F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2016-2017) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 13 October 2016

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 October 2016,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member

Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the matter between the club,

Club A, country B,

as Claimant

and the player,

Club C, country D,

as Respondent I

and the club,

Club E, country F,

as Respondent II

and the club,

Club G, country H

as Respondent III

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 24 July 2015, the player from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent I), born on 6 November 1985, and the club from country H, Club G (hereinafter: Club G or the Respondent III), mutually terminated their contractual relationship.

2. On 27 July 2015, the Respondent I and the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: Club A or the Claimant), concluded a “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel” (hereinafter: the contract with Club A), valid as of 1 August 2015 until 30 June 2017.

3. Pursuant to art. 5 of the contract with Club A, the Respondent I was entitled to the following remuneration:

 2015-16 season:

- 125,000 as monthly salary payable at the end of the month;

- 1,000,000 as sign-on fee payable after signature of the contract and upon receipt of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC);

 2016-17 season:

- 125,000 as monthly salary payable at the end of the month;

- 1,000,000 as sign-on fee payable in two instalments of 500,000 on 1 September 2016 and 31 January 2017 respectively.

4. Furthermore, art. 5.2 of the contract with Club A provides for the following benefits:

 An accommodation;

 A mean of transport;

 Three return flight tickets for the Respondent I and his family.

5. Art. 14 further stipulates that “the present contract comes into force upon its signature by the parties and its homologation by the Football Federation of country B or, if need be, by the Ligue Nationale de Football Professionnel” (free translation).

6. On 4 August 2015, the Respondent I and the club from country F, Club E (hereinafter: Club E or the Respondent II), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract with Club E), valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2017.

7. Pursuant to clause 3 of the contract with Club E, the Respondent I was entitled to the following remuneration:

 2015-16 season: EUR 115,000 (approx. 1,200,000) net payable as follows:

- EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 August 2015;

- Ten equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 payable on the 5th of the month from September 2015 until May 2016;

 2016-17 season: EUR 115,000 net payable as follows:

- EUR 15,000 by no later than 30 August 2016;

- Ten equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 payable on the 5th of the month from September 2016 until May 2017.

8. Clause 21 of the contract with Club E further provides, inter alia, that:

“2. The [Respondent I] declares that:

a) There is no impediment to the signature of the present contract and to the link established with the club, once he has full capacity to establish such link, i.e. to be bound to the club and officially practice the activity of professional football player in favour of the club, this being an essential condition to the contract, as acknowledged and signed;

b) That all questions/disputes related to prior contractual relationships with third parties are definitively settled, this being an essential condition to the contract, as acknowledged and signed;

c) His sporting registration rights do not belong to another club, this being an essential condition to the contract, as acknowledged and signed

3. Should the veracity of the facts described in the above-mentioned paragraph not be established, the present contract shall be deemed null and void, and the [Respondent I] shall compensate the club with all the amounts due” (free translation).

9. On 5 August 2015, the Association of Football Federations of country H issued the player’s International Transfer Certificate (ITC) in favour of the Football Federation of country B.

10. On 6 August 2015, the Football Federation of country B registered the Respondent I.

11. On the same date, the Claimant addressed an e-mail to the Respondent I, inviting him to collect his sign-on fee and to join the team on 9 August 2015.

12. On 8 August 2015, the Claimant sent a second e-mail to the Respondent I, taking note of his absence of reply and requesting his location in order to buy his flight ticket.

13. On 10 August 2015, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I, requesting him to be at the club’s facilities on 11 August 2015 and informing him that should he not do so, a penalty of EUR 2,000 per day of absence would be applied.

14. On 13 August 2015, the Association of Football Federations of country H issued the player’s ITC in favour of the Football Federation of country F.

15. On the same date, the Football Federation of country F registered the Respondent I.

16. On 14 August 2015, the Claimant’s representative informed the Football Federation of country F about the contract with Club A signed with the Respondent I and requested its intervention in the matter at stake.

17. On 19 August 2015, the Football Federation of country B addressed a correspondence to FIFA, requesting its intervention, in particular considering the fact that the Respondent I had played an official game with the Respondent II.

18. On 27 August 2015, FIFA replied to the Football Federation of country B, informing it that the issue related to the player’s ITC delivery was transmitted to its competent bodies.

19. On 15 and 23 September 2015, the Claimant sent a correspondence to the Respondent III and the Association of Football Federations of country H, asking them for explanations regarding the circumstances surrounding the player’s ITC delivery.

20. On 23 September 2015, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the Respondent I and Respondent II, informing them that it would lodge a claim in front FIFA for breach of contract.

21. On 26 October 2015, Respondent II replied to the Claimant, explaining that when it signed the contract with Club E with the Respondent I, it believed that the latter was a free agent. In support of its assertion, Respondent II points out that no dispute arose when it requested the player’s ITC from the Association of Football Federations of country H. In view of the above, Respondent II concludes that it cannot be held jointly liable with the Respondent I of any breach.

22. On 2 November 2015, the Claimant sent a new correspondence, rejecting Respondent II’s argumentation and reiterating its intention of lodging a claim in front of FIFA.

23. On the same day, the Claimant addressed a correspondence to the Respondent III and the Association of Football Federations of country H, requesting once again explanations regarding the ITC issue.

24. On 22 December 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent I, Respondent II and the Respondent III holding them jointly and severally liable for breach of contract without just cause and inducement to the breach respectively. In particular, Club A requested the amount of EUR 1,500,000 as well as the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent I, Club E and Club G.

25. In its claim, the Claimant explains that by signing two contracts covering the same period of time, the Respondent I breached art. 18 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. Club A further sustains that Club E and Club G should be held jointly liable to the payment of the compensation based on art. 17 par. 2 and 17 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players respectively, all the more considering their lack of reaction to its several correspondence.

26. As to the calculation of the compensation, the Claimant first points out that the residual value of the contract amounts to EUR 508,250, broken down as follows:

 EUR 270,250 as residual salaries;

 EUR 188,000 as residual sign-on fees;

 EUR 50,000 as monetary value of the benefits provided to the Respondent I under art. 5.2 of the contract with Club A.

27. In continuation, the Claimant stresses that in order to determine the compensation, the Dispute Resolution Chamber should take into consideration the following elements: (i) the significant financial efforts made to hire the Respondent I; (ii) the breach occurred within the protected period; (iii) its absence of fault; (iv) the suddenness of the termination and (v) the sporting and financial damage resulting from the obligation to hire a new player not perfectly substitutable in a hurry.

28. In its reply to the claim, Respondent II reiterates that it relied on the information uploaded in TMS according to which “the [Respondent I] mutually agreed an early termination with his former club” and, therefore, believed in good faith that the Respondent I was a free agent. In addition, Respondent II outlines that if the Respondent I had a contract and was registered with another club, a dispute would have arisen when it requested the player’s ITC, quod non. In this respect, Respondent II points out that it was only informed of the contract signed between the Respondent I and the Claimant on 24 September 2015, i.e. more than one month after the signature of the contract with Club E. In view of the above, Respondent II concludes that it should not be held jointly liable to pay compensation and sporting sanctions should not be imposed on it.

29. In his reply to the claim, the Respondent I alleges that the “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel”, i.e. the contract with Club A, does not constitute a valid contract. First, the Respondent I highlights that it did not understand the content of the contract with Club A, which was drafted in French, a language that he does not understand. In this regard, the Respondent I explains that he interpreted the terms “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel” as “a mandate to be registered in the Federation of country B to iniciate negociations regarding the future signature of sports labor contract and not a real professional labor contract”.

30. In addition, the Respondent I sustains that he did not travel to country B and therefore neither signed any original of the contract, nor was he provided with a copy of the latter. In this respect, the Respondent I points out that he did not know that a contract could be concluded via e-mail.

31. In continuation, and should the contract with Club A be deemed valid, the Respondent I argues that it did not come into force as the requirements stipulated in art. 14 of the contract with Club A were not complied with.

32. The Respondent I further states that the conviction that he was a free agent was reinforced by the delivery of his ITC by the Association of Football Federations of country H in favour of Respondent II.

33. In view of the above, Respondent II and the Respondent I conclude that if any compensation was awarded, the Association of Football Federations of country H should be responsible for its payment.

34. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent III did not reply to the claim.

35. In its replica, the Claimant outlines that it acted diligently before signing the contract with Club A with the Respondent I, making sure that the latter was a free agent. In addition, the Claimant insists that several contract offers were made to the Respondent I before the parties reached an agreement and concluded the contract with Club A on 27 July 2015.

36. In continuation, the Claimant outlines that upon the Respondent I’s request, the contract with Club A was translated into English. Moreover, the Claimant points out that the Respondent I could not ignore that the document constituted a “professional labor contract” and not a “mandate” for the following reasons: (i) the contract was signed between him and a club, whereas a mandate is normally signed between an agent and a player or a club; (ii) the form and the clauses of a contract and a mandate differ completely; and (iii) the correspondence addressed to the Respondent I on 6, 8 and 10 August 2015 clearly refer to an employment contract.

37. Furthermore, the Claimant emphasises that the fact that the contract with Club A was concluded via e-mail does not have influence over its validity, as long as it contains the essentialia negotii. In this respect, the Claimant points out that both parties expressed their consent in a written document. In addition, the Claimant alleges that it bought a flight ticket for the Respondent I to travel to country B. The Claimant further argues that the contract with Club A was registered in the framework of the ITC procedure and that, in any case, the validity of a contract cannot be made subject to its homologation by, or its registration at the Federation.

38. Regarding Respondent II’s argumentation, the Claimant stresses that its alleged absence of fault is irrelevant since the joint liability of the new club provided for in art. 17 par. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is automatic. In this respect, the Claimant states that, in a second instance, Respondent II could lodge a claim against the Respondent I and the Respondent III to obtain damages.

39. In their joint final comments, the Respondent I and Respondent II reiterate their preivous argumentation, while emphasising that the Respondent I would not have agreed on the content of clause 21 of the contract with Club E if he had been aware that he was bound by a valid employment contract with the Claimant.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 22 December 2015. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a club from country B, a player from country D, a club from country F and an club from country H.

3. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the claim in the present matter was lodged on 22 December 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to establish as to whether, as claimed by the Claimant, a breach of contract had been committed by the Respondent I, it should first of all pronounce itself on the issue of the validity of the “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel” dated 27 July 2015, which was submitted by the Claimant.

6. In this respect, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent I challenged the validity of said contract. In particular, the Claimant explains that the latter document was drafted in a language that he did not understand and that he interpreted the terms “Contrat d’Engagement de Joueur Professionnel” as “a mandate to be registered in the Federation of country B to iniciate negociations regarding the future signature of sports labor contract and not a real professional labor contract”. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to refer to its longstanding and well-established jurisprudence and emphasised that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. In light of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent I’s reported ignorance of the French language is not a valid cause to consider the document he signed as null and void.

7. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber proceeded to analyse the argument of the Respondents that the contract with Club A cannot be deemed as a valid employment contract. In this respect, the Chamber wished to highlight that, in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the Claimant and the Respondent I.

8. After careful study of the contract presented by the Claimant, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent employment contract, in particular, the fact that the contract establishes that the Respondent I has to render his services to the Claimant during a fixed period of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I a monthly remuneration.

9. Furthermore, the Chamber wished to emphasise that, in a connected world, the physical presence of the parties is no longer needed to conclude a valid contract, more and more contracts being now concluded by electronic means and at a distance. Therefore, the DRC rejected the argument of the Claimant in this regard.

10. On account of the above, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the arguments of the Respondent I and the Respondent II cannot be upheld and that the contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent I on 27 July 2015 was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from the 1 August 2015 until 30 June 2017.

11. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent I challenged the enforceability of the contract with Club A on the basis that it was not approved by the Football Federation of country B and the League in accordance with its art. 14. In this respect, the DRC deemed of pertinence to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity or enforceability of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration or homologation procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of one party and on which the other party has no influence.

12. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent I.

13. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’ respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was undisputed that the Respondent I never joined the Claimant in order to offer his services to the latter in accordance with the relevant employment contract. Also, it is undisputed that, on 4 August 2015, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with the Respondent II covering partially the same period of time as the employment contract the Respondent I signed with the Claimant. By acting as such, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent I had acted in breach of the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and is therefore to be held liable for termination of the contract without just cause.

14. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs shall apply.

15. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that given the facts of the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent I had obviously occurred within the applicable protected period.

16. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question of the consequences of such unjustified breach of contract committed by the Respondent I during the protected period.

17. In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent I is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Respondent I’s new club, i.e. the Respondent II, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Respondent I’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by the CAS. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach. In any event, the Chamber determined that it would attend to the question of the possible inducement to breach of contract by the Respondent II at a later stage of its deliberations, i.e. after having discussed the issue of the compensation due to the Claimant.

18. Taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent I under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.

19. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent I contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

20. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years.

21. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent under the existing contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s).

22. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent I had been set to expire on 30 June 2017. Therefore, as of 4 August 2015, i.e. the date of the breach, the total value of the Respondent I’s employment agreement with the Claimant for the remaining contractual period amounted to 4,875,000. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that should the Respondent I have stayed with the Respondent II until the date of expiry of the contract concluded with the Claimant, i.e. 30 June 2017, he would have been entitled to receive an amount equivalent to 2,509,090.70. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Respondent I respectively with the Claimant and the Respondent II over the relevant period amounted to 3,692,045.35.

23. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the Respondent I must pay the amount of 3,692,045.35 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation (cf. point II.17 above).

24. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of the breach of contract by the Respondent I within the protected period, and in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent I in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates, inter alia, that sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled, once again, that art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, which deals with the consequences of entering into more than one contract covering the same time period, clearly states that a player shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs.

25. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not provide the possibility for deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances.

26. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the breach of contract by the Respondent I had occurred during the applicable protected period. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Respondent I had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches.

27. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the issue of inducement by the Respondent II and held that considering the small time frame between the termination of the Respondent I’s contract with the Respondent III and the signature of the contract with Club E as well as the fact that the International Transfer Certificate was delivered to it by the Association of Football Federations of country H, the Respondent II could not have been expected to know about the contract with Club A at the time of signing the contract with the Respondent I. In view of the above, the Chamber decided that the issue of inducement as regards the Respondent II is not to be further considered.

28. Furthermore, the Chamber pointed out that the responsibility for having issued two International Transfer Certificates lies entirely with the Association of Football Federations of country H in accordance with art. 9 of the Regulations, and that, therefore, the Respondent III cannot be held liable for said act. Consequently, the DRC decided to reject the Claimant’s claim with respect to the Respondent III.

29. The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, against the Respondent I, Club C, and the Respondent II, Club E, is partially accepted.

2. The claim of the Claimant against the Respondent III, Club G, is rejected.

3. The Respondent I is ordered to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 3,692,045.35.

4. The Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation.

5. In the event that the aforementioned amount is not paid within the above-mentioned time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent I and the Respondent II immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

7. A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the Respondent I. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and international championships for clubs.

8. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne, Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Marco Villiger

Deputy Secretary General

Encl. CAS directives