F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theDispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Ivan Gazidis (England), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, Player V, from country F as Claimant against the club, Club P, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theDispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Ivan Gazidis (England), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, Player V, from country F as Claimant against the club, Club P, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case Facts relating to the preliminary issue of competence: 1. On 19 August 2010, Player V, from country F (hereinafter: player or Claimant) and Club P, from country P (hereinafter: club or Respondent) signed a “pre-contract”. 2. On 24 August 2010, the parties signed a standard country G Super League employment contract, in accordance with which all disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance. 3. On 24 August 2010, the player signed another employment-related document, which does not bear any signature of the club and which contains various other remuneration as well as a clause indicating that the country G Football Federation shall resolve any disputes that may arise between the parties. 4. On 15 April 2011, the player lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA for breach of contract at the club’s fault. 5. In reply to the claim, the club contested FIFA’s competence to deal with the present matter invoking res iudicata. In this respect the club refers to the aforementioned PEEOD and the fact that it had filed an application against the player in front of such deciding body, which passed a decision in July 2011. 6. From the country G decision dated 7 July 2011 presented by the club, it can be noted that the club referred the matter to the PEEOD on 9 May 2011, that the hearing took place on 30 May 2011, and that the deciding body declared the contract terminated at the player’s fault as of 10 May 2011 due to his absence as of 20 April 2011 without valid reason. 7. The player denies having ever been informed of local proceedings against him and insists that FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber has competence to deal with the present matter. Facts related to the substance of the matter: 8. On 19 August 2010, the parties signed a “pre-contract” relating to a two years’ contractual duration against a total remuneration of EUR 550,000 net (EUR 275,000 per year) payable in 22 unspecified instalments starting on 30 August 2010. The pre-contract further contains various bonuses in addition to EUR 1,000 per month for accommodation as well as a car and air tickets (6 round trip tickets country G – country F per year). 9. On 24 August 2010, the parties signed a standard Super League contract valid as from 24 August 2010 until 30 June 2012, in accordance with which the player was entitled to receive a monthly gross salary of EUR 850.18 (x 12 months, plus 2 extra monthly salaries as Christmas, Easter and holiday bonuses) as well as the total amount of EUR 80,000 net in 8 equal instalments of EUR 10,000 payable on 30 September 2010, 30 November 2010, 30 February 2011, 30 April 2011, 30 September 2011, 30 November 2011, 30 February 2012, 30 April 2012. 10. The player further presented a document entitled “Agreement” and dated 24 August 2010, which solely bears the player’s signature and includes 30 June 2012 as date of expiry. According to this document, it shall apply in addition to the standard employment contract and apart from various bonuses and fringe benefits that are also set out in the “pre-contract”, the player was to receive the total amount of EUR 450,000 net to be paid in 22 monthly consecutive instalments as of 30 August 2010. 11. On 24 February 2011, the player put the club in default of payment of the total amount of EUR 91,735.42 including the amounts of EUR 81,800 for four monthly instalments (October 2010 to January 2011), EUR 4,000 for rent since September 2010, air tickets and bonuses, all in accordance with the “Agreement”. 12. On 23 March 2011, the player sent another default notice to the club adding his February 2011 remuneration under the standard employment contract and February instalment and rent according to the “Agreement”. 13. On 15 April 2011, the player informed the club that he considered himself free from any commitment to the club, given that, in addition, his March 2011 remuneration had remained unpaid. 14. On 15 April 2011, the player lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA maintaining that the club acted in breach of contract and therefore, he asked that he be awarded payment of the following monies: - On the basis of the standard employment contract: EUR 850.18 for March 2011 as outstanding salary; EUR 12,550.54 (3 x EUR 850.18 plus EUR 10,000) as remainder for the 2010-11 season (April to June 2011); EUR 50,202.16 (12 x EUR 850.18 plus 4 x EUR 10,000) for the 2011-12 season; - On the basis of the “Agreement”: EUR 122,700 as outstanding remuneration as from October 2010 until March 2011; EUR 6,000 as outstanding accommodation payments (October until March); EUR 8,000 as winning bonus; EUR 1,797 as outstanding air tickets; EUR 61,350 as remuneration as from April 2011 until June 2011; EUR 3,000 as accommodation as from April 2011 until June 2011; EUR 225,000 as remuneration for the 2011-12 season; EUR 12,000 as accommodation for the 2011-12 season. - 5% interest p.a. on all of the above-mentioned amounts as of 11 April 2011. 15. The player explains that he has always respected his contractual obligations, whereas the club failed to comply with its obligations towards him. 16. In this regard, the player points out that the “Agreement” completes the standard employment contract, so as to reflect the terms agreed upon between the parties in the “pre-contract”. He adds that he would never have committed himself to the club on the sole basis of the terms of the standard employment contract, especially in the light of his earnings with his previous employer. 17. Furthermore, the player highlights that in the context of the “Agreement” he received EUR 10,500 from the club in September 2010 as a first part of his August salary as well the amount of EUR 30,950, which allegedly consists of EUR 10,000 as second part of his August salary, EUR 20,450 for the September salary, and EUR 500 as accommodation allowance. In this regard, the player presents various documents relating to payments in connection with the standard contract as well as one bank statement regarding a credit of EUR 30,950, the payer of which is referred to as “XY Ltd”. 18. According to the player, these payments demonstrate that the club started the execution of the “Agreement”. 19. He further maintains that after his default notice of March 2011, the club started disciplinary proceedings against him. 20. On account of the above, in particular the outstanding remuneration, the player holds that the club acted in breach of contract without just cause. 21. As to the substance of the matter, the club rejects the player’s claim. 22. The club points out that according to the standard employment contract, in particular, its art. 2 par. 4, any existing additional or subsequent agreements will be in writing and make reference to it and, in order to be valid, must be sent to the competent bodies. The club presented a confirmation from the country G Football Federation that no contract other than the standard employment contract was registered in their records. 23. As regards the “Agreement”, the club highlights that it only bears the signature of the player and thus shall be disregarded. Should it be considered valid, though, the club points out that, according to its art. 5, the official contract to be filed at the country G Football Federation is null and void and does not modify the “Agreement”. Consequently, the player would then not have been entitled to the payments under the standard employment contract. 24. As regards the payment documents presented by the player, the club holds that these documents show that the player was regularly paid his monthly remuneration under the standard employment contract. In addition, according to these documents, the player received 3 cash deposits of EUR 10,000 each, on 13 December 2010, 25 January 2011, and on 1 April 2011. 25. Furthermore, as regards the payment of the amount of EUR 30,950, the club stresses that it does not know any company by the name of XY Ltd and has thus no knowledge of the origin of this payment. 26. Finally, the club confirmed that the player indeed offered his services until mid April 2011 as stated by the player’s team mates, but that, since then, the player abandoned the club, which is why it would seek the annulment of the contractual relation and compensation in a separate application that it would submit later on. 27. Upon request, the player informed FIFA that, on 1 July 2011, he signed an employment contract with Club D, from country F, for a period of two years and he submitted a copy of the relevant employment contract. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 15 April 2011. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of articles 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country F player and a country G club. 3. However, the DRC acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding body invoking res iudicata. In this respect, the club refers to the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) and the fact that it had filed an application against the player in front of such deciding body, which passed a decision on 7 July 2011, in accordance with which the contract was considered terminated at the player’s fault as of 10 May 2011 due to his absence as of 20 April 2011 without valid reason. 4. The Chamber noted that the Claimant, for his part, rejected such position and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. 5. Accordingly, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to briefly recall that on the basis of the principle of res iudicata, a decision-making body is not in a position to deal with the substance of a case in the event that another deciding body has already dealt with the same matter by passing a final and binding decision. Indeed, the parties to the dispute as well as the deciding authority are bound by the final and binding decision previously passed. 6. In this respect, first and foremost, the Chamber outlined that the standard country G Super League employment contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent on 24 August 2010 contains a clause in accordance with which all disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance. 7. For the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber highlighted that said standard employment contract was signed by and between the parties subsequent to the “pre-contract” and, consequently, shall be considered to be the valid contract at the basis of the present matter. In addition, the document referred to as “Agreement”, which bears the same date as the standard employment contract and includes remuneration contained in the “pre-contract”, lacks the club’s signature and, therefore, cannot be considered a legally binding contract. For these reasons, the Chamber concluded that when analysing the preliminary question as to the competence of the Chamber, it shall take into account the terms of the standard country G Super League employment contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent on 24 August 2010. 8. Having said that, the Chamber further took into account that, on 22 July 2013, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) issued an award, whereby it decided that the national arbitration bodies of the country G Football Federation fulfill the requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and guarantees fair proceedings. Furthermore, the CAS underlined in said award that FIFA’s deciding body is not an appeal body. 9. In this context, the Chamber took note that the country G deciding body at the basis of the aforementioned CAS decision is the same deciding body as the one included in the jurisdiction clause of the standard country G Super League employment contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent. 10. On account of the above, the DRC established that the present matter is a res iudicata due to the facts that a) the employment contract contains a clear jurisdiction clause in favour of the national arbitration body of the country G Football Federation, b) the CAS confirmed that the relevant country G deciding body fulfills the requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and guarantees fair proceedings, i.e. the relevant country G deciding body is competent to adjudicate disputes between players and clubs like the matter at hand, and c) said competent national deciding body already passed a decision as to the substance of the present matter. 11. In light of the above, the Chamber unanimously decided that in accordance with the general legal principle of res iudicata it is not in a position to deal again with the substance of the present matter. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber The claim of the Claimant, Player V, is not admissible. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl.: CAS directives