of this entitlement will remain pending and subject to the rendering of a decision by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of [FIFA] in respect of point 3 above.” 5. On 7 November 2013, FIFA requested “Club C”, via the Football Federation from country D (Football Federation from country D), to provide its position with regard to the aforementioned CAS Award. 6. On 22 November 2013, Club C Pty Ltd (hereinafter: the new club) presented the requested position as “the legal person that presently operates the team known as Club C in the A-League Competition conducted in country D by Football Federation from country D”. 7. In particular, the new club ascertained that it did not exist as a legal entity neither at the time of the events giving rise to the dispute nor at the time the original DRC proceedings were commenced. In this respect, the new club sustained that “the proper respondent to this claim is the legal person that concluded the Club C team at both these and all other relevant times, i.e. Club C S PTY Ltd” (hereinafter: the old club). 8. In continuation, the new club stressed that teams in the “A-League” are not affiliated members of the Football Federation from country D but only participate through a licence that the latter association grants to the relevant legal entity based on a “Club Participation Agreement”. In this respect, the new club ascertained that “the affiliation that exists for A-League Clubs in country D is the contractual relationship that exists between Football Federation from country D and the legal entity that fields the team in the A-League Competition”, therefore “the member club of Football Federation from country D is the legal person that conducts the A-League club, not the trading name”. 9. Along these lines, the new club asserted that “Club C” is just a trading name which has no legal status and it is neither a legal nor a natural person. Hence, according to the new club, “Club C” has no standing to be sued and the correct respondent for any claim has to be the entity that conducted the team at the time when the relevant events giving rise to the claim occurred, i.e. the old club. 10. The new club further argued that, if certain circumstances are met, the Football Federation from country D may terminate a licence and thereafter issue a new one to a complete new legal person. The new club stressed in this regard that “the legal obligations and liabilities of an entity that has its license terminated are not passed to any new legal entity that is subsequently licensed to operate a team”. In order to support its argument, the new club enclosed a letter from the Football Federation from country D dated 29 April 2013 addressed to CAS explaining the system. The Football Federation from country D stated therein, inter alia, that the name and logos of “Club C” are owned by the Football Federation from country D and that “it remains the position of Football Federation from country D that all liabilities relating to the Old Club must as a matter of law remain with the Old Club as there is no legal basis to transfer the liabilities to the New Club”. 11. Having established the aforementioned, the new club explained the following: a. On 22 September 2010, the old club´s license was terminated by the Football Federation from country D due to its insolvency; b. On 10 October 2010, the Football Federation from country D granted the new club a license until 2020 to participate in the A-league in the same territory as the old club; c. The new club decided to use the same name and logo as the old club but a different jersey. In addition, the new club used the same home stadium due to the fact that it is the only professional standard stadium in its territory. 12. In continuation, the new club stressed that it does not have any connection with the old club nor are there any common directors or shareholders. In this respect, the new club asserted that “it did not acquire any rights or assets from [the old club]”. 13. Additionally, the new club pointed out that the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players do not provide for a clear definition of what might constitute a club. In this respect, the new club referred to the following articles: i) “Art. 67 of the FIFA Statutes as they apply to the imposition of disciplinary measures only contemplates there being natural or legal persons”, ii) art. 3 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code which, according to the new club, “makes plain that a club must be either a natural or legal person” and iii) art. 4 of the FIFA Club Licensing Regulations which, according to the new club, establishes that “licences for the persons to conduct teams in national club competitions are to be issued to legal entities”. 14. Therefore, in the new club’s view “each of these provisions suggests that for the purpose of FIFA regulations a club is the legal entity that operates it”. 15. What is more, according to the new club, there is no FIFA or Football Federation from country D rule that requires a licensee to assume the debts of the previous licensee and thus, “in the absence of an express rule to this effect promulgated by either FIFA or Football Federation from country D, there is no basis for the DRC to impose one”. 16. Furthermore and as to its liability to pay training compensation, the new club sustained that in accordance with art. 3.1 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the club with which the player is registered is responsible for paying training compensation. In this context, the new club emphasised that the club with which the player was registered was the old club and thus, the latter is the only legal person that has the liability to pay training compensation. 17. In its position, Club A stressed the following: a. “This particular case needs to be analysed under the general principles of international sports law, including the spirit of fair play and the prevention against practises jeopardizing the integrity of all matches and competitions as stipulated in the FIFA Statutes (2012)”; b. The necessity to protect the bona fide of third parties is of the utmost importance, therefore, any entity currently holding a license from the Football Federation from country D has standing to be sued in this matter and shall be liable to pay the relevant amount to it; c. Since 2008 and until now all actions and proceedings have been undertaken in the name of Club C, i.e. i) the player’s ITC was issued by the Football Association from country B in favour of Club C and ii) all correspondence exchanged between the parties was issued by Club C; d. During the investigation phase of the original DRC proceedings, neither the new club nor the Football Federation from country D, brought to the attention of FIFA that the license to operate “Club C” had been transferred to another legal entity. 18. Finally, Club A stated that it was impossible for it or any third party to suspect the occurrence of the transfer of the license to a new entity taking into account for example the history of the participation of Club C in the A-League and that “half of the team” remained the same after the change of licensee. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber referred to the Arbitral Award CAS 2012/A/2919 rendered by CAS on 24 September 2013 whereby CAS decided that Club A was entitled to receive as training compensation in relation to the transfer of the player the amount of USD 200,000 plus 5% p.a. as of 18 December 2009. 2. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that in the aforementioned Arbitral Award, CAS decided to refer the case back to FIFA in order for the DRC to decide the following question: Does Club C, under the management and operation of Club C Pty Ltd, has standing to be sued in the proceedings in respect of the transfer of the Player E from Club A to Club C, and is it liable to pay the amount awarded under point 4 of this decision to Club A?”. 3. In view of the above, at this point, the DRC wished to highlight that in the present considerations, it will confine itself to assess whether “Club C”, under the management and operation of the new club, has standing to be sued in the present proceedings and if it is therefore liable to pay the amount and interest awarded under point 4 of the relevant CAS Award to Club A. 4. Having said this, the Chamber went to analyse the procedural rules to be applied in the case at stake. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 30 March 2010. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the 2008 edition of the Procedural Rules). 5. The applicable rules having been established, the DRC started by acknowledging the argumentation and documentation presented by the parties in order to support their respective positions. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand, including those submitted during the relevant CAS proceedings. 6. First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged the position of the new club, which stresses that it does not have standing to be sued in the present proceedings in view of the following arguments: i. In accordance with the license system followed by the Football Federation from country D, the legal obligations and liabilities of an entity that has its license terminated are not passed on to any new legal entity that is subsequently licensed to operate a team. Therefore, the new club cannot be held liable for obligations that were born when the license to operate the club “Club C” belonged to the old club; ii. The new club does not have any connection with the old club nor are there any common directors or shareholders. In this respect, the new club asserted that “it did not acquire any rights or assets from [the old club]”. iii. “Club C” is just a trading name which has no legal status and it is neither a legal nor a natural person. Hence, “Club C” has no standing to be sued and the correct respondent for any claim has to be the entity that conducted the team at the time when the relevant events giving rise to the claim occurred, i.e. the old club; iv. Along these lines and in view of the content of different provisions of the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Disciplinary Code and the FIFA Club Licensing Regulations, it appears that “for the purpose of FIFA regulations a club is the legal entity that operates it”; v. In accordance with art. 3.1 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations, the club with which the player is registered is responsible for paying training compensation and since the player was registered at a time when the old club held the license to operate “Club C”, it is the old club which needs to pay the relevant training compensation. 7. Having said this, the members of the Chamber took note of Club A’s position which stressed that “this particular case needs to be analysed under the general principles of international sports law, including the spirit of fair play and the prevention against practises jeopardizing the integrity of all matches and competitions as stipulated in the FIFA Statutes (2012)”. Moreover, Club A pointed out that during the original proceedings, neither the Football Federation from country D nor the new club argued that the license to operate “Club C” had been transferred. 8. With the above-mentioned considerations in mind and in relation to the new club’s position, the DRC referred to previous decisions of FIFA’s decision-making bodies related to this particular issue as well as to the CAS Award 2013/A/3425 which mutatis mutandis can be applied to the present matter. Indeed, in said Award, CAS, while confirming a previous decision of the Player’s Status Committee of FIFA, established that a club is a sporting entity identifiable by itself, which is formed by a combined set of elements that constitute its image. 9. In particular, the DRC fully adopted the reasoning of the Sole Arbitrator in the aforementioned Award that reads as follows: “The Sole Arbitrator highlights that the decisions that had dealt with the question of the succession of a sporting club in front of the CAS (CAS 2007/A/1355; TAS 2011/A/2614; TAS 2011/A/2646; TAS 2012/A/2778) and in front of FIFA’s decision-making bodies (…), have established that, on the one side, a club is a sporting entity identifiable by itself that, as a general rule, transcends the legal entities which operate it. Thus, the obligations acquired by any of the entities in charge of its administration in relation with its activity must be respected; and on the other side, that the identity of a club is constituted by elements such as its name, colours, fans, history, sporting achievements, shield, trophies, stadium, roster of players, historic figures, etc. that allow it to distinguish from all the other clubs. Hence, the prevalence of the continuity and permanence in time of the sporting institution in front of the entity that manages it has been recognised, even when dealing with the change of management companies completely different from themselves” (original text in Spanish). 10. Having said this, the members of the Chamber focused their attention on the following facts: a. Both the old and the new club competed in the A-League under the name of “Club C”; b. The logo of “Club C” did not change after the change of license; c. Both the old club and the new club held their local matches in the same stadium; d. Sixteen players of the old club continued to play for “Club C” after the relevant change of licence. 11. In this respect, the DRC was of the unanimous opinion that the new club’s argument that it had not acquired any rights or assets of the old club cannot be upheld. 12. Furthermore and in the same line of reasoning, the DRC wished to stress that during the relevant CAS proceedings, the Football Federation from country D stated in its letter dated 15 January 2013 that “[the new club] was under no obligation to use the ‘Club C’ brand when it was granted a licence to participate in the A-League in October 2010; [the new club] could have elected to develop a new brand and name the team, for example, the ‘Club C Tigers’ or some other name and branding that was acceptable to Football Federation from country D”. 13. Therefore, the DRC deemed it important to underline that, according to the Football Federation from country D, it was the new club who decided to use the same name and logo of “Club C”, despite having no obligation to do so. In the DRC’s opinion, the most plausible reason for such a decision was precisely to maintain the identity and image of “Club C” after the change of license therewith allowing the new club to be perceived by any third party as the same club, i.e. “Club C”. 14. In continuation, the members of the Chamber focused their attention on the “Club Participation Agreement” concluded between the new club and the Football Federation from country D, in particular its schedule 6, which stipulates that “[the new club] must consent to the assignment of the Team’s current Players to [the new club] on the terms and conditions of the Player’s current contracts existing as at the date of this Agreement (unless otherwise agreed by the Football Federation from country D)” and that “[the new club] must offer to current employees of the Team employment on the terms and conditions of their current employment”. The DRC noticed therefore that, in principle, the new club had to offer new employment contracts to the team’s players. Indeed from the documentation on file it can be noted that sixteen players remained with “Club C” after the relevant change of licence. 15. With the above considerations in mind, the DRC did not find it coherent that the new club would be responsible for respecting the old club’s obligations towards its players but not towards any other bona fide third party. Along these lines, the DRC did not consider it valid for the new club to acquire only the assets that are directly linked with “Club C”, i.e. the logo, the name, the stadium, its players but not its liabilities. 16. On account of all the above, the DRC reached the following conclusions: a. There are sufficient elements to establish that “Club C” has been the same club throughout its history, despite the change of the management company behind the operation of the team; b. Moreover, by using the same name, logo, stadium and players, it is evident that the new club had the intention to maintain the identity and image of “Club C” in order to be considered the same club; 17. In view of the foregoing conclusions, the DRC unanimously decided that “Club C” has standing to be sued in the present proceedings and it is therefore liable to pay to Club A the amount specified in point 4 of the Arbitral Award CAS 2012/A/2019, i.e. USD 200,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 18 December 2009. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club C, has standing to be sued in the present proceedings and it is therefore liable to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount and interest awarded in point 4 of the Arbitral Award CAS 2012/A/2919 issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport on 24 September 2013. 3. If the sum and interest provided in point 4 of the above-mentioned Arbitral Award are not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives