F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the matter between the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the club, Club C, country D as Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country F, as Counter-Respondent II and the club, Club G, country F, as intervening party regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the matter between the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the club, Club C, country D as Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country F, as Counter-Respondent II and the club, Club G, country F, as intervening party regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 25 August 2011, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the player or the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I), born on 21 June 1984, and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: Club C or the Respondent / Counter-Claimant) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2016. 2. According to the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I was entitled to receive an annual remuneration of EUR 445,000, broken down as follows: - EUR 145,000 net as salary payable in ten equal monthly instalments; - EUR 300,000 net as signing fee payable in four equal instalments on 31 October, 31 December, 31 March and 15 June of the respective seasons (4 x EUR 75,000). 3. On 30 August 2012, the parties signed another contract (hereinafter: the amendment) valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2016. Although the remuneration remained the same as in the contract, the parties decided to include the following additional clause 5: “Si el JUGADOR rescinde unilateralmente el presente contrato, para firmar para otra club o public limited sports company, sin cause imputable al [CLUB], por medio de cualquier legislación, laboral o federativa vigente, EL JUGADOR y su nuevo club, serán responsables directos y subsidiarios, respectivamente del abono de una indemnización a favor [del CLUB] de QUINCE MILLONES DE EUROS (15.000.000.-), a tal efecto EL JUGADOR se compromete a manifestar expresamente esta cláusula a cualquier club o public limited sports company, que estuviera interesado en contratar sus servicios” (free translation: Should [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I] terminate the present contract in order to sign with another club or public limited sports company, without just cause, in accordance with any labour or federative law in force, [the Claimant / CounterRespondent I], directly, and his new club, subsidiarily, will be liable to pay a compensation amounting to EUR 15,000,000 to [the Respondent / CounterClaimant]. In this regard, [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I] undertakes to inform every club interested in signing a contract with him of the content of said clause). 4. On 20 September 2012, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the company Company H, domiciled in the country I, (hereinafter: the company) concluded a “Contrato de Asesoramiento Deportivo” (hereinafter: the scouting agreement), valid for five seasons until 30 June 2016, by means of which the company undertook to scout the European football market on behalf of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 5. Pursuant to the scouting agreement, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant undertook to pay to the company the following amounts: - 2011-12 season: EUR 417,000, broken down as follows: o EUR 382,000 payable in four equal instalments on 15 October 2011, 15 December 2011, 15 March 2012 and 15 June 2012; o EUR 35,000 payable on 1 July 2012. - Following seasons: EUR 426,250, broken down as follows: o EUR 44,250 payable on 15 September of the respective season; o EUR 382,000 payable in four equal instalments on 15 October, 15 December, 15 March and 15 June of the respective season. 6. Art. 5 of the scouting agreement provides that “ambas partes acuerdan someter cualquier controversia derivada de la interpretación de este contrato al Tribunal de Arbitraje Deportivo (TAS), con sede en Lausana (Suiza)” (free translation: both parties agree to submit any dispute arising out of the interpretation of said agreement to the Court of Abritation for Sport (CAS), in Lausanne (Switzerland)). 7. In addition, the scouting agreement states that “el presente contrato anula y sustituye el anterior firmado con fecha 24 de Agosto de 2.011, siendo el único con validez” (free translation: the present contract cancels and replaces the former one signed on 24 August 2011, being the only valid one). 8. On 3 February 2014, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant concluded an agreement by means of which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I “presta su total y absoluta conformidad a la anulación de todos y cada uno de los compromisos económicos concertados con [el club] para la temporada 2.013-2.014, reflejados en contrato de trabajo de jugador y declara expresamente no tener cantidad alguna pendiente de percibir para la temporada 2013/2014, otorgando finiquito de la forma más amplia que en derecho se requiere, y por todos los conceptos, a favor del [club] dando por extinguidas las relaciones laborales y económicas entre las partes, para la temporada 2013/2014” (free translation: [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I] fully agrees on the cancellation of the financial obligations agreed with [the Respondent / CounterClaimant] for the 2013-14 season in the employment contract, and expressly states that there is no outstanding amount for the 2013-14 season, granting therefore the broadest acquittance, and for any concept, in favour of [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] and extinguishing the labour and economic relationships between the parties for the 2013-14 season). 9. On the same day, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club from country F, Club G (hereinafter: Club G) concluded an agreement (hereinafter: the loan agreement), free of charge, for the loan of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I until 30 June 2014. The Spanish version of the loan agreement specifies that “el CLUB TURCO deberá hacerse cargo del sueldo del JUGADOR para la temporada deportiva 2013-14, de acuerdo al contrato official entre el CLUB TURCO y EL JUGADOR a parte estipulado” (free translation: the club from country F undertakes to pay [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I]’s salary for the 2013-14 season, in accordance with the separate contract concluded between the club from country F and [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I]) while the English one only stipulates that “the club from country F takes the responsibility to reach an agreement with the [Claimant / Counter-Respondent I] and to undersign with him a separate employment contract for the football season 2013/2014”. 10. On 4 July, 8 July and 16 July 2014, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant extended the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s holidays, eventually granting him an extension until 23 July 2014. 11. By a letter dated 28 July 2014, apparently received on 31 July 2014, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, making reference to his outstanding remuneration corresponding to his signing fee due on 31 December 2013 as well as three instalments due in accordance with the scouting agreement, terminated his contract. 12. On 5 August 2014, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for breach of contract requesting to be awarded with the amount of EUR 2,104,000, broken down as follows: - EUR 361,500 as outstanding remuneration: o EUR 75,000 corresponding to his signing fee due on 31 December 2013; o EUR 286,500 corresponding to three instalments due in accordance with the scouting agreement; - EUR 1,742,500 as compensation: o EUR 890,000 as residual value of the contract; o EUR 852,500 as residual value of the scouting agreement. 13. In his claim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I asserts that as of October 2013, and due to financial difficulties to pay his remuneration, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant informed him that it would stop paying him until he left the club. According to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, in January 2014, the signing fee due on 31 December 2013 as well as two instalments due in accordance with the scouting agreement, payable on 15 October and 15 December 2013, were outstanding. Regarding said outstanding amounts due in accordance with the scouting agreement, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I explains that on 31 January 2014, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant undertook to pay the company an amount of EUR 115,500 by 15 April 2014 as final settlement for the 2013-14 season. Nevertheless, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I points out that since the Respondent / Counter-Claimant failed to comply with its obligations by 15 April 2014, the settlement agreement became null and void and therefore an amount of EUR 361,500 was outstanding (cf. point 12 above). In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I underlines that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant prevented him from resuming trainings by extending his holidays, side-lined him from the professional team and refused to meet his agent in order to discuss the issue. In light of the foregoing, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I concludes that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was no longer interested in his services and thus that he had just cause to terminate the contract. 14. On 13 August 2014, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contacted Club E (hereinafter: Club E or the Counter-Respondent II) requesting the latter not to conduct negotiations with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I without its consent. 15. On 16 August 2014, the Counter-Respondent II replied to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s correspondence affirming that it had never been interested in the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I. 16. On 10 September 2014, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant replied to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s claim and lodged a counterclaim against him for breach of contract and the Counter-Respondent II for inducement to the breach, requesting: - EUR 15,000,000 as compensation as per the additional clause 5 of the second contract; - Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Counter-Respondent II. 17. In its submission, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant first of all asserts that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I terminated the contract in violation of Swiss law insofar as he did not put it previously in default. 18. In continuation, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asserts that the scouting agreement cannot be deemed as part of the employment relationship. In support of its assertions, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant outlines that the parties to the contract and to the scouting agreement, their dates as well as their objects are different. In addition, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant underlines that the scouting agreement does not make any reference to the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the latter failed to provide a power of attorney authorising him or his agent to act on behalf of the company before FIFA. In this regard, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant adds that in case there would be a simulation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I could not claim the lifting of veil in virtue of the principle “venire contra factum proprium”. Finally, the Respondent / CounterClaimant points out that the scouting agreement contains a jurisdiction clause in favour of CAS. In view of the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant concludes that FIFA does not have jurisdiction to deal with said scouting agreement. Subsidiarily, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant sustains that it complied with all the obligations it had towards the company. 19. Having stated the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant refers to the agreement concluded on 3 February 2014 by means of which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I acknowledged that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had no financial obligations towards him, as well as to the loan agreement according to which Club G undertook to pay the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s salary until 30 June 2014, and concludes that at the time of termination, no amount was outstanding. In view of the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asserts that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I had no just cause to terminate the contract and should therefore be held liable for the breach. 20. Moreover, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant emphasises that on 30 August 2012, the parties inserted a compensation clause in their contract. According to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, such clause constitutes a fundamental element of the contractual relationship and it should be therefore considered that the parties entered into a new employment contract. Accordingly, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asserts that this day should be taken into consideration in order to calculate the 2-year protected period and concludes that the breach occurred within the protected period. 21. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant stresses that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I was induced to breach his contract by the CounterRespondent II. In support of its assertion, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant underlines that the Counter-Respondent II made him undertake a medical examination in July 2014. In addition, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant explains that at the beginning of July 2014, an agent contacted it in order to make two transfer offers on behalf of the Counter-Respondent II; however, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant considered them insufficient and rejected them. Finally, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant highlights that the Claimant / CounterRespondent I declared that he had signed a pre-contract with the CounterRespondent II, the validity of which would depend on the exit of another player. 22. Regarding the calculation of the compensation, the Respondent / CounterClaimant sustains that should the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) deem the amount of EUR 15,000,000 disproportionate, it could not reduce it to less than EUR 4,500,000. In this regard, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant outlines that this amount corresponds to the transfer fee paid to Club J for the transfer of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and provided a copy of said transfer agreement. 23. In its response to the counterclaim, the Counter-Respondent II rejects the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s assertion alleging that if it had induced the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I to breach his contract, it would have signed an employment contract with him. In addition, the Counter-Respondent II outlines that since no employment contract was signed, the presumption stipulated in art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is not applicable. Consequently, it would be up to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to carry the burden of proof, which it failed to do. 24. For his part, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, in his response to the counterclaim, sustains that he put the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in default before terminating his contract by means of a SMS and an e-mail dated 7 July 2014. In said e-mail, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I explains that he will not attend the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s training sessions until the latter pays the amounts due to him since 15 April 2014. 25. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I asserts that since the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not comply with the agreement concluded with the company on 31 January 2014, he is entitled to raise the “exceptio non adimpleti contractus” in order to delay the execution of his own obligations arising from the agreement signed on 3 February 2014. 26. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I maintains that the contract and the scouting agreement are inseparable. First of all, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I outlines that the reference to the “relaciones laborales y económicas entre las partes” made in the agreement concluded on 3 February 2014 can only be explained by the parties’ will to refer both to the contract and the scouting agreement. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I states that the payments made by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to the company were addressed to him. He further highlights that the first scouting agreement was concluded on 24 August 2011, i.e. one day before the signature of the contract, and that both agreements have the same expiry date. Then, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I stresses that if the amount of his remuneration was only stipulated in the contract, it would mean that his average monthly salary would be less than EUR 40,000, which would be incoherent considering that he is an established player. Moreover, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I sustains that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant forced him to resort to the simulation and therefore, in accordance with the principle “nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans”, it should not be entitled to request the agreement to be disregarded. Finally, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I asserts that the jurisdiction clause in favour of CAS contained in the scouting agreement has to be disregarded since said agreement cannot be analysed regardless of the labour relationship of which it is part. In this regard, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I also adds that in any case the decisions rendered by FIFA can be appealed at CAS. 27. As far as the protected period is concerned, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I sustains that it cannot be considered that the parties signed a new employment contract on 30 August 2012 since they did not modify any essential elements of their contractual relationship. 28. Regarding the inducement of the Counter-Respondent II, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I outlines that he went for the first time to the Counter-Respondent II’s headquarters on 5 August 2014, i.e. after the termination of his contract. 29. Moreover, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I argues that the additional clause 5 of the amendment is illegal, alleging that the power of establishing the amount due as compensation rests with the DRC and not with the parties. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I underlines that the excessive amount of the clause dissuades any club interested in his services from signing him and consequently, can be assimilated to a ban from playing, whereas only disciplinary bodies can impose such a type of sanction. In this regard, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I insists on the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s behaviour, which, by constantly threatening these interested clubs to sue them in case they would sign a contract with him, violated art. 57 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code. In view of the above, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I claims to be awarded with an amount of EUR 100,000 as of the termination of the contract until the date of signature of a new employment contract. 30. Finally, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I stresses that the contract was terminated on 1 August 2014. 31. In its final comments, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant starts by reiterating its argument as to the alleged inducement of the Counter-Respondent II, adding in particular that when the second offer was made, the agent mentioned that in case the latter was refused, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I would terminate the contract. In addition, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant stresses that art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations may apply in case the alleged inducer encouraged the player to terminate the contract no matter the fact that a contract was actually signed subsequently. 32. In continuation, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant acknowledges having received the SMS and e-mail sent by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, but outlines that they cannot be considered as default notices since these messages only refer to “amounts that are due” without specifying them. 33. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant explains that if the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I considered the agreements signed on 31 January 2014 and 3 February 2014 null and void, it should have challenged their validity at that time. 34. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further repeats its arguments regarding the nature of the scouting agreement. In this regard, the Respondent / CounterClaimant emphasises that if there was a simulation, it would only be fiscally beneficial for the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I. In addition, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asserts that the company did not comply with the Tax law of country D and consequently, no payment could be made to it. 35. Finally, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant sustains that the amount set in the additional clause 5 is not excessive considering the transfer fee paid to Club J, i.e. EUR 4,500,000, the total value of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s contract, i.e. EUR 4,000,000 gross, the specificity of sport as well as the fact that the breach occurred during the protected period. 36. According to the information contained into the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 13 January 2015, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and Club G concluded an employment contract, valid as of the date of signature until 31 May 2016 and according to which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 76,000. 37. After the closure of the investigation, Club C asserted that Club G had induced the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I to breach the contract and therefore requested FIFA to imposed sporting sanctions on it on the basis of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations. 38. Having been invited to provide FIFA with its comments, Club G states that it has never contacted the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I while he was under contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. In this respect, Club G stresses that it signed an employment contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, at his initiative, six months after the latter had terminated the contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant due to outstanding remuneration. Finally, Club G outlines that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant identified the CounterRespondent II as the inducer. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 August 2014. Consequently, the 2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at stake (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations (edition 2015), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B, a club from country D and two clubs from country F. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 5 August 2014, the 2014 edition of said Regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. In continuation, with regard to the claimed payments in connection to the scouting agreement, the Chamber also had to verify whether, for formal reasons, it was competent to deal with this specific component or not. In fact it remains that this part of the claim could possibly not be considered due to the Chamber lacking competence to deal with disputes unrelated to employment matters. 5. As a general rule, if there are separate agreements, the DRC tends to consider the scouting agreement signed with a company as such and does not have the competence to deal with it. However, such conclusion might be different if specific elements of the separate agreement suggest that it was in fact meant to be part of the actual employment relationship. 6. In this regard, the members of the Chamber duly acknowledged that on 25 August 2011, and amended on 30 August 2012, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had concluded an employment contract valid as from 25 August 2011 until 30 June 2016, according to which the Respondent / Counter-Claimant undertook to pay an annual remuneration of EUR 445,000 to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I. Moreover, the Chamber took note that, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and a company named “Company H.”, i.e. the scouting agreement, had signed a “Contrato de Asesoramiento Deportivo”, by means of which the Respondent / Counter-Claimant undertook to pay the company an annual amount of EUR 426,250. 7. First, the Chamber emphasised that the “Contrato de Asesoramiento Deportivo” has as its object the scouting of the European Football market. In addition, the DRC noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is not a signing party to the scouting agreement. Finally, the members of the Chamber deemed it fit to stress that the scouting agreement does not make any reference to the employment contract concluded between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I failed to submit any documentary evidence regarding a possible link between the employment contract and the scouting agreement or between him and the company. 8. As a consequence, bearing in mind the above as well as art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations which stipulates that the Chamber is competent to hear employmentrelated disputes, the Chamber concluded that it lacked competence to deal with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s claim related to the scouting agreement. 9. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so it started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 10. The members of the Chamber recalled that on 25 August 2011, and then amended on 30 August 2012, the parties concluded an employment contract, valid as from 25 August 2011 until 30 June 2016 and that the Claimant / CounterRespondent I, unilaterally terminated said contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant on 31 July 2014, i.e. before the ordinary expiry of the employment contract, after having put the latter in default by e-mail on 7 July 2014. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the default notice makes reference to outstanding amounts but does not further specify said amounts. 11. In continuation, the members of the DRC took note of the fact that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant considers that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I terminated the employment contract without just cause after having been induced by the Counter-Respondent II. On the other hand, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I claims to have had a just cause for the unilateral termination of the employment contract since the Respondent / Counter-Claimant failed to pay him the amount of EUR 361,500, corresponding to the instalment of the signing fee due on 31 December 2013 plus three instalments due in accordance with the scouting agreement, prevented him from resuming trainings and side-lined him from the professional team. 12. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract was breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 13. In order to do so, the Chamber, first and foremost, recalled that, as previously stated, it had no competence to deal with the scouting agreement and that therefore, the allegedly outstanding amounts due in accordance with said agreement could not be taken into consideration in order to determine the possible Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s just cause to terminate the contract. 14. In continuation, the DRC outlined that on 3 February 2014 before going on loan with Club G for the rest of the 2013-14 season, the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant concluded an agreement by means of which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I (in free translation) “fully agrees on the cancellation of the financial obligations agreed with the [Respondent / Counter-Claimant] for the 2013-14 season in the employment contract, and expressly states that there is no outstanding amount for the 2013-14 season, granting therefore the broadest acquittance, and for any concept, in favour of the [Respondent / Counter-Claimant] and extinguishing the labour and economic relationships between the parties for the 2013-14 season”. 15. The members of the Chamber agreed that the aforementioned agreement signed by both the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Respondent / CounterClaimant unambiguously stipulates that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had no financial obligations in favour of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I for the 2013-14 season. In addition, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the Chamber deemed that the Claimant / CounterRespondent I had not presented any documentation, which would demonstrate the nullity or the unenforceability of said agreement. 16. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant / CounterRespondent I waived all his financial rights against the Respondent / Counter- Claimant for the 2013-2014 season and that, therefore, no amount was outstanding on the date of termination of the contract, i.e. on 31 July 2014. 17. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber deemed it important to stress on the incoherence of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, who, on the one hand, sent an e-mail on 7 July 2014 to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant informing it that he would not attend the training sessions until he receives his monies and then, on the other hand, asserts that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant prevented him from resuming trainings. 18. On account of the above considerations, the members of the Chamber established that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment contract on 31 July 2014 and that, consequently, he is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact without just cause. 19. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber decided to accept the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I had breached the contract without just cause and rejected the Claimant / CounterRespondent I’s claim. 20. Having established that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract as of 31 July 2014, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is liable to pay compensation to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous content of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s new club, i.e. Club G, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by the CAS. 21. Taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party. 22. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. The members of the Chamber recalled the content of the additional clause 5 of the contract, included on 30 August 2012, which provides, that (in free translation) “should the [Claimant / CounterRespondent I] terminate the present contract in order to sign with another club or public limited sports company, without just cause, in accordance with any labour or federative law in force, the [Claimant / Counter-Respondent I], directly, and his new club, subsidiarily, will be liable to pay a compensation amounting to EUR 15,000,000 to the club. In this regard, the [Claimant / Counter-Respondent I] undertakes to inform every club interested in signing a contract with him of the content of said clause”. 23. In this respect the members of the Chamber agreed that this clause is to the benefit of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant only, as it does not grant the same rights to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, and that, therefore, said clause cannot be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation. 24. In addition, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber emphasised that should it have been considered valid, quod non, the clause sets an amount to be paid in case of breach of contract by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I which is clearly disproportionate considering the remaining period of the contract and the Claimant’s annual salary. 25. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years. 26. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant / CounterRespondent I under the existing contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s). 27. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant provided for an average monthly salary of EUR 37,000. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant I / Counter-Respondent is entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 76,000 according to the contract signed with Club G, i.e. the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s new club. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, and considering the remaining period of validity of the contract concluded between the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, i.e. 23 months, the Chamber concluded that the average remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I respectively with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and Club G over the relevant period, amounted to EUR 1,300,000. 28. The members of the Chamber then turned to the further essential criterion relating to the fees and expenses paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for the acquisition of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s services insofar as these have not been amortised over the term of the relevant contract. The Chamber recalled that a transfer compensation of EUR 4,500,000 had been paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to the club from country K, Club J for the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I‘s transfer, documentation of which has been presented by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. According to article 17 par.1 of the Regulations, this amount shall be amortised over the term of the relevant employment contract. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent I was still bound to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for two further years of contract when he terminated the relevant employment contract, which was signed by the parties with a view to remain contractually bound for a total period of five seasons. As a result of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I’s breach of contract in July 2014, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant has thus been prevented from amortising the amount of EUR 1,800,000, i.e. 2/5 of EUR 4,500,000, relating to the transfer compensation that it paid in order to acquire the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s services, which the club spent with the intention to benefit from the player’s services for the period of time that would then be established by means of the contract of employment. 29. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I must pay the amount of EUR 3,100,000 to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, Club G is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation (cf. point II.20 above). 30. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber finally analysed whether the breach of contract by the Respondent I had occurred within the protected period. In this regard, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. Having stated the following, the DRC recalled its longstanding jurisprudence according to which the protected period starts again when, while renewing the contract, the previous contract is extended and pointed out that the contract concluded on 30 August 2012, merely added an (invalid) compensation clause without modifying the duration or the remuneration payable to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I. Therefore, the members of the Chamber concurred that 25 August 2011 was the date to be deemed as starting point of the protected period. In view of the above, and considering that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I was 27 when he signed the contract and that the breach occurred on 31 July 2014, the Chamber held that the breach occurred after the expiry of the third season and thus, outside the protected period. Consequently, the DRC concluded that no sporting sanctions could be imposed on the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, on the CounterRespondent II and on Club G. 31. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is partially accepted and that the Claimant / CounterRespondent I has to pay to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant EUR 3,100,000. 32. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Respondent / CounterClaimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, Player A, is rejected. 2. The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, is partially accepted. 3. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is ordered to pay to the Respondent / CounterClaimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 3,100,000. 4. The intervening party, Club G, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation. 5. In the event that the amount due to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned point 3 is not paid within the abovementioned time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.. 6. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant is directed to inform the Claimant / CounterRespondent I and the intervening party, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 7. Any further claim lodged by Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman John Bramhall (England), member Jon Newman (USA), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the matter involving the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the club, Club C, country D, as Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country F as Intervening party regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts 1. On 1 July 2013, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent), and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2015. 2. The contract specifies inter alia that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to the following fixed remuneration:  USD 32,000 as sign-on fee;  USD 192,000 due on 15 July 2013;  USD 62,500 as monthly salary. 3. Pursuant to article 5 of the contract, “the first party [the Respondent / CounterClaimant] shall pay for the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] amount of (100.000 only one thousand) as housing allowance (FOR EACH SEASON)”. 4. Article 6 stipulates that “the first party [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] shall provide the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] a suitable means of transport (another country makes 7 seats) to be handled to the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] by official receipt from the first party [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] and the car will be under his custody till the expiry or termination of this contract. The second party [the Claimant / CounterRespondent] shall solely bear the payment of all the fines and damages on the car”. 5. Article 7 of the contract provides that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant shall “provide air tickets to travel business class to the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] and his wife and three of his Daughters when attending to start work contract (Country B-Country D-Country B)”. 6. As per article 8 of the contract, “the first party [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] shall provide the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] with the suitable environment and training. The first party [the Respondent / CounterClaimant] shall provide the second party [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] with trainers and the technical and administrative bodies that assist the player on training and developing his technical and physical skills”. 7. On 16 October 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in writing. 8. On 17 October 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for breach of contract, requesting the payment of the following amounts:  USD 125,000 as unpaid salaries for August and September 2013, plus 5% interest p.a. as of the date of claim.  “USD 1,262,500” as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract, plus 5% interest p.a. as of the date of claim, corresponding to: - USD 562,500 as salary from October 2013 to June 2014; - USD 750,000 as salary from July 2014 to June 2015. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent also requests the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 9. Prior thereto, by means of a correspondence dated 7 October 2013, sent by fax on the same date, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent put the Respondent / CounterClaimant in default, claiming the following: - the payment of the relevant outstanding amount by no later than 10 October 2013; - to be provided with a car as stipulated in article 6 of the contract within the above-mentioned deadline; - to immediately allow him to return to the sporting activities with the professional team. 10. According to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the Respondent / CounterClaimant prevented him from participating in the professional team’s sporting activities without any valid reason and in breach of article 8 of the contract. In particular, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent alleges that he was excluded from training with the “A professional team” and was told to train twice a day on his own and at a different location and time from his teammates. In this regard, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent provided a document named “Training Program”, which he allegedly received from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, listing the training dates with the timetable and the location from 30 September to 7 October 2013. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further alleges that he was excluded from taking part in a friendly match of the “A professional team” on 13 October 2013 and was told that he was not part of the team anymore. The Claimant / CounterRespondent provided a document allegedly taken from the official website of the Pro League Committee listing of country D the name of the players and indicating that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was “no longer with the club”. 11. After being requested by correspondence from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant dated 8 October 2013 to provide his bank account details and a driving license from country D, on the same day, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sent to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant the said documentation. However, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant apparently did not act accordingly. 12. In this context, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sent a second default notice on 11 October 2013, urging the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to comply with the relevant requests established in the first default notice by no later than 14 October 2013. 13. On 14 October 2013, after the Respondent / Counter-Claimant requested once again on 13 October 2013 the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s bank account details, especially the SWIFT code and IBAN number, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sent again the relevant information and gave a final warning to act immediately according to the relevant requests. 14. Consequently, considering the apparent absence of reaction from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deems having duly terminated the contract on 16 October 2013. 15. In its statement of defence, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant solely rejects the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim and alleges that it is the Claimant / CounterRespondent who breached the contract in the first instance. According to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, on several occasions, the Claimant / CounterRespondent missed training or refused to take part in training with the first team. Consequently, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant fined the Claimant / CounterRespondent in accordance with the “Discipline Regulations (Breaches & Penalties) of Professional Players at Club C” (hereinafter: the club’s internal disciplinary rules). 16. In this respect, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant provided the following correspondence along with their alleged postal receipts which are partly illegible: - correspondence dated 16 September 2013 from the Respondent / CounterClaimant, informing the Claimant / Counter-Respondent of the deduction of 5% from his salary of September 2013 due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s alleged absence from training with the first team on 15 September 2013; - correspondence dated 29 September 2013 from the Respondent / CounterClaimant, informing the Claimant / Counter-Respondent of the deduction of 10% from his salary of September 2013 due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s alleged “rejection of collective training with the team”; - correspondence dated 30 September 2013 from the Respondent / CounterClaimant, informing the Claimant / Counter-Respondent of the deduction of 20% from his salary of September 2013 due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s alleged “contravention of instructions and rejection of collective training with the team”; - correspondence dated 2 October 2013 from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, informing the Claimant / Counter-Respondent of the deduction of 10% from his salary of October 2013 due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s alleged absence from training with the first team on 1 October 2013; - correspondence dated 3 October 2013 from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, informing the Claimant / Counter-Respondent of the deduction of 20% from his salary of October 2013 due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s alleged absence from training with the first team on 2 October 2013 as well as his alleged “contravention of instructions and rejection of collective training with the team”. 17. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant also states that the Claimant / CounterRespondent did not put the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in default in good and due form. In particular, it sustains that it was not given a reasonable deadline. In this regard, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant points to the first default notice (cf. point 9 above) which apparently was received by it on 8 October 2013 and according to which it was granted 3 working days to comply with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s requests; the second default notice (cf. point 12 above) giving a deadline of 1 working day; and the final warning (cf. point 13 above) which did not set a deadline, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent urging the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to act immediately. 18. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant acknowledges the outstanding salaries but maintains that the delay of payment was of a few weeks only and thus, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s living conditions were not put at risk. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant refers to its correspondence dated 8 and 13 October 2013 (cf. points 11 and 13 above) in order to evidence its will to pay the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 19. In this context, on 20 November 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant lodged a counterclaim before FIFA against the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for breach of contract and termination of the contract without just cause, requesting the payment of: - USD 191,333.35, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 16 October 2013; - legal costs to be borne by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 20. In his replica, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent rejects the Respondent / CounterClaimant’s position and reiterates his entire argumentation in order to prove that he duly terminated the contract. In particular, in order to demonstrate that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant failed to provide him with “a decent and proper training program and supervision” as set forth in article 8 of the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent points one more time to the “Training Program” provided which does not mention any trainer or supervisor. 21. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent also refers to the Respondent / CounterClaimant’s request for his bank account details and apparent will to proceed to the payment subsequently. In this respect, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sustains having already provided the Respondent / Counter-Claimant with his bank account details by the end of July 2013, in anticipation for the deposit of the next month’s salary. Besides, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deems that if the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was really willing to pay the outstanding salaries, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant could have sent a bank check as it apparently did on previous occasions. 22. Finally, regarding the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim, and especially the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s allegation relating to his absence from training, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent acknowledges not attending a training session on 18 October 2013 due to the absence of car in order to drive to the club, and in addition states that the postal receipts provided by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant (cf. point 16 above) are unreadable and should not be taken into account. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further emphasises that in any event, in the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s correspondence dated 8 and 13 October 2013, it does not mention the fines imposed on him due to his alleged absence from training. 23. In this context, on 10 November 2014, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent amended his claim against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, requesting the following:  USD 125,000 as unpaid salaries for August and September 2013, plus 5% interest p.a. as of the due date of each payment;  USD 1,312,500 as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 16 October 2013, corresponding to: - USD 562,500 as salary from October 2013 to June 2014; - USD 750,000 as salary from July 2014 to June 2015;  country D 100,000 corresponding to the accommodation cost “for the second season”, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 16 October 2013;  USD 3,000 corresponding to flight tickets “paid by myself [the Claimant / CounterRespondent] for my [his] family“, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 29 June 2013;  Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent / Counter-Claimant;  Legal costs to be borne by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 24. In its duplica, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant purely reiterates its position and further adds that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s argumentation lacks evidence. With regard to the postal receipts (cf. point 16 above), the Respondent / Counter-Claimant alleges having informed the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s legal representative of the fact that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was not collecting correspondence addressed to him. 25. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent confirmed that he remained unemployed for the season 2013-2014 and subsequently, on 3 July 2014, he concluded an employment contract with the club from country F, Club E (hereinafter: Club E), valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2015. The contract states that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to a total fixed remuneration amounting to EUR 67,500 for the relevant period. 26. As regards Club E, it deems having signed a contract with the Claimant / CounterRespondent in accordance with the Regulations of FIFA and the Football Federation of country F. II. Considerations of the Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or the DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 October 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at stake (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B, a club from country D and a club from country F. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 17 October 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered the substance of the present matter. In doing so, it started by acknowledging the abovementioned facts of the matter as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant entered into a contractual relationship, which was to run from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2015 and according to which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was entitled to a sign-on fee in the amount of USD 32,000, a lump-sum payment of USD 192,000 due on 15 July 2013, a monthly salary of USD 62,500, as well as to be covered his accommodation expenses in the amount of 100,000 per season. The contract also foresees that the Respondent / CounterClaimant is to provide the Claimant / Counter-Respondent with a car and flight tickets for him and his family. 6. In continuation, the Chamber also took note that it is uncontested by both parties that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated in writing the contractual relationship on 16 October 2013. 7. In this regard, the Chamber took due note that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, on the one hand, insisted on the fact that his salary for August and September 2013 had not been paid at the time of his departure. Moreover, the DRC observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deplored his training conditions, insofar as he was training on his own and was excluded from the first team. On this basis, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent considers that he had a just cause to terminate the contract. 8. The Chamber further took note of the argumentation of the Respondent / CounterClaimant, which argued that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had unilaterally terminated the contractual relationship without just cause and had thus lodged a counterclaim, inter alia, for compensation. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant acknowledged the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s allegations as per the outstanding salaries, underlying that the delay of payment was of a few weeks only. Furthermore, the DRC noted that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant sustained that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent missed training or refused to take part in training with the first team on several occasions, resulting in the Respondent / Counter-Claimant fining the Claimant / Counter-Respondent as per its internal disciplinary rules by means of several correspondence addressed to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 9. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim and counterclaim respectively lodged by the parties, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant / CounterRespondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. 10. At this point and for the sake of good order, the Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 11. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant acknowledged the delay in the payment of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salary for August and September 2013 and did not dispute the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s allegations as to his exclusion from training with the first team. 12. Moreover, the DRC took into account that prior to the termination of the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had on several occasions put the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in default of said breaches. The members of the Chamber further observed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant neither disputed the contents of the relevant default notices as to the outstanding salaries and the exclusion of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent from the first team, nor gave valid reasons for the non-payment of said outstanding amounts. 13. In this regard, the DRC referred to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s argument pertaining to the fines allegedly imposed on the Claimant / Counter-Respondent due to his alleged absence from training, which, according to the Chamber, were not sufficiently substantiated. In particular, the Chamber underlined the absence of clear and undoubtable evidence as to the effective notification of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s correspondence addressed to the Claimant / CounterRespondent in this respect. Therefore, the DRC decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s argument in this respect should not be taken into account. 14. On account of all the above circumstances, the Chamber established that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had no longer been interested in the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s services. Such conduct constitutes, in the Chamber’s view, a clear breach of contract. Accordingly, the Chamber concurred that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had just cause to terminate the contract. Consequently, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and thus the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim is rejected. 15. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract with just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the DRC focussed its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the DRC decided that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to receive an amount of money from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as compensation for the termination of the contract with just cause, in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 16. First of all, in relation to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s financial claim regarding outstanding remuneration, the DRC decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is liable to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination, i.e. 16 October 2013. 17. Consequently, and as mentioned in point II. 11. above, the DRC recalled that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not dispute the non-payment of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salary for August and September 2013. Therefore, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is liable to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the amount of USD 125,000 as outstanding salary for August and September 2013. Equally, as regards the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim pertaining to air tickets and on the basis of the information provided by FIFA Travel and referring to art. 7 of the contract contract, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the amount of USD 3,000 as air tickets for the player and his family. 18. In continuation and with regard to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent's request for interest, as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the DRC decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent an interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of USD 125,000 as of the due date of each payment until the date of effective payment, and on the amount of USD 3,000 as of 10 November 2014 until the date of effective payment. 19. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 20. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contracts contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the said employment contracts and financial protocols at the basis of the matter at stake. 21. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision rovides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. 22. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent under the terms of the employment contract as from its date of termination with just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent until its original date of expiry, i.e. 30 June 2015. The DRC thus concluded that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent would have received USD 1,312,500 as salary from October 2013 until 30 June 2015. 23. Moreover, the DRC reverted to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim for accommodation expenses for the season 2014-2015 amounting to 100,000. In spite of the discrepancy in the contract in this respect and considering that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not dispute such request, the DRC decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant shall pay the relevant amount to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 24. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of USD 1,312,500 and the amount of 100,000 serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand. 25. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant / CounterRespondent had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 26. The Chamber recalled that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent signed an employment contract with Club E valid as from July 2014 until June 2015, in accordance with which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was to receive a total fixed remuneration amounting to EUR 67,500 during the said period of time, corresponding approximately to USD 92,000. 27. On account of the above, the DRC partially accepted the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s claim and determined that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay the amount of USD 1,220,500 and the amount of 100,000 as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand. 28. In addition, taking into account the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of USD 1,220,500 as of 17 October 2013 until the date of effective payment, and on the amount of 100,000 as of 10 November 2014 until the date of effective payment. 29. Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim pertaining to procedural costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 30. The DRC concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is partially accepted. 2. The counter-claim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected. 3. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant has to pay to the Claimant / CounterRespondent, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 128,000 plus 5% interest until the date of effective payment as follows: a. 5% p.a. as of 1 September 2013 on the amount of USD 62,500; b. 5% p.a. as of 1 October 2013 on the amount of USD 62,500; c. 5% p.a. as of 10 November 2014 on the amount of USD 3,000. 4. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant has to pay to the Claimant / CounterRespondent, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 1,220,500 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 17 October 2013 until the date of effective payment, as well as in the amount of 100,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 10 November 2014 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the aforementioned amounts plus interest are not paid within the stated time limits by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected. 7. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent / CounterClaimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives