F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 15 February 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 February 2018,

in the following composition:

Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman

Eirik Monsen (Norway), member

Stéphane Burchkalter (France), member

Philippe Diallo (France), member

Joseph Bell (Cameroon), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant / Counter-Respondent

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent / Counter-Claimant

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 4 August 2015, the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent), and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant), signed an employment contract valid as from 1 August 2015 until 30 June 2020.

2. According to art. 2 par. 1 of the employment contract, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant undertook to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, until the 5th day of the month ensuing the month concerned, the following gross monthly remuneration: EUR 5,000 up to a total amount of EUR 55,000 for the season 2015/2016 and EUR 5,000 up to a total amount of EUR 60,000 […] for the seasons 2016/2017 until 2019/2020.

3. According to art. 12 of the employment contract, “le Joueur et [Respondent / Counter-Claimant], au cas de non accomplissement des dispositions de ce contrat et avant toute autre initiative, s’engagent à notifier l’autre partie ayant en vue la solution à l’amiable de la dispute dans un délai de 30 jours à compter de cette notification et, au cas où cette notification n’est pas faite, le non accomplissement des dispositions de ce contrat ne pourra pas être invoqué autant que rupture du contrat par aucune des parties, les deux parties acceptant que cette clause est essentielle à la conclusion de ce contrat, et qu’elle a été créée dans l’interêt des deux parties” (free translation into English: “the Player and [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant], in case of non-accomplishment of the provisions of this contract, and before any other initiative, undertake to notify the other party of the possibility of an amicable resolution of the dispute within 30 days from that notification and, in case that the notification does not occur, the non-accomplishment of the provisions of this contract cannot be invoked as a breach of the contract by any of the parties, the two parties accept that this clause is essential to the conclusion of this contract, and that has been created for the interest of the two parties”).

4. According to art. 14 of the employment contract, ”si le Joueur résilie unilatéralement et sans cause ce Contrat de Travail Sportif ou si [Respondent / Counter-Claimant] favorise le congédiement invoquant juste cause, le Joueur est oblige au payement de l’indemnité correspondante à la valeur des rémunérations qui seraient dues si le contrat avait abouti à sa fin et, aussi, au payement, à titre de clause pénale, de la somme de € 30.000.000,00 […] iva non comprise, sans préjudice de l’application de sanctions sportives par les entités nationales et internationales compétentes” (free translation into English : “if the Player terminates unilaterally and without cause this Sport Employment Contract or if [the club]” terminates with just cause, the Player is obliged to pay an indemnity corresponding to the value of the remuneration that would have been due if the contract were executed till the end and, also, to the payment of € 30.000.000,00 as penalty clause […] VAT not included, without prejudice to the application of sporting sanctions by the national and international competent entities”).

5. By letter dated 20 March 2017, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant notified the Claimant / Counter-Respondent that “in face of [his] persistent and prolonged absence from the training sessions and competition […], [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] has no other option than to invoke [his] abandonment of work”. In said correspondence the Respondent / Counter-Claimant recalled art. 53, para. 4 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, provides that “the abandonment of work is considered as termination without just cause”. Consequently, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant informed the Claimant / Counter-Respondent that he was deemed to be in breach of contract without just cause in light of his prolonged absence without notification to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and warned him about the consequences in terms of compensation envisaged in the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

6. On 30 March 2017, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent replied to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in writing, rejecting the allegations made by the latter with the aforementioned correspondence. In this letter, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent referred to the situation he had allegedly encountered with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant since the start of the employment relationship and that given these circumstances he had decided to return to Country B, which he allegedly communicated to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and his agent. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further proposed to find a “peaceful solution to terminate the contract”, asking the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to reply by 10 April 2017.

7. By letter dated 26 April 2017, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent unilaterally terminated the employment contract. In this correspondence, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent pointed out that he had not received a reply to his letter of 30 March 2017.

8. On 2 May 2017, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent lodged a claim against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in front of FIFA, requesting that the latter be ordered to pay him the amount of EUR 190,000 as residual value of the contract and EUR 3,000,000 “ex aequo et bono” as compensation for breach of contract.

9. With his claim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent explained that as from August 2015 until December 2015 he was part of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s B team but, shortly after signing the contract, he had been suddenly excluded from the squad without having been granted any playing time. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further submitted that, subsequently, he was loaned to the club of Country B, Club E as from February 2016 until June 2016 and that – when he returned from the loan – he was once again excluded from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s B team.

10. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that, as from June 2016 until December 2016, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had not fielded him at all.

11. Moreover, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claimed that, since the beginning of the employment relationship, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant showed a lack of interest in executing the contract and had even de facto pushed him to terminate it.

12. In support of his claim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had fielded him for only 68 minutes in 18 months. In this respect, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent explained that during his time at the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, various e-mails were sent by his mother and his manager to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, enquiring about his playing time and showing deep concerns about the repercussions of this situation on his professional career. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent pointed out that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant never replied to any of these emails.

13. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent highlighted that, while employed by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, on top of being allowed to play for a very limited amount of time, he had to experience (i) the exclusion from the B team for unknown reasons from July until November 2016, with the consequence of having to train on his own to stay fit, (ii) the exclusion from the restaurant of the team for unknown reasons, (iii) the exclusion from all the trainings without justification, (iv) a change of the number of his jersey without reason and (v) a regular exclusion from friendly games 5 minutes before the beginning of the match. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that all these circumstances ultimately led to a situation of psychological distress for which he underwent specific treatment.

14. On account of the above, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that, following the advice of his mother, on 5 January 2017 he moved back to Country B, informing the Respondent / Counter-Claimant accordingly. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent explained that this decision was the result of the above-mentioned conditions in which the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had put him since the beginning of the employment relationship and which had culminated in a “total burn out”.

15. Moreover, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claimed that the experience at the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had substantially put an end to his football career and, for this reason and all the others mentioned above, his termination of the contract was supported by just cause.

16. On 31 May 2017, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent addressed a correspondence to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and to FIFA by means of which he (i) terminated the contract for sporting just cause in accordance with art. 15 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and (ii) amended his claim, adding sporting just cause as a subsidiary reason for termination.

17. In reply to the claim, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asked that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s request be rejected and, on 19 June 2017, filed a counterclaim against him for breach of contract without just cause.

18. In order to support its argumentation, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant recalled that, throughout the duration of the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was registered by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as a member of the squad and he had been given substantial playing time in several friendly matches. In this respect, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant pointed out that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s poor performance was the reason why he had not been fielded regularly by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s B team and why he was loaned to Club E in February 2016.

19. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant explained that, after his return from Club E, and following a new period of poor performance, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent requested to be sent for a trial period to Club F from 23 December 2016 to 1 January 2017. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant stressed that this solution was greatly appreciated by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s agent.

20. In respect of the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant argued that a confirmation of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s poor quality of play can be found in the fact that neither Club E nor Club F exercised the option to retain him after, respectively, the loan and the short trial.

21. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant explained that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was supposed to resume training in Country D on 2 January 2017 but he failed to do so. Consequently, and given that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had allegedly disappeared without a valid reason and without the permission of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the latter notified the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 20 March 2017 that it was terminating the contract with just cause.

22. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further argued that the emails sent by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s agent and by his mother confirmed the will of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to terminate the employment relationship with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant.

23. In summary, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant requested that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim be rejected and counterclaimed to be awarded EUR 190,000 as compensation for the termination of contract plus 5% interest p.a. as of 20 March 2017. In this respect, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant pointed out that the reciprocal will of the parties to not continue working together was the reason why it was asking said amount in compensation rather than relying on art. 14 of the employment contract. Finally, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asked for the rejection of the subsidiary request concerning breach of contract for sporting just cause, because the contract had allegedly already been terminated on 20 March 2017.

24. In his replica and reply to the counterclaim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent entirely reiterated the position expressed with his claim and further explained that, after the trial period at Club F, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not show any interest in him and did not communicate the dates of the trainings. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent pointed out again that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant remained passive although having been informed by his agent and his mother of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s decision to return to Country B in January 2017.

25. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued once more that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant‘s stance was aimed at pushing him to terminate the contract and, basically, it did not let him execute it in the first place.

26. Furthermore, with regards to the issue of the termination with sporting just cause, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claimed that he could notify his intention only on 31 May 2017, after the end of the season, in accordance with art. 15 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

27. In relation to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argued that, with its correspondence of 20 March 2017, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not clearly indicate that it was terminating the contract with just cause.

28. In its final comments, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant reiterated the position it had expressed with its reply to the claim and further explained that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s poor performance showed that he was not ready to play for the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s B team in 2015. However, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant argued that, even though it had loaned the Claimant / Counter-Respondent twice, it was still interested in continuing to receive his professional services and kept paying him regularly until April 2017.

29. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant denied that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent received the treatment described in his claim during his stay in Country D and, in any case, claimed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent failed to meet the burden of proof, as he only produced exchanges of messages with his agent to this end.

30. In continuation, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant claimed that “no mail addressed by Player A to the League representative of Club C has been produced in this process”. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further reiterated, invoking DRC jurisprudence and the CBA of Country D, that the prolonged absence of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent constituted a material breach of the employment relationship and, therefore, there was no other option for the Respondent / Counter-Claimant than to terminate the contract with just cause with the letter of 20 March 2017.

31. In light of the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant entirely recalled the conclusions made with its reply to the claim and, additionally, asked the application of sporting sanctions on the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. With regards to the issue of the sporting just cause, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant reiterated that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s request should be rejected since the contract had been already terminated with just cause in March 2017 and further specified that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is not in any case an “established professional” for the purposes of art. 15 of the Regulations.

32. In his final comments, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent substantially restated the position he had expressed with his previous briefs and added that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had acted in violation of art. 12 of the employment contract, given that it had not communicated with him prior to taking the ultimate measure of terminating the contract. Therefore, according to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had not validly terminated the contract on 20 March 2017.

33. Since the termination of the contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent has not entered into any new employment relationship.

34. After the closure of the investigation, by letter dated 27 November 2017, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asked that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s last submission not be taken into account, alleging that with it the latter had introduced new arguments to which the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had not been given the possibility to reply.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 2 May 2017. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018) the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment–related dispute with an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the aforementioned Regulations (edition 2018) and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 2 May 2017, the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the members of the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. With respect to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s request not to take into consideration the final submission of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in which the latter allegedly brought forward new arguments, the Chamber wished to highlight that the parties have had ample opportunity to defend their case and present documentation. In any case, recalling the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s argument regarding art. 12 of the employment contract (cf. number I./32. above), the Chamber wished to point out that, in general, the existence of a written warning or default notice prior to the termination of an employment contract is examined ex officio by the members of the deciding body.

6. Having said that, the DRC firstly acknowledged that, on 4 August 2015, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant signed and employment contract valid as from 1 August 2015 until 30 June 2020.

7. In continuation, the DRC noted that, according to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant breached the contract without just cause, allegedly having put him in a condition of intense unease throughout the employment relationship, which, ultimately, allegedly led to a situation of extreme psychological distress and put an end to his football career. Namely, according to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the unlawful behaviour of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant consisted in that (i) he had been allowed to play for a very limited amount of time during his stay at the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, (ii) he had been excluded from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s B team for unknown reasons from July until November 2016, with the consequence of having to train on his own to stay fit, (iii) he had been excluded from the restaurant of the team for unknown reasons, (iv) he had been excluded from all the trainings without justification, (v) he had to accept a change of the number of his jersey without reason and (vi) he had been regularly excluded from friendly games 5 minutes before the beginning of the match. In brief, the DRC noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent claimed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant‘s stance was aimed at pushing him to terminate the contract and, basically, not letting him execute it in the first place.

8. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, for its part, explained that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had not been fielded regularly due to his poor performances, which was the reason why he had been sent on loan twice. In addition, the DRC noted that, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had been given substantial playing time in several friendly matches.

9. In continuation, the DRC observed that, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, after his last short period of trial at the club of Country G, Club F, ending on 1 January 2017, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not resume his duties in Country D at the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s premises without having been given the permission to do so. The members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant indicated such circumstance as the reason to send the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the correspondence dated 20 March 2017 in which it declared that the latter’s abandonment of work had to be considered as a termination without just cause.

10. Furthermore, the DRC deemed worthwhile to point out that, with its counterclaim, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant declared it was asking EUR 190,000 as compensation for breach of contract rather than the higher amount provided for in art. 14 of the employment contract, given the reciprocal will of the parties to not continue working together.

11. Having established the above, the DRC took note that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant argued that it terminated the contract with its letter of 20 March 2017, in which it informed the Claimant / Counter-Respondent that “in face of [his] persistent and prolonged absence from the training sessions and competition […], [it] has no other option than to invoke [his] abandonment of work”. The members of the Chamber further noted that, in said correspondence, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant recalled art. 53, para. 4 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, provides that “the abandonment of work is considered as termination without just cause”.

12. In this respect, the members of the Chamber deemed important to underline that it was rather questionable whether the above-mentioned correspondence could be considered a formal termination letter. To begin with, the members of the Chamber deemed important to highlight that, in that letter, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not explicitly state that it was terminating the contract, but rather referred to the CBA of Country D, reminding the Claimant / Counter-Respondent that according to said collective bargaining agreement his abandonment of work had to be considered a termination without just cause. In this regard, the DRC considered important to add that the employment contract does not make any reference to the CBA of Country D and that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not submit any document regarding the invoked provisions. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not terminate the contract on 20 March 2017 by means of its letter of the same date.

13. Having established that, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the events at the core of the matter and noted, first and foremost, that it remained uncontested that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent returned to Country B in the beginning of January 2017 at the end of his short trial period with Club F instead of returning to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant.

14. In this context, the Chamber noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent blamed the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, and the conditions the latter had allegedly put him in, for the psychological distress he allegedly suffered and which was behind the decision to make his way back home after his trial period in Country G. In this respect, the DRC observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent himself acknowledged having returned to Country B on 5 January 2017, following the advice of his mother. In addition, the Chamber took note that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the employment contract on 26 April 2017 invoking the situation he allegedly had encountered with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as described in his statement of claim.

15. The members of the Chamber recalled that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contested the allegations of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent relating to the alleged treatment he received from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and that the latter had explained that the poor performance of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was the reason why he had not been fielded regularly.

16. With regards to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s allegations relating to his alleged treatment by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the DRC concurred in the conclusion that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence corroborating the allegations on the basis of which he terminated the employment contract. More in particular, the members of the Chamber observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was not able to prove that he had been excluded from the B team and substantially forced to train on his own. Equally, the DRC observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had not provided evidence of his alleged exclusion from the restaurant of the team or from the trainings, nor that he had been regularly excluded from friendly games right before the beginning of the match. In other words, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence that, throughout the employment relationship, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had put in place a conduct substantially aimed at alienating him from the rest of the team.

17. In relation to the above, the members of the DRC agreed that the exchange of messages with his former agent and the messages sent by his mother and his new agent to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in December 2015 and in January 2017 presented by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in support of his position did not constitute enough evidence. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber deemed important to mention that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent informed the Respondent / Counter-Claimant of his decision not to go back to Country D only a week after having returned to Country B, via an e-mail sent on 13 January 2017 by his agent, who communicated that “it would be better for [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] to stay in Country B till the end of January”. Moreover, the Chamber took into account that it has remained undisputed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant has regularly paid the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salaries until April 2017.

18. With all the foregoing in mind, the members of the Chamber had no other option than to conclude that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s behaviour was in breach of his contractual obligations and that he had no just cause to terminate the employment contract.

19. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the employment contract was already terminated by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent prior to his further correspondence of 31 May 2017 invoking sporting just cause for the termination of the contract, the Chamber agreed that it was not necessary to further analyse and discuss as to whether the Claimant / Counter-Respondent may have had sporting just cause to terminate the contract.

20. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s claim in its entirety.

21. Having established the above, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim. In this respect, they found of utmost importance to analyse the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s stance throughout the employment relationship with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent.

22. First of all, the DRC highlighted that it was undisputed that, since the beginning of the employment relationship, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had been assigned to the B team and that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had only occasionally fielded him in official matches. In this respect, the members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant itself, in reply to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent who raised this point in his claim, declared that it had fielded him on various occasions during friendly matches.

23. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant declared it had sent the Claimant / Counter-Respondent initially on loan to the club of Country B, Club E, and then on trial to the club of Country G, Club F, because it was not satisfied with his performance. The Chamber further noted that, in order to make its point even stronger, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant added that the footballing skills displayed by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent were so poor that none of the above-mentioned clubs exercised the option to retain him. In other words, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant appears to have shown an utter dissatisfaction with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’ services.

24. Most importantly, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant itself, in order to justify a request for compensation in an amount different from the one provided for in the contract, quite unequivocally stated that the parties had a reciprocal will not to continue working together. In other words, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant confirmed in its own submissions what it had practically shown during the contractual relationship with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, namely that, for its part, it was not really interested in the latter’s services.

25. In addition, the members of the DRC observed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not put the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in default of his absence. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the first notice that was sent by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was that of 20 March 2017, when the latter had been unquestionably absent as of 5 January 2017.

26. On account of all the above-described circumstances, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was no longer interested in pursuing its contractual relationship with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent.

27. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim for payment of compensation in its entirety.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Player A, is rejected.

2. The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, is rejected.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)

Avenue de Beaumont 2

CH-1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl.: CAS directives