F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – solidarity contribution/ contributo di solidarietà – (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 30 November 2017

Decision of the sub-committee of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC)

passed on 30 November 2017,

in the following composition:

Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman

Roy Vermeer (Netherlands), member

Jérôme Perlemuter (France), member

on the claim presented by the club,

Club A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding training compensation in

connection with the player, Player E

I. Facts of the case

1. According to the player passport issued by the Football Association of Country B (Football Association F) the player, Player E, born on 4 January 1999, was registered as an amateur with its affiliated club, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), as follows:

Club Registration dates Category

Club A

as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011

2

Club A

as from 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012

2

Club A

as from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013

2

Club A

as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014

2

2. The football season in Country B runs from 1 July to 30 June of the following year.

3. According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 24 August 2015, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorised the transfer of the minor player, Player E (hereinafter: the player), from Country B to Country D. Likewise, on 4 September 2015, the player was registered as a professional with the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), and the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) of the player was issued by the Football Association F in favour of The Football Association of Country D (Football Association G) on 3 September 2015, indicating the Claimant as the player’s last club.

4. Also according to the TMS, the Respondent belonged to the club category 1 at the time the player was registered with it.

5. On 5 May 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent asking to be awarded training compensation in connection with the first professional registration of the player with the Respondent. In particular, the Claimant requested EUR 300,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 30 days after the player’s registration with the Respondent and that the latter bear any possible costs of the present proceedings.

6. In this context, the Claimant referred to art. 25 par. 6 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: FIFA Regulations), according to which, FIFA decision-making bodies shall apply the aforementioned regulations whilst taking into account, inter alia, national laws, and held that, under Law of Country B, the Claimant was not in a position to offer the player a contract in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations. In particular, the Claimant referred to an award issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (hereinafter: Award H), according to which the CAS recognized that it is forbidden under Law of Country B to offer the player a contract before he reaches the legal minimum age of 16 years old and that it cannot be expected from a club to risk criminal sanctions in order to retain its entitlement to training compensation, and stated that the present matter is identical to the case at the basis of the Award H.

7. In this regard, the Claimant provided extracts of the relevant provisions of Law of Country B as well as a copy of a royal decree, in accordance with which no valid and binding employment contract can be concluded with football players under the age of 16. In this respect, the Claimant highlighted the criminal sanctions that could be imposed on a club in the event of an offence.

8. Furthermore, the Claimant compared general CAS jurisprudence in connection with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations to the Award H, in which award the CAS panel concluded that, considering the particularities of the case at the basis of the Award H, what in other matters could be insufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine and bona fide interest in keeping the player, in the Award H it came to a different conclusion. In this respect, the Claimant argued that CAS clearly makes a distinction between the situation in which the training club could have offered the player a professional contract, but failed to do so, and the situation in which the training club did not legally have such possibility. In particular, the Claimant asserted that the burden of proof required in the last situation is much lower, since the training club only has to convince the panel that the club would have offered the player a contract if it had the possibility to do so.

9. In this respect, the Claimant referred to jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), pursuant to which, the fact that a club could have offered the player a contract but failed to do so was a crucial factor in deciding that no training compensation was payable. The Claimant further argued that, a contrario, where a club was not in the position to offer the player a contract, the conclusion must be that training compensation is payable, unless there are other factors showing that the club was no longer interested in the player.

10. In this context, the Claimant held that, in April 2014, the player, who at that time was 15, communicated his decision to leave the club and his deregistration took effect as of 1st July of the following season, i.e. 1 July 2014, in line with the Football Association F regulations. The Claimant stressed that the only reason why it did not offer the player a contract was the legal impossibility, due to his age. In particular, the Claimant recalled that it is well-known for its state of the art training facilities and that it has developed a policy aimed at social integration and education of its young players that lead to sporting success, where well-known players, such as Player J, Player K, Player L, Player M and Player N were trained.

11. With regards to the player, the Claimant submitted a copy of the player’s evaluations dated between December 2009 and December 2013 and asserted that the results of his evaluations show his talent, his positive development, with increasing scores that were amongst the highest of his team, and the club’s advice, which in the Claimant’s opinion show the specific attention that was given to the player and his development, with the aim to prepare him for professional football, and the Claimant’s interest in retaining him for the future. In particular, the evaluations submitted contained the following comments:

- evaluation dated 21 December 2013: the player’s stamina is considered as a strength, whereas it is suggested that he needs to work on his “start speed, acceleration and duel strength”,

- evaluation dated April 2013: “[the player] is the leading player of the group. This season he made progression on his personality in the team and also in executing his tasks with the teamplay. Working points are still to score more and to penetrate more in the penalty area. Keep up the good work and we wish you all the best next season in the U15 team”,

- evaluation dated April 2012: “[the player] played an outstanding 2nd period and has developed both tactically as mentally (playing for the team). Improving movement between the lines and speed of action. The player is considered to be very important for the team and he is now better coping with this role (he now realizes that he needs other players around him in order to succeed). The next two seasons will be defining = how will he be coping with the increasing importance of physical strength?”,

- evaluation dated March 2012: “very talented: ([the player] is ahead of the other players)”,

- evaluation dated December 2011: “[the player] is playing on a level that we may expect from a player with his talents. He has difficulties when playing against more physical players = he needs to play quicker and smarter. Talent that will need to progress a lot on a mental and tactical level as he is lacking physical strength at the moment”,

- evaluation dated 19 December 2011: “after a hesitating start [the player] played a very good first period and is considered to be a very important player for the team. He stands out above the average, which sometimes leads to negative reactions. We will raise the bar in the next period and we will work on his shortcomings to make this top player even better!”.

12. Likewise, the Claimant provided a copy of unsigned invitations to the national team drafted in Language of Country B for matches to be played on 28 October 2013, on 27 November 2013 and on 22 January 2014 as well as the following player’s statistics with the Claimant’s youth teams:

13. Equally, the Claimant submitted an interview between Two Journalists of Country B and Country D who closely follows players in Country D, which reads as follows: “I [The Journalist of Country B] haven’t seen him play but they tell me he’s like all those small skilful guys (…). [The player] was one of the best players in [the Claimant] U14s and U15s (…). He left this summer after a dispute, not that [the Claimant] thought he was not good enough (…). From what I’m told [the Claimant] wanted to keep [the player], but they had some reservations about [his brother], who isn’t the tallest for his age – [the Claimant] have a policy of wanting tall goalkeepers. [The player’s father] wanted both boys at the same club, so that’s why they decided to leave [the Claimant]”. In this respect, the Claimant further provided mass media articles, published between 19 February 2015 and 5 October 2016, which describe the player as “wonderkid”, that refer to him as one of the “60 best young talents in the world football” and that compare him to Player O.

14. As to the calculation of training compensation, the Claimant held that between 1 October 2009 and 31 July 2014, art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations contained the “exception to the exception”, by means of which, if the event giving rise to the right to training compensation occurred before the end of the season of the player’s 18th birthday, training compensation shall not be calculated on the basis of category 4 clubs but following the regular calculation method.

U11

U12

U13

U14

U15

Goals scored per season

20

25

29

14

11

Minutes played per season (%)

90%

84%

90%

88%

83%

Assists per season

22

10

30

21

19

15. In this regard, the Claimant asserted that, in line with consistent jurisprudence of FIFA and CAS regarding the retroactive application of the relevant regulations as well as with the FIFA Circular number 1437, the amendment of art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations is not applicable to the present matter since, during the period the player was registered with the Claimant, it was not in force. Similarly, the Claimant submitted an extract of an EPFL “Q&A session with FIFA” dated 5 February 2015, according to which to the question “is the higher amount, respectively training costs of the new club (i.e. category 1 club up to USD 90,000), applicable for the training period of a player between 2009-2014?” the FIFA representative replied that “to answer this question it is most relevant to know when the elements to the dispute arose (…). In this case at hand it would probably seem to be the training period. Therefore it might still be possible to apply the old provision in force between 2009 and 2014, respectively the higher amount defined as the training costs incurred by the new club, if the training occurred in that period of time. Ultimately, it will be up to the [DRC] to finally take a decision regarding this aspect”. Equally, the Claimant provided a copy of a slide of a presentation supposedly made by EPFL, according to which, after 2014 and in accordance with the FIFA Circular number 1437, the “exception to the exception” contained in the 2009 edition of the Regulations is removed but the FIFA DRC does not apply the new provision retrospectively.

16. In light of the foregoing, the Claimant concluded that the amount payable as training compensation must be determined by the FIFA Regulations that were in place at the time during which the player was trained by the Claimant, irrespective of future changes. As a result, the Claimant asserted that, considering that the player was registered with the Respondent when he was 16, that the Claimant is a category 2 club and that the Respondent belongs to category 1, EUR 300,000 are payable as training compensation, i.e. EUR 75,000/season for the seasons 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014.

17. In its reply, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim by stating that the latter failed to comply with the requirements of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations. In this respect, the Respondent referred to DRC and CAS jurisprudence and held that, in the absence of a contract offer, the burden of proof lies on the party claiming training compensation, who shall unambiguously demonstrate that it had a bona fide and genuine interest in retaining the player in order to be able to offer a contract to him at a later date, and that such intention has to have been manifested in a pro-active way, including communicating such interests to the player.

18. In particular, the Respondent asserted that the Claimant is not able to provide sufficient evidence of its interest in retaining the player and that such absence arises because the Claimant did not have such interest and did not genuinely intend to retain his services beyond the season 2013/2014.

19. In this respect, the Respondent submitted a declaration of the player’s father, according to which “[the Claimant] rarely spoke to me about [the player’s] future and did not discussed any plan for him beyond the 2013/2014 season” and the Claimant “made no attempt to convince me or [the player] that [the Claimant] was committed to [him] or that they were considering offering [him] a contract in the future”. As a result, the Respondent asserted that, after the end of the season, having still not received any approach from the Claimant to invite him to re-register with it for the following season, the player reasonably concluded that the Claimant was no longer interested and therefore proceeded to leave the club and seek other opportunities.

20. Moreover, the Respondent did not dispute that the Claimant was unable to offer the player a contract, but rejected that this fact alleviates its obligation to show bona fide and genuine interest in order to retain its entitlement to training compensation.

21. In this respect, and as to the documentation provided by the Claimant, the Respondent asserted that they are inadequate and insufficient. In particular, the Respondent stated that:

- the player’s performance evaluations and appearance data show a steady decline in the player’s performance over time, including a decrease in the minutes played per season, his goals per season and his number of assists per season;

- the Claimant failed to provide any performance data or evaluation reports in relation to the season 2013/2014 and stated that this omission is striking since it was the player’s last season at the Claimant and is what will need to be analysed to determine whether the Claimant sufficiently discharged the burden of proof. In this respect, the Respondent acknowledged that the player was injured for some time of that season, but insisted that his injury does not justify the complete absence of such records and that the Respondent considers that the effect of the injury on the Claimant’s interest in retaining the player is highly material;

- it is surprising that the Claimant has no evidence of its discussions with the player regarding his future, yet it claims that he was one of the leading players in his year group in season 2012/2013;

- as to the purported “call-ups” of the player to the national team, the Respondent challenged the veracity of the invitations on the basis that they were neither signed nor printed on the letterhead of the Football Association F. Equally, the Respondent submitted a declaration of the player’s father, according to which he was in the national team on 3 occasions but did not play in a single competitive match for the National Team of Country B during his registration with the Claimant;

- as to the interview with The Journalist of Country B, the Respondent pointed out that he has no connection to the player or the Claimant and that he has not even seen the player in action at the time the article was written;

- as to the mass media articles, the Respondent held that they cannot be accepted since the Claimant is trying to use them as evidence of its intention to retain the player but they were published after the player joined the Respondent.

22. Additionally, the Respondent asserted that the purpose of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations is to ensure solidarity between football clubs and to encourage clubs to train young players by compensating their expenses if the player subsequently decides to leave the training clubs contrary to their wishes. However, the Respondent argued that such system cannot operate to the detriment of players’ freedom to move, particularly when a player’s training club has not offered him the opportunity to continue his career with it, as it would constitute a breach of EU law in relation to the free movement of workers.

23. In light of the foregoing, the Respondent held that the Claimant has shown no interest in retaining the player beyond the 2013/2014 season and that it has given the player no reason to believe that he had the opportunity to build a career with it. In this context, the Respondent stated that, even with the understanding that no training compensation was payable, after the Claimant’s release, it took the player a year to secure a new club. In particular, the Respondent argued that, if it had considered that training compensation was payable for the player, it would not have registered the player, and his prospects of finding a new club would have been diminished and possibly even extinguished through no fault of his own, which, in the Respondent’s opinion, cannot possibly be the intention of the FIFA Regulations.

24. Furthermore, the Respondent alternatively argued that, if any, the amount payable as training compensation would be EUR 40,000. In this respect, the Respondent submitted that the triggering element for the payment of training compensation, pursuant to art. 20 of the FIFA Regulations, is not the training of the player with the Claimant but the professional registration of the player with the Respondent or, alternatively, when the Respondent’s liability crystallised following the player’s registration. Consequently, the Respondent stated that, pursuant to art. 26 of the FIFA Regulations, and considering that the player entered into the scholarship agreement with the Respondent on 1 July 2015 and that he was registered with the Respondent in September 2015, the 2014 edition of the FIFA Regulations, which does not contain the “exception to the exception”, is applicable to the present matter.

25. As to the retrospective effect of laws, the Respondent asserted that it is prohibited under Swiss law, unless it is expressly dealt with in the relevant regulations, it is limited in time, does not lead to serious inequality, it is justified by relevant grounds and does not infringe vested rights.

26. In this respect, the Respondent argued that the CAS award the Claimant referred to in fact confirms the Respondent’s position. In the relevant CAS award, the CAS Panel found that applying art. 26 par. 2 of the Regulations would violate the prohibition on retrospective effect as it does not fall within the exceptions. In particular, the Respondent alleged that CAS took a decision based upon which edition of the FIFA Regulations it considered had the closest connection to the facts of the case, which in the present matter would be the edition 2014 of the FIFA Regulations, since it is the edition that was in force when the player left the Claimant, signed a contract with the Respondent, was registered for the Respondent and training compensation was purported to have fallen due.

27. In this regard, the Respondent submitted that art. 26 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations should be upheld in the present matter and that the retrospective application of the 2014 edition of the FIFA Regulations could in any event be justified since the amendment to art. 5 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the FIFA Regulations was introduced to rectify the “exception to the exception”, which, in the Respondent’s opinion, was contrary to public policy and potentially unlawful if applied in practice. In particular, the Respondent referred to a decision passed by the European Court of Justice, in accordance with which, disproportionate compensation would be a serious risk of constituting an unjustified restriction on the player’s ability to move between clubs within the EU, and held that FIFA amended this provision before it had been applied in order to comply with EU law. In light of the foregoing, the Respondent concluded that the retrospective application in the CAS award the Claimant referred to was justified in order to avoid the application of the “exception to the exception”, whereas in the present matter, “the retrospective application of the amendment is required precisely to avoid the application of such potentially unlawful provision”.

II. Considerations of the sub-committee of the DRC

1. At first, the sub-committee of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: sub-committee) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 May 2017. Consequently, the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the sub-committee referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in light of arts 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In accordance with art. 3 of Annexe 6 in conjunction with art. 24 par. 3 and art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), the sub-committee is competent to decide on the present dispute relating to training compensation between clubs belonging to different associations handled through TMS.

3. Furthermore, the sub-committee analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of said Regulations (editions 2015 and 2016), and considering that the player was registered with the Respondent as a professional on 3 September 2015, the 2015 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the sub-committee and the applicable regulations having been established, the sub-committee entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the sub-committee started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and documentation submitted by the parties. However, the sub-committee emphasized that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. First of all, the sub-committee took note that the Claimant submitted that it is entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 300,000, on the basis that the player had signed his first professional contract with the Respondent.

6. Likewise, the sub-committee noted that the Respondent, for its part, rejected the claim arguing that the Claimant has not made a contract offer to the player in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations and has not shown genuine and bona fide interest in keeping the player.

7. In addition, the sub-committee took into account that it has remained uncontested that the player signed his first professional contract with the Respondent.

8. In this respect, and hereby referring to the rules applicable to training compensation, the sub-committee stated that, as established in art. 1 par. 1 in combination with art. 2 par. 1 lit. i. of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21 when a player is registered for the first time as a professional before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday.

9. Moreover, the sub-committee referred, in particular, to art. 6 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which contains special provisions regarding players moving from one Association to another Association inside the territory of the European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA). More specifically, the sub-committee turned its attention to art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 which stipulates, inter alia, that the former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered post at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract.

10. In view of the above, the sub-committee stated that, first and foremost, it had to verify whether art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations applies in the present case as lex specialis, and, in the affirmative, to determine if the Claimant had complied with the said provision in order to be entitled to training compensation.

11. As far as the applicability of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations is concerned, the sub-committee stated that, as the player moved from a club in Country B to a club in Country D, i.e. moved from one Association to another Association inside the territory of the EU, said article is applicable. Therefore, the sub-committee concluded that the aforementioned provision applies in the case at hand as lex specialis.

12. On account of the above, the sub-committee analysed whether or not the Claimant had complied with the prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations in order to be entitled to training compensation.

13. In this sense, the sub-committee emphasized that, in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 sent. 1 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, if the former club does not offer the player a contract, no training compensation is payable unless the former club can justify that it is entitled to such compensation. The former club must offer the player a contract in writing via registered mail at least 60 days before the expiry of his current contract (cf. art. 6 par. 3 sent. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations).

14. In this context, the sub-committee pointed out that the Claimant acknowledged not having offered the player a professional contract on the basis that he was under the legal minimum age of 16 when deregistering from the Claimant. In this respect, the Claimant submitted that in accordance with Law of Country B, no valid and binding employment contracts can be concluded with football players under the age of 16.

15. On account of the above and the documentation on file, the sub-committee concluded that it has remained undisputed that the Claimant was not in the position to offer the player a contract.

16. Having said this, in continuation, the sub-committee proceeded to analyse if the Claimant could justify that it is nevertheless entitled to training compensation for the player’s first registration as a professional with the Respondent.

17. In particular, the sub-committee examined whether the Claimant had provided sufficient proof in support of said justification to receive training compensation. The sub-committee referred to the constant jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, which was confirmed by CAS, and considered that such justification can, in general, be manifested by a club by displaying a genuine and bona fide interest in keeping the player in question in its team and by showing a proactive attitude vis-à-vis the respective player, so as to clearly manifest that the club intends to count on the player for the future.

18. In this respect, the sub-committee, and hereby referring to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, recalled that the burden of proof to demonstrate any justification to receive training compensation notwithstanding not having offered a contract to the player, i.e. a genuine and bona fide interest of the Claimant in retaining the services of the player, lies with the Claimant. Equally, the sub-committee recalled that, according to the well-established jurisprudence, this justification is limited to very exceptional circumstances and shall be analysed on a case-by-case basis.

19. Having said that, the sub-committee examined the documentation submitted by the Claimant and highlighted that, although the player was registered with the Claimant until 30 June 2014, his last evaluation dates back to 21 December 2013. Equally, the sub-committee deemed that the comments outlined in the player’s evaluations do not constitute conclusive evidence demonstrating that the Claimant had a genuine and bona fide interest in keeping the player in its team beyond the 2013-2014 season. Likewise, the sub-committee underscored that the Claimant had not provided documentation demonstrating the player’s role in the Claimant’s team for the future or that it had communicated such future plans to the player and/or his parents. Consequently, the sub-committee concurred that the Claimant had not demonstrated a proactive attitude vis-à-vis the player, so as to clearly manifest that it intended to count on the player for the future.

20. In light of the above, the sub-committee concluded that the Claimant had not provided sufficient and conclusive evidence demonstrating that it had in fact a genuine and bona fide interest in retaining the player. Consequently, the sub-committee concurred that the aforementioned considerations could lead to no other conclusion than that the Claimant failed to comply with the prerequisites of art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations in that it could not justify that it is entitled to training compensation in spite of not having offered the player a contract. In view of the foregoing, the sub-committee decided that the Claimant is not entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent for the training and education of the player and that, thus, the Claimant’s claim had to be rejected.

21. As a result, and taking into account the above, the sub-committee did not deem it necessary to discuss and analyse the other arguments brought up by the parties to the present dispute.

22. Lastly, the sub-committee referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the DRC relating to disputes regarding training compensation, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. It is further stipulated that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and that, in accordance with Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute.

23. In respect of the above, the sub-committee held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 300,000 related to the claim of the Claimant. Consequently, the sub-committee concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000 (cf. table in Annexe A).

24. Considering the above, and taking into account the complexity of the case as well as the outcome of the decision, the sub-committee determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 20,000, which shall be borne by the Claimant.

III. Decision of the sub-committee of the DRC

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is rejected.

2. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 20,000 are to be paid by the Claimant to FIFA, CHF 5,000 of which have already been paid as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings. Consequently, the additional amount of CHF 15,000 is to be paid by the Claimant to FIFA within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no. XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH 27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the sub-committee of the DRC:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Enclosed: CAS directives