F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 July 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 July 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member John Bramhall (England), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case Facts relating to the preliminary issue of the competence of the DRC: 1. On 1 July 2011, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) which stipulated in its art. 15 that ``Ambas partes aceptan y reconocen que el presente Contrato de Trabajo deberá ser registrado ante la Federación de Fútbol de país D, dependiendo de dicha formalidad la vigencia y exigibilidad de la totalidad de las contraprestaciones estipuladas ene l presente contrato de trabajo, por lo que en caso de suscitarse alguna controversia derivada de la relación laboral entre ambos, no podrán invocar la validez de otro Contrato distinto al presente Contrato de Trabajo debiendo observar lo dispuesto en el artículo 105 del Estatuto de la Federación de Fútbol de pais D’’ (free translation: “Both parties accept and recognize that the current employment contract shall be registered before the Football Federation of country D with the validity and enforceability of the totality of the considerations stipulated in the current employment contract depending upon this formality, so that in case any dispute arises from the labour relationship between them, the parties would not be able to invoke the validity of any other different contract to the current employment contract and must observe the provisions of art. 105 of the Football Federation of country D’s Statutes”). 2. Furthermore, art. 15 also established that ``Las partes se obligan a observar y respetar lo dispuesto por los Estatutos y Reglamentos de la F.I.F.A. y la Federación de Fútbol de pais D, y a sujetarse a la jurisdicción que sus ordenamientos señalen. Este Contrato de Trabajo se somete a la jurisdicción, para todo asunto de índole laboral a la Comisión de Conciliación y Resolución de Controversias de la Federación de Fútbol de pais D” (free translation: “The parties oblige themselves to observe and respect the provisions of the Statutes and Regulations of FIFA and the Football Federation of country D, and to submit themselves to the jurisdiction designated therein. This employment contract is subjected to the jurisdiction, for every labour related matter, of the Conciliation and Dispute Resolution Commission of the Football Federation of country D”). 3. Moreover, on the same date, the parties signed an agreement containing specific conditions of the employment relationship, valid for the same period of time as the one in the contract (hereinafter: the second contract), which stipulated in its art. 15 that “En virtud del carácter de afiliados a la Federación de Fútbol de pais D y de acuerdo con las disposiciones estatutarias y reglamentarias de la propia Federación de Fútbol de pais D ambas partes se someten para la interpretación, ejecución y cumplimiento del presente contrato, a jurisdicción y competencia de la Comisión de Resolución de Controversias y demás autoridades competentes de la Federación de Fútbol de pais D” (free translation: “In their capacity as affiliates of the Football Federation of country D according to the statutory and regulatory provisions of the own Football Federation of country D, both parties submit themselves for the interpretation, execution, and enforcement of the present contract, to the jurisdiction and competence of the Conciliation and Dispute Resolution Commission and other competent authorities of the Football Federation of country D”). 4. The Respondent contested the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter, referring to the aforementioned article of the second contract. 5. In this regard, the Respondent argued that the Conciliation and Dispute Resolution Commission of the Football Federation of country D (hereinafter: the CCRC) fulfills the procedural standards in accordance with the jurisprudence of FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber, as it meets the requirements of art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 6. Moreover, the Respondent argued that due to the fact that the Respondent is affiliated to the Football Federation of country D (hereinafter: the Football Federation of country D), the Claimant is obliged to refer his claim to the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D. 7. The Claimant, for his part, insisted that FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber should deal with the present matter. In particular, the Claimant held that art. 15 of the second contract does not explicitly mention that the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D or other judicial bodies of the Football Federation of country D would have exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute amongst the parties, but that said article merely mentions that the parties will submit themselves to the jurisdiction and competence of the bodies of Football Federation of country D. The Claimant further argued that art. 15 cannot be interpreted as a clause where the parties agreed to exclusively submit a dispute to the judicial bodies of the Football Federation of country D. In relation, the Claimant argued that in case of doubt about the possible interpretation of a clause, it must be construed against the drafter according to the principle of in dubio contra proferentem. 8. Moreover, the Claimant argued that taking into account the wording of art. 15 of the second contract, he was never entitled, nor he will be, to refer the dispute to the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, due to his non- affiliation to the Football Federation of country D after his deregistration from the Respondent. The Claimant stated that the Football Federation of country D had previously declared itself not competent to deal with requests involving a party which is not an affiliate. 9. The Claimant referred to the content of art. 79 of the Football Federation of country D Statutes which establishes that “La [CCRC] es un órgano autónomo e independiente que tendrá como función conocer y resolver todas las reclamaciones que los Afiliados de la Federación tengan entre si” (free translation: “The [CCRC] is an autonomous and independent organ whose object is to hear and decide every claim that affiliates to the Federation have amongst them”). 10. The Claimant also referred to art. 32 of the Regulations of the CCRC which established that “La [CCRC] tendrá únicamente la jurisdicción de disputas internas, es decir, disputas entre partes afiliadas a la misma. Tratándose de disputas internacionales, es decir, disputas entre Clubes de distintas Asociaciones o Confederaciones entre sí o con Clubes y/o Jugadores y/o Agentes de Jugadores afiliados a la Federación, será competente la FIFA o el TAS” (free translation: “The [CCRC] will only have jurisdiction over national internal disputes, that is, disputes amongst parties affiliated to it. In case of international disputes, that is, disputes between Clubs of different Associations or Confederations amongst them or with Clubs and/or Players and/or Players’ Agents affiliated to the Federation, FIFA or TAS shall be competent depending on the case”. 11. For his part, the Claimant argued that the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D does not comply with the procedural requirements needed. Facts relating to the substance of the matter: 1. On 1 July 2011, the Claimant and the Respondent entered into the contract valid as of the date of signature until 30 April 2013. 2. On the same date, the parties signed the second contract containing specific conditions of the employment relationship, valid for the same period of time as the one stated in the contract. 3. Art. 14 of the contract contains a compensation clause which stipulated that the termination of the contract is subject to arts. 47 and 303 of the Labour Federal Law of country D and that if the Claimant terminates the contract without just cause, he shall compensate the Respondent. 4. In addition, art. 10 of the second contract established that ``En los términos del artículo 53 y 293 de la ley federal del trabajo el club podrá dar por terminada la relación de trabajo sin responsabilidad para el mismo en los casos siguientes: a) la incapacidad física de el jugador que motive la disminución ostensible de sus facultades para ser incorporado a su actividad como jugador de fútbol profesional; para este efecto, desde ahora el jugador acepta en forma expresa la opinión del director técnico; b) la inhabilidad manifiesta de el jugador para desempeñar el trabajo contratado en el presente documento…”(free translation: “In accordance with arts. 53 and 293 of the Labour Federal Law of country D, the club may terminate the contractual relation without any responsibility in the following cases: a) physical disability of the player that motivates the apparent decline in the player’s capability to be incorporated to his activity as a professional football player; in this regard, as from now, the player expressly accepts the coach’s opinion; b) the player’s manifest incapability to perform his work as regulated in the present contract…”). 5. Art. 10.1 of the second contract contains several reasons/causes for termination, such as ``por baja ostensible en su calidad técnica y que de origen a que el director técnico decida retirarlo de la alineación o no considerarlo apto para incorporarlo” (free translation: “a remarkable drop in the player’s technical quality such that the coach decides not to field him or deem him good enough to incorporate him”). 6. Moreover, art. 14 of the second contract established that “El club y el jugador, en caso de terminación anticipada de su contrato atento a lo dispuesto por el artículo 53, fracción primera de la Ley Federal del Trabajo, por así convenir a los intereses de ambas partes, el jugador manifiesta desde este momento su conformidad para recibir, en el caso de una transferencia futura, exclusivamente el 10%...” (free translation: “The player and club, in order to suit the interests of both parties, in case of an early termination of the contract in accordance with art. 53, par. 1 of the Labour Federal Law of country D, the player expresses his consent to receive, in case of a future transfer, exclusively 10%...”) . 7. According to arts. 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive, inter alia, the following amounts and benefits: Season 2011/2012 – USD 600,000, to be paid in instalments every fifteen days; Season 2012/2013 – USD 700,000, to be paid in instalments every fifteen days; 8 economy class flight tickets per season country D/country E/country D and/or country D/country B/country D for the Claimant and his family; Performance based bonuses. 8. According to the second contract, 75% of each of the amounts stipulated in arts. 6, 7 and 8 of the contract, shall be considered an advance of the value of the “prima de transferencia del jugador”, as established in the Labour Federal Law of country D. 9. On 19 October 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract during the protected period and requested the payment of the total amount of USD 1,131,157, as follows: USD 250,650 as outstanding salaries; USD 11,157 as reimbursement for costs: - USD 10,200 related to flight tickets purchased; - 9,920 related to medical costs; - 2,356 related to costs for the renewal of residence and work permits. USD 869,350 as compensation for breach of contract, as follows:  USD 449,350 as the residual value of the contract;  USD 420,000 for the “specificity of sport” corresponding to 6 monthly salaries. The Claimant requested 5% interest over the outstanding amounts as of their respective due dates and 5% interest over the compensation amount as of the date of termination of the contract. Finally, the Claimant requested the application of sporting sanctions upon the Respondent and reimbursement of legal fees in the amount of USD 30,000. 10. According to the Claimant, soon after arriving to the Respondent in 2011, he was diagnosed with a heart condition. Notwithstanding, the Claimant stated that he was allowed by the medical team of the Respondent to continue with his activities, subject to a control every 6 months. According to the Claimant, he played without any problem throughout the entire 2011/2012 season, even becoming top scorer of the league from country D twice. 11. Subsequently, the Claimant explained that at the beginning of the 2012/2013 season, his medical exams revealed that he still had the same heart condition, but that, again, he would still be authorized to carry out his profession subject to periodic controls. 12. Notwithstanding the above, the Claimant stated that, after that medical examination, the Respondent’s internal doctor approached him and told him that he was worried about his heart condition. As a consequence, the Claimant stated that he again visited the cardiologist who ended up suggesting him to undergo a further examination, specifically a cardiac catheterization. The Claimant stated that said cardiac catheterization took place on 3 July 2012 in a hospital of country D. 13. The Claimant asserted that, on 9 July 2012, he underwent further exams that showed that the heart condition was still there and that, as a consequence, the doctor prescribed him medication. The Claimant sustained that, after this, the Respondent never followed up on his condition. 14. Subsequently, the Claimant stated that, on 13 July 2012, every player in the squad of the Respondent received their salary for the first 15 days of July, except him. 15. Furthermore, according to the Claimant, another exam was conducted on 17 July 2012, at his exclusive request, and the relevant results were not positive. As a consequence, the cardiologist immediately prescribed him with a temporary inability of 1 month from any activities. 16. The Claimant sustained that on 18 July 2012, the Respondent forbid him from accessing its premises and that while checking the Respondent’s website on 24 July 2012, he realised that the Respondent had removed him from the team for the 2012/2013 season. 17. In continuation, the Claimant explained that his residence and work permits were set to expire on 26 July 2012 and that the Respondent did not take any steps to renew them. The Claimant claimed that said permits ended up being renewed by country D’s authorities, but solely due to his efforts. 18. Moreover, the Claimant argued that by a letter dated 27 July 2012, the Respondent informed him that the contract was being temporarily suspended due to his physical inability and that, accordingly, the Claimant would be discharged from performing his activities under the contract and the Respondent, for its part, of paying the respective salary. 19. The Claimant argued that by a letter dated 9 August 2012, he replied to the Respondent’s letter and stated that the contract was in force and could not be suspended. The Claimant sustained that the suspension of the contract was inconsistent with the fact that, as a result of his heart condition, he had been declared temporarily incapacitated by his doctor. The Claimant further accused the Respondent of the following: prohibiting him from entering its premises; removing him from the official webpage and not inviting him for the Respondent’s official picture for the 2012/2013 season; failing to pay him salaries in the amount of USD 70,000, as well as reimbursement of flight tickets in the amount of USD 10,200 and, failing to renew his work and residence permits. Furthermore, the Claimant requested the Respondent to comply with its obligations. 20. The Claimant declared that, on 15 August 2012, he underwent a new examination and that, although the results were better, the doctor still decided that a second period of a 1 month inability was appropriate. 21. By means of a letter dated 17 August 2012, the Respondent replied to the Claimant’s letter dated 9 August 2012 and invited him to a personal meeting at its premises on 20 August 2012. 22. Afterwards, by a letter dated 28 August 2012, the Respondent sent a termination agreement proposal to the Claimant, in which the Respondent was willing to pay to the Claimant the net amount corresponding to one month salary and the reimbursement of the expenses incurred for medical treatment which had not yet been paid by the Respondent. In addition, the proposal established that the Claimant expressly recognizes and accepts owing the Respondent 50% of the amount paid in relation to his transfer. The proposal established that the sum proposed to be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant should be deducted from this amount and furthermore, 28 September 2012 was stipulated as the date for payment by the Claimant to the Respondent. 23. The Claimant stated that on 26 September 2012, and as a result of a new examination, he was granted a third inability period until the beginning of November. 24. By a letter dated 5 October 2012, the Claimant refused the proposed mutual termination of the contract and put the Respondent on final notice to comply with its obligations within the next five days, amounting, allegedly, to three months of outstanding salaries, reimbursement of flight tickets in the amount USD 10,200, reimbursement of medical costs in the amount of USD 773 and reimbursement of renewal of his work and residence permit fees in the amount of USD 184, corresponding to the total amount of USD 221,157. 25. On 18 October 2012, by means of a letter dated on that same date, the Claimant terminated the contract unilaterally claiming that, in addition of what was already mentioned in his letter of 5 October 2012, the Respondent failed to pay the first fifteen days of October 2012 and that he was deregistered from the league from country D without having been informed. 26. A few hours later, by a letter dated 18 October 2012, the Respondent terminated the contract unilaterally on the basis that the Claimant was allegedly suffering from an “irreversible cardiac condition”. 27. The Claimant alleged that he had just cause to terminate the contract for the following reasons: the Respondent failed to provide him with the necessary medical assistance; the Respondent prohibited him from accessing the its premises; the Respondent failed to renew his residence and work permits; the Respondent proceeded to deregister him from the Football Federation of country D and register a foreign player in his place, thereby completing the foreign players’ quota; the Respondent failed to pay him the salaries due between July 2012 and the first half of October 2012, as well as reimburse his flight tickets, resulting in the aggregate amount of USD 250,650. 28. In its response, the Respondent did not present arguments as to the merits of the claim and limited itself to argue that the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D has the exclusive competence to deal with the matter at hand. 29. In his replica, the Claimant repeated his position and submitted his arguments in relation to the competence. 30. In its duplica, the Respondent repeated its position. 31. Finally, the Claimant signed a new contract with the club from country E, Club F on 15 January 2013. Moreover, the Claimant was registered with Club F on 11 February 2013, after the decision taken by the Single Judge of FIFA’s Players’ Status on 8 February 2013, by means of which the provisional registration of the Claimant was authorized. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 October 2012. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2015 Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015; hereinafter: the Regulations) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent, with reference to the second part of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations, claimed that not FIFA but the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D was competent to deal with the present case. In particular, the Chamber took note that the Respondent argued that an equitably represented, independent, national arbitration tribunal such as that demanded by the FIFA Regulations (art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations) existed in country D and that the parties had agreed in art. 15 of the second contract that, for every labour related matter, the second contract is subject to the jurisdiction of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D. 4. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the Claimant argued that FIFA was competent to decide on the present issue, as the Claimant sustained that the arbitration tribunal in question, the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, did not comply with the requirements established in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations. 5. As a consequence, the Chamber started by acknowledging that, despite being entitled to seek redress before an ordinary national court of law, the parties did not dispute that the matter at hand was brought to an alternative dispute resolution process within football. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that it was necessary to ascertain who is competent to decide on the issue within the football-related dispute resolution system. In other words, the competence of a national deciding body on the one side and FIFA on the other must be determined. 7. In this regard, the Chamber referred to art. 22 b) of the Regulations, according to which it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the Association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. 8. In view of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentary evidence presented by the Respondent, i.e. a copy of the Regulations of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D (edition 2012) and the Social Statutes of the Football Federation of country D (edition 2012). 9. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that according to art. 79 of the Social Statutes of the Football Federation of country D and art. 1 of the Regulations of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D is responsible for addressing, processing and resolution of, inter alia, labour disputes between football players and clubs, affiliated to the Football Federation of country D. 10. Furthermore, and referring to the composition of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, the Chamber noted that, in accordance with art. 3 of the Regulations of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D is composed of four members, which are nominated as follows: a) a President, designated by agreement between the Clubs’ Representative and the Players’ Representative. In case an agreement is not reached, the President would be designated by the Executive Committee of the Football Federation of country D; b) a Secretary, designated by the President and ratified by the Executive Committee of the Football Federation of country D; c) a Clubs’ representative designated by the professional Clubs; d) a Players’ representative designated by the professional football players. 11. Moreover, the members of the Chamber noted that the possibility for a party to file an appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport is duly established in art. 86 of the Social Statutes of the Football Federation of country D, provided that a party has exhausted all internal judicial bodies and remedies and granting a period of 21 calendar days for the filing of such appeal. In this respect, the DRC observed that under the provisions of the Social Statutes of the Football Federation of country D, the Football Federation of country D will ensure full compliance by its members of any final decision taken by the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 12. Consequently, and taking into consideration the entire structure and functioning of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D as set out in the Regulations of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, as well as the Social Statutes of the Football Federation of country D, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent was able to prove that the CCRC meets the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 b) of the Regulations and in FIFA Circular no. 1010. 13. The Chamber was eager to emphasise that both the first and the second contract at the basis of the present dispute contain a jurisdiction and competence clause in favour of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D. In particular, art. 15 of the first contract established that in relation to employment related matters, the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D would have jurisdiction, while the second contract established that the parties, in their capacity as affiliates to the Football Federation of country D, submit themselves to the jurisdiction and competence of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D and other competent authorities of the Football Federation of country D. 14. It was observed by the DRC that the Claimant held that art. 15 of the second contract does not explicitly mention that the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D or other judicial bodies of the Football Federation of country D would have exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute amongst the parties, but that instead, said article merely mentions that the parties will submit themselves to the jurisdiction and competence of the bodies of Football Federation of country D. The Chamber noticed that the Claimant argued that art. 15 cannot be interpreted as a clause where the parties agreed to exclusively submit a dispute to the judicial bodies of the Football Federation of country D and that in case of doubt about the possible interpretation of a clause, it should be construed against the drafter according to the principle of in dubio contra proferentem. 15. In this respect, the DRC pointed out that the clause in question, i.e. art 15 of the second contract, as agreed by the parties, makes an explicit and unambiguous reference to competence and jurisdiction of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D for interpretation, execution and enforcement of the relevant contract, and therefore, the Claimant’s argument cannot be sustained. 16. Moreover, it was noted by the Chamber that the Claimant further argued that taking into account the wording of art. 15 of the second contract, he was never entitled, nor he will be, to refer the dispute to the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D, due to his non-affiliation with the Football Federation of country D after his deregistration from the club. In this respect, the Chamber highlighted that the Claimant was registered with his new club, Club F (hereinafter: Club F), on 11 February 2013. 17. In the view of the aforementioned argument, the DRC emphasized that a player remains registered within an association until his International Transfer Certificate is issued in favour of a club belonging to another association. In the case at stake, the player was registered with Club F on 11 February 2013, therefore, effectively remaining registered and affiliated to the association of the Respondent until 10 February 2013. The Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged his claim before FIFA on 19 October 2012 and consequently, concluded that the Claimant remained registered within the Football Federation of country D for more than 3 months after the dispute arose. Therefore, the DRC concluded that the Claimant should have lodged his claim in front of the CCRC of the Football Federation of country D at the time. 18. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be accepted and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is not competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is inadmissible. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marcus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives