F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theDispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 July 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (country G), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant / Counter-Respondent against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country F as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of theDispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 July 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (country G), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant / Counter-Respondent against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country F as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 11 November 2009, the club from country G, Club H and the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: Claimant / Counter-Respondent) concluded a transfer contract regarding the transfer of the player, Player C (hereinafter: Respondent I / Counter-Claimant), born on 13 July 1990, to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent effective as from 1 July 2010 and for a transfer compensation amounting to EUR 629,000. 2. According to art. 5 of the above-mentioned transfer contract, “For the period from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2010 the parties agree that the player will play on loan base with the club which will be indicated by the club from country B”. 3. As from 29 January 2010 until 13 July 2011, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was registered with the club from country I, Club J firstly as an amateur (until 24 August 2010) and then as a professional, as confirmed by the player passport issued by the Football Federation from country I. 4. On 1 August 2010, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract or Club A Contract), which provided for a duration as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2015. 5. The Club A Contract does not include any reference to a collective bargaining agreement. 6. According to art. 3 of the Club A Contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent undertakes to pay the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant “if he is registered for Club A and if he plays in Club A’ teams ” the following net amounts: - EUR 60,000 as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011; - EUR 70,000 as from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012; - EUR 80,000 per season, as from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2015. 7. Article 5 of the Club A Contract inter alia stipulates that “During the football season 2010/2011 (from 1st July 2010 until 30th June 2011), the player accepts to be transferred to the club from country I, Club J”. 8. In addition, art. 7 of the Club A Contract reads as follows: “This player’s contract is a final one; the parties are committed, starting from the football season 2010/2011, for purely formal reasons and in respect of the applicable Regulations of the Football Federation from country B, to fill out and subscribe all the contract-forms as predisposed by the Football Federation from country B, in conformity with the collective labour agreement. In case the player will not fulfil this contract, by signing an agreement with another club (except Club J) or not signing the contract form as predisposed by the Football Federation from country B or in any way causing him no to be actually transferred to Club A as stated above, he will have to pay to Club A a penalty of EUR 1,500,000”. 9. On 19 August 2010, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent agreed in writing that “On 1st August 2010 we entered into an employment contract with you for sport services ending on 20 June 2015. Subsequently, on 19 August 2010 we entered into a contract for the transfer of your sport services until 30 June 2011 with the club from country I, Club J. In consideration of the above, for your transfer to the Club J, the undersigned club [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] will recognize you as an integration of the salary a net amount of EUR 20,000, to be paid in two instalments of equal amount payable respectively on 31 August 2010 and on 28 February 2011”. 10. On 19 August 2010, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and Club J signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2011. 11. On 20 August 2010, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and Club J signed an agreement for the loan of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant until 30 June 2011. The loan agreement inter alia stipulates that the loan is free of payment and that the relevant International Transfer Certificate (ITC) will be returned to the club upon expiry of the loan. 12. On 7 July 2011, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the club from country F, Club E (hereinafter: Respondent II) signed an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until the end of the 2015-16 season, i.e. for 5 years. According to said contract, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was entitled to the following gross remuneration: - Season 2011-12: • EUR 12,000 as monthly salary; • EUR 30,000 as lump sum payment; - Season 2012-13: • EUR 15,000 as monthly salary; • EUR 20,000 as lump sum payment; - Season 2013-14: • EUR 17,000 as monthly salary; • EUR 20,000 as lump sum payment; - Season 2014-15: • EUR 20,000 as monthly salary; • EUR 20,000 as lump sum payment; - Season 2015-16: • EUR 23,000 as monthly salary; • EUR 20,000 as lump sum payment. 13. By means of its letter of 28 July 2011, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent invited the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to resume training with the club on 1 August 2011 and received no reaction from the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. 14. On 22 December 2011, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II, alleging that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, induced by the Respondent II, breached the Club A Contract without just cause by having entered into an employment contract with the Respondent II during the protected period. Therefore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent requests the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to be held liable for the payment of the total amount of EUR 7,500,000, made up of: - EUR 6,000,000 as compensation for breach of contract; - EUR 1,500,000 as per the penalty fee contained in art. 7 of the Club A Contract. 15. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent requests that it be established that the Respondent II induced the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to breach the contract, that the Respondent II be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned amounts and that sporting sanctions be imposed on both the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and on the Respondent II. 16. In its arguments, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent states that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant did not return after the end of his loan with Club J on 30 June 2011, in spite of having always been correctly paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent during the entire loan period and of having, in March 2011 and May 2011, expressed his interest in resuming his activities with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent under better financial terms. 17. In July 2011, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent allegedly became aware of the fact that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had signed an employment contract with the Respondent II, as a result of which, on 8 July 2011, it informed the Respondent II in writing that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still under contract with it and that the Respondent II induced him to breach said contract. These claims were rejected by the Respondent II. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent adds that it was not informed by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant of his wish to join another club and that the negotiations with the Respondent II were held without its knowledge. 18. With regard to its claim for compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 6,000,000 the Claimant / Counter-Respondent refers to the remaining gross value of the contract, allegedly EUR 547,847. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further refers to contractual appearance bonuses and indicates that it is not aware of the financial conditions under the Club E contract, which it deems should also be taken into consideration in order to establish the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s market value at the time of the breach. 19. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further invokes the transfer compensation of allegedly EUR 700,000 agreed upon with the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s former club from country G, Club H, (cf. point 1 above) as well as the amount of EUR 150,000 relating to agent expenses. 20. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent includes the costs of EUR 148,415.64 which it allegedly paid to Club J for offering him the best opportunity for his development. In this regard, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent presented Club J’s letter dated 1 July 2011 asking the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to pay the amount of EUR 59,890 for the 2009-10 season and EUR 88,525.64 for the 2010-11 season. 21. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further invokes the written transfer offer of EUR 4,500,000 (plus EUR 1,000,000 variable) that it received from another club from country I, Club K. 22. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent refers to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s participation with the national team of country D at the Continental Youth Championship, the FIFA U-20 World Cup, the 2010 FIFA World Cup and emphasises that he has a promising career at top level ahead of him. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent also outlines the substantial remaining period of the contract, the loss of opportunity to negotiate the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s transfer, the difficulty to replace a player of his level and experience without a major investment. 23. In its reply to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim, the Respondent II maintains having contacted the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant for the first time at the end of the 2010-11 season. Asked about his contractual situation, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant allegedly informed the Respondent II that he signed a pre-contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 1 August 2010, however the Claimant / Counter-Respondent failed to register him and, subsequently, he was registered with Club J, with which he signed a contract on 19 August 2010, valid until 30 June 2011. Therefore, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant confirmed to the Respondent II that he was no longer contractually bound to Club J and thus free to sign with another club. 24. In order to verify such information, the Respondent II asked the Football Federation from country F to contact the Football Federation from country B. The Football Federation from country F specifically referred to the fact the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had been on loan with Club J and asked if the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still contractually bound with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Football Federation from country B answered “The Player C is not registered with our club”. The Respondent II highlights that the Football Federation from country B’s reply confirms that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was not contractually bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 25. In addition, the Respondent II points out that it consulted the Transfer Matching System (TMS) from which it noted that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s contract with Club J had ended and that he was not contractually bound to another club. The Respondent II also presented a copy of the ITC issued by the Football Federation from country I in favour of the Football Federation from country F on 14 July 2011, as well as a copy of the player passport issued by the Football Federation from country I, which does not include the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 26. The Respondent II further highlights that Club J and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent belong to the same shareholder and that it is surprising that Club J did not oppose to the issuance of the relevant ITC to the Football Federation from country F if the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was indeed contractually bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent until the end of the 2014-15 season. 27. In continuation, the Respondent II claims that the contract signed between the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 1 August 2010 is not valid according to the law in country B and the FIFA Regulations. In this respect, the Respondent II presented a legal opinion apparently issued by a Mr V upon the Respondent II’s request. Said legal opinion concluded that the contract signed between the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 1 August 2010 “cannot be considered valid within the Football Association from country B”, since in particular it does not comply with art. 2 and art. 3 of the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, which allegedly establish that a contract, under penalty of nullity, must be drawn up on the specific form of the standard contract and must be registered with the competent league. The aforementioned conclusion was in particular based on the fact that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was never registered with the Football Federation from country B. 28. Furthermore, the Respondent II claims that the contract is also not valid according to the FIFA Regulations, since no ITC was ever requested by the Football Federation from country B from the Football Association from country G and therefore the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was never duly registered with the Football Federation from country B. In fact, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s ITC was delivered by the Football Association from country G to the Football Federation from country I in January 2010 and then, upon expiry of the loan with Club J, by the Football Federation from country I to the Football Federation from country F. Club J never opposed to the delivery of the ITC, since it knew that the loan contract and employment contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent were not valid. The Respondent II refers to a CAS decision, which allegedly inter alia states that as the ITC was not requested and the player concerned, thus, not registered, the club was not in the position to loan the player to another club (CAS 2005/A/808). 29. The Respondent II deems that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim is to be rejected as it is based on an invalid contract and, thus, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is not entitled to claim against the Respondent II and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant any type of compensation or sanction. 30. Subsidiarily, with regard to the amounts referred to for the calculation of compensation, the Respondent II questions the veracity of the invoice allegedly issued by Club J to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for costs allegedly incurred on the occasion of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s loan, since the relevant loan was free of compensation. 31. Finally, the Respondent II requests that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent be condemned to pay the attorney fees incurred by the Respondent II in the amount of EUR 20,000 and bear all procedural costs. 32. In his reply to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant holds that he was registered with Club J on the basis of an ITC issued by the Football Association from country G to the Football Federation from country I on 29 January 2010 and that, on 1 August 2010, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent made him sign the Club A Contract that did not contain the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s signature at the time. 33. He further claims to have been advised by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to stay with Club J since it did not count on his services for the 2010-11 season, apparently since the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had already exceeded the number of foreign players allowed per team. Therefore, and since the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not take steps in order to complete his registration, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant deemed that the Club A Contract, which only contained his signature, was not valid and that, once his contract with Club J would come to an end on 30 June 2011, he would be free to sign a contract with the club of his choice. 34. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant confirms having been contacted by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in March and May 2011, regarding the terms and conditions for the next five seasons, but denies having ever expressed any interest in accepting the proposal of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent which was not that of joining its 1st team, as alleged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, but of being transferred to another Team from country B as stipulated in its offer dated 25 May 2011: “Art. 6 For the football season 2011/2012 (from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012) the player accepts to be transferred to an club from country B; during the football season 2011/2012, the player will receive from said club from country B the remuneration as according to Article 3 of this contract”. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant claims that, in spite of knowing that he did not wish to accept such proposal, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent continued to pressure him to do so. 35. By the end of the 2010-11 season, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was contacted by the Respondent II and informed the latter that he was at the end of his contract with Club J and that he did not wish to render his services to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, which had made him the aforementioned proposal. In this regard, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant alleges having requested the Respondent II to verify whether he was not contractually bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and, consequently, the Football Federation from country F consulted the Football Federation from country B and received the answer mentioned under point 24 above. 36. As regards the validity of the Club A Contract, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant maintains the argumentation previously exposed by the Respondent II, according to which the contract is invalid as per the law in country B and the FIFA Regulations, pointing out inter alia that the Club A Contract was not drawn up in the form of the standard contract issued by the relevant sporting authority in country B and it was not registered by the Football Federation from country B. 37. In addition, he claims that the loan contract signed between Club J and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is also not valid, since according to art. 10 par. 1 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the FIFA Regulations), a loan contract is only valid if it is also signed by player concerned. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, however, did not sign said loan contract. Furthermore, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant refers to annexe 3, art. 4 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and claims that no ITC has ever been requested by or delivered to the Football Federation from country B, but from the Football Association from country G directly to the Football Federation from country I. Therefore, he does not consider to have been loaned from the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to Club J, but to have simply signed an employment contract for the 2010-11 season with Club J. 38. Moreover, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant claims that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is solely responsible for the lack of validity of the contract and that it is also responsible for the loss of profit of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant of EUR 370,000, corresponding to the salaries established in the Club A Contract. Instead of playing for a 1st division team in country B, as he believed he would, he was transferred to Club J, at the time a 3rd division team in country I, and at the start of the 2010-11 season he was asked to stay with Club J. 39. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant thus rejected the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim and lodged a counterclaim against the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the prejudice to his financial situation and to his image as a footballer, requesting the payment of EUR 530,000, made up of: - EUR 370,000 corresponding to his loss of profits; - EUR 100,000 for the sporting prejudice caused; - EUR 60,000 for the moral damage before the Respondent II. 40. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant further asks that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent pays EUR 25,000 relating to legal fees and bears the procedural costs. 41. Alternatively, in case the DRC deems that the contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is valid and that he is to be held liable to pay compensation to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant points out that the contract contains a penalty clause, according to which the maximum amount of compensation would be EUR 1,500,000. In addition, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant believes that, since the contract contains a penalty clause, sporting sanctions cannot be imposed. 42. Furthermore, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant deems the aforementioned penalty clause to be disproportionate as it corresponds to 300 monthly salaries of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. Thus, in case the DRC deems that any amount of compensation is payable by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, it should be a lower amount than that established in the compensation clause. 43. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant also rejects the argumentation put forward by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in relation to the amount of EUR 6,000,000. 44. In its replica, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent fully rejects the argumentation of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II, and maintains its claim. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent maintains that the contract signed with the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant on 1 August 2010 is to be considered as valid and binding. 45. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent states that the Club A Contract was also valid as per the Regulations of country B, since “no effective regulation provide for the obligation of the parties to conclude professional players’ contracts in one single form without any contractual freedom”. The form provided by the Football Federation from country B is a mere administrative formality and was also going to be signed by the parties in the present case and filed separately, once the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant would return from his loan with Club J. In this regard, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent refers to art. 7 of the Club A Contract. According to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the contract signed between the parties on 1 August 2010 was a complete and final contract, the validity of which does not depend on the form. In this regard, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent quotes an award of the Arbitration Court of the country B league “Serie C” of 22 December 2006, which allegedly confirmed “the full validity and enforceability of a private agreement between a club and a player as its employee, there where the parties did not sign an deposit the official form of the league”. 46. As to the argument that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent has never requested the pertinent ITC, the club from country B explains that, for administrative reasons, considering that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant would be transferred directly from country G to country I, it was decided that the most practical solution would be that the Football Federation from country I directly requests the ITC from the Football Association from country G. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claims that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s registration was not to be found in TMS, because the transfer occurred before the insertion of data into TMS became compulsory in October 2010. 47. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further holds that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was perfectly aware of his temporary transfer to Club J until 30 June 2011 and, in support of its assertion, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent points out that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant signed the document dated 19 August 2010 (cf. point 9 above) and accepted the payment of EUR 68,000 from the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, while under contract and registered with Club J. 48. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claims that according to art. 10 of the FIFA Regulations the signatures of the releasing club, of the club accepting the player on loan and of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant do not necessarily need to be contained in the same document. In particular, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant expressed his consent to the loan by signing the document dated 19 August 2010. the Claimant / Counter-Respondent also states that it would not have paid a considerable amount of compensation to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s former club and immediately afterwards release him to another club, free of payment. Furthermore, it claims to have identified the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant as a key player for its first team and intended to engage him for the 2011-12 season, since it had one free spot left for the registration of a foreign player. 49. As regards the drafted contract dated 25 May 2011 presented by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent explains that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had expressed his strong desire to remain with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, which is why the “draft offer of the employment contract” has never been executed as such. From the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s perspective there was no need to sign a new contract with the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant since the Club A Contract was still valid. 50. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent points out that the legal opinion provided by the Respondent II shall not be taken into account, as it lacks the signature of and information about the qualification of the person who drafted it. 51. Finally, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent fully rejects the counterclaim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, which it deems contradictory, as he requests compensation based on a contract that he considers invalid. 52. In his duplica, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant maintains that the loan agreement must be declared null and void. First of all, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant states that the document signed on 19 August 2010 does not make any reference to a loan, but just mentions twice the word “transfer”. Additionally, he claims that the EUR 40,000 paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to Club J were only aimed at compensating the unjustified financial loss suffered by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant because of the transfer to Club J. Indeed, according to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, the Club A Contract entitled him to receive EUR 60,000 as salary plus EUR 20,000 as bonus while the contract with Club J provided for a salary of EUR 40,000. Moreover, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant recalls that the supposed loan agreement is not valid since it does not contain his signature. 53. In addition, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant states that the deadline for registering the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant on the basis of the Club A Contract expired on 30 August 2010. Therefore, in order for the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to be registered with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent after the expiry of the contract with Club J, a new contract was needed, that is the reason why negotiations were undertaken in March and May 2011. 54. Subsequently, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant reiterates his argument according to which the Club A Contract is invalid as per the law in country B. In this respect, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant states that should a contract which does not respect the standard form be qualified, two options would be available. Either it is considered as an employment contract and therefore several employment contracts for a same employment relationship would exist, which would be an aberration, or it is not deemed as an employment contract and, consequently, the DRC would not be competent since FIFA jurisdiction is limited to “employment-related disputes”. 55. Finally, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant reiterates his counterclaim and his subsidiary argumentation regarding the lack of proportionality of the penalty clause and the impossibility to impose sporting sanctions. 56. In its duplica, the Respondent II first of all recalls that the contract should be considered contrary to the law in country B. In this regard, the Respondent II sustains that the jurisprudence put forward by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent (cf. point 45 above) is not relevant inasmuch as it concerned an administrative employee of a club and not a professional player. 57. Furthermore, the Respondent II also holds that it would have been impossible to register the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant on the basis of the Club A Contract due to the expiry of the deadline to do so on 31 August 2010. 58. The Respondent II further states that, even before TMS became mandatory, the issuance of an ITC in paper format was compulsory to validly transfer a player. Since no ITC was ever issued in favour of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the transfer from the club from country G to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent violated the applicable regulations and must be deemed null and void. Consequently, both parties were not entitled to enter into an employment agreement in August 2010. 59. In addition, the Respondent II repeats the argumentation exposed by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant in his duplica regarding the lack of validity of the loan agreement. 60. Accordingly, the Respondent II states that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim is to be rejected as it is based on an invalid contract. 61. Alternatively, should the DRC deem that the contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is valid and that the Respondent II induced the relevant breach, the Respondent II points out that the contract contains a penalty clause, according to which the maximum amount of compensation would be EUR 1,500,000. Moreover, according to the Respondent II, said amount is clearly disproportionate and should be reduced considering that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant never played for the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the latter planned to loan him out again. 62. In addition, the Respondent II reckons that, since the contract contains a penalty clause, sporting sanctions cannot be imposed. 63. In its final comments, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent reiterates the argumentation submitted previously. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 22 December 2011. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the 2008 and 2012 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2012) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between an club from country B, a player from country D and a club from country F. 3. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2012), and considering that the original claim in the present matter was lodged on 22 December 2011, the 2010 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to establish as to whether, as claimed by Claimant / Counter-Respondent, a breach of contract had been committed by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, it should first of all pronounce itself on the issue of the validity of the relevant employment contract, which was signed by and between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant on 1 August 2010. 6. In this context, the Chamber duly noted that whereas the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant has not contested that he signed a document on 1 August 2010, both Respondents held that the document cannot be considered as valid since it did not comply with the formalities allegedly imposed by the law in country B, in particular it was not drafted on the specific form provided by country B league and was not registered at the Football Federation from country B. Additionally, the Respondents pointed out that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent never requested the ITC from the Football Association from country G and, therefore, was not in a position to validly enter into an employment agreement with the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. 7. In this respect, the DRC considered relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of one party and on which the other party has no influence. 8. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber highlighted that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. 9. After a careful study of the contract, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent employment contract, in particular, the facts that the contract establishes that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant has to render his services to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent during a fixed period of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant a monthly remuneration. 10. Furthermore, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. 11. On account of the above, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the arguments of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant as well as the Respondent II cannot be upheld and that the contract signed by and between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant on 1 August 2010 was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from the 2010-11 season until the 2014-15 season. Equally, the Chamber deemed fit to clarify that the fact that the parties to said contract held talks with a view to amend their employment relationship between March and May 2011 has no effect as to the validity of the relevant contract. To the contrary, as such talks were apparently unsuccessful, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant remained bound by the terms of the contract dated 1 August 2010. 12. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. 13. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’ respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was undisputed that after the end of his loan with Club J on 30 June 2011, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant never joined the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in order to offer his services to the latter in accordance with the relevant employment contract. Therefore, on account of all the above, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had acted in breach of the employment contract. 14. Also, in light of the above-mentioned facts, it is undisputed that, on 7 July 2011, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant signed an employment contract with the Respondent II covering partially the same period of time as the employment contract the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant signed with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 15. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs shall apply (cf. art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations). 16. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber decided to accept the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had breached the contract without just cause and rejected the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s claim. 17. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that given the facts of the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had obviously occurred within the applicable protected period. 18. The DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s new club, i.e. the Respondent II, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by the CAS. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach. In any event, the Chamber determined that it would attend to the question of the possible inducement to breach of contract by the Respondent II at a later stage of its deliberations, i.e. after having discussed the issue of the compensation due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 19. In this context, the Chamber lent emphasis on the primacy of the principle of the maintenance of contractual stability, which represents the backbone of the agreement between FIFA/UEFA and the European Commission signed in March 2001. This agreement and its pillars represent the core of the former (editions 2001, 2005 and 2008) as well as of the 2010 edition of the Regulations, which all stakeholders – including player and club representatives – agreed upon in 2001. 20. Above all, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by the above Regulations concerning in particular compensation for breach of contract without just cause serve as a deterrent aimed at discouraging the early termination of employment contracts by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent deciding authorities would represent an inappropriate example towards all the football actors. 21. In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party has proven to be an efficient means and has always found a widespread acceptance since it guarantees that the fundamental principle of the respect of the contracts is duly accounted for. 22. Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in art. 17 of the Regulations are applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players, signifying that both clubs and professionals who are seen to have committed a breach of contract without just cause will in all cases be subject to pay compensation and, under specific circumstances, also be subject to the imposition of sporting sanctions. 23. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party. 24. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the Respondent 1 / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. The members of the Chamber recalled the content of art. 7 of the contract which reads as follows: “This player’s contract is a final one; the parties are committed, starting from the football season 2010/2011, for purely formal reasons and in respect of the applicable Regulations of the Football Federation from country B, to fill out and subscribe all the contract-forms as predisposed by the Football Federation from country B, in conformity with the collective labour agreement. In case the player will not fulfil this contract, by signing an agreement with another club (except Club J) or not signing the contract form as predisposed by the Football Federation from country B or in any way causing him no to be actually transferred to Club A as stated above, he will have to pay to Club A a penalty of EUR 1,500,000”. 25. The members of the Chamber agreed that this clause is to the benefit of the club only, i.e. it is not reciprocal as it does not grant the same rights to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, and that, therefore, said clause cannot be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation. 26. In addition, the Chamber outlines the ambiguous wording of said clause and stresses that it is inserted in an article dealing with aspects related to the registration of the contract and never refers to the concept of compensation to be paid in case of “breach of contract”. As such, the last sentence rather refers to a “penalty” in case the player somehow prevents the contract from being registered. The Chamber thus considered that the above-mentioned article could not be considered as a clause by which both parties to the contract had agreed to the amount due in case of termination of the contract without just cause. 27. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years. 28. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant under the existing contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s). 29. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, signed on 1 August 2010, had been set to expire on 30 June 2015. Since the breach occurred on 7 July 2011, i.e. at the beginning of the 2011-12 season, the total value of his employment agreement with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the remaining contractual period of four seasons appeared to be composed of the amount of EUR 70,000 for the 2011-12 season, as well as the amount of EUR 240,000 for the seasons 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, for an aggregate amount of EUR 310,000. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II amounts to a total of EUR 858,000 (yearly lump sum payments and salaries) for the period from the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant until its contractual expiry, i.e. from July 2011 to 30 June 2015. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant respectively with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent II over the relevant period amounted to EUR 584,000. 30. Having stated the above, the DRC recalled that the remuneration paid by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s new club(s) is particularly relevant insofar as it reflects the value attributed to his services by his new club at the moment the breach of contract occurs and possibly also provides an indication towards the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s market value at that time. In this regard, the DRC took due note that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant appeared to have increased his income considerably by concluding an employment contract with the Respondent II. 31. The members of the Chamber then turned to the further essential criterion relating to the fees and expenses paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the acquisition of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s services insofar as these have not been amortised over the term of the relevant contract. The Chamber recalled that a transfer compensation of EUR 629,000 EUR had been paid by Claimant / Counter-Respondent to the club from country G, Club H, for the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant‘s transfer, documentation of which has been presented by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. According to article 17 par.1 of the Regulations, this amount shall be amortised over the term of the relevant employment contract. As stated above, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for four further years of contract when he terminated the relevant employment contract, which was signed by the parties with a view to remain contractually bound for a total period of five seasons. As a result of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s breach of contract in July 2011, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent has thus been prevented from amortising the amount of EUR 503,200, i.e. 4/5 of EUR 629,000, relating to the transfer compensation that it paid in order to acquire the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s services, which the club spent with the intention to benefit from the player’s services for the period of time that would then be established by means of the contract of employment. 32. The Chamber then turned its attention to the agent fees that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent alleged had incurred in connection with the signing of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. In this regard, the members of the Chamber pointed out that according to article 17 par. 1 of the Regulations agent fees may be included as one of the criteria to be taken into account in the calculation of compensation. However, since the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not provide any evidence that agent fees were actually paid, the DRC referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and held that such fees had not to be included. 33. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant must pay the amount of EUR 1,087,200 to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation. 34. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period. 35. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not provide for a possibility to the deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances. 36. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the breach of contract by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had occurred during the applicable protected period. In this respect, the members of the Chamber outlined the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s bad faith for having behaved as if he was free of any employment contract in spite of having acknowledged on various occasions the existence of the contract, and in particular by means of the document signed on 19 August 2010 (cf. point I.9). Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches. 37. Finally, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question of whether, in view of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s new club, i.e. the Respondent II, must be considered to have induced the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to unilaterally terminate his contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent without just cause during the protected period, and therefore shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods. 38. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with the aforementioned provision, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional player who has terminated his previous contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach. 39. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber pointed out that the Respondent II recognised having been informed by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant that the latter had concluded a “pre-contract” with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 1 August 2010 and was therefore aware of the existence of a contractual relationship. In addition, the DRC noted that the Respondent II considered having been diligent enough in requesting the Football Federation from country F to contact the Football Federation from country B in order to ask whether the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still contractually bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. In this regard, the members of the Chamber first of all emphasised that the request expressly mentioned the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s loan to Club J. Moreover, the Chamber stressed that the Football Federation from country B’s response did not answer the Football Federation from country F’s specific question since the response referred to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s absence of registration and not to the existence or not of an employment contract between the club and the player concerned. Therefore, the DRC concluded that the Respondent II, prior to signing the contract with the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant had not taken the necessary measures in order to establish whether or not the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still contractually bound to the club from country B. What is more, by acting as stated above, the DRC deemed that the Respondent II did not exercise sufficient diligence in attempting to inform itself as to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s contractual situation and, consequently, as to whether it could lawfully enter into an employment relationship with the former. Finally, the members of the Chamber wished to point out that in spite of having been informed by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 8 July 2011 of the existence of a contract between the latter and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, i.e. one day after the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II signed their contract, the Respondent II disregarded this information and went ahead with the process for the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s registration. 40. In light of the aforementioned and given that Respondent II did not provide any specific or plausible explanation as to its possible non-involvement in the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s decision to unilaterally terminate his employment contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the DRC had no option other than to conclude that the Respondent II had not been able to reverse the presumption contained in art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations and that, accordingly, the latter had induced the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant to unilaterally terminate his employment contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 41. In view of the above, the Chamber decided that in accordance with art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent II shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. On account thereof, in accordance with the fourth sentence of art. 17 par. 4, the club shall be able to register new players, either nationally or internationally, only as of the next registration period following the complete serving of the relevant sporting sanction. 42. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is partially accepted and that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant has to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent EUR 1,087,200 as compensation for the unilateral termination of the contract without just cause during the protected period. In this respect, the DRC also determined that the Respondent II is jointly and severally responsible for the payment of the above-mentioned amount of compensation to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 43. Furthermore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant shall be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches. 44. And finally, the Chamber established that the Respondent II shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. 45. Moreover, the Chamber rejected the claims of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant as well as the Respondent II pertaining to legal expenses and procedural costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 46. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is partially accepted. 2. The counterclaim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is rejected. 3. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is ordered to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 1,087,200. 4. The Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation. 5. If the aforementioned amount is not paid within the above-mentioned time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 7. A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and international championships for clubs. 8. The Respondent II shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. 9. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent are rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives