F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 August 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Philippe Diallo (France), member Guillermo Saltos Guale (Ecuador), member Jon Newman (USA), member Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player G, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club X, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 August 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Philippe Diallo (France), member Guillermo Saltos Guale (Ecuador), member Jon Newman (USA), member Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player G, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club X, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 5 January 2009, Player G, from country A (hereinafter: player or Claimant), and Club X, from country G (hereinafter: club or Respondent), signed a “professional player’s contract” (hereinafter: contract) valid as from the date of signature until 31 December 2011. Furthermore, on the same date, the parties signed a “contract annex” (hereinafter: annex) which makes reference to the contract. 2. On 2 January 2009, the parties signed a “private contract” (hereinafter: private agreement) valid as from the date of signature until 31 December 2011. 3. Both the private agreement and the annex stipulate that the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, a bonus of EUR 10,000 if he participates in 50% of the club’s official matches, an additional bonus of EUR 10,000 if he participates in 60% of the official matches and an additional bonus of EUR 20,000 if he participates in 70% of the official matches. 4. On 5 April 2012, the player lodged a complaint before FIFA against the club claiming two outstanding bonus payments in the total amount of EUR 30,000 for the participation in official matches in the 2010/2011 season, as per the annex to the contract. In particular, the player makes reference to the bonuses due for taking part in 60% and 70% of the matches. The player stated that he participated in all the relevant matches until 3 April 2011, date on which he got injured. According to the player, in case of an injury his participation should be considered as if he had not been injured. 5. In its reply to the claim, the club stated that FIFA has no jurisdiction to decide on the present dispute. The club referred to clause 10 of the contract, which states that all disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance, and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance. Furthermore, the club argued that if the player had thought that the aforementioned bodies do not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, he should have supported his allegation with evidence. 6. As to the merits, the club alleged that on 10 May 2011, the player signed a declaration by means of which he confirmed that he had received the participation bonuses for the 2010/2011 season. In addition, the club pointed out that the player had not participated in more than 70% of the official matches. According to the club, the player missed a lot of matches. Moreover, the club added that there were only two matches remaining as from the moment the player stopped playing, 3 April 2011, until the end of the season. In this regard, the club held that the claim should be rejected. 7. On 16 July 2013, the player amended his claim. As regards FIFA’s competence, the player argued that his claim was clearly based on the “private agreement” of “25.01.2007”, which does not contain a jurisdiction clause. Finally, the player held that a procedure in country G is not reasonable, since he has been living in country U for over a year, and since country G arbitral deciding bodies only deal with form contracts issued by the country G football league. 8. Upon FIFA’s request to provide documentary evidence for the competence of the PEEOD and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation, the club sent a copy of the “Codified Statutes” of the country G Football Federation (edition 2009; hereinafter: country G Football Federation Statues) and referred in particular to art. 41 and appendix F concerning the composition of the country G Football Federation organs and committees. The club also provided certain extracts of the “country G Football Federation’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players” (no edition indicated; hereinafter: country G Football Federation Regulations). The club referred in particular to art. 20, 22, 23 and 24 of the country G Football Federation Regulations concerning the jurisdiction of the country G Football Federation committees. The club stated that FIFA’s requirements for a national DRC are met, since fair proceedings are guaranteed and the principle of equal representation of players and clubs are respected. Finally, the club pointed out that the parties had agreed on a jurisdiction clause, according to which the aforementioned country G deciding bodies would be competent in case of a dispute. The club argued that, consequently, the country G deciding bodies would even be competent if FIFA’s requirements were not fulfilled. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 April 2012. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between an country A player and a country G club. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 10 of the contract, according to which all disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance, and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance (hereinafter: jurisdiction clause). 4. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. The Chamber noted that the Claimant, by means of his submission dated 16 July 2013, argued that his claim was based on the “private agreement” of “25.01.2007”, which does not include a jurisdiction clause. 5. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. While analysing whether it was competent to decide on the matter, the Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. In this regard, the Chamber referred to the private agreement concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent on 2 January 2009, the basis on which the Claimant requests his claims. The Chamber established that the private agreement did not include any jurisdiction clause in favour of a national deciding body, which could potentially exclude FIFA’s jurisdiction. 7. Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding that a national deciding body was competent. 8. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 9. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010, 2012 and 2014), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 5 April 2012, the 2010 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 10. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 11. Having established the above, the Chamber unanimously stated that first and foremost, it is crucial to clarify the date of the submission of the petition to FIFA, in order to establish whether the claim was brought to FIFA in due time. In this context, the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations, which, in completion to the general procedural terms outlined in the Procedural Rules, clearly establishes that the decision-making bodies of FIFA shall not hear any dispute if more than two years have elapsed since the event giving rise to the dispute arose and that the application of this time limit shall be examined ex officio in each individual case. 12. In this context, the DRC duly noted that the Claimant claims outstanding bonus payments, as per the private agreement, for the participation in matches in the 2010/2011 season, in particular, until 3 April 2011, date on which he got injured. The Chamber went on to analyse the content of the contract, the annex and the private agreement and noted that, although the annex and the private agreement acknowledge the entitlement of the Claimant to certain bonus payments, none of them specify when the payments of such bonuses were due. 13. Thus, the DRC established that the payment of a bonus for the participation in a certain percentage of matches would generally – in the absence of a relevant contractual clause – be due upon the player’s last participation with a club or upon the club’s last official match of the relevant season, at the latest. In this respect, the Chamber noted that according to the Claimant, he played his last match in the 2010/2011 season on 3 April 2011. Moreover, the DRC stated that even if it deemed the bonus payment to fall due upon the last match of the club in the relevant season, the bonus would have become due before 30 June 2011 in the case at hand, the date on which the 2010/2011 season in country G expired. 14. In continuation, the DRC noted that the player’s initial claim, whose petitions were based on the annex to the contract, was lodged in front of FIFA on 5 April 2012. Furthermore, the Chamber took note of the Claimant’s submission to FIFA dated 16 July 2013, by means of which he amended his initial claim and specified that he wished to base his petitions on the “private agreement”. 15. In this regard, the Chamber established that – in the light of the wording and the grammatical interpretation of the submission dated 16 July 2013 – the Claimant changed the contractual basis of his claim and, by means of such aforementioned submission, founded his claim on the private agreement. 16. In conclusion, the Chamber concurred that the Claimant’s claim on the basis of the private agreement was lodged in front of FIFA on 16 July 2013, while the event giving rise to the dispute arose before 30 June 2011, i.e. the date on which the 2010/2011 season in country G expired and the payment of match bonuses would have become due at the latest. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant had brought his claim against the Respondent after the aforementioned two-year period of time (cf. point II./11. above) had elapsed. 17. In view of all the above, the Chamber found that the Claimant’s claim for the payment of bonuses must be declared barred by the statute of limitations in application of art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber The claim of the Claimant, Player G, is inadmissible. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Enclosed: CAS directives