DECISIONI DI GIUSTIZIA SPORTIVA • F.I.F.A. - CAMERA DI RISOLUZIONE DELLE CONTROVERSIE - CONTROVERSIE DI LAVORO

• Data decisione: 29 luglio 2016 • Stagione sportiva: 2016/2017

F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2016-2017) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 29 July 2016

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 29 July 2016,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Santiago Nebot (Spain), member

John Bramhall (England), member

Guillermo Saltos Guale (Ecuador), member

Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 7 July 2015, the Player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter; the Claimant or the player) and the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter; the Respondent or the club) (hereinafter jointly referred to as the parties) concluded an employment contract valid as of 1 July 2015 until 31 December 2016.

2. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent as follows:

a. USD 50,000 as monthly salary payable as of July until December 2015;

b. USD 500,000 as sign-on fee payable in two instalments of USD 300,000 “within 30 days” and USD 200,000 “before 1st October” respectively;

c. USD 91,666 as monthly salary payable as of January until December 2016;

d. USD 500,000 as sign-on fee “in 2016”.

3. The contract further provided that “Each month of 15th, [the Respondent] will pay the last month salary to [the Claimant]”.

4. Furthermore, clause 11.7 of the contract stipulates as follows: “Club will provide a high class apartment for player and his family in City E, the rent fee about 5000 month. If player don’t like the apartment, club will pay player 5,000 for rent a house. If the house is more than 5,000, club takes charge 5,000 only”.

5. Likewise, clause 13 of the contract reads: “Either party may terminate the contract at any time, if both parties agree to its termination in writing”.

6. Moreover, clause 18 of the contract provides that: “After finishing the 2015 season, according to the investment and target for the next season, if [the Respondent] pursue a better rank in the league, then [the Claimant] need notice in writing to [the Claimant] to continue the contract and [the Claimant’s] salary and signing fee for the 2016 season according to this contract. If in the season 2016 [the Respondent] do not want to increase the investment and not pursue a better rank in the league, then [the Respondent] need notice to [the Claimant] in writing that no longer execution of the contract before 31st December 2015, then [the Claimant] as a free player could transfer to any clubs, this contract automatic invalid, [the Respondent] do not need to pay [the Claimant] any money or any compensations by any names, and all the clauses about 2016 season no longer valid”.

7. Equally, clause 19 of the contract states, inter alia, that: “During the contract period, if [the Claimant] cancel or terminate the contract by himself for whatever described reason (including sporting just cause) without the permission of [the Respondent], [the Claimant] shall pay USD 2,000,000 as the penalty…”.

8. For its part, clause 24 of the contract reads: “This contract comes within the jurisdiction of the Law of Country D; any dispute will be resolved by consolation. If it cannot be resolved both sides, send it to the Football Association of Country D and FIFA to adjudicate”.

9. On 26 February 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA requesting the total amount of USD 2,670,298.16 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 30 December 2015 broken-down as follows:

a. USD 550,000 “for 2015, as balance of salary and signature fee”;

b. USD 1,100,000 as “salary for 2016”;

c. USD 500,000 as “signature fee” of 2016;

d. USD 550,000 as specificity of sport;

e. Minus USD 29,701.84 which is, according to the Claimant, the value of his new contract.

10. In particular, the Claimant explained that on 30 December 2015, the Respondent unilaterally terminated the contract by means of a letter which reads, inter alia, as follows:

“…Unfortunately, according to the club financial plan of 2016, club do not want to increase investment and pursue better rank, then according to article 18 of the agreement (…) club notice player in writing that in the season 2016 club do not want to increase investment, player can be transfer (…) all the clauses in the agreement about 2016 season no longer valid”.

11. The Claimant further explained that at the time of the termination of the contract, the Respondent had only paid him USD 250,000 out of USD 800,000 which were due.

12. In continuation, the Claimant stressed that clause 18 of the contract is a unilateral option for the club to terminate the contract and thus, it is not valid. In this respect, the Claimant underlined that, in accordance with clause 13 of the contract, he needed the consent of the Respondent to terminate the contract or otherwise, he was subject to a payment of USD 2,000,000 as per clause 19. Hence, the player emphasised that the above-mentioned clause 18 of the contract cannot be deemed as valid.

13. As a consequence, the Claimant is of the opinion that it is evident that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause and therefore, he is entitled to receive compensation for breach of contract on top of his outstanding salaries.

14. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that he concluded a new employment contract with the Club of Country B, Club F valid as of 16 February 2016 until 30 June 2016, according to which he is entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 6,000.

15. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent firstly argued that, according to clause 24 of the contract, Law of Country D should be applicable to the present matter. In this context, the club explained, while enclosing the Labour Contract Law of Country D that under Labour Law of Country D unilateral options “are not prohibited at all”.

16. In continuation, the Respondent stressed that according to clause 18 of the contract, it had the right to terminate the contract and that it “acted accordingly by sending a termination letter dated 30 December 2015”.

17. Consequently, according to the Respondent, “there are no more obligations of any kind between the parties”. In this respect, the Respondent asserted having paid all the player’s salaries due until December 2015 and provided the following payment receipts:

Date of payment

Amount

Conversion made by the club itself

10 September 2015

956,580

USD 150,000

15 September 2015

637,185

USD 100,000

4 January 2016

1,263,919

USD 200,000

4 January 2016

18,600

USD 2,920

4 January 2016

500

USD 80

1 March 2016

2,292,955

USD 350,000

18. The Respondent further argued that in case it would be determined that it terminated the contract without just cause, any payable compensation should be calculated in accordance with Law of Country D. In this respect, the Respondent held that, in accordance with said law, a potential compensation payable to the Claimant would be limited to “USD 2,115” in accordance with art. 47 of the Labour Law of Country D which provides that “if a monthly salary of a worker is three times the average monthly salary of the workers of the region (…) the rate for his financial compensation payable shall be three times the average monthly salary”, which according to the club, amounts to “USD 705”.

19. In the alternative and only in case it would be determined that FIFA Regulations are applicable, the Respondent expressed that it did not terminate the contract but that it ended “by natural expiration” since the second year needed to be confirmed by the club in order to be valid and binding upon the parties. In this respect, the Respondent argued that clause 18 should be considered as a unilateral extension option which have been recently accepted by CAS. Along these lines, according to the Respondent, the clause fulfils the requirements established in the “Report G”. The Respondent alleged that therefore the alleged unilateral option does not create an “illegitimate situation”.

20. Furthermore, the Respondent held that the player “tacitly accepted the natural expiration of the contract” as he did not raise any kind of complaint or warning after he was informed of the alleged termination of the contract. In this respect, the Respondent argued that the first notification of the Claimant complaining about the alleged termination of the contract was by means of FIFA’s letter of 3 March 2016. Therefore, the player waited almost “two months” in order to complain about the termination. This means that it should be understood that the Claimant accepted said termination.

21. The Respondent further claimed that the Claimant confirmed the expiration of the contract as the latter requested, on 16 and 17 February 2016, for the club to confirm that he was a “free agent”.

22. In continuation, the Respondent argued that the Claimant decided to rent an apartment which monthly rent amounted to 12,000 for the period between July and November 2015, i.e. 4 months. In this respect, the Respondent argued that it paid the total amount of 48,000 to cover the player’s rent expenses. Therefore, and in view of the content of clause 11.7 of the contract, the Respondent requested for the reimbursement of the amount of 28,000 (48,000 – 20,000).

23. In his replica, the Claimant firstly rejected the application of Law of Country D and argued that the only applicable regulations are FIFA Regulations.

24. Furthermore, the Claimant stressed that clause 18 of the contract does not comply with any requirement established by the “Report G” and therefore, it ratified that said clause is invalid.

25. As to his alleged tacit acceptance of the contract termination, the Claimant argued that the scenario presented by the Respondent is irrelevant as in the present matter, it was the Respondent itself the party that terminated the contract and that the only limitation to his claim is the statute of limitations of two years established in the FIFA Regulations. In this regard, the Claimant underlined that it lodged his claim in front of FIFA only two months after the contract’s unlawful termination.

26. As to the request for the Respondent to confirm that he was a free agent, the Claimant explained that this was a necessary step in order for him to be able to be registered with his new club however, by no means can be interpreted as an acceptance of the termination of the contract.

27. As to the request for reimbursement of the Respondent, the Claimant asserted that the Respondent paid the total amount of the rent expenses without informing him. Therefore, such payment must be understood as an acceptance to cover the totality of the costs and thus, said Respondent’s request should be rejected.

28. Finally, the Claimant “recalculated” his claim in the amount of USD 2,664,632.19.

29. In its rejoinder, the Respondent stressed again that the applicable law is Law of Country D.

30. Furthermore, it argued that, contrary to what the player argues, clause 18 of the contract clearly complies with the requirements of the “Report G” in order to be qualified as a valid unilateral extension option clause. In this respect, the Respondent argued that i) it notified the player that “the option would not be exercised” before the transfer window opened in Continent H and ii) that the player’s salary increase was of an “83%”.

31. Finally, the Respondent reiterated the arguments contained in its first submission.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 February 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the player’s claim was lodged on 26 February 2016, the 2015 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter; the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. First, the Chamber acknowledged that on 7 July 2015, the parties concluded an employment contract valid as of 1 July 2015 until 31 December 2016.

6. Subsequently, the Chamber noted that it is undisputed that on 30 December 2015, the Respondent addressed a letter to the Claimant which reads, inter alia, as follows:

7. Having said that, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the claim of the Claimant who argues that the Respondent’s unilateral termination of the contract by means of the letter dated 30 December 2015 was without just cause as it was based on clause 18 of the contract which, according to the Claimant, is invalid. In this respect, the Chamber noted the position of the Claimant who argues that said clause is a unilateral termination clause in favour of the Respondent and which does not comply with any requirement of the “Report G”.

8. As a consequence, the DRC noted that the Claimant requested the amount of USD 550,000 “for 2015, as balance of salary and signature fee” as well as USD 2,120,298.20 as compensation for breach of contract, claim which was later “recalculated” in the amount of USD 2,664,632.19.

9. In continuation, the members of the Chamber went to analyse the position of the Respondent in relation to the termination of the contract which can be summarised as follows:

a. According to clause 24 of the contract, Law of Country D should be applicable to the present matter under which unilateral options “are not prohibited at all”;

b. According to clause 18 of the contract, it had the right to terminate the contract and that it “acted accordingly by sending a termination letter dated 30 December 2015”.

c. It argued having paid to the Claimant the amount of USD 803,000 for the year 2015;

d. Subsidiarly and in case it would be determined that the contract was terminated without just cause, any payable compensation should be calculated in accordance with Law of Country D;

e. In the alternative to all the above and only in case it would be determined that FIFA Regulations are applicable, the Respondent did not terminate the contract but it ended “by natural expiration” since the second year needed to be confirmed by the club in order to be valid and binding upon the parties. In this respect, the Respondent argued that clause 18 should be considered as a unilateral extension option which have been recently accepted by CAS and which fulfils the requirements established in the “Report G”;

f. The player “tacitly accepted the natural expiration of the contract” as he did not raise any kind of complaint or warning after he was informed of the alleged termination of the contract;

g. The Claimant confirmed the expiration of the contract as the latter requested for the club to confirm that he was a “free agent”.

10. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in the dispute at hand, considering the claim of the player, was to determine whether the relevant employment contract had been unilaterally terminated without just cause by the Respondent and, in the affirmative, which would be the potential consequences of said termination. Thereafter, the Chamber considered that it would have to address the request of the Respondent to obtain the reimbursement of the alleged overpayment of the Claimant’s rent expenses.

11. With the above in mind, the members of the Chamber first wished to recall that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard, the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. This should apply, in particular, also to the termination of a contract. In this respect, the DRC wished to point out that it is in the interest of football that the termination of a contract is based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerable from country to country. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to the termination of the contract but rather the Regulations, general principles of law and, where existing, the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.

12. As a consequence to the above, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that any potential validity or invalidity of clause 18 of the contract as well as the calculation of any potential compensation would have to be assessed taking into consideration the Regulations, general principles of law as well as the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.

13. Bearing in mind the above, the Chamber focused its attention on clause 18 of the contract and deemed that, in view of the parties’ stance, the first question that it needed to address was the nature of clause 18 of the contract. In this respect, contrary to the position of the Respondent, the members of the DRC were of the unanimous opinion that said clause is evidently a clause granting the Respondent the right to unilaterally terminate the contract by December 2015. Indeed, it is clearly established in the contract that its period of validity would run until 31 December 2016. In this respect, the Chamber felt comforted with its conclusion as the aforementioned clause’s wording clearly and unambiguously provides that, in case the club did not wish to “pursue a better rank in the league” it needed to notify the Claimant “in writing that no longer execution of the contract before 31st December 2015” (emphasis added).

14. Consequently, the Chamber’s conclusion in this disputed point was that, by means of its letter of 30 December 2015, the Respondent did not refuse to extend the contract concluded between the parties but rather unilaterally terminated it.

15. In continuation, the Chamber went to analyse the validity of the aforementioned clause 18 of the contract and, in this respect, unanimously decided that said clause is to be considered invalid in view of its potestative nature. In this context, the members of the Chamber wished to highlight that, in general, potestative clauses, i.e. clauses that contain obligations which fulfilment are conditional upon an event that one party entirely controls, cannot be considered since they limit the rights of the other contractual party in an excessive manner and lead to an unjustified disadvantage of the latter towards the other. In casu, the Respondent was the only party which could decide to terminate the contract depending on its wish to either “increase the investment” or “pursue a better rank in the league”.

16. What is more, the DRC considered that the relevant clause is in direct opposition with the general principle of proportionality and the principle of balance of rights of the parties since it provides benefits only towards the Respondent with no equivalent right in favour of the Claimant. In this respect, the Chamber underlined that in case the Claimant would have terminated the contract during the period of validity of the contract, i.e. as of 1 July 2015 until 31 December 2016, he would have to pay to the Respondent USD 2,000,000 as per clause 19 of the contract.

17. On account of all the above, the members of the Chamber reiterated that clause 18 of the contract is to be deemed invalid and therefore, inapplicable.

18. In continuation, the Chamber wished to address the arguments of the Respondent that the Claimant accepted the “natural expiration of the contract” as i) he took two months after the termination in order to lodge his claim in front of FIFA and ii) he requested the Respondent to issue a confirmation letter wherein it was stated that he was a “free agent”.

19. In this regard, the members of the Chamber unanimously decided that the aforementioned arguments of the Respondent cannot be sustained. First, the members of the Chamber considered that, contrary to the allegations of the Respondent, a rather short period of time elapsed between the date of the early termination of the contract by the Respondent, i.e. 30 December 2015, and the date when the Claimant lodged his claim in front of FIFA, i.e. 26 February 2016, clearly indicating that the Claimant was in complete disagreement with the unilateral termination of the contract made by the club.

20. As to the second argument, the Chamber found it evident that the request of the Claimant to the Respondent to issue the relevant letter was only intended to facilitate the conclusion of a new employment contract with another club and by no means could be interpreted as an acceptance by the Claimant of the unjustified early termination of the contract by the Respondent let alone a waiver of the consequences thereof.

21. In light of the above considerations, the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that the Respondent had no just cause to terminate the contract binding it to the Claimant on 30 December 2015 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for said early termination of the contract without just cause.

22. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without just cause by the Respondent.

23. First of all, the members of the Chamber wished to refer to the amounts requested by the Claimant as outstanding remuneration. In this regard, the members of the Chamber wished to emphasise that the Claimant did not dispute at any moment having received the amounts contained in the payment receipts provided by the Respondent (cf. point I./17). In this respect, the members of the Chamber considered that the documentary evidence provided by the Respondent is sufficient to demonstrate, to its satisfaction, that indeed the Claimant received all his monies for the year 2015.

24. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber rejected the claim of the Claimant for outstanding remuneration.

25. Notwithstanding the above, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract.

26. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. In this regard, and taking into account the consideration in point II./11. ut supra, the Chamber dismissed the argument of the Respondent that any compensation payable to the Claimant should be calculated exclusively on the basis of the Labour Law of Country D.

27. The Chamber then reverted to the application of art, 17 par. 1 of the Regulations and, in this respect, it held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber acknowledged that clause 19 provided for a compensation of USD 2,000,000 payable to the Respondent in case the Claimant would terminate the contract “without the permission of [the Respondent]”.

28. Nevertheless, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that they could not take such clause into account in order to determine the payable compensation for breach of contract as the scenario foreseen in said clause is not applicable in the matter at hand. Indeed, it was not the Claimant but the Respondent which terminated the contract.

29. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years.

30. With the aforementioned in mind, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract, along with the professional situation of the player after the early termination of the contract occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that the remaining value of the contract which was breached as from its early termination by the Respondent until its regular expiry amounts to USD 1,599,992, comprised of USD 1,099,992 as salaries for the year 2016 as well as USD 500,000 as the sign-on fee due “in July 2016”. The Chamber concluded that this amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

31. In continuation, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant had entered into two new employment contracts. The first one with the Club of Country B, Club F valid as of 16 February 2016 until 30 June 2016 according to which he was entitled to the total amount of EUR 30,000 and the second one with the Club of Country J, Club K valid as of 1 July 2016 and according to which, he was entitled, for the remaining of the year 2016, to the total amount of EUR 160,916, which added to the value of his first new contract makes a total of EUR 190,916 which in turn corresponds to roughly USD 210,000. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, the above-mentioned amounts shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

32. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of USD 1,389,992 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount, as well as 5% interest p.a. over said amount as from the date of the claim, i.e. 26 February 2016, until the date of effective payment.

33. Furthermore, the Chamber turned its attention to the request of the Respondent to be reimbursed the amount of 28,000 as it covered the Claimant’s rent expenses which amounted to 48,000. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Respondent referred to clause 11.7 of the contract, according to which, it was obliged to cover the Claimant’s rent expenses only to a maximum of 20,000.

34. The DRC noted that in reply to the above, the Claimant did not dispute the payment made by the Respondent, he argued however that the Respondent paid the total amount of the rent expenses without informing him. Therefore, such payment must be understood as an acceptance to cover the totality of said expenses.

35. After having considered the position of the parties with respect to this particular issue, the Chamber deemed that the Claimant had to reimburse the amount of 28,000 to the Respondent. The Chamber considered, whilst taking into account the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that the content of clause 11.7 of the contract is clear and leaves no room for interpretation, i.e. the Respondent undertook to cover the Claimant’s rent expenses up to the amount of 20,000.

36. Finally, the Chamber concluded its deliberations by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 1,389,992 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 26 February 2016 until the date of effective payment.

3. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned number 2. is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

6. The Claimant is ordered to reimburse to the Respondent, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of 28,000.

7. In the event that the amount due to the Respondent in accordance with the above-mentioned number 6. is not reimbursed by the Claimant within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

8. The Respondent is directed to inform the Claimant, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittance is to be reimbursed and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Marco Villiger

Deputy Secretary General

Encl. CAS Directives