F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 27 February 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Todd Durbin (USA), member Mohamed Al Saikhan (Saudi Arabia), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player G, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club K, from country P as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 27 February 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Todd Durbin (USA), member Mohamed Al Saikhan (Saudi Arabia), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player G, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club K, from country P as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 21 January 2011, Player G, from country B (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club K, from country P (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 21 January 2011 until 30 June 2014. 2. In accordance with the contract, the Claimant was entitled “for the whole period of the contract paid in currency of country P in the amount equivalent to: 1.025.000 EURO net (…) will be paid in monthly period in the amount of 25.000 EURO net payable in arrears by the 10th day of the next calendar month”. 3. Furthermore, the Claimant was entitled to match bonuses for every match played in which a point was obtained by the Respondent, as follows: - EUR 1,000 for each point while playing the full match; - EUR 1,000 for each point divided by the number of minutes on the field, in case the player did not play the full match. - EUR 200 for each point in matches in which the player was selected for the team, but did not play. 4. Art. 3 par. 3 of the contract stipulates: “Should the obligations stipulate in paragraph 1 or 2 be violated the Management Board of Club K will be entitled to file a motion with the Disciplinary Department of country P Football Association to charge the Player with disciplinary penalty, according to the procedure specified in Section VII of the Act of no. ii/12 of May 19, 2002 of the Board of the country P Football Association, as well as to penalize the Player in accordance to Disciplinary Regulations of country P Football Association and other valid rules and regulations.” 5. Art. 7 par. 3 stipulates that: “In matters not regulated by this Agreement, provisions of the Civil Code shall apply.” 6. Art. 7 par. 4 stipulates: “Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any disputes arising from the execution of this agreement shall be settled amicably, and in cases of a lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the jurisdiction of Club K except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an exclusive proper for the jurisdiction”. 7. Art. 7 par. 6 stipulates: “The agreement is bilingual (…) in case of any doubts and interpretation problems between those two versions the country P language version shall apply. Moreover each party has the right to refer the matter in question to the FIFA’s Players Status committee or FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”. 8. On 20 March 2013, the parties concluded an “Agreement-Debt Restructuring”, by means of which the Respondent acknowledged having the following debts to the Claimant: - EUR 113,200 net as salary and performance bonuses; - EUR 12,445 gross as bonus payments for UEFA Europa League qualifications. 9. According to art. 2 of the above-mentioned agreement, the Respondent would pay the Claimant his outstanding debt as follows: - EUR 87,000 net by 31 March 2013; - EUR 26,200 net by 7 September 2013; - EUR 12,455 gross by 7 September 2013. In turn, the Claimant confirmed that, for the duration of the agreement, he would not take any actions “towards vindication of aforesaid debt from [the Respondent]”. 10. On 17 July 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent, explaining that the latter had not fulfilled its contractual obligations towards him. The Claimant clarified that, in order for the Respondent to obtain a license for the 2013/2014 season, it had acknowledged its debt for the year 2012 in the aforementioned debt agreement. Thereafter, the Respondent had paid him his salaries for September, October, November 2012 and half of the salary of December 2012. 11. However, the Respondent subsequently failed to pay the other half of the salary of December 2012, the salaries of January 2013 to May 2013 as well as various bonuses. 12. As a result, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondent on 10 June 2013 requesting i) payment of the amount of EUR 137,500 regarding his monthly salaries and ii) the payment of his bonuses, until 14 June 2013 at the latest. 13. However, no payment was received, following which the Claimant terminated the contract on 17 June 2013 in writing. The Claimant outlined that, on the same day, the Respondent put on its website that the Claimant had terminated his contract. 14. On 18 June 2013, the Respondent contacted the Claimant’s agent by e-mail proposing to terminate the contract by mutual consent, offering to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 118,024.44, which e-mail remained unanswered by the Claimant. By means of a letter dated 18 June 2013, which according to the Claimant he received on 20 June 2013, the Respondent disputed the legitimacy of the Claimants claims, asking the latter to attend the Respondent’s training sessions as well as asking him to attend “negotiations”. 15. On account of all the above, the Claimant deemed that he had just cause to terminate the contract on 17 June 2013 and, after amending his claim on 2 October 2013, requested the total amount of EUR 350,342, calculated as follows: - EUR 12,500 for part of the salary of December 2012; - EUR 125,000 for the salaries of January to May 2013; - EUR 13,333.44 for the salary of 1 June 2013 until 16 June 2013; - EUR 5,187 for bonus payments; - EUR 38,655 for the “Agreement-Debt Restructuring” (EUR 26,200 + EUR 12,455); - EUR 149,666.56 as compensation for breach of contract (for the period of 17 June 2013 until 30 June 2014 taking into consideration the deduction of the amounts earned under his new employment contract); - EUR 6,000 as legal fees. 16. Equally, the Claimant requested 5% interest on all amounts as from the relevant due dates. 17. In reply to the claim lodged against it, the Respondent first of all contested FIFA’s competence to deal with the matter, asserting that according to art. 7 par. 4 of the contract, the competent body to deal with the matter is a court proper for the territorial jurisdiction of the registered seat of the Respondent, which means a civil court in the city of country P or the Football Court of Arbitration of the country P Football Association. 18. To its submission, the Respondent enclosed a copy of the following documentation: - Extract from the National Court Register; - Resolution No. ii/12 of 19 May 2002 adopted by the management Board of the country P Football Association; - Resolution No. ii/25 of December 2012 adopted by the Management Board of the country P Football Association – the Bylaw of the Court of Arbitration for Football. 19. Primarily, the Respondent deems that the country P civil court in the city of country P is competent, “bearing in mind the wide meaning of the term of employment-relation in the context of art. 22 of the Regulations”. Alternatively, the Respondent deems that the NDRC of the country P Football Association is competent referring once more to art. 7 par. 4 of the contract, to art. 1161 par. 1 of the Act of 17 November 1964 and to art. 1 of the Resolution No. ii/25 of 12 December 2012 of the Management Board of the country P Football Association on the adoption of the Rules of the NDRC of the country P Football Association. 20. Art. 22 par. 1 and 2 of Resolution No. ii/25 of 12 December 2012 stipulates: “1. Review and resolution of disputes filed for resolution by the Court of Arbitration shall be by three-person Adjudication Boards. 2. Either of the parties may appoint one arbitrator and, in the event of an obstacle, one replacement arbiter from the list of members of Court of Arbitration, the two so appointed arbiters shall appoint one Presiding Justice, who shall preside over the Adjudication Board”. Art. 11 par. 1 states: ”The Court of Arbitration for Football is composed from 25 to 27 arbiters appointed by the Management Board of the country P Football Association.” 21. Also, the Respondent asserts that, in accordance with art. 7 par. 3 of the contract, the dispute should be adjudicated in accordance with country P law. 22. As to the substance of the matter, the Respondent indicated that the Claimant was a successful player during the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 seasons, but that his efficiency “fell down” afterwards, scoring only 4 goals. The Respondent outlined that the reason for the decline in performance is unknown to it, but that it may well be that it was caused by the lack of commitment of the Claimant. 23. Furthermore, the Respondent indicated that, due to a temporary lack of financial liquidity, it owed the Claimant money, reason for which it concluded the debt agreement. The Respondent pointed out that the Claimant already received the first installment whereas the second installment was only due on 7 September 2013. 24. The Respondent acknowledged having received a letter from the Claimant on 10 June 2013, however, the Claimant had not warned the Respondent that, in absence of a payment, he would terminate the contract. On 18 June 2013, the Respondent proposed a settlement to the Claimant, which remained unanswered. Likewise, the Respondent’s letter of 20 June 2013 remained unanswered in which the Claimant was informed that, in accordance with the regulations of the country P Football Association, the termination of a contract is only possible by mutual consent. 25. In this context, the Respondent stressed that there is a lack of grounds for the unilateral termination of the contract, for the following reasons: a) According to the Resolution dated 19 May 2012, which is an integral part of the contract, there is no possibility of a unilateral termination of the contract; b) In case of a serious violation of the contract, the other party can only submit a motion for termination to the NDRC of the country P Football Association. Such application must be made in writing and it has to be submitted no later than 30 days after the breach. Since the player did not comply with this formality, the club deems that the contract is still binding and effective; c) The player did not “ask to pay outstanding salaries with notification that in case of lack of payment he will terminate the contract”. In the club’s view, a notification for termination is required; d) Even if there is an effective unilateral termination, there is no basis for the payment of compensation as the player did not provide a basis for such claim, nor is there a basis under country P law or in the Regulations; e) According to country P law, it is necessary to prove “a damage to the property of his assets within a specified dimension”. Since the player started playing for a new club, it must be assumed that he did not lose any income “and even if does, he did not proved the height of his loss”. 26. In a subsequent statement dated 16 September 2013, the Respondent also disputed the existence of any debts towards the Claimant, but even if a debt existed, the Respondent argued that the amount claimed by the Claimant is too high “because the offsetting results from the Claimant’s unhealthy during the sick leave within a period from 28.02.2013 to 14.03.2013 and from 01.05.2013 to 14.05.2013 were not taken into account”. According to the Respondent, the correct amount should be EUR 111,983.47, calculated as follows: - EUR 12,500 for half of January 2013; - EUR 24,107.14 for February 2013; - EUR 13,709.67 for March 2013; - EUR 50,000 for April and May 2013; - EUR 11,666.66 for June 2013. 27. In his replica, the Claimant rejects that country P law is governing the present dispute and insists on the competence of FIFA to hear the present matter stating that: - Art. 7 par. 4 does not contain an explicit jurisdiction clause in favor of civil courts in country P; - Both parties acknowledge the competence of sports arbitration bodies; - The NDRC of the country P Football Association is not an independent sports tribunal, in particular, all arbitrators are selected by the management board of the country P Football Association. 28. Furthermore, the Claimant contests that he was not performing well and insists that he terminated the contract on 17 June 2013 with just cause. Also, all the argumentation in relation to the compensation should be disregarded; he was not unjustifiably absent from work between 28 February 2013 and 14 March 2013, since he was having back problems but was still participating in the training of the club. In any case, the Respondent was anyhow not entitled to deduct salary, even Resolution No. ii/25 of December 2012 states that the player shall receive his entire remuneration during illness. 29. In its duplica, the Respondent insisted on the competence of a country P civil court proper for the territorial jurisdiction of city of country P. Furthermore, the Respondent holds that the NDRC of the country P Football Association is a duly constituted arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 30. Finally, the Respondent repeated its previous argumentation and reiterated that art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is not applicable “because of the lack of its primary validity conditions, that is the termination of the contract without a just cause”. 31. On 4 November 2013, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 31 October 2013, he received two payments from the Respondent totaling the amount of EUR 34,669.67, for which, however, it is not clear to which outstanding debt it corresponds. Nevertheless, the Claimant assumes that these payments correspond to the obligation deriving from the “Agreement-Debt Restructuring”, while stressing that the Respondent still owes the remaining amount of EUR 3,985.33 as well as 5% interest as from 7 September 2013 and 5% interest on the amount of EUR 34,669.67 as from 7 September 2013 until 31 October 2013. 32. Upon request, the Claimant informed FIFA that, on 19 June 2013, he signed a new employment contract with Club L, valid as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2016, in accordance with which he was entitled to currency of country B 26,404 per month. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 July 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an inter national dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a country B player and a country P club regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 7 par. 4 of the contract alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the relevant employment contract is either the civil court in the city of country P or the Football Court of Arbitration of the country P Football Association (hereinafter: the NDRC of the country P Football Association). 5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the Respondent. 6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competence to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract. 8. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause. 9. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that art. 7 par. 4 of the employment contract stipulates that: “Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any disputes arising from the execution of this agreement shall be settled amicably, and in cases of a lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the jurisdiction of Club K except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an exclusive proper for the jurisdiction”. 10. Having examined the relevant provision, the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that art. 7 par. 4 does not constitute a clear jurisdiction clause in favour of one specific court or arbitration tribunal in country P, since it only referred to a court “proper” for the jurisdiction of the Respondent. The foregoing conclusion is even supported by the Respondent’s statements which itself does not seem to be aware which judicial organ is competent; either the civil court in the city of country P or the NDRC of the country P Football Association. 11. However, the Chamber emphasised that even more pertinent is the provision contained in art. 7 par. 6 of the contract which makes a clear reference to the FIFA DRC. Indeed, art. 7 par. 6 stipulates: “The agreement is bilingual (…) in case of any doubts and interpretation problems between those two versions the country P language version shall apply. Moreover each party has the right to refer the matter in question to the FIFA’s Players Status committee or FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”. 12. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 13. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 17 July 2013. Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 14. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 15. First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 21 January 2011, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid as from 21 January 2011 until 30 June 2014 in accordance with which the player was entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 25,000. 16. The Chamber further observed that the Claimant unilaterally terminated the contract in writing on 17 June 2013 invoking just cause, and that he subsequently lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent seeking payment of the amount of EUR 350,342 plus interest, corresponding to his alleged outstanding remuneration, compensation for breach of contract as well as legal fees. 17. The Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant held that his salaries had not been paid from December 2012 until May 2013 and that he had put the club in default in writing on 10 June 2013, but that no payment was received following said default letter. Therefore, the Claimant deemed that he had terminated the contract with just cause on 17 June 2013. 18. Furthermore, the Chamber observed that the Respondent, for its part, was of the opinion that, on the basis of the Regulations of the country P Football Association and country P legislation, there was a lack of grounds to terminate the contract unilaterally and that there are no damages, since the Claimant had been employed by a new club. 19. As to the debts towards the Claimant, the Respondent stated that due to a temporary lack of financial liquidity, on 20 March 2013, it had concluded a debt settlement agreement with the Claimant. As to the other alleged debts, the Respondent contested that any such debts existed, but even if it had any debts to the Claimant, those were limited to the amount of EUR 111,983.47 “because the offsetting results from the Claimant’s unhealthy during the sick leave within a period from 28.02.2013 to 14.03.2013 and from 01.05.2013 to 14.05.2013 were not taken into account”. 20. In this respect, the DRC recalled the basic principle of the burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 21. In relation to the preceding paragraph, the Chamber noted that the Respondent however did not substantiate its defence, as it did not present any evidence in respect of any payments it sustained to have made to the Claimant prior to 17 June 2013. Equally, in relation to the Respondent’s argumentation concerning the Claimant’s sick leave, the Respondent had not been able to refute the statements of the Claimant that, although having had back problems, he continued to participate in the Respondent’s training sessions. Equally, the Respondent had not indicated on the basis of which provision in the contract it would be allowed to deduct salary in case of the Claimant’s sick leave. 22. As a consequence, and taken into account the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber determined that, due to the lack of documentary evidence provided by the Respondent, it could be established that on 17 June 2013, the following payments were outstanding: i) EUR 137,500 for the salaries of (half of) January 2012 until May 2013, and ii) EUR 5,187 concerning the bonus payments. 23. Having taken into consideration the previous considerations, the Chamber considered that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of time. Therefore, the Chamber considered that the Respondent was found to be in breach of the employment contract and that the breach was of such seriousness that, in line with the Chamber’s long-standing and well-established jurisprudence, the Claimant had a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contractual relationship with the Respondent on 17 June 2013, having previously put the Respondent in default of payment of the outstanding amounts. 24. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Claimant had terminated the employment contract with just cause on 9 November 2012 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact with just cause by the Claimant. 25. Furthermore, and in relation to the arguments of the Respondent that the termination had not been done in accordance with the country P law and country P Football Association Regulations, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. This should apply, in particular, also to the termination of a contract. In this respect, the DRC wished to point out that it is in the interest of football that the termination of contract is based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerable from country to country. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to the termination of the contract but rather the RSTP, general principles of law and, where existing, the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence. 26. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant. 27. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination i.e. the amount of EUR 142,687, consisting of the monthly salaries of half of December 2012 until May 2013 and the bonus payments. Equally, the Chamber noted that during the course of the present proceedings also the amount of EUR 38,655 stipulated in the “Agreement-Debt Restructuring had fallen due. Finally, the Chamber recalled that the Respondent had made one further payment to the Claimant after the termination of the contract, more specifically, the Respondent had paid the Claimant the total amount of 34,670 on 31 October 2013, which amount should be deducted from the outstanding remuneration. As a result, the Chamber determined that the Respondent has to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 146,672 as outstanding remuneration. 28. Furthermore and considering the Claimant’s claim for interest, the Respondent must pay 5% interest on the amount of EUR 146,672 as from the respective due dates. 29. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding remuneration on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 30. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 31. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 32. Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of the employment contract, the contract would run for another 13 months. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Claimant until the regular expiry of the contract amounts to EUR 325,000 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 33. In continuation, the Chamber remarked that the Claimant had found new employment with Club L, from country B, as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2016. In accordance with the employment contract signed between the Claimant and Club L, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly salary of currency of country B 26,404 per month, which corresponds to approximately EUR 13,444. As a result, the total remuneration the Claimant would receive from Club L for the 12-month period between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014 amounts to EUR 161,328. 34. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 35. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 163,672 to the Claimant, which is considered by the Chamber to be reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract. 36. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e., 17 July 2013, until the date of effective payment. 37. As a consequence, the DRC concluded that the Respondent is liable to pay the total amount of EUR 310,344 to the Claimant, consisting of the amount of EUR 146,672 corresponding to the Claimant’s outstanding remuneration and the amount of EUR 163,672 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract. 38. Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 39. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player G, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club K, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 146,672, plus 5% interest until the date of effective payment as follows: a. 5% p.a. as of 1 January 2013 on the amount of EUR 12,500; b. 5% p.a. as of 1 February 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000; c. 5% p.a. as of 1 March 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000; d. 5% p.a. as of 1 April 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000; e. 5% p.a. as of 1 May 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000; f. 5% p.a. as of 1 June 2013 on the amount of EUR 25,000; g. 5% p.a. as of 17 July 2013 on the amount of EUR 5,187; h. 5% p.a. as of 8 September 2013 on the amount of EUR 3,985. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 163,672 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 17 July 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives