F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – club vs club disputes / controversie tra società – (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 24 July 2019

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 July 2019,

by

Roy Vermeer (the Netherlands)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the club

Club A, Country B

as “Claimant”

against the club

Club C, Country D

as “Respondent”

regarding a contractual dispute between the parties and

relating to the player Player E

I. Facts of the case

1. On 27 December 2015, the Country B club, Club A (hereinafter: Club A or the Claimant) and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: Club C or the Respondent) signed a loan transfer agreement for the temporary transfer of the player Player E (hereinafter: the player) to Club C, “free of payment”, for the period from 1 January 2016 until 30 June 2016. On the same date, i.e. 27 December 2015, the player and Club C, entered into an employment contract valid from 6 January 2016 to 20 June 2016.

2. On 25 March 2016, the player and Club C signed an employment contract valid as from 21 June 2016 until 20 June 2021 (hereinafter: the first employment contract), in accordance with which the player was entitled, inter alia, to a total remuneration of USD 4,800,000.

3. In this regard, art. 9.4 of the first employment contract established the following: “If [the Player] wants to leave during the contract period, in this case, he must pay penalty amount of 5,000,000 US $ (Five million Dollar only)”.

4. On 28 May 2016, Club A, Club C, and the player signed a tri-partite document titled “Agreement of Professional Football Player Transfer” (hereinafter: the agreement) for the permanent transfer of the player from Club A to Club C as from 21 June 2016.

5. The agreement stipulated, inter alia, the following: “[…] 3- [Club C] adheres to pay the amount of [USD 500,000] upon the arrival of the International Playing Card (ITC); 4- [Club C] adheres to pay five payments to [Club A], the amount of each payment is [USD 100,000] according to the following dates: 01/01/2017 - 01/01/2018 - 01/01/2019 - 01/01/2020 - 01/01/2021”.

6. Art. 6 of the agreement reads as follows: “The three parties agreed that in case of the willingness of [Club C] and the willingness of [the player] to sell the Player’s Card of [the player] to another club during the validity period of the payments which end up on 01/01/2021, [Club C] adheres to pay 20% to [Club A] as substitute of transfer of his new club which will be paid in synchronization with the player’s transfer to his new team and the validity of above payments referred in the fourth item remain according to the agreed appointments“.

7. On 15 January 2017, the player and Club C signed a second employment contract valid as from 1 January 2017 until 30 June 2021 (hereinafter: the second employment contract). Moreover, according to the second employment contract, drafted in English and language of Country D, the player and Club C agreed to cancel the first employment contract.

8. In accordance with the second employment contract, the player was entitled to a total remuneration of USD 6,350,000 from Club C, payable by means of monthly salaries of USD 117,592, due at the end of each month.

9. Art. 9.2 of the second employment contract stipulated the following: “In case of a request [the player] to leave the club during the current term of the contract in this case he must pay the amount of $ 6,500,000 (only six million and five hundred thousand US dollars) as a penal order to achieve the application of the penalty clause thus the need for the player’s commitment to: be informed of the company [Club C] in writing 20 days before the closing of the period under and record players. The payment of the penalty clause before the…” (note: no further specification in the English text of the second employment contract).

10. On 17 January 2017, the player, Club C and the Saudi club, Club F (hereinafter: Club F) signed a tri-partite document titled “Professional Football Player Loan Agreement” (hereinafter: the loan agreement to Club F) for the temporary transfer of the player from Club C to Club F, for the period as from 17 January 2017 until 30 June 2017, and by means of which Club F undertook the obligation to pay USD 1,000,000 to Club C as loan transfer fee.

11. According to Club C, on 11 May 2017, it received and official offer from Club F for the permanent transfer of the player from the former to the latter, against the payment of USD 3,000,000, which it refused.

12. On 11 June 2017, the player sent a letter to Club C titled “Subject: Termination of a contract of Professional Football Player”, in which the player referred to article 9.2 of the second employment contract and notified Club C about the termination of the second employment contract pursuant to said article.

13. On 30 June 2017, Club A contacted Club C requesting the payment of 20% of the total amount paid as compensation, in accordance with art. 6 of the agreement, in relation to the alleged permanent transfer of the player from Club C to Club F.

14. On 6 July 2017, Club C replied in writing to Club A, maintaining that the player unilaterally terminated the second employment contract, that there “were no transfers involving Club C involving the Player”, and therefore, “[Club A] is not entitled to any sums”.

15. On 10 October 2017, Club A lodged a claim before FIFA against Club C concerning the payment of additional transfer compensation in accordance with art. 6 of the agreement due to the alleged permanent transfer of the player to Club F in July 2017. In particular, the Claimant requested the following:

a. “Apply the provisions of (art. 6 of the agreement) on the amount paid to [Club C] for the release of the player i.e. 6.5 Million USD and to pay [Club A] 20% thereof i.e. USD 1,300,000 and to apply 5% interest on this amount as of the date of the transfer of the Player till the date of payment;

b. To order [Club C] to produce all the documents that [Club A] has no access […];

c. To order [Club C] to compensate [Club A] for the damage it caused it by refusing to pay its contractual obligation on time which had caused tremendous damage for [Club A]. For the purpose of this claim, [Club A] evaluates the damage it suffered to be USD 1,000,000 to be paid by [Club C];

d. To order [Club C] to contribute to the legal cost of [Club A] and pay him USD 15,000 in addition to any cost that FIFA would levy on this proceeding”.

16. According to Club A, before the end of the loan to Club F, Club C received offers from the latter, amongst other clubs, for the definitive transfer of the player. Club A maintained that said initial offers were rejected by Club C and subsequently, the latter informed both the player and Club F that should “the player wants to leave […], the amount of 6.5 million USD has to be paid for the player to be released”.

17. In this context, Club A sustained that, in light of the Club C’s alleged “non-flexible position”, Club C was paid the amount of USD 6,500,000, and the player was released and subsequently permanently registered with Club F.

18. Along this line, Club A was of the opinion that “[the player] could have not been able to pay the amount stipulated in his Buy-out clause by himself, and he would have need the assistance of a third party who was interested in him, which in our case it was nothing but obvious to be Club F”. In this respect, Club A held that the player’s alleged total income from his football career did not go beyond USD 1,645,000, “assuming he did not use any of the amount he earned during his career”.

19. With these considerations, Club A referred to art. 6 of the agreement and sustained that it is clear that Club C has the obligation to pay Club A 20% of USD 6,500,000, in view of the fact that the player moved to Club F and that Club C was paid this amount in order to enable the move.

20. In this regard, Club A referred to art. 18.1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations as well as case law, and held that “the primary goal of interpretation is to ascertain the true common intentions (consensus) of the parties”, and with this in mind, Club A maintained that art. 6 of the agreement has to be seen as “Sell-on Clause”, and its intention was to provide an additional payment to it in case of “resale” of the player to a third club.

21. Moreover, Club A referred to the CAS Award CAS 2011/A/2356 and held that art. 9 of the second contract should be considered a “Buy-out clause” and that it should be considered “rather a future transfer fee” agreed between Club C and the player in order for the player to be released from the Club C. Moreover, Club A stated that its inclusion in the second contract was done in an attempt to avoid the payment of the sell-on fee to Club A.

22. Hereto, Club A sustained that what matters to determine the existence of a “transfer” under the FIFA Regulations is whether a particular player’s move meets the following 4 requirements, which in casu Club A deemed were met:

a. The consent of the club of origin to the early termination of its contract with the player. According to Club A, this requirement was met by means of art. 9 of the second employment contract i.e. the alleged buy-out clause;

b. The willingness and consent of the new club of acquiring the player’s rights. According to Club A this requirement was met as the player was registered with Club F on a permanent basis;

c. The consent of the player to move from one club to the other club. According Club A this requirement was met as the player signed an employment contract with Club F;

d. The price or value of the transaction. According to Club A, the value of the transaction is the USD 6,500,000 that Club C received.

23. Finally, according to Club A, the “formal” interpretation of art. 6 of the agreement done by Club C in order to reject Club A’s entitlement to the sell-on fee “is contrary to the principle of good faith”.

24. In its reply, Club C asked that Club A’s claim be rejected. More specifically, Club C requested FIFA to acknowledge “that the sell-on clause in article 6 of the Transfer Agreement was never triggered and the player was not transferred to third club”, as well as that Club A bears the costs of the proceedings and is ordered to pay USD 20,000 as “Attorney fees”.

25. In this respect, Club C, while referring to art. 6 of the agreement, sustained that Club A’s intention was limited to inserting a “Sell-on Clause” with a percentage agreed by the parties being 20%. Club C held that it was Club A that “initiated such clause”.

26. Along this line, Club C held, that in accordance with CAS jurisprudence, in particular CAS 2016/A/4379, a “Sell-on clause” must be defined as a clause where the old club may receive an additional fee from the new club when the player is transferred to a third club regardless of the amount of the transfer. Club C maintained that it is undisputed that in the matter at hand it did not transfer the player to a third club.

27. Moreover, Club C referred to the wording of art. 6 of the agreement and maintained that, in accordance with it, “Club C was only in the obligation to pay [Club A] 20% only when the Player’s International Card is sold to a third club”. In this respect, Club C stated that it is undisputed that it never “sold” the player’s International Card to a third party, but rather the player himself unilaterally terminated the employment contract with it.

28. In addition, Club C deemed that the award CAS 2011/A/2356 does not apply to the present matter since it identifies a transfer for the purposes of solidarity mechanism and is therefore limited to that concept.

29. In relation to art. 9 of the second employment contract, Club C deemed that it should be considered as a “Buy-out clause”, and that its scope should be considered specific and limited to the termination of the employment contract by the player, and “cannot by any means extend to be interpreted as a right of transfer or a sell of the player’s international card”. Furthermore, Club C declared that the buy-out clause was inserted since the first contract.

30. In this regard, Club C held that, by executing the buy-out clause and fulfilling the payment in connection thereto, it did not have the authority over the player and could not interfere in the player’s move to a different club.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: Single Judge) analysed which edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber is applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2018) as well as to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 10 October 2017. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the 2017 edition of said Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand (hereinafter: Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and par. 4 as well as art. 22 lit. f) of the 2019 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at stake since it concerns a dispute between two clubs affiliated to different associations.

3. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred to art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2019) and to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 10 October 2017. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the June 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable in the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Single Judge emphasized that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. The Single Judge acknowledged that, following a previous loan transfer agreement, on 28 May 2016, Club A, Club C, and the player signed the agreement for the permanent transfer of the player from Club A to Club C as from 21 June 2016, in turn of a transfer fee payable in instalments amounting to a total of USD 1,000,000.

6. Moreover, the Single Judge took into account that, according to art. 6 of the agreement, “the three parties agreed that in case of the willingness of [Club C] and the willingness of [the player] to sell the Player’s Card of [the player] to another club during the validity period of the payments which end up on 01/01/2021, [Club C] adheres to pay 20% to [Club A] as substitute of transfer of his new club which will be paid in synchronization with the player’s transfer to his new team and the validity of above payments referred in the fourth item remain according to the agreed appointments”.

31. In continuation, the Single Judge took note that, after having signed a first contract on 25 March 2016, on 15 January 2017 the player and Club C signed a second employment contract valid as from 1 January 2017 until 30 June 2021, according to which the first employment contract was cancelled and the player was entitled to a total remuneration of USD 6,350,000.

7. The Single Judge then observed that art. 9.2 of the second employment contract established the following: “In case of a request of [the player] to leave the club during the current term of the contract in this case he must pay the amount of $ 6,500,000 (only six million and five hundred thousand US dollars) as a penal order to achieve the application of the penalty clause […]”.

8. The Single Judge further noted that, following a loan agreement dated 17 January 2017 between the player, Club C and Club F for the temporary transfer of the player from Club C to Club F, for the period as from 17 January 2017 until 30 June 2017, on 11 June 2017 the player terminated his employment contract with Club C referring to its article 9.2.

9. In addition, the Single Judge observed that, during the course of the proceedings, it was never contested that the player joined Club F initially on a temporary basis and, subsequently, permanently.

10. In continuation, the Single Judge took into account that, according to Club A, after an initial offer of USD 3,000,000 which had been refused by Club C, Club F eventually paid the amount of USD 6,500,000 established at art. 9.2. of the employment contract between Club C and the player, in order for the latter to release himself from the former and sign with Club F. Moreover, the Single observed that, according to Club A, as a consequence of the player’s transfer from Club C to Club F, the sell-on clause envisaged at art. 6 of the agreement between Club A and Club C of 28 May 2016 had been triggered. Consequently, Club A deemed that it was entitled to 20% of the amount paid to Club C, i.e. USD 1,300,000, as well as damages and the reimbursement of procedural costs.

11. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that, according to Club C, no transfer had occurred with Club F, as the player unilaterally terminated the contract without its consent, invoking the “buyout clause”. Moreover, the Single Judge took note that, according to Club C, the player was never transferred based on a contractual scheme, whereas the intention of the parties was to delimit the activation of the “sell-on clause” only to the scenario of a proper “sale” of the player, thing which did not happen in the case at stake. Therefore, according to Club C, the sell-on clause contained in the agreement with Club A had not been triggered

12. To sum up, the Single Judge observed that the parties, substantially did not dispute that: (a) after having joined Club F on loan in January 2017, the player was transferred to Club F from Club C on a permanent basis in June 2017; (b) the employment contract provided for a buyout clause in the amount of USD 6,500,000; (c) the buyout clause had been executed, as consequence of which the player was transferred to Club F (d) the transfer agreement signed on 28 May 2016 between Club A and Club C provided for a sell-on clause in the amount equivalent to 20% of the sum received by Club C from a future transfer of the player.

13. In light of the parties’ conflicting position and considering the abovementioned undisputed facts, the Single Judge concluded that the main issue in the matter at stake was to determine whether Club F’s execution of the payment of the buyout clause contained in the player’s employment contract triggered the sell-on clause contained in the transfer agreement between Club A and Club C.

14. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent relied on a specific award rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 29 November 2010, i.e. CAS 2010/A/2098 Club G v. Club H.

15. The Single Judge deemed it worth recalling, first of all, the Panel’s cursory look at the raison d’être of sell-on clauses carried out in said award, as it is safe to assume that its findings are generally accepted in the football world and undisputed between the parties of the present matter. According to the Panel, the purpose of sell-on clauses “is to “protect” a club (the “old club”) transferring a player to another club (the “new club”) against an unexpected increase, after the transfer, in the market value of the player’s services; therefore, the old club receives an additional payment in the event the player is “sold” from the new club to a third club for an amount higher than that one paid by the new club to the old club”.

16. That said, the Single Judge preliminary pointed out that, according to the Panel in the Club G v. Club H case, the factor triggering the sell-on clause in the transfer agreement underlying that very dispute was a subsequent “resale” of the player, which – for the ease of reasoning – the Panel equated to a simple sale.

17. Furthermore, in that occasion, the Panel observed that “in the context of a “sale” contract, a transfer, being object and purpose of the parties’ consent, can actually be made in two ways: (i) by way of assignment of the employment contract; and

(ii) by way of termination of the employment agreement with the old club and signature of a different employment agreement with the new club. In both cases, the old club expresses its agreement (to the assignment or to the termination of the old employment contract, as the case may be) against the receipt of a payment – which substitutes for the loss of the player’s services; the new club accepts the assignment of the existing employment contract or consents to enter into a new contract with the player; and the player consents to move to the new club”.

18. Moreover, the Single Judge noted that, according to the Panel, “a transfer of a player can also take place outside the scheme of a (“sale”) contract, in the event that the player moves from a club to another following the termination of the old employment agreement […]”.

19. Against this background, bearing in mind that the transfer agreement at the basis of that dispute had a sell-on fee triggered in case of a “resale” of the player by Club G to a third club, the Panel in the said award recognised that, to the extent that the sell-on clause in that case refers to a “resale”, it applies only to subsequent transfers of the player to a new club which are based on a contract.

20. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Single Judge pointed out that:

(i) in the Panel’s reasoning in CAS 2010/A/2098, a crucial role was played by the ‘Real Decreto’ concerning the inclusion of buyout clauses in players’ employment contracts and the impact on club’s willingness when players are transferred as a consequence of the execution of buyout clauses, which does not apply to the matter at stake;

(ii) contrary to the CAS 2010/A/2098 case, whereby the underlying sell-on clause explicitly referred to a “resale” of the player, the sell-on clause at the basis of the present dispute solely refers to a “willingness of [Club C] and the willingness of [the player] to sell the Player’s Card of [the player] to another club”;

(iii) as pointed out by the Panel in CAS 2010/A/2098 case, a transfer of a player can occur outside the contractual scheme of a sale.

21. That having been clarified, the Single Judge was of the opinion that, in order to shed light on the sell-on clause’s meaning, he should look at its literal tenor as first means to interpret the parties’ real intention. In this respect, he noted that such clause does not seem to explicitly require the contractual scheme of a sale, “resale”, or any other determined contractual scheme in order for the 20% sell-on clause to be triggered.

22. The clause at stake rather seems to require only that the player is transferred to a third club “during the validity period of the payments which end up on 01/01/2021”. It appeared to the Single Judge that said circumstance undisputedly occurred in the case at hand, since it remained uncontested that the player was transferred from the Respondent to Club F following the execution of the USD 6,500,000 buyout clause.

23. Although confident of the exhaustiveness of the foregoing line of reasoning, for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge deemed it worth to recall, once more, the very purpose of sell-on clauses. In the reality of the transfer market, whereby the value of players undergoes unforeseeable fluctuations, clubs agree to include such clauses in order to ‘protect’ themselves against an uncertain or hardly predictable significant increase in the value of a player that, at a certain stage, they decide, or have the necessity, to sell to another club.

24. Against this background, the Single Judge also recalled that the football market shows that clubs sometimes follow the practice of including buyout clauses in the employment contracts they sign with players.

25. In light of the foregoing, the Single Judge was of the opinion that the substance of the transaction underneath the execution of buyout clauses and the purpose that such clauses serve must be always kept in mind. In this respect, the Single Judge wished to emphasise that the reality and the substance of the transactions should prevail on discussions about forms or schemes of transfers, even more so in cases – like the one at stake – where the ‘selling club’ freely decided to insert a buyout clause in the employment contract signed with the player.

26. Moreover, the Single Judge thought important to bear in mind that, although formally speaking these buyout clauses seem to require that the player pays the related amount himself, in reality most of the times, if not always, their amount is, as a matter of fact, not payable by a physical person. As it happens, players do not trigger buyout clauses by paying the, often enormous, amounts themselves. The clubs wanting to secure their services do so on their behalf.

27. In other words, buyout clauses, regardless of how they are drafted, constitute de facto an anticipated acceptance of a future possible transfer of a player against the relevant predetermined amount.

28. In light of all the above considerations, the Single Judge concluded that, as the transfer of the player from Club C to Club F had undisputedly occurred, Club A was entitled to 20% of the amount received by Club C in relation to it, in accordance with art. 6 of the transfer agreement signed between the parties on 28 May 2016.

29. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’, Club C is liable to pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 1,300,000 in accordance with clause 6 of the transfer agreement.

30. In addition, taking into account Club A’s request, the Single Judge decided that Club C must pay to the Claimant 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as of the date of 12 June 2017, as requested, until the date of effective payment.

31. The Single Judge concluded his deliberations by establishing that any further claim lodged by Club A is rejected.

32. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party.

33. In this respect, the Single Judge highlighted that the claim is partially accepted and that Club C is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the both Club Aand Club C have to bear the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.

34. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is higher than CHF 200,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

35. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 25,000.

36. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that Club Ahas to pay the amount of CHF 5,000 and Club C the amount of CHF 20,000 in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, the total amount of USD 1,300,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount from 12 June 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. If the aforementioned sum, plus interest as established above, is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any other claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid by both parties within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows:

5.1. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid by the Claimant directly to FIFA. Considering that the Claimant has already paid the amount of CHF 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant is exempted from paying the aforementioned amount as costs of the proceedings.

5.2. The amount of CHF 20,000 has to be paid by the Respondent directly to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no. XX-XXXXX/XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 2. is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer

Encl. CAS directives