F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 15 February 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 February 2018,

in the following composition:

Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman

Eirik Monsen (Norway), member

Stéphane Burchkalter (France), member

Philippe Diallo (France), member

Joseph Antoine Bell (Cameroon), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 1 July 2015, the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2018.

2. In accordance with the contract’s payment schedule, the Respondent was to pay the Claimant the total amount of EUR 7,500,000, as follows:

a) For the season 2015-2016:

i. An “advanced payment” of EUR 1,250,000 payable on or before 1 August 2015;

ii. A monthly salary of EUR 104,166, payable 12 times on or before the end of each month, from July 2015 until June 2016.

b) For the season 2016-2017:

i. An “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 payable on or before 1 August 2016;

ii. A monthly salary of EUR 125,000, payable 12 times on or before the end of each month, from July 2016 until June 2017.

c) For the season 2017-2018:

i. An “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 payable on or before 1 August 2017;

ii. A monthly salary of EUR 125,000, payable 12 times on or before the end of each month, from July 2017 until June 2018.

3. On 29 September 2016, the Claimant, the Respondent, and the club of Country D, Club E (hereinafter: Club E), signed a tripartite document titled “LOAN AGREEMENT” (hereinafter: the loan agreement) by means of which the parties agreed on the loan of the Claimant from the Respondent to Club E, free of payment, as from the date of signature of the loan agreement until 30 June 2017.

4. In accordance with the loan agreement, the Respondent was entitled to request the player’s return “in case it receives an offer from other club” or “for any other reasons” and the Claimant and Club E “shall accept to early terminate the employment contract without any condition or compensation”.

5. Art 4. of the loan agreement stipulated the following:

“4. Complement of Remuneration

4.1 During the period in which the [Claimant] is under employment contract with [Club E], [the Respondent] shall pay to the [Claimant] the total amount of EUR 2,100,000…as follows:

(i) An advanced payment of EUR 1,000,000…shall be paid by [the Respondent] to the [Claimant] on or before 15st November 2016; and A monthly salary of EUR 122,222 shall be paid through equal and nine monthly instalments by [the Respondent] to the [Claimant] on or before the end of each calendar month from October 2016 through June 2017.”

6. Moreover, art. 15 of the loan agreement established that:

“15. Termination

15.1 The termination of this agreement however caused is without prejudice to the right duties and liabilities of either party accrued prior to termination.

15.2 Either Party may terminate this Agreement immediately on notice in witting to the other if the other is in material breach of this Agreement shall have failed (where the breach is capable of remedy) to remedy the breach within 15 (fifteen) working days of the receipt of a request in writing from the party not in breach to remedy the breach, such request specifying the breach and indicating that failure to remedy the breach may result in termination of this Agreement.”

7. On the same date, i.e. 29 September 2016, the Claimant and Club E signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2017, according to which the Claimant was entitled, inter alia, to a total remuneration of EUR 300,000 for said period.

8. By means of a letter dated 16 January 2017, Club E unilaterally terminated the contract with the Claimant. The letter on file (hereinafter: Club E’s termination notice), addressed to the Claimant, reads as follows:

“Dear Sir,

On behalf of [Club E], we would like to inform you that our team technical committee and the administration of the team decided to terminate your contract with the club start it from January 16/01/2017….

…

(signature)”

9. On 19 January 2017, the Claimant sent a letter to Club E in reply to the termination notice received, in which he sustained that Club E’s termination notice does not provide a cause or an explanation for the termination. Furthermore, the Claimant requested the latter club to provide him with its comments in this regard on or before 23 January 2017.

10. By correspondence dated 20 January 2017, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 1,366,666 corresponding to the “advanced payment” and the salaries from October 2016 to December 2016, in accordance with the loan agreement, setting a 10 days’ time limit in order to remedy the default.

11. On 25 January 2017, the Respondent sent a letter addressed to both the Claimant and Club E, in which it reminded them that in accordance with the loan agreement, only the Respondent was entitled to prematurely terminate it and request the early return of the Claimant. Furthermore, the Respondent stated that its contract with the Claimant is suspended until 30 June 2017 and that since it has not authorized the unilateral termination by Club E, it did not agree with said termination.

12. By means of letters dated 2 February 2017 and 6 March 2017, respectively, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 1,488,888 corresponding to the “advance payment” and the salaries from October 2016 to January 2017, in accordance with the loan agreement, setting a 10 days’ time limit in order to remedy the default. In this context, in his letter of 6 March 2017, the Claimant informed the Respondent that in view of the termination of the employment contract with Club E, he was available to return to the Respondent upon receiving all payments allegedly owed by the Respondent.

13. On 4 April 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA, requesting outstanding remuneration in the aggregate amount of EUR 1,611,110 corresponding to the “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 due on 15 November 2016, as well as the salaries from October 2016 until February 2017, in the amount of EUR 122,222, each. Furthermore the Claimant requested interest as follows:

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 31 October 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 1,000,000 as from 15 November 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 30 November 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 31 December 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 31 January 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 28 February 2017 until the date of effective payment.

14. In his claim, the Claimant sustained that due to the “very low remuneration that [Club E] was prepared to offer”, and as to have him agree to the loan to Club E, the Respondent undertook to maintain employment-related obligations with him throughout the loan period in accordance with art 4. of the loan agreement. In this regard, the Claimant held that the Respondent had not made any payments to him during the loan period, without “any legitimate reasons for doing so”.

15. Furthermore, the Claimant explained that after Club E terminated their employment contract, termination which “shall be addressed in different proceedings”, he contacted the Respondent requesting the amounts due to him under the loan agreement. The Claimant held that in reply to his letters, he only received the Respondent’s letter dated 25 January 2017, by means of which, in his opinion, the Respondent is pretending that “it had no obligations towards him”.

16. The Respondent, on its part, rejected the Claimant’s claim.

17. In this respect, the Respondent held that after being informed of Club E’s termination notice, it sent its letter dated 25 January 2017, addressed to both the [Claimant] and Club E, “without providing any value judgement whether there was (or not) just cause for the early termination”. In this context, the Respondent sustained that, in any case, it made clear to the player that its obligations towards him were temporarily suspended, “except regarding the payment of a complimentary remuneration during the term of the Loan Agreement”.

18. However, the Respondent held that since the reasons why Club E terminated the contract were not clear, it “had no other alternative except to stay the payment of any amount whatsoever due as complement of the remuneration”.

19. In this regard, the Respondent argued that since “the matter is still sub judice before the decision-making bodies of FIFA, it has decided to suspend the referenced payment until a final decision is rendered”. In this regard, the Respondent referred to CAS jurisprudence to support its argumentation.

20. In his replica, the Claimant rejected the argumentation of the Respondent.

21. The Claimant insisted in his arguments and further held that after the claim was lodged, he contacted the Respondent on two occasions, namely on 5 April 2017, and 23 May 2017 inter alia, informing it that he was available to return and requested instructions from the Respondent in this respect. The Claimant declared that he did not receive a reply from the Respondent to these letters.

22. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Respondent’s position to withhold the complimentary payments cannot be upheld, since the unilateral termination of Club E only took place on 16 January 2017, and the Respondent has not provided a reason to not fulfill the obligations that were already due prior to said date, i.e. the “advanced payment” due on 15 November 2016, as well the salaries for October, November and December, all 2016.

23. Subsequently, the Claimant sustained that the Respondent’s argumentation that it has the right to withhold payments until FIFA decides whether Club E had just cause or not to terminate the contract, cannot be considered valid, since the Respondent has not referred to a single provision of law that could provide for that right and since there is no pending dispute before FIFA between the Claimant and Club E.

24. Moreover, according to the Claimant, the finding of the referred CAS jurisprudence was made in application of the principle of excpetio non adimpleti contractus, which allegedly states that in contracts with reciprocal obligations, a party may withhold its own performance until the other has duly performed his or her obligation under the contract. In this context, the Claimant explained that it is not sufficient to simply state that a counterparty has not complied with its obligations, and that in turn, it needs to be duly proven, scenario which was proven in the quoted CAS award but has not been proven in the matter at hand.

25. After requesting an extension to submit its duplica, on 4 August 2017, the club stated that the parties were “negotiating the terms and conditions of a settlement relating the matter at hand”. No further position as to the substance was received from the Respondent afterwards.

26. On 13 September 2017, the Claimant extended his request for relief, requesting further amounts which allegedly “have in the meantime become due and payable and were not object of his [initial statement of claim]” under both the loan agreement and the contract. The Claimant requested the additional amount of EUR 1,625,000, plus 5% interest p.a. over the amounts now due and not previously requested, as from the relevant due dates in accordance with the loan agreement and the contract.

27. In this regard, the Claimant sustained that “on the present date”, the amount of EUR 3,350,000 remains allegedly outstanding, of which EUR 1,611,110 has already been claimed. Along this line, the player explained that the following amounts have become due since he lodged his initial claim:

a) On the basis of the loan agreement:

i. EUR 122,222 as of 31 March 2017;

ii. EUR 122,222 as of 30 April 2017;

iii. EUR 122,222 as of 31 May 2017;

iv. EUR 122,222 as of 30 June 2017.

b) On the basis of the contract:

i. EUR 125,000 as of 31 July 2017;

ii. EUR 1,000,000 as of 1 August 2017, corresponding to the “advanced payment”;

iii. EUR 125,000 as of 31 August 2017.

28. The Claimant further explained that he requested the amount of EUR 1,625,000 and not the aggregate amount of EUR 1,613,890, “so as not to prevent the FIFA DRC to award the relief that it considers appropriate”, particularly, in case that it is considered that upon the termination of the contract with Club E, the obligations under the contract resumed immediately. The Claimant further explained that the small difference would be that the monthly salaries between for the period of March 2017 and June 2017 would amount to EUR 125,000 each, under the contract, whereas under the loan agreement, said salaries would amount to EUR 122,222 each.

29. Moreover, the Claimant held that after lodging his claim, he sent several letters to the Respondent, requesting inter alia, that all alleged outstanding remuneration is paid. Namely, on 20 July 2017, 26 July 2017, 2 August 2017, 21 August 2017, 31 August 2017 and 4 September 2017.

30. In this regard, the Claimant held that on 25 July 2017, the Respondent replied to him, and according to Claimant, the Respondent recognized the outstanding amounts by means of this letter. Said letter, addressed to the Claimant, reads as follows:

“ …

Thank you for your letter dated 20 July 2017. By this letter we would like to invite the [Claimant] to return to Country D to fulfil his contract with us. Please find enclosed to this letter his flight tickets.

In additional, we are aware of our outstanding payments towards the [Claimant] but, in order to speak to the [Claimant] and proceed with such payments, we need him back in Country D to personally discuss the matter…

We would like to emphasise the [Claimant] is very important for us and [the Respondent] will continue to fulfill every single obligation set out in his employment contract.

We are looking forward to meet him, settle this matter and having him playing for season 2017/2018…”

31. Furthermore, the Claimant sustained that on 16 August 2017 and 20 August 2017, he had meetings with the Respondent in Country D, meetings in which the Respondent, allegedly, offered to pay him the amount of EUR 2,100,000 in order to mutually terminate the contract and release it from all liabilities. The Claimant declared that he rejected the offer.

32. In this context, the letter of the Claimant dated 21 August 2017, addressed to the Respondent reads as follows:

“Dear Sirs,…

We refer to…our meetings held in Country D, at [the Respondent]’s request, on 16 and 20 August 2017.

As per [the Respondent] letter of 2 August 2017, [the Claimant] travelled to Country D, where he arrived on 16 August 2017….

Much to [the Claimant]’s surprise, his arrival in Country D has not resulted in his inclusion in the team….in fact, [the Claimant] was surprised to arrive and learn that the team is currently in Country F…..In addition,…[the Respondent] has not allowed [the Claimant] to train at [the Respondent]’s facilities and is required to train by himself, at the hotel gym, without any proper supervision.

….

It is now evident that, contrary to its claims, [the Respondent] never had the intention to fulfill [the contract]….

In view of the above, we hereby communicate that [the Claimant] shall not consider or entertain any further offers for settlement from [the Respondent] and maintains his availability to be reinstated by [the Respondent]….”

33. In its reply to the Claimant’s extended claim, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s request for relief and argumentation.

34. In this respect, the Claimant stressed that for the principle of procedural efficiency there is no reason to submit its comments to the claim of the Claimant in relation to the loan period with Club E and that there is no legal basis for the Claimant to receive any remuneration after the end of the loan agreement.

35. Subsequently, the Respondent confirmed that it offered to pay the amount of EUR 2,100,000 to the Claimant during the meetings held on 16 August 2017 and 20 August 2017, but contrary to what the player asserted, the Respondent sustained that the only purpose of this offer, was to pay the remuneration due to the Claimant regarding the loan period.

36. In this regard, the Respondent asserted that the Claimant requested that the amount should be paid to a bank account located outside of Country D, which the Respondent rejected. The Respondent held that, in turn, it conditioned the abovementioned payment to his permanent return to Country D, in order to join a group of players who were under a special type of training since, allegedly, they were behind the physical condition of the players from the first team.

37. Along this line, the Respondent held that it never had the intention to force the Claimant to attend individual training sessions permanently but only temporarily, which were allegedly necessary for the Claimant to reach the same physical condition as the first team. The Claimant concluded that, therefore, there was no violation of the “personality rights of the [Claimant]”.

38. The Respondent further argued that the Claimant has always conditioned his return to the Respondent from Country G, his current place of residence, to the payment of the alleged outstanding remuneration. In this respect, the Respondent held that this argumentation can be confirmed in the Claimant’s letters. Moreover, the Respondent held that by means of its letter dated 2 August 2017, it objected this decision from the Claimant and that it ratified that upon his return and his acceptance to resume duties, it would “obviously” comply with its financial as well as other contractual duties towards him.

39. In continuation, the Respondent affirmed that in view of the Claimant’s “unacceptable” and “reiterated” behavior to “remain enjoying his holidays”, it had no other alternative than to suspend the obligation to pay the remuneration due from the end of the loan to date. The Respondent deemed that the Claimant’s position to refuse to resume his contractual activities based upon “the fact that the Respondent supposedly refused to pay remuneration during the period in which the former was under loan” is groundless.

40. Finally, the Respondent held that the Claimant has “clearly accepted the suspension of [the contract] by [the Respondent] when preferred to stay in Country G”.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 4 April 2017. Consequently, the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter; the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2017 and 2018 editions of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018), and considering that the claim was lodged on 4 April 2017, the 2016 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter; the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. Having established the foregoing, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber continued by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of the matter. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In this respect and first of all, the DRC acknowledged that, on 1 July 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent signed the contract, valid as from date of signature until 30 June 2018. Moreover, in accordance with the contract’s payment schedule, the Respondent would pay the Claimant the total amount of EUR 7,500,000. This amount was supposed to be paid under the terms described in point I./2 above.

6. Furthermore, the Chamber observed that, on 29 September 2016, the Claimant, the Respondent and the club of Country D, Club E, signed the loan agreement, by means of which the parties agreed, inter alia, on the loan of the Claimant from the Respondent to Club E, free of payment, as from the date of signature of the loan agreement until 30 June 2017.

7. In relation to the loan agreement, the members of the Chamber took note of the content of Art 4. of the loan agreement which stipulated, inter alia, that “During the period in which the [Claimant] is under employment contract with [Club E], [the Respondent] shall pay to the [Claimant] the total amount of EUR 2,100,000…as follows: (i) An advanced payment of EUR 1,000,000…shall be paid by [the Respondent] to the [Claimant] on or before 15st November 2016; and A monthly salary of EUR 122,222 shall be paid through equal and nine monthly instalments by [the Respondent] to the [Claimant] on or before the end of each calendar month from October 2016 through June 2017.”

8. It was duly observed by the Chamber that the employment contract entered by the Claimant and Club E for the corresponding loan period was unilaterally terminated by Club E, by means of its letter of 16 January 2017.

9. Furthermore, the DRC noted that the Claimant first contacted FIFA requesting outstanding remuneration from the Respondent in the aggregate amount of EUR 1,611,110, amount that corresponds to the “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 due on 15 November 2016, as well as the monthly instalments as from October 2016 until February 2017, in the amount of EUR 122,222, each. In this regard, the Claimant held that the Respondent, up to February 2017, had not performed any payments during the loan period, without “any legitimate reasons for doing so”.

10. In continuation, the Chamber duly observed that, on 13 September 2017, the Claimant extended his request for relief, and requested amounts that have allegedly fallen due after February 2017 under both the loan agreement and the contract. In this regard, the Claimant requested the additional amount of EUR 1,625,000, amount that, according to the Claimant, corresponds to his dues from March 2017 until August 2017.

11. Along this line, the DRC considered that in sum, the Claimant is claiming outstanding remuneration from the Respondent, on one hand, for the period while he was on loan with Club E i.e. as from October 2016, and on the other hand, for the period after the expiry of the loan with Club E, when he was supposed to resume his duties with the Respondent up until August 2017.

12. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent rejected the claim put forward by the Claimant, as it held, in respect to the amounts requested for the period the Claimant was on loan with Club E, that since the reasons why Club E terminated the contract with the Claimant were not clear, it “had no other alternative except to stay the payment of any amount whatsoever due as complement of the remuneration”, and that since “the matter is still sub judice before the decision-making bodies of FIFA, it has decided to suspend the referenced payment until a final decision is rendered” and in respect to the claimed amounts after the expiry of said loan, that in view of the Claimant’s “unacceptable” and “reiterated” behavior to “remain enjoying his holidays”, it had no other alternative than to suspend the obligation to pay the remuneration due from the end of the loan to date, as the Respondent held that the Claimant has “clearly accepted the suspension of [the contract] by [the Respondent] when preferred to stay in Country G”.

13. In view of the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Chamber highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the diverging position of the parties, was to determine as to whether the player is entitled to the amounts requested and subsequently if the Respondent has any valid reason not to pay any amounts the Claimant would, in principle, be entitled to.

14. With regard to the amounts requested by the Claimant from the Respondent during the loan period with Club E, the Chamber deemed it vital to outline that according to its well-established jurisprudence, in case the player is loaned to another club, the effects of the employment contract with the club of origin are temporarily suspended, unless the club of origin and the player have otherwise agreed. Against such background, the Chamber recalled the content of art 4. of the loan agreement, in which it is explicitly stipulated that the Claimant would still receive remuneration from the Respondent during his loan with Club E, i.e. the Claimant and the Respondent explicitly agreed that this financial obligation towards the player was not suspended by the loan, in fact, it was modified. Therefore, the Chamber unanimously concluded that the Claimant is, in principle, entitled to receive remuneration from the Respondent for the loan period with Club E.

15. Having said that, the DRC recalled the contents of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and took note that the Respondent did not submit documentation to support its argumentation that “the matter [Club E’s termination of the contract concluded with the Claimant] is still sub judice before the decision-making bodies of FIFA”, and which was, as a matter of fact, contested by the Claimant.

16. What is more, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that while the employment contract of the player and Club E was terminated by Club E, the loan agreement, however, was not.

17. With these considerations in mind, the DRC was of the opinion the reasons provided by the Respondent for the non-payment of the amounts due to the Claimant under art. 4 of the loan agreement cannot be considered valid.

18. Consequently, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the outstanding remuneration due in accordance with art. 4 of the loan agreement. In this regard, the Chamber underlined that it had remained uncontested that the Respondent had not paid the “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 due on 15 November 2016, and the 9 instalments of EUR 122,222 each, as from October 2016 until June 2017. Therefore, the Respondent must pay the Claimant the total amount of EUR 2,099,998, due under the loan agreement.

19. Regarding the requested amounts after the expiry of the loan with Club E i.e after 30 June 2017, the Chamber recalled that the contract signed between the Claimant and the Respondent was valid until 30 June 2018 and there is no indication on file that said contract has been terminated. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant is, in principle, entitled to receive remuneration from the Respondent under the terms of the contract after the expiry of the loan agreement with Club E, since the effects of the employment contract with the club of origin are understood as resumed.

20. Having established the above, the members of the Chamber unanimously concurred that they could not agree with the Respondent’s argumentation regarding the suspension of its financial obligations towards the Claimant as from the expiry of the loan agreement, taking into consideration that the Respondent was already in breach of its obligations towards the Claimant for a considerable amount of time, i.e. for 9 months, and in respect to a substantial amount, specifically more than EUR 2,000,000. Moreover, the DRC found it important to note that from the documentation on file, it remains uncontested that the Claimant travelled to Country D and was therefore, available to render his services to the Respondent.

21. At this stage, the Chamber noted that it remained uncontested that the Respondent did not pay the Claimant the “advanced payment” of EUR 1,000,000 due on 1 August 2017 and 2 instalments of EUR 125,000 each, corresponding to Claimant’s salaries of July 2017 and August 2017, payable under the contract.

22. Consequently, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 1,250,000, due under the contract.

23. It follows from the above considerations, in particular, taking into account the considerations under numbers II./18 and 11./22 above, that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 3,349,998.

24. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on each of the relevant payments under the loan agreement and under the contract, as of the day following the day on which the relevant payments fell due, until the date of effective payment.

25. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 3,349,998 plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows:

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 November 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 1,000,000 as from 16 November 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 December 2016 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 January 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 February 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 March 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 April 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 May 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 June 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 122,222 as from 1 July 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 125,000 as from 1 August 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 1,000,000 as from 2 August 2017 until the date of effective payment;

- 5% p.a. over the amount of EUR 125,000 as from 1 September 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. In the event that the amount plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned number 2. Is paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

____________________________

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS directives