F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 May 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member Alejando Marón (Argentina), member Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country B, represented by Mr xxxx as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 May 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member Alejando Marón (Argentina), member Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country B, represented by Mr xxxx as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. The player from country B, A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the club from country R, club B (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed an undated employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2014. 2. In addition, the parties signed an undated “Financial addendum to the individual employment agreement” (hereinafter: the addendum), as well as an undated “Annex to Individual Employment Agreement” (hereinafter: the annex). 3. According to the contract, the addendum and the annex, the Respondent undertakes to pay the Claimant, inter alia, the following monies: a. EUR 11,000 as monthly salary payable until the 5th day of the following month, for the period of 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2013; b. EUR 12,000 as monthly salary, payable on the 5th day of the following month, for the period of 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014; c. An apartment “from the club worth 500 Euro monthly”; d. 2 flight tickets per season, X-Y; e. Match bonuses, as follows: i. EUR 900 per victory in home matches; ii. EUR 400 per point in every away matches. 4. Furthermore, the addendum stipulates that “the above mentioned bonus will be granted in 50% if the Player performed as reserve field player” and “The bonuses for sport performance will be paid monthly until 25th of next month”. 5. Finally, the contract also stipulates that: “the period of warning in the case of resignation is 20 working days (…) “ and that “Disputes regarding the concluding, execution, amending, suspension or termination of the present individual employment agreement are solved before the Court of material and territory competence, as provided by the law, or to the organisms with jurisdictional duties of the XY Football Federation, Professional Football League, F.I.F.A. and the Court of Arbitration for Sport”. 6. On 4 January 2013, after having sent the Respondent two reminders dated 1 and 15 November 2012, the Claimant terminated the employment contract in writing, alleging that the Respondent had not paid part of his salary of August 2012 and his salaries for the months of September to December 2012, for a total amount of EUR 46,000, as well as all bonuses and additional payments due, according to the addendum. 7. On 7 January 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA for breach of contract, requesting, after amending his claim, the payment of the total amount of EUR 259,700, broken down as follow: a. EUR 47,500 as outstanding salaries corresponding to the period of August 2012 to 3 January 2013 with 5% interest p.a. [i.e. EUR 11,000 x 4 + EUR 2,000]; b. EUR 3,700 as match participation and performance bonuses; c. EUR 208,500 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to the remaining salaries from 4 January 2013 to 30 June 2014; d. Legal fees and procedural costs. 8. According to the Claimant, the Respondent failed to pay him his salaries as of 5 September 2012 as well as some of his due bonuses. Therefore, on 1 November 2012, the Claimant sent a first default notice to the Respondent, by means of which he requested the payment of his outstanding remuneration for August and September 2012 as well as his bonuses, giving the club a deadline until 9 November 2012. After receiving a letter dated also 9 November 2012, by means of which the Respondent informed the Claimant that the due amount will be paid shortly, the Claimant sent a second default notice on 15 November 2012, urging the Respondent to proceed with the payment of the allegedly outstanding amounts by no later than 26 November 2012, otherwise he “would be forced to undertake the appropriate legal actions”. 9. On 4 January 2013, the Claimant terminated the contract with the Respondent in writing and with immediate effect, after having received only a partial payment of the salary for August 2012 (EUR 9,000) but no other outstanding amounts. In addition, the Claimant invited the Respondent a last time to pay its due within seven days, without success. 10. In its reply, the Respondent firstly contested the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter. In this respect the Respondent submitted excerpts of the Statutes of the XY Football Federation (2011 edition) as well as the Regulations of Application of the XY Statute (2011 edition). In addition, it submits a letter from the XY Professional Football League relating to the composition of the XY Dispute Resolution Commission and Appeals Commission. They further submit a letter from the XY Football Federation related to the composition of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber. All the documents were provided by the Respondent in xx language only. 11. As to the substance, the Respondent admits that there have been delays in the payment of some amounts due to the Claimant, because of “the general economic situation” of the Respondent. For this reason, and due to the fact that the Claimant had some difficulties to adapt to “the team’s game”, the Respondent and the Claimant agreed on 13 December 2012 to terminate the contract, with effect as from 20 December 2012. According to this termination agreement, the Claimant declares having no other financial claims against the Respondent. Additionally, the Respondent holds having paid part of the outstanding amounts, as well as “expenses that the contract does not stipulate” to the Claimant. In return, the Claimant waived any other claims against the Respondent and accepted to sign the agreement. 12. In his replica, the Claimant, first of all, insists that FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the present matter and denies the competence of the XY NDRC, which, as per the Claimant, does not meet the minimum procedural standards required by art. 22 lit. b) of the RSTP. 13. In continuation, the Claimant fully rejects the validity of the agreement dated 13 December 2012 (cf. point I.11. above), and denies having signed the document. According to the Claimant, the Respondent presented a false document to avoid having to execute its obligations towards him. Furthermore, he claims to have never received any amounts allegedly paid by the Respondent and highlights that the Respondent did not provide any evidence of payment. Finally, the Claimant underlines that the Respondent admitted in its reply to have had delays in the payment of its financial obligation. 14. In In its final position, the Respondent reaffirms its arguments and holds that FIFA DRC is not competent to consider the case. Finally, the Respondent holds that the agreement is valid and informed FIFA that it is ready to submit the document to an expert to attest whether the signature of the Claimant has been forged or not. 15. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that, after the termination of the contract with the Respondent, he found new employment with the following clubs: e. xxxxx (xx), valid as from 7 January 2013 to 30 June 2014 for which he earned a monthly salary of EUR 7,000; f. xxxxxx (xx), valid as from 6 January 2014 to 30 June 2015 for which he earned a monthly salary of xx (xx) 10,600. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 7 January 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015; hereinafter: the Regulations), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a player from country B and a club from country R regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber to deal with the present case, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the deciding bodies of the XY Football Federation (XXX) and of the XY Professional Football League (XXX). 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter because the deciding bodies of the XXX and the XXX do not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and cannot provide for fair proceedings in accordance with the Regulations. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. O. of the contract (cf. point I.5. above), which stipulates that “Disputes regarding the concluding, execution, amending, suspension or termination of the present individual employment agreement are solved before the Court of material and territory competence, as provided by the law, or to the organisms with jurisdictional duties of the XY Football Federation, Professional Football League, F.I.F.A. and the Court of Arbitration for Sport”. 9. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that art. O. of the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour either of the national deciding bodies, i.e. of the XXX or the XXX, and, therefore, cannot be applicable. 10. Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body. 11. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 7 January 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 13. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 14. In this respect, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that they signed an employment contract valid as from 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2014, as well as an addendum and an annex to it, according to which the Claimant was entitled to receive the monies described in point I.3. above. 15. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent maintaining that he had terminated the employment contract with just cause on 4 January 2013, after previously having put the club in default, since the Respondent allegedly failed to pay his remuneration as from August 2012. Consequently, the Claimant asks to be awarded his outstanding dues, corresponding to salaries and bonuses as from August 2012, as well as the payment of compensation for breach of contract (cf. point I.7. above). 16. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber took due note of the allegations of the Respondent, who claims that on 13 December 2012 the parties signed a document (hereinafter: the termination agreement) containing a declaration in accordance with which the employment contract was terminated by mutual consent with effects as from 20 December 2012, and the player confirmed having no financial claims against the club (cf. point I. 11 above). 17. The Chamber further noted that the Claimant on the one hand denies having signed such document, the termination agreement provided by the Respondent being a counterfeit. On the other hand, the Respondent insisted that the document in question was signed by the player, provided FIFA with the original of such document and, consequently, rejected the claim lodged of the Claimant. 18. In view of the foregoing, the DRC pointed out that the core document in the present dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, is the termination agreement apparently signed by both parties on 13 December 2012. In other words, the Chamber considered that the underlying issue in the dispute at hand consists of establishing whether the Claimant’s argument regarding the alleged counterfeit of the termination agreement could be upheld or, in case not, whether the financial obligations of the Respondent towards the Claimant could be considered as extinguished with the alleged signature of the aforementioned document. 19. At this stage, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to remind the parties of the content of art 12. par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which: “Any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”. 20. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule, FIFA’s deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority. 21. In this regard, the DRC noted that termination agreement dated 13 December 2012 bears the signature of the Respondent and the alleged signature of the Claimant. In addition, the members of the DRC pointed out that, upon FIFA’s request and in view of the Claimant’s allegation of falsification, the Respondent was able to provide the original of such agreement, currently available for the analysis of the Chamber. 22. In continuation, the DRC recalled that all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and, therefore, it focused its attention on the original of the termination agreement as well as on other documents containing the Claimant’s signature, provided by the parties in the context of the present dispute. 23. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures of the Claimant in the various documents provided in the present affair, the DRC had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, the signatures on such documents appear to be the same. Thus, the Claimant’s allegation of counterfeit cannot be upheld. 24. In view of the foregoing, the DRC concluded that, by signing the termination agreement, the Claimant agreed to terminate the employment contract with the Respondent and declared not to have any pending financial claims towards the Respondent. 25. In this context, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to emphasize that a party signing a document of legal importance, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility and is consequently liable to bear the possible legal consequences arising from the execution of such document. 26. In view of all of the above, and based on the documentation currently at their disposal, the members of the Chamber came to the conclusion that, the present claim of the Claimant pertaining to outstanding salaries and compensation for breach of contract has to be rejected, since the relevant termination agreement seems to have been duly signed by the Claimant and, therefore, the parties amicably agreed upon the termination of their employment relationship and the Respondent does not have any pending financial obligations towards the Claimant. 27. Based on all the foregoing, the members of the Chamber concluded their deliberations by establishing that the claim of the Claimant is entirely rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl: CAS directives