F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 16 October 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member Todd Durbin (USA), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 16 October 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member Todd Durbin (USA), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 21 June 2012, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2014. 2. According to said contract, the Claimant was entitled to the following remuneration: - 2012-2013 season: monthly salary of EUR 10,000 net payable by the 15th day of the month following the month for which such remuneration is due; - 2013-2014 season: monthly salary of EUR 12,000 net payable by the 15th day of the month following the month for which such remuneration is due. 3. The contract also provides for the following benefits: - accommodation allowance of EUR 250 per month; - six round air tickets country D – country B – country D per season at a maximum price of EUR 1,500 per ticket, for the claimant, his wife and one child; - car renting allowance of EUR 350 per month. 4. Additionally, clause I.1.2 of the contract states the following: “working time – accumulated reporting of working hours based on a 5-days workweek”. 5. Besides, clause I.1.3 provides that “this Contract is made pursuant to the labor and social security laws and regulations of country D, the applicable regulations of the Football Federation from country D, the club bylaws and the requirements of FIFA and UEFA.” 6. According to clause IV.2.2, “the player shall compete in all Club’s matches and events, trainings – common and/or individual, in all activities that represent preparation for football games or competitions. The above provision shall also apply when the PLAYER is not included in the team for a certain game, either as a start player or a substitute.” 7. Furthermore, clause IX.1.4 contains a stipulation which reads as follows: “upon Player’s breach of its obligations hereunder, including any obligations set forth in the job description. The Contract shall be terminated with decision of the Court of Arbitration at the Football Federation from country D”. 8. In addition, clause X of the contract stipulates that “the Club and the Player shall observe the provisions of the Collective Labor Agreement and the Club’s internal Regulations, if any”. 9. In continuation, clause XII.2 provides that “any matter not governed by this Contract, shall be subject to the provisions of the applicable rules and regulations of the Football Federation from country D and the law in country D”. 10. Finally, clause XII.3 states that “any disputes between parties arisen in relation with the execution or interpretation of this Contract shall be settled amicably by written agreement between the parties, otherwise such dispute shall be referred to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”. 11. On 18 February 2013, the Respondent terminated the contract in writing and without prior notice. The termination by the Respondent was then ratified by the Football Federation from country D on 21 February 2013. 12. On 25 February 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, requesting: - EUR 19,428 as outstanding payments, composed of: • EUR 10,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 16 February 2013 until the date of effective payment, as salary for January 2012; • EUR 6,428, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 19 February 2013 until the date of effective payment, as pro rata temporis salary for the period of 1 February to 18 February 2013; • EUR 3,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 19 February 2013 until the date of effective payment, corresponding to the cost for two round air tickets since the Respondent had apparently only paid for 3 tickets of the 5 the Claimant had purchased until the date of the claim. - EUR 267,672, plus 5% interest as of 19 February 2013 until the date of effective payment, as compensation, composed of: • EUR 187,572 as residual value of the contract as of 19 February 2013; • EUR 4,000 as accommodation allowance as of 1 March 2013 until 30 June 2014; • EUR 5,600 as car renting allowance as of 1 March 2013 until 30 June 2014; • EUR 10,500 as costs for seven round air tickets; • EUR 60,000 as sporting and moral damage considering the specificity of sport. - Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent. Preliminary issue of competence of the DRC: 13. The Respondent contests the competence of FIFA to deal with the matter, asserting that the contract is governed by law in country D which allegedly provides for the exclusive competence of civil courts to deal with employment- related disputes. In this respect, the Respondent refers to articles 19.1 of the Civil Procedural Code in country D which stipulates that “The parties to a property dispute may agree that said dispute be settled by an arbitration court, unless the said dispute has as its subject matter (…) maintenance obligations or rights under an employment relationship”. The Respondent further relies on articles 360 of the Labour Code in country D which provides that the “Labor disputes shall be dealt with by courts. They shall be reviewed in compliance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, unless provided for to the contrary in this code (…)”. Accordingly, the Respondent concludes that clause XII.3 of the contract has to be interpreted restrictively, i.e. excluding disputes related to “nonobservance and termination of the employment agreement, establishment of the cause for termination of the employment agreement or assessing and awarding of compensations as legal consequence”, at risk of being deemed null and void. 14. In addition, the Respondent points out that it has lodged a claim which is pending before a District Court in country D and that therefore, in accordance with the principle of lis pendens, FIFA would not be competent. According to said claim, the Respondent requests the Court to confirm that: - “[the Respondent] does not owe to the professional football player compensation for unfair dismissal due to the termination of employment contract to the case if the dismissal has not been declared illegitimate by the competent court - [the player]’s filling of claim for compensation for dismissal resulted from illegitimate unilateral termination of the employment contract to the case with an arbitration body is inadmissible as the employment contract between [the Respondent] and [the player] has been concluded pursuant to the provisions of article 68, paragraph 1, section 1, and paragraph 4 of the applicable Labour Code in country D”. Upon FIFA’s request, the Respondent submitted a District Court’s statement from country D attesting that a procedure with Ref. No. XXXXX and aiming at annulling clause XII.3 of the contract is currently pending. 15. In his submission, the Claimant considers that the reference made to the application of law in country D in the contract is to be interpreted as an application of the substantive law, excluding the provision concerning the “conflict of law”. Accordingly, the country D provisions put forward by the Respondent are not applicable and the dispute does not fall under state jurisdiction. 16. Moreover, the Claimant states that the procedure pending before the country D District Court only aims at establishing that art. XII.3 of the contract would be null and void and therefore has a different object to the procedure before FIFA, which is why the principle of lis pendens is not applicable. He further highlights that the Respondent’s claim was lodged one month after he filed his claim before FIFA and that he was never formally notified of the proceedings. In this regard, the Claimant sustains that even though the courts in country D had jurisdiction, “the body to which the matter is referred to first [would be] competent to pass a decision in the substance of the matter”. 17. In continuation, the Claimant asserts that a Respondent’s claim in front of state courts has already been dismissed in appeal and that the current claim is actually a new one. 18. Finally, the Claimant also sustains that even if clause XII.3 was set aside by the courts in country D, FIFA would still be competent in accordance with article 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations). 19. In response, the Respondent asserts that the country D Regional Court dismissed without reviewing the merits its first claim because the latter wrongly understood that the Respondent wanted to “obtain a court decision that states that the player has no right of motion of claim as legally acknowledged right before it is exercised”. Nevertheless, the Respondent outlines that the court stated “even if an arbitration body would pass a decision on a labour dispute, regardless of its lack of jurisdiction, the respondent club may defend itself against it in the next stage of the proceedings, namely at the stage of recognition and enforcement of such arbitral decision on the territory of country D by a civil court”. Accordingly the Respondent concludes that should an award be rendered by an arbitration tribunal in the present matter, the latter would never be recognised in country D. 20. In view of the foregoing, the Respondent explains that it lodged a new claim “request[ing] from the country D Regional Court to declare the arbitration clause null and void”. Therefore, the Respondent requests FIFA to stand by until a decision is rendered by the country D ordinary courts. 21. Alternatively, the Respondent sustains that should the Dispute Resolution Chamber not rely on law in country D, the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation from country D should be competent. In this respect, the Respondent makes reference to article 1 par. 3 of the Statutes of the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation from country D (hereinafter: the Football Federation from country D Regulations) which states that said court is established as “a permanent and independent jurisdiction for resolution of disputes arisen in the system of the Football Federation from country D”. The Respondent further refers to article 4 par. 1 of the Football Federation from country D Regulations which reads as follows: “The Court of Arbitration hears and resolves disputes between: Football clubs and players or coaches – related to fulfillment, non-fulfillment or termination of contracts; reasons, type and amount of compensation for terminated or non-fulfilled contracts; existence, modification or termination of sports rights; existence, modification or termination of license contracts of coaches”. 22. As to the competence of the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation from country D, the Claimant outlines that it is subordinated to the Football Federation from country D and therefore lacks independence and impartiality. Additionally, the Claimant maintains that the parties clearly agreed by means of clause XII.3 of the contract to submit their contractual disputes to FIFA, the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation from country D’s competence being limited to acknowledge the termination of the contract. Substance of the matter: 23. In its claim, the Claimant asserts that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause. In fact, the Claimant maintains that the Respondent breached the contract in several ways. According to the Claimant, the Respondent failed to pay his salary for January 2013, due on 15 February 2013. Moreover, the Claimant sustains that the Respondent imposed a 6-day working week on him, deprived him from professional training conditions and obliged him to train alone even though he was not injured. This, in violation of the employment contract. 24. The Claimant further states that the termination was based on the Respondent’s dissatisfaction with his performance and the latter’s will to allocate a spot as non-EU player to a Player from country E instead of him. 25. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent first of all addresses the issue of applicable law. In this regard, the Respondent refers to article 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) as well as to clause XII.2 of the contract and concludes that the law in country D, in particular the labour law in country D, has to apply to the case. In this respect, the Respondent makes reference to article 10 par. 2 of the Labour Code in country D which stipulates that “This Code shall apply to the employment relationships (…) of foreign citizens on employment in country D, insofar as it is not provided otherwise in a law or in an international treaty, which is in force with respect to country D”. 26. In continuation, the Respondent points out that it imposed an individual training programme on the Claimant because the latter refused to take part in two pre-season games, which constitutes a breach of clause IV.2.2 of the contract. 27. Furthermore, the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s assertion that he was deprived from professional training conditions, emphasising that he was trained by licensed coaches at the Respondent’s facilities. In this regard, the Respondent stresses that the Claimant refused to comply with the individual training programme and therefore did not fulfil his contractual obligations. 28. The Respondent further sustains that the Claimant’s working time is in accordance with labour law in country D which allows an employee to have a 6-day working week provided that he is compensated with an additional resting period. 29. As to the alleged outstanding salary, the Respondent maintains that the amounts were made available at the Respondent’s accounting office but the Claimant intentionally refused to cash them in order to be able to raise a Respondent’s failure to comply with its obligations. 30. In light of the foregoing elements, the Respondent concludes that articles 186, 187 and 188 of the Labour Code in country D entitled it to terminate the contract with just cause. 31. Finally, the Respondent emphasises that according to the Labour Code in country D, the compensation for unfair dismissal is limited to six months gross remuneration. The Respondent also mentions that the accommodation and car renting allowances are not monetary obligations and therefore cannot be considered as an integral part of the monthly remuneration. 32. In its replica, the Claimant asserts that the Regulations should apply since the Respondent did not prove that the rules in country D invoked were of a mandatory nature according to Swiss law. 33. Moreover, the Claimant sustains that the obligation to train individually is contrary to the Collective Bargaining Agreement and was imposed as a disciplinary sanction in violation of his right to be duly informed. 34. In continuation, the Claimant explains that the reason why he did not take part in the friendly games was due to the fact that the head coach did not select him and not because of his alleged refusal. In this regard, the Claimant firmly contests the impartiality of the witness statements submitted by the Respondent. 35. The Claimant further asserts that the termination on the basis of his alleged refusal to take in part in the friendly games does not constitute a sufficient reason to terminate an employment contract according to Swiss law and that the Respondent waived its right to terminate the contract on this ground by waiting for three weeks. Finally, the Claimant maintains that he had already been subject to a disciplinary sanction for his alleged misconduct and thus the termination of the contract constitutes a violation of the principle ne bis in idem. 36. Furthermore, the Claimant states that the Respondent could have paid his salary for January 2013 by wire transfer to his account in country D as the Respondent had always done. 37. Additionally, the Claimant highlights that he was side-lined during an essential part of the preparation phase, which clearly evidences that the Respondent did not count on him for the second part of the season and wanted to release him. 38. In its duplica, the Respondent first of all repeats its previous arguments. Subsequently, the Respondent asserts that the Claimant was invited to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings but never exercised such rights. Additionally, the Respondent stresses that the obligation to train alone was not imposed as a disciplinary sanction. The Respondent further points out that the contract was terminated in accordance with the rules and deadlines provided by law in country D. 39. In addition, the Respondent recognises that the salary for the period as of 1 January 2013 until 18 February 2013 is outstanding but emphasises that this situation is only due to the Claimant’s refusal to collect it and provide the Respondent with a valid bank account. The Respondent then sustains that the requested costs relating to flight tickets cannot be included in the outstanding remuneration since the Claimant claims the reimbursement of tickets bought in June 2013, i.e. after the termination of the contract. 40. Having been requested to inform FIFA about his new contractual situation, the Claimant stated that on 1 July 2013, he signed a contract with Club F, valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2014, according to which he was entitled to receive EUR 40,000. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 25 February 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a player from country A and a club from country D regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies, alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the relevant employment contract is either the civil courts in country D or the Court of Arbitration of the Football Federation from country D (hereinafter: the NDRC of the Football Federation from country D). 5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the Respondent. 6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract. 8. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause. 9. In this respect, the Chamber stressed on the content of the provision contained in art. XII.3 of the contract which makes a clear reference to the FIFA DRC. Indeed, art. XII.3 stipulates that “any disputes between parties arisen in relation with the execution or interpretation of this Contract shall be settled amicably by written agreement between the parties, otherwise such dispute shall be referred to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber”. 10. On account of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. XII.3 of the contract and art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. The foregoing conclusion is even supported by the Respondent’s statements which itself does not seem to be aware which judicial organ is competent; either the civil courts in country D or the NDRC of the Football Federation from country D. 11. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012 and 2014), and considering that the claim in the present matter was lodged on 25 February 2013, the 2012 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 12. Furthermore, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. 13. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 14. In this respect, the DRC acknowledged that, on 21 June 2012, the parties concluded an employment contract, valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2014 and that the Respondent, unilaterally and without prior notice, terminated the employment contract with the Claimant on 18 February 2013, i.e. before the ordinary expiry of the employment contract. 15. In continuation, the members of the DRC took note of the fact that the Claimant considers that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause. On the other hand, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent claims to have had a just cause for the unilateral termination of the employment contract since the Claimant had refused to take part in two friendly games and to comply with the individual training programme imposed on him. 16. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract was breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 17. In this context, the DRC started by recalling that only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract without prior warning. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. A premature termination of an employment contract can always only be an ultima ratio. 18. In continuation, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the reasons put forward by the Respondent in order to justify the termination, i.e. the alleged Claimant’s refusal to take part in two friendly games and to follow an individual training programme. In doing so, the DRC observed that the Respondent submitted, in support of its assertions, various witness statements made by officials of its own organisation. In this regard, the Chamber deemed it fit to outline that the positions occupied by the witnesses put in doubt the impartiality of their statements and therefore, after making reference to art. 12 par. 3 and par. 6 of the Procedural rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and the evidence shall be considered with free discretion respectively, concluded that the Respondent did not satisfactorily carry the burden of proof regarding the Claimant’s misconduct. 19. Having failed to demonstrate that the Claimant’s obligation to train alone resulted from the latter’s misconduct, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of said side-lining. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the side-lining occurred for at least the period comprised between 3 February 2013 and 18 February 2013, i.e. the date of termination of the contract, as it can be inferred from the documentation provided by the parties in this regard. The indicated period forms part of what is considered to be a crucial phase of preparation for the second part of the season, during which all players are required to display their performance, in order to be able to undergo a selection by the club’s coach for the next season. 20. In view of the aforementioned fact, the DRC was of the opinion that the Claimant had founded reasons to believe that the Respondent was no longer interested in his services for the upcoming second part of the season. 21. Furthermore, the DRC deemed it important to highlight that it is uncontested that at the time of the termination, the salary for the month of January 2013 was outstanding. 22. On account of the above, and in particular considering the absence of prior warning, the outstanding remuneration as well as the Respondent’s incapacity to justify the Claimant’s side-lining, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent and, therefore, concluded that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 18 February 2013 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact without just cause. 23. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 24. First of all, the Chamber reverted to the Claimant’s financial claim, which includes outstanding salaries as well as outstanding flight tickets. In this regard, the Chamber emphasised the fact that it would only consider the amounts that have already fallen due at the date of termination, i.e. 18 February 2013. 25. At this stage, the DRC made reference to its previous considerations and recalled that at the time of the termination, the salary for January 2013 was outstanding. 26. Then, the Chamber turned its attention to the reimbursement of flight tickets claimed by the Claimant and pointed out that the latter failed to provide any documentary evidence that he actually incurred these costs. As a result, and after making reference to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the members of Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim in this regard. 27. Consequently, in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda and taking into account the fact that the employment contract was terminated on 18 February 2013, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 10,000 as outstanding remuneration corresponding to the salary relating to January 2013. 28. In addition, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 10,000 as of 16 February 2013. 29. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 30. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 31. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. 32. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract until 30 June 2014, taking into account that the player’s remuneration which had fallen due up until 18 February 2013 is included in the calculation of the outstanding remuneration. Therefore, the Chamber held that the remuneration due as of February 2013 until 30 June 2014 should be taken into consideration to figure out the amount due as a compensation for breach of contract. In view of the above, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 203,600 shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract 33. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 34. The Chamber noted that according to the Respondent’s declarations and the documentation submitted, on 1 July 2013, the Claimant concluded an employment contract with the club from country G, Club F, valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2014, according to which the Claimant was entitled to receive a total remuneration of EUR 40,000. 35. In accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 36. Furthermore, reverting to the Claimant’s petition regarding the flight tickets, on the basis of the information provided by FIFA Travel, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 3,600 for three air tickets country D-country B in order for the Claimant and his family to go home, as per the contract. 37. In view of all of the above, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 167,200 to the Claimant, which is considered by the DRC to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract. 38. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 25 February 2013, until the date of effective payment. 39. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim filed by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 10,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 16 February 2013 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract amounting to EUR 167,200 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 25 February 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned points 2. and 3. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives