F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the matter between the player, Player A, country B as Claimant and the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the matter between the player, Player A, country B as Claimant and the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 September 2010, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), born on 9 April 1982, concluded an employment contract with the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2011. On 27 January 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent. However, by means of the signature of a new employment contract, the parties settled the dispute (cf. below in point I. 2.) 2. On 22 August 2012, the Claimant concluded an employment contract with the Respondent (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2014. 3. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to the following basic remuneration: - For the 2012-2013 season, nine monthly payments in the amount of EUR 30,000, due at the end of each month, starting in September 2012 (EUR 270,000 in total). - For the 2013-2014 season, twelve monthly payments in the amount of EUR 15,000, due at the end of each month, starting in June 2013 (EUR 180,000 in total), in case the Respondent stayed in the second tier of the football league system of country D. 4. In addition, the contract entitled the Claimant, inter alia, to the following bonuses: - For the 2013-2014 season, EUR 10,000, if the Respondent stays in the second-tier of country D, due on 17 September 2013. - EUR 20,000, “if [the Respondent] stays in the play-offs” (in French, “si le club reste en play off”). 5. Furthermore, clause 3 of the contract included the following: « Club C et le footballeur acceptent, déclarant et s’engagent que le footballeur sera payé 190.000€ au titre de ses services près le club au cours de la saison de football 2012/2013 Club C pour la période passée doit seulement payer au footballeur la somme de 130.000€, les parties se sont entendues sur la somme et le mode de paiement de cette somme. A la somme de 130.000€ dont le footballeur a droit pour la période passée le paiement de la somme de 190.000€ pour la nouvelle saison est ajoutée si bien que dans le cadre de ce contrat il sera effectué un paiement total de 320.000€ (totale des indemnités de la somme de garantie et l’indemnité mensuelle), les parties n’ont aucun contentieux concernant cet élément. » "Club C and the football player agree and commit upon that the football player will be paid € 190,000 for his services to the club during the football season 2012/2013 Club C will only pay the sum of € 130,000 for the previous period, and the parties have agreed on the amount and method of payment for the said amount. To this sum of € 130,000 that the [Claimant] is entitled to receive for the previous period, € 190,000 shall be added for the new season, so that in the framework of this contract a total payment of € 320,000 will be made (total for the collateral and the monthly allowance), the parties have no dispute on this issue” (note: free translation from French). 6. In addition, clause 9 of the contract established the following : « Les litiges nés de ce contrat sont de la compétence exclusive du Conseil de résolution des litiges. Les parties peuvent faire recours au Conseil d’arbitrage de la fédération de football du pays D dans les délais contre les décisions du Conseil de résolution des litiges » "Disputes arising from this contract are the sole responsibility of the Dispute Resolution Council. The parties may appeal to the Arbitration Council of the Football Federation of country D in time against the decisions of the Dispute Resolution Council" (note: free translation from French). 7. On 17 April 2013, the Claimant informed FIFA about his decision to terminate the contract with the Respondent with just cause. In particular, the Claimant explained that “it has been three months since he had not received any remuneration” and that the Respondent also failed to respect the amicable settlement for the first contract. 8. On 14 May 2013, the Claimant formally lodged a new claim before FIFA against the Respondent, and requested the payment of a total amount of “EUR 390,000”, “plus lawyer’s and other costs”, detailed as follows: - EUR 130,000, corresponding to the Respondent’s failure to comply with the “amicable settlement concluded on 22 August 2012”; - EUR 150,000, corresponding to overdue salaries from January 2013 until May 2013 (EUR 30,000 per month); - EUR 20,000 as an individual bonus for the Respondent’s classification among the best six teams in the championship and participation in the play offs of the 2012/2013 season; - EUR 10,000, for the 2013-2014 season bonus due for the Respondent’s stay in the second-tier of country D; - EUR 15,000 per month, for the remaining salaries from June 2013 until May 2014 (calculated as EUR 180,000). 9. In addition, the Claimant declared that following this dispute, the Respondent sanctioned him for “undisciplinary behaviour”, by imposing salary deductions and forcing him to play with the reserve team and training on an individual basis. The Claimant considered that the grounds of this sanction were intended to avoid the payment of the overdue salaries. 10. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent argued that the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the Arbitral Tribunal of the Football Federation of country D should be competent in this dispute, and that this has been acknowledged by the parties in the contract. However, and despite being requested to do so, the Respondent did not provide documentary evidence in this regard. 11. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent considered that in any case it fulfilled its obligations in connection with the first contract, and that this matter was settled with the signature of the second contract. 12. Furthermore, the Respondent declared that the Claimant failed to fulfil his contractual obligations in relation to the contract as, inter alia, he failed to participate in the trainings arranged by the Respondent “on a regular basis” as from 8 February 2013. Finally, the Respondent considered that the Claimant was imposed disciplinary sanctions for his “disrespectful conduct against [its] moral values”, and that in this regard, he was given a fine in accordance with its own internal disciplinary bylaws. In particular, the Respondent requested from the Claimant the payment of an amount of 224,277, corresponding to fines imposed on him, and reimbursement of salaries that were paid too much (EUR 11,111 and 66,517). 13. As a consequence of this, the Respondent attached a letter apparently sent to the Claimant on 8 April 2013, by means of which it deemed the contract to be terminated as from that date. 14. Regarding the overdue payments, the Respondent considered that they are related to the “[Claimant]’ contribution to the [Respondent]”, and that due to the Claimant’s refusal to serve for two months, he should not be paid for that time frame. Nevertheless, the Respondent stated that the Claimant was paid for his “February, March payments plus for his 8 days of April payment”. 15. The Claimant replied to the Respondent’s comments, and highlighted that by signing the contract, he thought that “this time, the [Respondent]’s management will fulfil its commitments”. The Claimant also considered that the events in relation to the contract are due to the Respondent’s will “to hurt and make him to pay for the 2011 claim he lodged before the FIFA DRC”. 16. In reference to the claimed amounts, the Claimant highlighted that the Respondent did not provide any evidence for the alleged payment. 17. In addition, the Claimant considered that the sanctions imposed by the Respondent on him were made in an arbitrary way and that there is no evidence of his failure to fulfil his obligations with the Respondent. 18. As to the competence, the Claimant declared that he was unaware that the contracts granted competence to the NDRC of country D. In addition, the Claimant considered that the NDRC of country D is not independent and it would not ensure a fair procedure respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 5 19. In its final comments, the Respondent mentioned that “we first of all expect FIFA to inform which authority should be active and authorized” and that it was explicitly stipulated in the contract that the place of resolution of the dispute shall be in country D. 20. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that he remained unemployed until 15 December 2013, when he concluded an employment contract with the club from country E, Club F, valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2015. According to the said contract, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly remuneration in the amount of 2,675,400, equivalent to approximately EUR 24,613 as of 15 December 2013. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 May 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2012, 2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a player and a club that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a player from country B and a club from country D regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 9 of the contract, alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the relevant employment contract is the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: NDRC of country D) and the Arbitration Tribunal of the Football Federation of country D. 5. In this regard, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant insisted on FIFA’s jurisdiction to deal with the present matter, arguing that the NDRC of country D is not independent and it would not ensure a fair procedure respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 6. In view of the above, the members of the Chamber then turned their attention to said art. 9 of the contract, which reads as follows: “Les litiges nés de ce contrat sont de la compétence exclusive du Conseil de résolution des litiges. Les parties peuvent faire recours au Conseil d’arbitrage de la fédération de football du pays D dans les délais contre les décisions du Conseil de résolution des litiges (Free translation of the first sentence : "Disputes arising from this contract are the sole responsibility of the Dispute Resolution Council”). Hence, the Chamber outlined that said clause explicitly and exclusively refers to a national dispute resolution chamber, i.e. the “Dispute Resolution Council”. 7. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 8. In this respect and regardless of the fact that the relevant employment contract contains a specific arbitration clause, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, in the case at hand, the Respondent has failed to prove that an independent arbitration tribunal in compliance with the requirements of the FIFA regulations has been established in country D. 9. On account of all the above and referring to the principle of the burden of proof contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 10. The competence of the Chamber having been established, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015), and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 May 2013. Therefore, the DRC concluded that the 2012 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 11. Having established the foregoing, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of the matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered for the assessment of the matter at hand. 12. In particular, the Chamber took note that, on 1 September 2010, the parties concluded an employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2014. 13. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber noted that, on 22 August 2012, the parties concluded a new employment contract, valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2014. 14. Thereafter, the members of the Chamber examined the documentation provided by the Respondent, by means of which it apparently notified the Claimant, on 8 April 2013, about the termination of the contract with just cause. 15. In this regard, the DRC stressed that the Claimant did not dispute having received said letter. Consequently, the members of the Chamber unanimously agreed to establish that the Respondent terminated the employment contract on 8 April 2013. 16. Having established the foregoing, the Chamber turned its attention to the question related to the early termination of the contract and, in particular, as to whether said termination by the Respondent was with or without just cause. 17. In particular, the Chamber took note of the Respondent’s allegation, according to which said termination was due to the Claimant’s alleged “disrespectful conduct against the moral values” of the Respondent, as well as for his alleged failure to participate in the trainings “on a regular basis”. 18. In relation to the documentation provided by the Respondent, the DRC recalled the basic principle of the burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Similarly, the Chamber referred to art. 9 par. 1 lit. e) of the Procedural Rules which stipulates that all documents of relevance to the dispute shall be submitted in the original version as well as translated into one of the official FIFA languages. 19. In this context, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not provide a translated version of the documents in support of the aforementioned allegation, enclosed to its submission in the language of country D only. In view of the foregoing and taking into consideration art. 9 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC decided that it could not take into account the relevant documents which were not translated into an official FIFA language. 20. Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent had not sufficiently substantiated its defense, as it did not present any conclusive documentary evidence in one of the official FIFA languages, which could corroborate that the Claimant did not fulfill his commitments as agreed upon in the contract. 21. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber also acknowledged that it had to examine whether the reasons put forward by the Respondent could justify the termination of the contract in the present matter. 22. On account of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent and, therefore, concluded that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 8 April 2013. Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause. 23. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without just cause by the Respondent on 8 April 2013. 24. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber noted that, according to the clause 3 of the aforementioned contract, the Respondent committed to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 130,000 for the outstanding amounts allegedly due to the Claimant in connection with the contract signed by the parties on 1 September 2010. In addition, the members of the Chamber also noted that, according to said contract, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly salary in the amount of EUR 30,000, for the 2012-2013 season, as well as, inter alia, the following bonuses: - For the 2013-2014 season, EUR 10,000, if the Respondent stays in the second-tier of country D, due on 17 September 2013. - EUR 20,000, “if [the Respondent] stays in the play-offs” (in French, “si le club reste en play off”). 25. In this respect, the DRC took into consideration that according to the Claimant, the Respondent had failed to pay his remuneration in the total amount of EUR 310,000, corresponding to the amount stipulated in clause 3 of the contract, the unpaid salaries of January, February, March, April and May 2013, as well as the aforementioned bonuses. Consequently, the Claimant requested to be awarded with the payment of the total amount of EUR 310,000. 26. Moreover, the DRC noted that the Respondent, in its defense, explained that “in any case it fulfilled its obligations in connection with [the contract signed on 1 September 2010]”, and provided several documents, however, it did not provide evidence supporting that the payments of January, February and March 2013, as well as the payment established in clause 3 of the contract, were paid. 27. Having observed the aforementioned, the members of the Chamber took note that, due to the termination of the contract by the Respondent on 8 April 2013, any outstanding remuneration that may be due to the Claimant, could only fall due until said date, without prejudice of any possible compensation that may be awarded to the Claimant for the early termination of the contract. 28. In this context, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not provide a translated version of the documents in support of its allegation that it fulfilled its obligations, enclosed to its submission in the language of country D only. In view of the foregoing and taking into consideration art. 9 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC decided that it could not take into account the relevant documents which were not translated into an official FIFA language. 29. As to the documentary evidence presented in the English language, the Chamber observed that such documents did not make an explicit reference to the allegation arisen by the Respondent. Therefore, the DRC decided that said documents could not be considered as a legitimate basis to prove that the Respondent fulfilled its obligations. 30. Consequently, the Chamber considered that the Respondent had not sufficiently substantiated its defense, as it did not present any conclusive documentary evidence which could corroborate that the remuneration of January, February and March 2013, as well as the payment established in clause 3 of the contract, were paid. 31. Moreover, the members of the Chamber also noted that, according to the Respondent, it imposed a series of salary deductions for the Claimant’s alleged “disrespectful conduct against [its] moral values”. 32. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that, in principle, a player cannot be fined for alleged “disrespectful conduct against moral values”, as this is a purely unilateral and subjective evaluation by the Respondent. Thus, the Chamber emphasized that, under the specific circumstances of the matter at stake, a “disrespectful conduct against moral values” cannot be considered as a valid reason to reduce the Claimant’s salary or to fine him. Hence, the Chamber considered that by fining the Claimant based on the aforementioned reason, the Respondent acted in an abusive manner and therefore, decided to also disregard the fines imposed by it. 33. In addition, the Chamber referred to its previous consideration, according to which the documentation in the language of country D submitted by the Respondent in this respect could not be taken into account. 34. Furthermore, and in any case, the Chamber wished to point out that the imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not be used by clubs as a means to set off outstanding financial obligations towards players. Therefore, the Chamber decided not to take into consideration the fines apparently imposed on the Claimant. 35. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber pointed out that according to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive bonus payments linked to the Respondent’s sporting results. According to the Claimant, bonus payments totalling EUR 30,000 remained unpaid in connection to said bonuses. 36. In this respect, the Chamber recalled once again the basic principle of the burden of proof, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. In particular, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant did not provide enough evidence, in order to substantiate that said bonuses were effectively due by the Respondent in the light of its sporting results. Therefore, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s request relating to outstanding bonus payments. 37. In view of all the above and, in particular, taking into account that the Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence about the payment of the relevant outstanding remuneration, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfil its contractual obligations towards the Claimant and is to be held liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 220,000, in view of the outstanding amounts for the salaries of the period comprised between January 2013 and March 2013, as well as to the amount stipulated in clause 3 of the contract. 38. In this regard, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to the outstanding salaries on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 39. In continuation, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 40. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 41. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. 42. The members of the Chamber then turned their attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and the new contract, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. The members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of compensation. 43. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the Claimant’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 44. Indeed, on 15 December 2013, the Claimant found employment with the club from country E, Club F. In accordance with the pertinent employment contract, valid as from 15 December 2013 until 30 June 2015, the Claimant is entitled to receive, inter alia, a monthly salary of 2,675,400, equivalent to EUR 24,613. In this regard, the Chamber noted that, as from 15 December 2013 until 31 May 2014, the respondent would have earned the amount of EUR 147,678. 45. In addition, the DRC observed that, during the period comprised between 15 December 2013 until 31 May 2014, the Claimant would have earned from the Respondent the amount of EUR 90,000. 46. Consequently, the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the Claimant and the new club for the period as from 15 December 2013 until and including 31 May 2014 largely exceeds the residual value of the employment contract with the Respondent for the same period of time. Therefore, the Chamber decided that, even though the Respondent is liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause, there is no amount that should be awarded to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract for the period as from 15 December 2013 until 31 May 2014, since the Claimant has been able to fully mitigate his damages for said time period. 47. However, the members of the Chamber noted that as from the termination of the employment contract on 8 April 2013 until the signature of his new employment contract on 15 December 2013 with Club F, the Claimant remained unemployed and, therefore, decided that he should be entitled to receive compensation for this specific period of time. 48. In accordance with the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute, as from 8 April 2013 until 15 December 2013, the Claimant was entitled to receive the two instalments of EUR 30,000 in relation to the 2012-2013 season, as well as six monthly instalment of EUR 15,000 each, in relation to the 2013-2014 season which all add up to the amount of EUR 150,000. 49. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 150,000 to the Claimant. 50. In addition, as regards the claimed legal expenses, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as to its long-standing and well-established jurisprudence, in accordance with which no procedural compensation shall be awarded in proceedings in front of the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s request relating to legal expenses. 51. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 220,000. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 150,000. 5. In the event that the amounts set forth in points 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 3. and 4. are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Avenue de Beaumont 2 CH-1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Acting Deputy Secretary General Enclosed: CAS directives