F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 July 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, Country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, Country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 July 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, Country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, Country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 27 July 2014, the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), and the Player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed a document named “contract”, which established that the Respondent “present the contract to Player [the Claimant] … to play for Club C during the football season 2014/2015 with the following conditions”: - a total value of USD 200,000; - accommodation; and - two flight tickets. Moreover, the “contract” established that “This contract is valid for (seven) days from the date of issue. If the player agree with these conditions, please sign below as confirmation of acceptance.” 2. On 18 March 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, requesting the amount of USD 100,000 as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest as of 20 February 2015. The Claimant further requested the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent. 3. According to the Claimant, he received an offer in writing from the Respondent dated 27 July 2014 (cf. point I.1. above) which contained all the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, indicating the duration, the remuneration, the date and the signature of the Respondent as well as other benefits. The Claimant accepted the offer and signed said document. 4. Subsequently, the Respondent sent him a flight ticket to join the team in Country E on 6 August 2014 for the pre-season training which would last until 17 August 2014, date on which the team would return to Country D. 5. The Claimant further held that, after a few days, the Respondent allegedly informed him that he could not return with the team to Country D, since the club had already reached the quota for foreign players and would thus, not be able to register him. In this respect, the Claimant held that he tried to solve the situation with the Respondent, however without success, which is why he had no other alternative than to return to Country B. 6. In this regard, the Claimant stated that the Respondent already knew the maximum number of foreign players it would be allowed to register at the moment it signed the “contract” with him and thus, it had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract. 7. The Claimant further held that the Respondent had caused him damages, considering that he had rejected other offers from different clubs and, by the date of termination, most football seasons in other countries had already started. 8. In this context, the Claimant held that the only option for him was to accept an offer from a Club of Country F participating in the second division, Club G. In this respect, the Claimant submitted a copy of the employment contract signed with Club G, dated 19 August 2014, valid until 30 June 2016, establishing a global remuneration of EUR 11,033.75 for the first season. 9. The Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim, alleging that the Claimant never signed the “standard player’s contract” and was never registered as a player with the Respondent, considering that the “contract” was just “an offer to enter into a contract for the season 2014/2015”. 10. According to the Respondent, the Claimant was offered to the Respondent via an agent who allegedly requested the employment contract details, which document would be signed after the Claimant’s arrival in Country D, details that were sent by the Respondent and signed by the Claimant by means of the “contract”. The Respondent accepted having sent a flight ticket to the Claimant in order for him to join the team in Country E on 6 August 2014. 11. In this regard, the Respondent stated that, after having tested the Claimant’s skills, it concluded that the Claimant had not reached the level of a professional player, which conclusion was allegedly notified to him, and his flight ticket was rescheduled so he could return to his country on 14 August 2014. 12. In his replica, the Claimant insisted that the document signed on 27 July 2014, i.e. the “contract”, is a valid employment contract, containing all the necessary elements. Moreover, the Claimant highlighted that the Respondent admitted that he had joined the club in Country E. Finally, the Claimant argued that neither his alleged low performance nor the non-registration of the contract constitute a just cause to terminate the contractual relationship. 13. Although invited to provide its final comments, the Respondent failed to do so. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 March 2015. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2015; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of Country D. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 18 March 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this respect, the DRC took note that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent for breach of contract, alleging that the Respondent had unilaterally terminated the “contract” without just cause. 6. On the other hand, the members of the DRC noted that the Respondent alleged that there was no valid employment contract between the parties considering that the “contract” was only an offer to the Claimant of an employment contract to be signed in Country D. In addition, the Chamber took note that, according to the Respondent, no standard contract was ever signed between the parties or registered at the Football Association of Country D. 7. From the above facts, however, the members of the Chamber concluded that there does not seem to be any disagreement between the parties as to the fact that the Claimant had joined the Respondent for preseason activities in Country E. 8. The DRC determined that the fundamental disagreement between the Claimant and the Respondent – and the central issue to the present dispute – is whether the “contract” signed between the parties constitutes a valid and binding employment contract between the parties. 9. Consequently, the Chamber, first and foremost, focused its attention on the question as to whether a legally binding employment contract had in fact been concluded by and between the Claimant and the Respondent. 10. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should also contain all the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration. After a careful study of the “contract” presented by the Claimant, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent document, in particular, the fact that the contract establishes that the Claimant is entitled to receive a total remuneration of USD 200,000, accommodation and flight tickets in exchange for his services to the club as a player during the 2014/15 football season. 11. In addition, the members of the DRC agreed that the Respondent’s argument with respect to the alleged requirement of the conclusion of a “standard contract” in order for the employment contract to be considered valid cannot be sustained. 12. The Chamber then reverted to the argument of the Respondent relating to the fact that the Claimant was never registered with the Respondent. 13. In this regard, bearing in mind art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Chamber considered relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no influence. For these reasons, the members of the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s arguments in this regard. 14. On account of all of the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that by having signed the “contract” a valid and legally binding employment contract had been entered into by and between the Claimant and the Respondent on 27 July 2014. 15. Having established that a valid and legally binding employment contract had been in force between the Claimant and the Respondent, the Chamber went on to analyse as to whether such contract had been breached and, in the affirmative, which party is to be held liable for breach of contract. 16. To this end, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that, given that the Respondent did not contest that it had not performed any of its obligations under the employment contract and that, in fact, it merely disputed the legal validity of such contract, the conclusion that a valid and legally binding employment contract had been entered into unavoidably leads to the conclusion that such contract was breached by the Respondent. Indeed, the Chamber took into account that, according to the Claimant, he was informed by the Respondent that he could not go to Country D with the team, since the Respondent had reached its foreign player quota and would not be able to register him. The Respondent, for its part, has not contested these allegations of the Claimant. 17. On account of the above circumstances, the Chamber established that the Respondent had obviously no longer been interested in the Claimant’s services by sustaining that no valid employment contract existed between the parties and informing the Claimant to return to Country B. On account of all of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent had refused to accept the Claimant’s services without any valid reason. Such conduct constitutes, in the Chamber’s view, a clear breach of contract without just cause. Accordingly, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause. 18. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract. 19. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 20. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 21. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the contract for the season 2014/2015 and concluded that the Claimant would have received in total USD 200,000 had the contract been executed until its expiry date. 22. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 23. The Chamber noted that, on 19 August 2014, the Claimant had signed an employment contract with Club G valid until 30 June 2016, establishing a global remuneration of EUR 11,033.75 for the season 2014/2015, enabling him to earn an income of approximately USD 13,000 during said period of time. 24. The Chamber also considered important to point out that, although the employment contract was fully valid and enforceable, the execution of the contract had never started since the Respondent had refused to accept the Claimant’s services. 25. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of USD 65,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. 26. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 18 March 2015, until the date of effective payment. 27. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of USD 65,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 18 March 2015 until the date of effective payment. 3. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives