F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 December 2013, by Mr Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge on the claim presented by the player, Player C, from country S as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 December 2013, by Mr Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge on the claim presented by the player, Player C, from country S as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 27 August 2012, Player G, from country S (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club A, from country C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 1 August 2012 until 31 May 2013. 2. According to art. 1 lit. a) of the contract, the Respondent undertook to provide the Claimant EUR 15,000 as global remuneration, payable in 10 equal instalments of EUR 1,500, as from 30 August 2012 until 31 May 2013, always on the 30th day of the following month. 3. Article 7 of the contract further establishes that “The employer can terminate the present contract at any time for a good cause i.e. if the player does not conduct himself on and off football pitch in a manner suitable to a non-amateur football player, and if the player show disrespect and or disobedience to the manager of the club and or if the coach of the player verifies that the player is not in a suitable physical and technical condition to offer his services to the club as a professional player and or if the player makes statements or actions deemed by the committee of the club as harmful to the club to or as such as its absolute discretion”. 4. Moreover, art. 13 of the contract stipulates that “The country C Football Association rules and regulations apply in relation to jurisdiction and both parties agree that they will respect the rules of FIFA and UEFA which are supplementary only to country C Football Association rules and or in the case of vagueness”. 5. Finally, art. 14 of the contract establishes that “Both parties to the present agreement recognize, accept and agree that any dispute that might arise between the parties according to the present agreement will be resolved only by the relevant adjudicatory bodies and or dispute resolution bodies of the country C Football Association and or by courts established within the jurisdiction of the Republic of country C and by no other national or international body or association or arbitrary body or court”. 6. Also on 27 August 2012, the parties signed an image rights agreement (hereinafter: the agreement), valid for the same period of time as the contract, and according to which the Respondent undertook to provide the Claimant, inter alia, with the following amounts: - EUR 45,000 as global remuneration, payable in 10 equal installments of EUR 4,500, as from 30 August 2012 until 31 May 2013, always on the 30th day of the following month; - EUR 10,000 as bonus in case the club is ranked 4th to 1st in the championship; - EUR 5,000 as bonus in case the club is ranked 8th to 5th in the championship; - EUR 10,000 as bonus in case the club wins the country C Football Association Cup; - the use of a car; - accommodation; - 2 return tickets from country C to country S. 7. Furthermore, art. 6 of the agreement repeats the wording of art. 14 of the contract (cf. point I.5. above). 8. By means of its correspondence dated 1 January 2013, the Respondent invited the Claimant to attend a meeting on 2 January 2013 with the Executive Committee, in order to “discuss the terms of your contract of employment and or any other agreement between you and the employer”. In addition, the letter states that “Subject to the above development you are hereby informed and requested that by tomorrow 2 January 2013 you are granted permission not to attend any further scheduled trainings of the teams of the employer until new notice is served to you”. 9. On 25 January 2013, the Claimant reminded the Respondent of its arrears towards him, corresponding to his salaries for October 2012 until January 2013, in the amount of EUR 6,000 each, and to living expenses for said period, amounting to EUR 500 per month. Furthermore, the Claimant mentioned that the permission to be absent from training represents “a serious detriment to my career as a football player”. Finally, the Claimant informs the Respondent that, should such situation persist, he would terminate the contract with just cause. 10. On 26 February 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract without just cause, requesting the payment of the total amount of EUR 52,000, made up of: - EUR 24,000 corresponding to outstanding remuneration for October 2012 until January 2013 (4 x EUR 6,000), based on the amounts established in the contract and in the agreement, plus interest of 5% p.a.; - EUR 2,000 corresponding to outstanding accommodation expenses for October 2012 until January 2013 (4 x EUR 500), plus interest of 5% p.a.; - EUR 26,000 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to the remaining value of the contract. 11. In his arguments, the Claimant explains that, no amicable solution could be found after the meeting held with the Respondent’s Executive Committee on 2 January 2013. As from this moment, the Claimant claims having been prohibited to train with the club. 12. The Respondent never replied to the Claimant’s reminder of 25 January 2013 nor did it pay the allegedly outstanding amounts. Therefore, the Claimant returned to country S on 4 February 2013 and provided a copy of his air ticket in this regard. 13. In its response, the Respondent rejects FIFA’s jurisdiction over the present dispute, alleging that according to art. 13 of the contract, only the NDRC of the country C Football Association or a country C court should have jurisdiction over the present case. 14. The Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the “Regulations for the registration and transfer of football players” (edition 2005; hereinafter: the Regulations of the country C Football Association, which establish the following: a. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Committee (hereinafter: the Committee): According to art. 22.11 of the Regulations of the country C Football Association, the Committee is competent to “adjudicate and/or resolve any financial or other disputes which may arise: a) between clubs and non-amateur players […]”. b. with regard to the composition: Art. 22.1 par. 1 of the Regulations of the country C Football Association establishes that the Committee consists of five members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, three members). The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and one member are elected by the Executive Committee of the country C Football Association, whereas two members are elected by the country P Football Players’ Association. c. with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Concerning the possibility of an appeal against a decision taken by the Committee, art. 22.10 stipulates that “any decision of the [Committee] may be appealed to the Disciplinary Authority of the country C Football Federation. The Disciplinary Authority shall finally decide on the appeals referred thereto”. 15. Furthermore, the Respondent claims that FIFA is not competent to rule upon a dispute based on an image rights agreement. 16. With regard to the substance of the dispute, the Respondent explains that the Claimant has shown unprofessional behaviour during trainings and official matches. In spite of the multiple reminders allegedly sent to the Claimant and the fines allegedly imposed on him, he failed to comply with the terms of the contract and therefore he was invited to a meeting with the Respondent’s Executive Committee on 2 January 2013 (cf. point I.8. above). 17. However, in view of the fact that the Claimant’s services were needed, the Respondent by means of its correspondence of 22 January 2013 revoked the authorization for the Claimant not to attend training with immediate effect and reminded him that his failure to resume trainings would allow the Respondent to terminate the contract with just cause without the payment of any compensation to him. 18. As the Claimant allegedly failed to resume training with the Respondent, the latter stated having terminated the contract and the agreement based on art. 7 of the contract (cf. point I.3. above). 19. The Respondent further claims not having any outstanding debts towards the Claimant and, in this respect, it provides a copy of an undated “confirmation” signed by the Claimant according to which he accepts “the decrease of the salary the club has to pay me, for my services as a football player for a period of 5 months, that is between August 2012 and December 2012 (both months included), according to the image rights and or the supplementary agreement that has been signed between us on 27 August 2012. The decrease in my salary will be as follows: […] my salary will be decreased from EUR 4,500 per month to EUR 3,000 per month”. 20. Finally, the Respondent requests the claim to be rejected and claims that the Claimant should bear all legal expenses and procedural costs related to the present procedure. 21. In his replica, the Claimant insists on the jurisdiction of FIFA over the present case and points out that the deciding body of the country C Football Association does not guarantee fair proceedings, for it does not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 22. In addition, the Claimant states that FIFA should be competent to rule on the dispute based on the image rights contract, since the latter contains part of the remuneration due to him. Furthermore, the Claimant claims that the global salary agreed by the parties was EUR 60,000 and that it was the Respondent’s requirement that two different contracts should be signed. 23. The Claimant denies having received any warnings from or having been sanctioned by the Respondent and claims that no document was provided by the Respondent in this respect. In particular, the Claimant claims never having received the Respondent’s letter of 22 January 2013 (cf. point I.17. above) and never having been contacted by the Respondent with a view to resume training. On the contrary, the Claimant was the one trying unsuccessfully to contact the Respondent in order to solve such issue. 24. The Claimant further claims never having been informed of the termination of the contract by the Respondent, as it claims. 25. Finally, the Claimant claims that the Respondent’s argument regarding the alleged existence of fines against him in order not to pay his contractually due remuneration cannot be accepted and, thus, the Claimant insists on his initial claim. 26. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent did not submit its final position to the Claimant’s claim. 27. On 22 February 2013, the Claimant states having signed a new employment contract with the Club M, from country B, valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2013, for a monthly salary of currency of country B 7,890. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge 1. First of all, the DRC judge analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the DRC judge took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 February 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the DRC judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 lit. i. in connection with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations; edition 2012), it is competent to decide on the present litigation, which concerns an employment-related dispute of an international dimension between a country S player and a country C club. 3. However, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA's deciding bodies firstly on the basis of article 14 of the contract and article 6 of the agreement, highlighting that the parties had agreed to submit any dispute to the relevant adjudicatory bodies and/or dispute resolution bodies of the country C Football Association and/or to the Courts established within the jurisdiction of the Republic of country C. 4. In this respect, the DRC judge referred to the above-mentioned articles on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA's jurisdiction. According to said articles, “(…) any dispute that might arise between the parties according to the present agreement will be resolved only by the relevant adjudicatory bodies and or dispute resolution bodies of the country C Football Association and or by Courts established within the jurisdiction of the Republic of country C and by no other national or international body or association or arbitrary body or court”. Hence, the DRC judge outlined that the content of the relevant articles is rather vague and that said clauses do not explicitly refer to a specific national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations. 5. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the DRC judge emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations, he is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the DRC judge referred to FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the DRC judge further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. In this context, the DRC judge wished to stress that the Respondent was unable to prove that, in fact, the NDRC meets the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations, in FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations. 7. In this respect, the DRC judge referred to the jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, which already, on several occasions, established that the NDRC does not meet the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC judge, as previously done by the DRC, referred to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle was one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations, Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players' associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…)”. In this respect, FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list.” 8. In conformity with the jurisprudence of the DRC, the DRC judge decided that the country C Regulations, in accordance with which, inter alia, the chairman, vicechairman and one member of the NDRC are appointed by the Executive Committee of the country C Football Association and two members are appointed by the country P Football Players' Association, do not meet the aforementioned principles. 9. In view of all the above, the DRC judge established that, in line with the constant jurisprudence of the DRC, the Respondent's objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter, on the basis of the arbitration clauses of article 14 of the contract and article 6 of the agreement, has to be rejected and that the DRC judge is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 10. Likewise, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA's deciding bodies also on the basis of the subject matter of the dispute at hand, highlighting that the Respondent contends that the present dispute is of a civil nature considering that the claim is based on an image rights agreement and not an employment-related dispute, thus escaping from the competence scope of art. 22 of the Regulations. 11. In fact, it remains that the claimed outstanding payments under the image rights agreement could possibly not be considered due to the DRC judge’s lack of competence to deal with disputes related to image rights. The DRC judge, therefore, had to also verify whether, for formal reasons, it was competent to deal with this specific component or not. 12. While analysing whether it was competent to adjudicate on this part of the claim, the DRC judge wished, without entering into any discussion regarding the actual wording of the preamble and art. 1 of the agreement nor its title itself, which undoubtedly define the agreement as an image rights agreement, to highlight that said agreement contained further elements which led to believe that it was not in fact an image rights agreement but rather a separate agreement accidental to the contract, i.e. directly linked to the services of the Claimant as a player and employee of the Respondent. 13. As a general rule, if there are separate agreements, the DRC judge tends to consider the agreement on image rights as such and, therefore, as non-competent to deal with it. However, such conclusion might be different if specific elements of the separate agreement suggest that it was in fact meant to be part of the actual employment relationship. In the case at hand, such elements appear to exist. In particular, the agreement contains inter alia stipulations regarding bonuses, the use of a vehicle, accommodation and flight tickets, which are typical for employment contracts and not for image rights agreements. Moreover, article 1.a) of the agreement designates the amounts referred to in it as “salary” and the DRC judge shall consider those amounts, therefore, as part of the player’s remuneration. Consequently, the DRC judge decided not to consider the agreement as an image rights agreement, but determined that said agreement was in fact an additional agreement to the contract instead. 14. In view of all the above, the DRC judge established that the agreement is to be considered, meaning that it is in a position to take it into consideration when assessing the Claimant’s claim. 15. Furthermore, the DRC judge analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC judge confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations and considering that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 February 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 16. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC judge entered the substance of the present matter. In doing so, the DRC judge acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that they had signed the contract as well as the agreement, both dated 27 August 2012, and that they had amended the agreement, in accordance with which amendment the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, the total amount of EUR 4,500 as remuneration for the period of October to December 2012 and the total amount of EUR 6,000 as remuneration for the period of January to May 2013. 17. In continuation, the DRC judge also took note that it is uncontested that the Claimant did not render the services agreed under the contract and the agreement as from 2 January 2013, when the Respondent excluded the Claimant from the scheduled training sessions until further notice by means of its correspondence dated 1 January 2013 sent by the Respondent to the Claimant. 18. In this regard, the DRC judge took due note that the Claimant, on one hand, argued that he terminated the contract and the agreement with just cause on 4 February 2013 based on the outstanding remuneration in favour of him and also on the lack of actual employment of the Claimant by the Respondent, in spite of the fact that he had previously notified the Respondent of its salary arrears towards him, for October, November and December 2012 and also January 2013 and the negative effects of being prevented from assisting to the scheduled training sessions. On the other hand, the DRC judge took due note as well that the Respondent argued that it terminated the contract and the agreement with just cause based on a breach of articles 7 and 8 of the contract due to an alleged absence of the Claimant to the scheduled training sessions after having revoked the authorization not to train given to the Claimant on 1 January 2013. 19. Having established the aforementioned, the DRC judge deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by either the Claimant or the Respondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC judge also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the contract and the agreement were breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the employment relationship. 20. In view of the above, the DRC judge went on to deliberate as to whether the non- performance of the Respondent’s obligation to pay the Claimant’s remuneration for 3 months and the exclusion from training, which is invoked by the Claimant as basis for the early termination of the employment relationship, can be considered as a just cause for doing so. 21. In this context, whilst referring to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the DRC judge deemed it fit to highlight that the Claimant had presented substantial documentary evidence corroborating his allegations regarding the salary arrears towards him and his exclusion from training with the Respondent. In this respect, the DRC judge acknowledged the content of the Claimant’s correspondence of 25 January 2013 to the Respondent (cf. point I.9. above) as well as the fact that the Respondent, in its defence, did not dispute that the payments of the remuneration of October to December 2012 had not been made and implicitly admitted the exclusion of the Claimant from training with the Respondent by providing a letter dated 22 January 2013 allegedly sent to the Claimant by means of which it called upon the Claimant to resume training. 22. Furthermore, by excluding the Claimant from training with the Respondent, the DRC judge established that the Respondent had no longer been interested in the Claimant’s services. Such conduct also constitutes, in the DRC judge’s view, a clear breach of contract. Consequently, the DRC judge concluded that the Respondent had seriously neglected not only its financial obligations towards the Claimant but also its non-financial obligations. 23. On account of the above and taking into consideration the DRC's longstanding jurisprudence in this respect, the DRC judge concurred that the Respondent did not have just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship on 2 January 2013 and, consequently, that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment relationship. 24. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the DRC judge deems it necessary to highlight that even in the case the Claimant would have actually been called upon to resume training with the Respondent, an absence could not constitute, per se, a valid reason for the termination of an employment contract. Only a breach or misconduct which is of certain severity would justify the termination of a contract. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be prematurely terminated. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employer to assure the employee’s fulfilment of his contractual obligations, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure. 25. Furthermore, the DRC judge duly noted that the Respondent admitted that remuneration from October until December 2012 had not been paid to the Claimant. However, the Respondent deemed that fines imposed on the Claimant by the Respondent for alleged undisciplined behaviour, were to be deducted from the amount owed to the Claimant. Consequently, the Respondent claimed that there was no amount owed to the Claimant. 26. Likewise, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Claimant rejected that the fine was to be deducted from his receivables, pointing out that the factual basis for that fine did not exist. 27. In this context, the DRC judge concurred that the alleged fine imposed on the Claimant by the Respondent shall be disregarded, since a) the Respondent did not prove any alleged unprofessional behavior, and b) the total amount of the fine allegedly imposed on the Claimant by the Respondent (i.e. EUR 26,000) represents more than a third of the player’s yearly remuneration and, consequently, must be considered disproportionate. 28. In addition, and irrespective of the foregoing consideration, the DRC judge wished to address the fact that the imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not be used by clubs as a method to set off outstanding financial obligations towards players. Consequently, the DRC judge decided to reject the Respondent’s argument in this regard. 29. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract and the agreement without just cause, the DRC judge focused his attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the DRC judge decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments, on the basis of the contract and the agreement and the evidence submitted in the course of this proceeding. 30. First of all, the DRC judge reverted to the Claimant’s financial claim, which includes outstanding remuneration of EUR 6,000 relating to his monthly salaries from October 2012 until January 2013 under the contract, EUR 18,000 relating to his monthly salaries from October 2012 until January 2013 under the original version of the agreement, EUR 2,000 relating to unpaid rent expenses for the aforementioned months and EUR 26,000 relating to compensation for the residual value of the contract and part of the agreement. 31. In this respect, the DRC judge recalled that the Respondent does not dispute the fact that the Claimant’s remuneration from October until December 2012 has not been paid but alleges that any outstanding remuneration should be set-off against a fine for unprofessional behaviour. On the other hand, the DRC judge took due note that the Claimant did not submit any proof regarding accommodation expenses and that the parties agreed on reducing the remuneration to be paid to the Claimant under the agreement to the payable amount of EUR 3,000. 32. Consequently, taking into account the documentation remitted by the Claimant to substantiate his claim, the lack of documentary evidence provided by the Respondent, the fact that both the contract and the agreement are to be considered as terminated as of 2 January 2013, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent is liable to pay the amount of EUR 13,500 to the Claimant, corresponding to his monthly salaries of October, November and December 2012 under the contract and the agreement. 33. In continuation, the DRC judge focused his attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the DRC judge firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and any other objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 34. In application of the relevant provision, the DRC judge held that, first of all, he had to clarify as to whether the contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC judge established that no such compensation clause was included in the contract or the agreement. 35. As a consequence, the DRC judge determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The DRC judge recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of payable compensation. 36. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the DRC judge proceeded with the calculation of the amount payable to the Claimant under the terms of both the contract and the agreement until 31 May 2013, taking into account that the player’s remuneration until December 2012 is included in the calculation of the outstanding remuneration (cf. point II.32. above). Accordingly, the DRC judge concluded that the amount of EUR 30,000 (i.e. salary as from January 2013 until May 2013 under the contract and the agreement, as amended) serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 37. In continuation, the DRC judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 38. Indeed, the Claimant signed a new employment contract with the Club M, from country B. In accordance with such employment contract, which has been made available by the Claimant, valid as from 22 February 2013 until 30 June 2013, the Claimant was entitled to receive a monthly salary of currency of country B 7,890. 39. Consequently, the DRC judge established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the Claimant and Club M for the period as from March 2012 until and including May 2013 amounted to currency of country B 23,670. 40. In this respect and bearing in mind all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 18,000 to the Claimant, which was to be considered a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the present matter, in addition to the amount of EUR 13,500 as outstanding remuneration (cf. point II.32. above). 41. The DRC judge concluded his deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim filed by the Claimant is rejected. ** III. Decision of the DRC judge 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player G, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club A, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, Player G, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 13,500, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 26 February 2013 until the date of effective payment. 3. If the aforementioned sum plus the interest is not paid within the above-mentioned time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and a formal decision. 4. The Respondent, Club A, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, Player G, compensation in the amount of EUR 18,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. If the said amount is not paid within the stated time limit, an interest rate of 5% p.a. will apply on said amount as of expiry of the above-mentioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and a formal decision. 5. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, Player G, are rejected. 6. The Claimant, Player G, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club A, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the DRC judge of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the DRC judge Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives