F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, 29 August 2017

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 29 August 2017,

by

Geoff Thompson (England)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Adel AmroucheCoach A, Country B

as “Claimant”

against the

Football Federation of Country C

as “Respondent”

regarding an employment-related

contractual dispute between the parties.

I. Facts of the case

1. On 1 January 2014, the Coach of Country B, Adel AmroucheCoach A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and Foorball Federation of Country C (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid for “five years and one month”, by means of which the Claimant was entitled to inter alia receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of 2,500,000 net “before the 6th day of each month in arrears, and in the event of delay in payment beyond the 6th day of the month, such delay shall be accommodated for a period not more than 14 days following”.

2. The Respondent is allowed to terminate the contract if the Claimant “conducts himself in a manner that brings Football in Country C into Disrepute” (cf. art. 6 (ii) of the contract).

3. In accordance with art. 6 (iii) of the contract “in the event that the Federation [i.e. the Respondent] terminates his agreement, it shall pay the Head Coach [i.e. the Claimant] all payments due to him to the end of his term as stated in this agreement on condition he does not take up coaching assignment elsewhere until the term expires. If any equivalent opportunity or job is taken up by the Head Coach during the term of this agreement then the Head Coach shall forfeit all compensation due to him”.

4. Equally, art. 6 (iv) of the contract established that “in case the Head Coach wishes to resign from his duties, he shall give a written notice for a period of 2 months. In such case the Head Coach shall pay two months salary (7,500,000) only to the Federation”.

5. Furthermore, art. 10 of the contract stated inter alia that, in case of force majeure “namely circumstances beyond the control of the parties which shall include (but shall not be limited to) acts of God, perils of the sea or of the air, drought, explosion, sabotage, accident, embargo, riot, civil commotion or breakdown of civil authority, wars or revolution (..), fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restriction and freight (..) neither party shall be under liability to the other of anything which apart from this provision may constitute breach of this agreement”.

6. Finally art. 12 provided that the Claimant and the Respondent “shall make effort to resolve amicably by direct informal negotiations any disagreement or dispute arising between them under or in connection with this agreement. If, after 30 days from the commencement of such informal negotiations Football Federation of Country C and the Head Coach have been unable to resolve amicably a contract dispute either party may require that the dispute be referred for resolution and arbitration at the Centre for Arbitration & Dispute resolution in accordance with the Arbitration Act of Laws of Country C and if no settlement is reached to FIFA”.

7. By means of a correspondence dated 25 August 2014 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the Respondent terminated the contract in order to preserve the “national interest”. In the same correspondence it is mentioned that “we regret the action the matter is neither in the control of your hands nor that of the Federation but the decision is purely on national and public interest”.

8. On 4 March 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract and requested from the Respondent the payment of outstanding remuneration in the amount of 5,000,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as follows: on 2,500,000 as of 7 July 2014 and on 2,500,000 as of 7 August 2014. Furthermore, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 132,000,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 26 August 2014.

9. In this respect, the Claimant explained having been provisionally banned by the Disciplinary Board of CAF on 4 June 2014 for two games “due to an alleged spitting offence against a referee in a game between Country C and Country D that had taken place on 20 May 2014”. According to the Claimant, he had served the ban in two games on 18 July and 3 August 2014 respectively whereas, on 17 July 2014, the CAF Disciplinary Board had passed a final decision banning him for one year. The decision in question was apparently appealed by the Claimant with the CAF Appeal Board which finally “rejected the spitting offence and lifted the one-year ban. However, due to a verbal dispute that had taken place between the Claimant and the Referee in the same game (..), the CAF Appeal Board banned the Claimant for six games – out of which two bans had already been served [cf. above] (..) and imposed a fine of USD 10’000”. In this context, the Claimant further clarified that, on 27 February 2015, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) had “lifted the fine imposed by the CAF Appeal Board and confirmed the ban of six (..) games” and on, 16 February 2016, “in an act of grace, the Executive Committee of CAF lifted the remaining sanctions (..)”.

10. In continuation, the Claimant specified that by the time the termination letter was issued, his salaries for June and July 2014 had been outstanding and therefore, he was entitled to claim from the Respondent 5,000,000 plus 5% interest p.a. since the relevant amount became due.

11. In continuation, the Claimant accused the Respondent of having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause. In the Claimant’s opinion, the disciplinary proceedings that had been opened against him “could never justify an anticipated unilateral termination” of his employment contract because when the termination letter was issued, the decision of the CAF Appeal Board had not yet been final and binding.

12. In addition, the Claimant considered his dismissal disproportionate as the Respondent could have warned and even suspended him before dismissing him. In this context, the Claimant was eager to emphasize that a termination of an employment relationship should always be the ultima ratio.

13. In view of the above, the Claimant deemed being entitled to compensation for breach of contract in the amount of his remaining salaries under the contract, i.e. from September 2014 until January 2019, i.e. 53 months at 2,500,000 “which is 132,5 Mio in total”, plus 5% interests p.a. as of 26 August 2014 in accordance with Swiss Law.

14. Finally, the Claimant clarified that after an unsuccessful attempt to solve the dispute amicably with the federation, he had submitted the matter to the Dispute Resolution Centre of Country C on 24 August 2015 in accordance with art. 12 of the contract (cf. point I.6 above). However and since no further information was received from the Dispute Resolution Centre of Country C after a mere confirmation of receipt on 9 September 2015, the Claimant explained to have withdrawn his request for mediation on 3 March 2016.

15. In its response on 9 May 2017, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety.

16. In this respect, the Respondent considered having had just cause to terminate the contract in view of the ban imposed on the Claimant in accordance with art. 6 (ii) of the contract (cf. point I.2 above) as well as Employment Laws of Country C. According to the Respondent, the Claimant’s offence “on a match official amounted to conduct unbecoming that was bound to affect [its] reputation” and the one year ban imposed on the latter “made it impossible to discharge his coaching duties” so that it had not had any option but to terminate their contractual relationship.

17. Furthermore, the Respondent deemed that, as per art. 10 of the contract, no compensation was to be paid to the coach (cf. point I.5 above).

18. In addition, the Respondent contested having been aware of the decision of the CAF Appeal Board dated 18 August 2014 when the contract was terminated.

19. In continuation, the Respondent contested FIFA’s competence to take a decision in the dispute at stake in accordance with clause 12 of the contract which requires “arbitration in case of any dispute on the contract has not been fully exhausted”. According to the Respondent, the Claimant “having referred the dispute to the Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, should have allowed the process to run its due course instead of imposing timelines and thereafter hurried withdrawing his case from the Arbiter even before the Respondent could be made aware of the referral of the matter to arbitration.”

20. The Respondent further mentioned its willingness to “work with the claimant in order to resolve this dispute amicably”.

21. Finally, the Respondent clarified that the Claimant had been “promptly and fully paid his dues up to the point of his dismissal (..) and the Respondent does not owe him any sums of monies in unpaid dues or at all”.

22. Lastly, the Respondent asked to be reimbursed for the legal costs incurred.

23. In his replica on 18 July 2015, the Claimant mainly reiterated the content of his claim and rejected the allegations of the Respondent.

24. In addition, the Claimant contested the applicability of the “force majeure clause” included in the contract (cf. point I.5 above) arguing that in casu “no Force majeure has ever occurred” and pointed out that the ban “did not hinder [him] to fulfil most of his other contractual obligations, such as observe opponent teams, selecting the players, prepare the team, instruct his assistants, determine the starting eleven on the bench in four official games”.

25. Equally, the Claimant stressed that the decision of the CAF Appeal Board of 18 August 2014 in which it was determined that he had not spat on anyone was duly notified to the Respondent on 23 August 2014.

26. Finally, the Claimant asserted having “perfectly complied with the formal requirements” of art. 12 of the contract (cf. point I.6 above).

27. In its final position on 22 August 2015, the Respondent mainly reiterated the contents of its previous submission.

28. In addition, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant had been employed by the Club of Country E, Club F on 16 June 2016 and, prior to that, he was a “Commentator with Channel G. He as such cannot claim salaries till January 2019 and is deemed to have forfeited the same and any other compensation due to him” as per art. 6 (iii) of the contract (cf. point I.3 above).

29. Asked about his labour situation as of 25 August 2014, the Claimant informed FIFA on 10 July 2017 that he had not been able “to conclude any employment contract since 25 August 2014”.

30. On 15 August 2017, the Claimant clarified having indeed worked for the Club of Country E, Club F (cf. point I.28 above) but added that no contract was concluded with the latter club as he “could not find an agreement with the said club with regard to the working conditions. Therefore, the parties terminated their cooperation without that an employment contract would ever have been concluded between them”.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, the Single Judge referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 4 March 2016, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he shall adjudicate on an employment-related dispute between a club or an association and a coach that has an international dimension.

3. As a consequence, the Single Judge would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present employment-related dispute involving a Coach of Country B and Football Federation of Country C Association.

4. However, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Respondent had contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies to take a decision in the matter at stake on the basis of clause 12 of the contract arguing that the arbitration had “not been fully exhausted”.

5. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that in accordance with clause 12 of the contract, the parties, in case of dispute, “may” refer the issue “for resolution and arbitration at the Centre for Arbitration & Dispute Resolution in accordance with the Arbitration Act of Laws of Country C” before reverting to FIFA “if no settlement is reached”. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge was first of all eager to emphasize that the aforementioned clause did mention FIFA as a competent body to which the parties should revert in case an amicable settlement of the dispute is not possible. Furthermore, the Single Judge pointed out that the provision in question allowed the parties to refer a possible dispute to the Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Country C – “the parties may require that the dispute be referred for resolution and arbitration at the Centre for Arbitration & Dispute resolution” (emphasis added) - without obliging them to do so. As a result, from the Single Judge’s point of view, it was safe to conclude that the parties had not agreed upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Country C and had not excluded the competence of FIFA to take a decision on a dispute arising from the agreement.

6. Notwithstanding the aforementioned and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge found it worthwhile to also mention that the Claimant had indeed and undisputedly contacted the Dispute Resolution Centre of Country C before lodging a claim with FIFA, but withdrew his claim after never having been contacted by such deciding body.

7. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee is competent, on the basis of art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that the Claimant’s claim is admissible.

8. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2015 and 2016 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 4 March 2016. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations).

9. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file.

10. In this respect, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 1 January 2014, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid for “five years and one month”, which provided for the Claimant to receive from the Respondent a monthly salary of 2,500,000 “before the 6th day of each month in arrears, and in the event of delay in payment beyond the 6th day of the month, such delay shall be accommodated for a period not more than 14 days following”.

11. Furthermore, the Single Judge remarked that, in accordance with art. 6 (ii) of the contract, the Respondent was allowed to terminate the contract if the Claimant “conducts himself in a manner that brings Football in Country C into Disrepute”. Furthermore, the Single Judge recalled that, as per art. 6 (iii) of the contract, if the Respondent “terminates his agreement, it shall pay the Head Coach [i.e. the Claimant] all payments due to him to the end of his term as stated in this agreement on condition he does not take up coaching assignment elsewhere until the term expires. If any equivalent opportunity or job is taken up by the Head Coach during the term of this agreement then the Head Coach shall forfeit all compensation due to him”. Equally, the Single Judge took note of the fact that, as stated in art. 6 (iv) of the contract, “in case the Head Coach wishes to resign from his duties, he shall give a written notice for a period of 2 months. In such case the Head Coach shall pay two months salary (7,500,000) only to the Federation”. In the same context, the Single Judge noticed that, as provided in art. 10 of the contract, in case of force majeure “namely circumstances beyond the control of the parties which shall include (but shall not be limited to) acts of God, perils of the sea or of the air, drought, explosion, sabotage, accident, embargo, riot, civil commotion or breakdown of civil authority, wars or revolution (..), fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restriction and freight (..) neither party shall be under liability to the other of anything which apart from this provision may constitute breach of this agreement”. Finally, the Single Judge observed that the contractual relationship between the parties was terminated on 25 August 2014 by the Respondent in order to preserve the “national interest”.

12. Subsequently, the Single Judge also took note of the coach’s allegations in accordance with which disciplinary proceedings would have been opened against him following an incident occurred during a match on 20 May 2014, whereas a final decision would have been taken by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 27 February 2015.

13. In continuation, the Single Judge remarked that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had accused the Respondent of having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause on 25 August 2014 and of having failed to pay him his salary of June and July 2014. The Single Judge also noted that, because of the aforementioned, the Claimant deemed being entitled to claim from the Respondent the payment of outstanding remuneration in the amount of 5,000,000, together with 5% interest p.a., and of compensation for breach of contract in the sum of 132,500,000, together with 5% interest p.a..

14. In addition, the Single Judge noticed that, for its part, the Respondent, had rejected the claim of the Claimant as to the substance arguing that the relevant termination of contract had occurred with just cause and alleging that all remuneration due to the latter up to that moment had duly been paid.

15. After having carefully contemplated the submissions of the parties as well as the documentation at his disposal, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was whether the Respondent had terminated the contract with or without just cause on 25 August 2014.

16. In this regard, the Single Judge recalled that the Respondent considered having had just cause to terminate the contract on the basis of art. 6 (ii) of the contract in view of the ban that had been imposed on the Claimant and deemed that, considering the content of art. 10 of the contract, no compensation whatsoever was payable to the latter.

17. In this context, the Single Judge acknowledged that it had to examine whether the reason put forward by the Respondent could justify the termination of the contract in the present matter.

18. To that end, the Single Judge referred to his well-established jurisprudence and emphasized that, as a general rule, only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract without notice. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employer to ensure the employee’s fulfilment of his contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure.

19. In view of the above, the Single Judge observed that the Respondent had been banned for six games in connection with a verbal dispute that had apparently taken place between him and a referee during a match on 20 May 2014. From the Single Judge’s point of view and in accordance with his constant jurisprudence, such an offense could not justify per se a termination of contract without notice. Equally, the Single Judge was of the opinion that the relevant offense did not constitute a danger to the national interest in Country C as alleged by the Respondent. In addition and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge deemed it necessary to add that, at the time of the contract’s termination, the ban imposed on the Claimant had not yet been valid and binding as the relevant decision had then been appealed at CAS.

20. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge was of the firm opinion that the Respondent did not have just cause to prematurely terminate the employment contract with the Claimant, since such breach could not legitimately be considered as being severe enough to justify the termination of the contract, and that there would have been more lenient measures to be taken (e.g., among others, a suspension or a fine) in order to sanction the latter for his behaviour during one single match. In fact, these measures had already been taken, considering the Claimants suspension for 6 matches until their lifting by the Executive Committee of the CAF, and no valid justification for further measures – as the termination – a was provided by the Respondent.

21. After having established the foregoing, the Single Judge went on analysing the consequences of the breach of contract without just cause committed by the Respondent.

22. Nevertheless, before entering the analysis of the consequences of the unjust breach of contract on the part of the club, the Single Judge deemed it appropriate to first assess whether any outstanding remuneration was still due by the Respondent to the Claimant. In this regard, the Single Judge underlined that the Claimant had requested from the Responded the payment of the amount of 5,000,000, corresponding to his June and July 2014 salaries, with an interest of 5% per year. Besides, the Single Judge recalled that the Respondent had not provided any evidence in support of the allegation that the claimed amounts would have been duly paid to the Claimant and referred to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules in accordance with which any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. Hence, the Single Judge concluded that the relevant arguments of the Respondent could not be taken into account for lack of proof.

23. In view of the aforementioned, considering the specific request of the Claimant as well as the content of the contract with regard to the latter’s monthly remuneration, bearing in mind that the contract between the parties had been terminated on 25 August 2014 and taking into account the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge resolved that the Respondent, in order to fulfil its obligations established in contract has to pay to the Claimant the outstanding amount of 5,000,000, corresponding to the latter’s salary of June and July 2014.

24. Additionally and with regard to the Claimant’s request for interest, the Single Judge, recalled that, in accordance with the agreement, the monthly salary of the Claimant was to be paid by the 6th day of the relevant month in arrears and, in case of delay in the payment “beyond the 6th day of the month” by no later than 14 days after. In this context, the Single Judge stressed that, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, when the parties to a contract have agreed on a grace period, the interest rates in case of late payment may apply as of the expiration of the relevant grace period.

25. As a result and taking into account the specifies of the present dispute, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant interest as follows: 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 from 21 July 2014 until the date of effective payment and 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 as of 21 August 2014, i.e. one day after the respective grace period elapsed.

26. Having established the aforementioned and turning his attention to the compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent following the termination without just cause of contract by the latter, the Single Judge reverted to the content of the compensation clauses inserted in the second contract (cf. art. 6 (iii) and (iv) of the contract) and pointed out that the relevant provisions not only provided for two completely different amounts to be paid in case of termination by the Respondent or by the Claimant but also specified that the Claimant was only entitled to receive compensation insofar as he remained unemployed. As a result, the Single Judge deemed that the provisions in question had to be considered as disproportionate as well as contrary to the principle of contractual freedom and against a coach’s obligation to mitigate the damage after having been dismissed without just cause. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that clause 6 (iii) of the contract could not be applied and that the amount of compensation due to the Claimant had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria.

27. Equally, the Single Judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed a new employment contract after having been dismissed by the Respondent on 25 August 2014 by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to his constant practice, such remuneration under a new employment contract would be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the coach’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

28. The Single Judge noted in this respect that, according to the Claimant´s own declaration, he had not been able to conclude any new employment contract as of 25 August 2014.

29. From the Single Judge’s point of view, considering the time elapsed between the early termination of the contract on 25 August 2014 and the date of today, i.e. three years later, the Claimant could have been expected to encounter new employment and mitigate the loss incurred to some extent.

30. Consequently, on account of all the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Single Judge decided to partially accept the Claimant´s claim and established that the amount of 60,000,000, corresponding to approximately half of the remaining value of the contract, i.e. the sum of 132,000,000, had to be considered fair and reasonable in casu as compensation for breach of contract.

31. Equally and with regard to the Claimant’s request for interest, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant 5% interest p.a. on the amount of 60,000,000 as from 4 March 2016, i.e. the date of the Claimant’s claim, until the date of effective payment.

32. Finally and as to the Respondent’s request to be reimbursed for the legal costs incurred, the Single Judge recalled that in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, “No procedural compensation is awarded in proceedings of the Players’ Status Committee and the DRC”. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent’s request regarding the reimbursement of the legal expenses allegedly incurred has to be rejected.

33. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the following payments are to be made to the Claimant by the Respondent:

- outstanding remuneration in the amount of 5,000,000, plus 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 from 21 July 2014 until the date of effective payment and 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 from 21 August 2014 until the date of effective payment;

- compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 60,000,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 4 March 2016 until the date of effective payment.

34. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party.

35. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant and the Respondent have to bear the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.

36. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is higher than CHF 200,001, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

37. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 20,000.

38. Consequently, both the Claimant and the Respondent have to pay the amount of CHF 10,000 in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, Football Federation of Country C, has to pay to the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of 5,000,000, plus interest, as follows:

a. 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 from 21 July 2014 until the date of effective payment;

b. 5% p.a. over the amount of 2,500,000 from 21 August 2014 until the date of effective payment.

4. The Respondent, Football Federation of Country C, has to pay to the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 60,000,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 4 March 2016 until the date of effective payment.

5. If the aforementioned sums, plus interest as established above, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 20,000 are to be paid by both parties, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows:

6.1. The amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A. Considering that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of CHF 5,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, has to pay the remaining amount of CHF 5,000.

6.2. The amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, Football Association of Country C.

6.3. Both amounts have to be paid directly to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

7. The Claimant, Adel AmroucheCoach A, is directed to inform the Respondent, Football Association of Country C, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 3. and 4. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Coach Adel AmroucheA, Country B / Football Association of Country C 16

Encl. CAS directives