F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 January 2016, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, A, country F as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 January 2016, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, A, country F as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 21 March 2014, the player from country F, A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club from country R, club B (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the first contract) valid as from the date of the signature until 30 June 2014. 2. According to art. 3. of the first contract, the Respondent undertakes to pay the Claimant, inter alia, the total amount of EUR 8,387, divided in a monthly salary of EUR 2,500 for the months of April to June 2014 and the amount of EUR 887 for the month of March 2014, payable on the 20th day of the following month. Furthermore, as from the month of April 2014, the Respondent shall pay EUR 250 net every month to the Claimant, as a monthly allowance for his apartment. 3. In addition, on 17 June 2014, the parties signed another contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015. 4. According to art. 3. of the contract, the Respondent undertakes to provide the Claimant with, inter alia, a total net amount of EUR 48,000, divided in monthly rates of EUR 4,000, payable on the 20th day of the following month. Furthermore, the Respondent shall pay a monthly allowance of EUR 250 net to the Claimant for his apartment. 5. Art. 3. of the contract further stipulates that the Claimant would be entitled, inter alia, to bonuses in relation to the final ranking of the Respondent in the League for the 2014/2015 season as follows: i. EUR 20,000 net for the places 1-5 of the final ranking; ii. EUR 15,000 net for the places 6-7 of the final ranking; iii. EUR 10,000 net for the places 8-10 of the final ranking. 6. Art. 3. specifies that these amounts are payable “at the end of the competitive year 2014-2015” and only if the Claimant “will play in at least 65% of official matches in League I”. Furthermore, in accordance with art. 3. 8, “If the player will not meet the condition regarding the minimum number of games played, the bonus will be calculated in proportion to the number of the games in which he has actual evolved”. 7. In addition, according to art. 3.10. of the contract, “The Club undertakes to pay to the player the value of 2 (two) round-trip plane tickets on the route X-Y”. 8. Art. 4.1.8 stipulates that “The Club can withhold and/or compensate from the price of this contract fines, as well as any other pecuniary sanctions established in accordance with the sporting regulations of the xxx and xxx, the signing of this agreement meaning express consent of the player about it, without the need for other formalities”. 9. Art. 4.2.25. further stipulates that “Should the player breach the obligations provisioned by points 4.2.3, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.17, 4.2.21., 4.2.22., 4.2.23, 4.2.24, as well as the ones of not consuming any type of forbidden or doping substances or methods, the club is entitled to unilaterally and promptly terminate the contract subject to just causes”. 10. According to art. 9. of the contract “Any disputes regarding the improper execution or non-execution of the obligations undertaken by the Parties by this Agreement shall be solved amicably. If such a solving is not possible, the parties have the right to address to XXX/XXX/FIFA/TAS/CAS jurisdictional bodies, according to the provisions of XXX/XXX/FIFA Charter and Regulations, or to submit it to the courts of general jurisdiction. In case sports jurisdiction is chosen, after the dispute is judged by SCJ/Dispute Resolution Chamber/Appeal Commission, the unsatisfied party may appeal the decision at XXX or FIFA,TAS/CAS. ”. 11. Additionally, according to art.10, “Football regulations applicable to this agreement are the charters, regulations and decisions of FIFA. UEFA, TAS/CAS, XXX or XXX, as the case may be and the decisions of club’s management”. 12. Furthermore, art. 11. of the contract stipulates that “The Agreement may cease under the following circumstances: at expiry of its term; by consent of the Parties; by other ways established by law or by the will of the parties”. 13. Moreover, according to art. 12. of the contract “In case of dispute as regards to applicable law, the law of country R shall prevail”. 14. On 17 September 2014, the Claimant sent a reminder to the club by means of which he underlined that “some of the salaries mentioned on the contract are yet to be paid”, giving to the Respondent a 3-day deadline to comply with its obligations, otherwise he will refer the matter to FIFA. 15. On 24 September 2014, having not received an answer or payment from the Respondent, the Claimant sent a second reminder to the Respondent, with the XY Football Association and FIFA in copy, alleging that the Respondent did not fulfil its financial obligations towards him. In particular, the Claimant points out that he did not receive his salaries for the months of June, July and August 2014, the rent for his apartment as well as his bonuses in accordance with the contract. Finally, the Claimant states in his correspondence that in case the Respondent fails to pay the relevant amounts within a deadline of three days, he “would be free toward any obligations of the club” and will ask for compensation. 16. On 27 September 2014, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract without just cause, requesting the payment of the total amount of EUR 67,500, broken down as follows: i. EUR 13,750 as outstanding remuneration, corresponding to his salaries from June, July and August 2014, his rent fee for June to August 2014 and his bonus for 6 matches played during the 2013/2014 season; ii. EUR 42,500 as compensation, corresponding to the Claimant’s monies from September 2014 until June 2015; iii. EUR 20,000 corresponding to a minimum estimation of financial loss regarding the bonuses and the optional additional contractual season; iv. EUR 5,000 as moral damages and interests as from the date of decision. 17. In his claim, the Claimant explains that on 29 September 2014, by means of an email, the Respondent informed the Claimant’s counsel that he committed disciplinary violations, and refuses to communicate his bank account number or to come to the Respondent’s headquarter to receive his payment in cash. Furthermore, the Respondent underlines that “The verbal reason he [the Claimant] invokes is that he wants to make us delay more than 90 days, because he was advised by his lawyer, which in this way FIFA will oblige us to pay him the whole contract”. 18. Furthermore, the Claimant claims that on 7 October 2014, his representative replied to the Respondent’s email (cf. point I.17. above), and rejected that he had committed serious disciplinary violations “to suffer from such a sportive isolation (no legal document signed to date and before your email”. Furthermore, he underlined that “the reasons referred to by the club are not only fallacious but also formulated so late that they can no longer be taken into account. The idea there is not to be swapping roles”. 19. The Claimant also states that until May 2014, he was paid directly by the Respondent without having to issue any bank order. As from the month of June 2014 the Respondent without giving any explanation failed to pay him despite his verbal reminders. In addition, the Claimant holds that the Respondent tried to reduce the amount due to him by reproaching him an alleged misbehaviour. Based on the foregoing, underlining the bad faith of the Respondent, the Claimant deems that the Respondent owes him his outstanding amounts, compensation and that he has the right to be free from any obligation towards the Respondent. 20. In its reply, the Respondent firstly contested the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter based on art 12 of the contract (cf point I.12. above). In this respect, the Respondent holds that the “syndic judge” of the civil court is competent to deal with the present dispute because of the fact that an insolvency procedure was opened for the Respondent and that “the syndic judge is full competence to solve unitarily all the payments request against the club from the date that the insolvency procedure was opened”. 21. As to the substance, the Respondent first underlines that the Claimant violated his contractual obligations and misbehaved during games and trainings. On 30 July 2014, the team’s coach proposed to the Respondent to impose a fine of EUR 1,500 on the Claimant for violating art. 6.7. and 6.8. of the Respondent’s internal rules. The Claimant was allegedly summoned to come to the Respondent’s headquarters for a hearing but he failed to present himself. According to the Respondent, following the hearing, on 15 September 2014 the Respondent imposed a fine of an amount of EUR 1,500 on the Claimant and notified the XY Football Association. 22. Furthermore, the Respondent holds that it could not communicate the decision to the Claimant because he allegedly refused to take it but according to it, the decision was then sent by registered post. 23. In continuation, the Respondent provided a report issued by the Respondent’s coach which states that the latter is not interested in the services of the Claimant since he committed several disciplinary offences. The Respondent further underlines that the Claimant was absent from training from 1 September until 15 September 2014 without authorisation or justification. After this period, the Claimant allegedly came back and stayed with the Respondent from 16 September until 27 September 2014 and left again. For this reason, the Respondent filed a request to the competent body of the XY Football Association to terminate the contract with the Claimant 24. Finally the Respondent holds that it was not able to pay the Claimant’s remuneration because of the fact that the latter refused to raise the money from the Respondent’s cashier and to communicate his bank account number. Since the Claimant did not come to the Respondent to receive the money his due amount for June 2014 was deposited, through a bailiff, on a bank account in country R on 17 October 2014. 25. On 28 October 2014, the Claimant replied to the payment offer issued by the Respondent and underlined that until now he had always been paid his salaries in cash and asked the Respondent to reconsider its offer, which he deemed unacceptable. 26. On 10 November 2014, the Respondent then issued another payment offer for an amount of [xx] 18,780, for the Claimant’s “fee and rent for July 2014”, inviting him to come to the Respondent to obtain his money, otherwise it will be deposited on the same account in country R (cf. point I.24. above). 27. For all the aforementioned reasons, the Respondent deemed that the DRC judge must recognise that the Respondent “agrees to pay the amount of 2.500 euro representing sportive bonus (...) and the amount of 4.250 euro representing fee and rent for August 2014 and to oblige the player to declare under his own responsibility all the particulars required for a bank account payment”, that the Claimant has to “make all the necessary steps in front of the bailiff” to receive his due amounts for the months of June and July 2014 and finally that no compensation is due to the Claimant since he refused to receive the payments voluntarily. 28. In his replica, the Claimant fully rejects the argumentation of the Respondent and, in particular, disputes his alleged misbehaviour. He further holds that the only fact that the Respondent may perhaps reproach to him is a minor issue with the coach, but the latter excluded him from the training (he holds that he remained polite and calm during a discussion with the coach in which they argued whether the ball was in or out of the pitch during a training). Therefore the Claimant holds being surprised that this minor fact could be raised against him and considered as breach of his contractual obligations. The Claimant further argues that he has never been summoned to come for a hearing at the Respondent’s headquarter. 29. In continuation, the Claimant holds that the Respondent is in bad faith and is trying to change the facts to avoid having to pay him. The Claimant finally states that this situation had a very negative influence on his health and his moral and is now in sick leave due to the present matter. 30. In its final comments, the Respondent reiterated its previous arguments and insisted on the fact that it is currently undergoing insolvency proceedings. It also underlined that the xxx NDRC confirmed its decision regarding the disciplinary offence committed by the Claimant. 31. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that after the termination of the contract with the Respondent, he found new employment with the club, xxxx, from 26 January 2015 until 30 June 2015, for which he earned a total amount of EUR 6982. The Claimant further indicated that he remains unemployed after the expiry of the mentioned contract with said club. II. Considerations of the DRC Judge 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the DRC judge took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 27 September 2014. Consequently, the DRC judge concluded that the 2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. With regard to the competence of the DRC judge, art. 3 of the Procedural Rules states that the DRC judge shall examine his jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2014 and 2015). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 lit. i. in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the DRC judge would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employmentrelated dispute with an international dimension between a player from country F and a club from country R, the litigious value of which does not exceed CHF 100,000. 3. However, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s DRC judge to deal with the present case, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the “syndic judge” of the civil court. 4. In this regard, the DRC judge noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. 5. In this respect, the DRC judge referred to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)’s jurisprudence, corroborated by the DRC, according to which the fact that a club is facing liquidation proceedings or is under bankruptcy – while remaining duly affiliated to its relevant football association – does not exclude FIFA’s competence to analyse the matter as to the substance. 6. Having said this, the DRC judge turned his attention to art. 9. of the contract (cf. point I.10. above), which stipulates that “Any disputes regarding the improper execution or non-execution of the obligations undertaken by the Parties by this Agreement shall be solved amicably. If such a solving is not possible, the parties have the right to address to XXX/XXX/FIFA/TAS/CAS jurisdictional bodies, according to the provisions of XXX/XXX/FIFA Charter and Regulations, or to submit it to the courts of general jurisdiction. In case sports jurisdiction is chosen, after the dispute is judged by SCJ/Dispute Resolution Chamber/Appeal Commission, the unsatisfied party may appeal the decision at XXX or FIFA,TAS/CAS.”. 7. In view of the foregoing, the DRC judge was of the opinion that by means of the contract concluded between them, the parties had agreed that FIFA – among several other bodies – was competent to adjudicate a contractual dispute arisen between them, as to the substance. 8. In view of all the above, the DRC judge established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter as to the substance has to be rejected and that the DRC judge is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the merits of the present matter. 9. Subsequently, the DRC judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2014 and 2015) and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 27 September 2014, the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 10. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC judge entered into the substance of the matter. The DRC judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts of the case as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the DRC judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 11. In this respect, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid as from 21 March 2014 until 30 June 2014. In addition, DRC judge took note that the parties signed another contract on 17 June 2014, valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015. Further, the DRC judge observed that it is undisputed by the parties that the Claimant was entitled to the amounts detailed in points I.2. to I.7. above, as per the aforementioned contracts. 12. In continuation, the DRC judge further observed that the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent seeking payment of the total amount of EUR 67,500 plus interest, corresponding to the amounts detailed in point I. 16. above. 13. Equally, the DRC judge took note of the reply of the Respondent, which asserted that the Claimant violated his contractual obligations and left the club without its permission (cf. points I.21. and I.23. above). 14. As a consequence of the above, the DRC judge duly noted that it first had to examine which is the date to be considered as the date on which the contract was considered to have been terminated. In this respect, the DRC judge acknowledged that the Claimant stated that on 17 September 2014, he had reminded the Respondent to comply with its obligations. Having allegedly received no reply, he sent a second reminder to the Respondent on 24 September 2014 giving it three days to comply with its obligations otherwise he will deem to be “free toward any obligations of the club” (cf. point I.15. above). Furthermore, the DRC judge further noted that the Respondent holds that the Claimant left the Respondent on 27 September 2014. After having taken into account all the circumstances of the present matter, in particular the fact that the Claimant provided a copy of a fax report proving the transmission of his letter of 24 September 2014 to the Respondent, the DRC judge found that the contract must be considered as terminated by the Claimant on 27 September 2014, after having put the Respondent in default twice and given a last three days deadline to the Respondent in his correspondence of 24 September 2014 in order to pay its alleged contractual debts. 15. In continuation, the DRC judge underlined that he had to examine whether or not the Claimant had had a just cause to terminate the contract with the Respondent on 27 September 2014. 16. In this respect, the DRC judge deemed it appropriate to recall the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 17. In view of the above, the DRC judge deemed that, in the present case, the Respondent carried the burden of proof of proving to have paid any of the amounts claimed by the Claimant or to have had any valid reasons not to pay the Claimant in accordance with the contract. 18. In this context, the DRC judge observed that the Respondent could not provide any documentary evidence proving to have paid the Claimant the outstanding amounts. Moreover, the DRC judge observed that the Respondent explicitly acknowledged that it did not pay the Claimant’s salary for the months of June to August 2014, which fell due on each 20th day of the following month (cf. point I.4. above), as well as an amount of EUR 2,500 as bonuses and several rent expenses (cf. points I.24., I.26. and I.27. above). 19. As a result, the DRC judge analysed whether the Respondent had any valid reasons not to have paid the Claimant’s remuneration as per the contract. First, the DRC judge observed that the Respondent stressed that it was not able to pay the Claimant due to the fact that the Claimant did not come back to the club to raise the money and it did not have his bank details (cf. points I. 24. to I.27. above). Furthermore, the Respondent claimed that the Claimant was fined due to his alleged bad behaviour. 20. In this regard, the DRC judge highlighted that the the alleged offer of the Respondent to pay part of the outstanding amounts as well as the deposit of some amounts through a bailiff, on a bank account in XY, occurred after the date of termination, i.e. 27 September 2014, and cannot be taken into account, as the contractual relationship between the parties no longer existed and that the Claimant left XY at that time (cf. point I.11. above). Furthermore, the DRC judge noted that the Claimant’s remuneration had been duly paid until May 2014 and, therefore, the DRC judge was not convinced by the Respondent’s arguments that it was hindered to pay the Claimant by any means or that the latter had refused to receive these payments. 21. As to the fine allegedly imposed by the Respondent on the Claimant on 15 September 2014, the DRC judge considered that such fine must be disregarded. Firstly, the DRC judge does not find it reasonable and proportionate that a player is fined for not complying with his contractual obligations, when the club, at that very moment, is itself in default of its own contractual obligations. Furthermore, the DRC judge deemed that in the context of the fine imposed on the Claimant on 15 September 2014 (cf. points I.21., I.22. and I.23. above), not only there was no clear evidence of the alleged disciplinary violation of the Claimant or of its notification, but also the Respondent recognized that it could not communicate the decision to the Claimant (cf. points I.21. and I.22. above). 22. As such, the DRC judge determined that the fine imposed on the Claimant must be disregarded. In this context, and irrespective of the foregoing consideration, the DRC judge wished to point out that the imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not be used by clubs as a means to set off outstanding financial obligations towards players. Consequently, the DRC judge decided to reject the Respondent’s argument in this connection. 23. Taking into consideration all previous deliberations, the DRC judge concluded that the total amount of EUR 13,750 was outstanding at the time of the termination of the contract by the Claimant, corresponding to monthly salaries for June (EUR 2,500), July (EUR 4,000) and August 2014 (EUR 4,000), rent fees for June to August 2014 (EUR 250 each) and bonuses for the season 2013/2014 acknowledged by the Respondent (EUR 2,500) as claimed by the Claimant (cf. point I.16. above). 24. In this context, and taking into consideration that the Respondent stated that it was not interested in the Claimant’s services (cf. point I.23. above), the DRC judge concluded that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of time regarding a significant amount of money. As a consequence, the DRC judge established in accordance with its well established jurisprudence that the Claimant had terminated the employment contract with just cause on 27 September 2014 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with the Claimant. 25. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the DRC judge went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant. 26. First of all, the DRC judge concurred that the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination i.e. the amount of EUR 13,750, consisting of the monthly salaries and the Claimant’s rent for the months of June to August 2014 as well as EUR 2,500 as match bonuses, amount previously recognised by the Respondent (cf. point I.27. above). 27. As a result, the DRC judge determined that the Respondent has to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 13,750 as outstanding remuneration. Considering the Claimant’s claim for interest, the DRC judge also ruled that the Respondent must pay 5% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amounts as from 28 January 2016. 28. In continuation, the DRC judge decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding remuneration on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 29. In this context, the DRC judge outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 30. In application of the relevant provision, the DRC judge held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC judge established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 31. Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the DRC judge took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the DRC judge concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Claimant on 27 September 2014 until its regular expiry amounts to EUR 42,500 (10 months) and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 32. In continuation, the DRC judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 33. The DRC judge remarked that the Claimant had found new employment on 26 January 2015, where he earned the total amount of EUR 6,983 for the period between the date of the signature until 30 June 2015 (cf. points I.31. above). 34. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber judge and the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, the remuneration as indicated in the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 35. In view of all of the above, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 35,517 to the Claimant, which is considered by the DRC judge to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract. 36. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent must pay to the player interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation for breach of contract as of the date of the present decision, i.e., 28 January 2016, until the date of effective payment. 37. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 13,750 as well as the amount of EUR 35,517, corresponding to compensation for breach of contract without just cause, plus 5% interests p.a. on both amounts as from the date of the present decision, i.e. 28 January 2016. 38. The DRC judge concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected. ***** III. Decision of the DRC judge 1. The claim of the Claimant, A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, club B, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 13,750 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 28 January 2016 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 35,517 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 28 January 2016 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 3. and 4. plus interest are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the DRC judge of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the DRC judge: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives