F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision7 June 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 7 June 2018,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Roy Vermeer (the Netherlands), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

on the matter between the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant / Counter-Respondent

and the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent / Counter-Claimant

and the club,

Club E, Country F

as intervening party

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 29 July 2016, the Player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent or the player) and the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant or the club) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from the date of signature until 28 July 2017.

2. According to art. 4 of the contract, the player was entitled to a monthly salary of USD 16,666, payable at the end of each month.

3. Art. 13 point 10 of the contract stipulates the following: “in case a dispute raises between the two parties about any of the articles of the contract, they shall seek to solve it amicably. In case of default of the amicable solution, the dispute shall be forwarded (DRC) before the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) of the Football Federation of Country D to solve it”.

4. On 30 October 2016, the player, via e-mail, put the club in default of the payment of USD 49,998, corresponding to the monthly salaries from August to October 2016. By said letter, the player requested the payment of the aforementioned amount within “the next 48 hours”.

5. By means of a letter dated 2 November 2016, delivered via e-mail on 4 November 2016, the player terminated the contract.

6. On 2 November 2016, the club sent a letter to the Football Federation of Country D, informing that the player had abandoned the team’s trainings as of 28 October 2016 without the club’s permission and left to Country B.

7. On 7 November 2016, the player lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the club for breach of contract, requesting the total amount of USD 199,992, plus 5% interest p.a. as from the due dates. In particular, the player requested the following:

a) USD 49,998 as outstanding salaries for the months of August, September and October 2016;

b) USD 133,328 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to the “remaining contract (8 months)”.

8. In his claim, the player explained that the club did not pay his monthly salaries for more than three months and argued that he therefore terminated the contract with just cause.

9. On 13 November 2016, the club sent a letter, addressed “for the lawyer of the player”, affirming that the player left the country without the club being informed and requested him to come back to the team’s trainings.

10. On 17 November 2016, the club approached again the Football Federation of Country D, reiterating that, despite its request, the player did not come back and resume trainings with the team.

11. On 28 November 2016, the club sent another letter, addressed “for the player lawyer”, reiterating its request to the player to resume trainings with the team.

12. In its reply to the claim, the club preliminarily contested FIFA’s jurisdiction, maintaining that only the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Federation of Country D (hereinafter: the NDRC of Country D) was competent to deal with the dispute, pursuant to art. 13 point 10 of the contract.

13. In particular, the club stressed that the NDRC of Country D is an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, as provided by the Statutes of the Football Federation of Country D.

14. Pursuant to art. 53 par. 1 of said Statutes, “A National DRC shall be composed according to the provisions of the DRC Regulations issued by Football Federation of Country D and the NDRC Standard Regulations published by FIFA”. Furthermore, the club submitted copy of the “Country D– Football Federation of Country D– Regulations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber following the Football Federation of Country D” (hereinafter: the Football Federation of Country D Regulations), whereby art. 6 provides that: “(…) 6.2 Chamber is composed of a chairman and a vice- Chairman and six other members.

6.3 (…) chamber’s chairman and his vice- chairman shall be appointed by the [Board of Directors of the Football Federation of Country D– hereinafter: the Board].

6.4 Three members representing the professional clubs, nominated by the Association of Professional League to be selected by the Board, provided that a club shall not have more than a representative.

6.5 Three members representing professional players to be selected by the Board till the establishment of professional players association and the nomination of their representatives”.

15. Subsidiarly, as to the merits of the case, the club rejected the player’s arguments and lodged a counter-claim against him for breach of contract.

16. In particular, the club maintained first that it provided the player with the following payments:

a) 62,500 in the Currency of Country D, allegedly corresponding to USD 16,666, on 18 August 2016, as advance payment of the salary for the month of August 2016. The club submitted a “payment voucher” for the amount of 62,500 in the Currency of Country D, issued by the club itself, which refers to “August salary”;

b) 5,000 in the Currency of Country D, allegedly corresponding to USD 1,333 on 21 August 2016, after a match played in the Professional League of Country D against the Club G. The club submitted a “payment voucher” for the amount of 5,000 in the Currency of Country D, issued by the club itself, which refers to “Club G bonus game in the league”;

c) 5,000 in the Currency of Country D, allegedly corresponding to USD 1,333, on 30 August 2016, after a match played in the Tournament of Country D against the Club H. The club submitted a “payment voucher” for the amount of 5,000 in the Currency of Country D, issued by the club itself, which refers to “XXX game bonus in the tournament”.

For each of the above-mentioned payments, the club also submitted a copy of the payment receipts allegedly signed by the player.

17. In continuation, the club averred that, after having made the aforementioned payments, it informed all the players that, due to “some cash flow problems”, they would have to wait until the first days of November 2016 to receive further payments.

18. With the aforementioned in mind, the club held that the termination of the contract was invalid as the relevant termination letter was signed by the player’s lawyer and not by the player himself. In particular, the club alleged that the player did not provide the club with any specific power of attorney authorising his lawyer to terminate the contract.

19. Moreover, the club affirmed that it did not receive in its inbox folder the e-mails containing the player’s default notice and termination letter. However, the club admitted that such e-mails were delivered in its spam-box folder. In view of that, the club considered that it did not receive any default notice from the player or, alternatively, it could not take notice of it in due course. Consequently, the club maintained that the player terminated the contract without just cause.

20. In any case, the club argued that the amount due to the player on the date the default notice was sent was not substantial, as it had provided him with the payment of the total amount of USD 19,332, i.e. the salary for August 2016 and two match bonuses. In particular, the club stressed that only the salary for the month of September 2016 was due on the aforementioned date.

21. On account of all the above, the club argued that the termination of the contract by the player was without just cause and hence requested the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 450,000, calculated as follows:

a) USD 150,000 corresponding to the remaining value of the contract;

b) USD 200,000 as expected costs to be borne by the club for the replacement of the player;

c) USD 100,000 as further compensation calculated upon the criterion of the “specificity of sport”, corresponding to the equivalent of six monthly salaries.

22. In his replica, the player preliminarily contested the club’s argument that the NDRC of Country D would be competent to deal with the present case. In particular, the player argued that such body does not comply with the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, as its chairman and vice-chairman, as well as the players’ and club’s representatives, are elected by the Football Federation of Country D Board.

23. As to the substance, the player rejected the club’s counterclaim and insisted that he terminated the contract with just cause on 4 November 2016. In particular, he remarked that a valid power attorney was enclosed with his default notice and with his termination letter, which were both delivered to the club.

24. Moreover, the player affirmed that his alleged signature on the payment receipts submitted by the club was forged and, consequently, he denied having received any salary for the month of August 2016 and the match bonuses indicated by the club.

25. What is more, the player maintained that the payment vouchers presented by the club for the match bonuses are to be considered as a “debt confession”. As a consequence thereof, the player amended his claim, also requesting the payment of said match bonuses in the amount of 10,000 in the Currency of Country D, plus 5% interest p.a. as from the relevant due dates.

26. In its duplica, the club insisted on the competence of the NDRC of Country D based on the jurisdiction clause contained in art. 13 point 10 of the contract, averring that said body is an independent arbitration tribunal.

27. On a subsidiary basis, the club rejected the player’s arguments as to the substance and, in particular, reaffirmed that he, in fact, signed the payment receipt related to his salary of August 2016. Moreover, it affirmed that the player, upon his request, received such payment in cash and it pointed out that the signature contained in the aforementioned document was identical to the one in the contract and the power of attorney. Furthermore, the club submitted the original version of the contested document as well as of the contract.

28. With regard to the match bonuses, the club averred that they were paid to all the players involved in the relevant matches and that the player signed the relevant payment receipts using his acronym. Moreover, the club submitted the original version of said payment receipts as well as a statement from three players of the club whereby they confirmed the payment. In addition, the club submitted the original version of three lists of attendance to the trainings allegedly signed by the player using his acronym.

29. Furthermore, the club reiterated that the player’s termination of the contract was invalid, due to the lack of a specific power of attorney for such termination. In addition, the club maintained that the default notice and the termination letter were not ordinary communications between the player and the club, but rather communications intended to produce legal effects. In view of that, the club argued that it was on the player the burden to prove of “having duly and timely informed” the club about their content. What is more, the club emphasised that the period between the default notice and the termination letter was “unreasonable and unfair”.

30. The club further affirmed that the player concluded a new employment contract with the Club of Country F, Club E (hereinafter: the intervening party or Club E) for a higher salary, allegedly on 12 December 2016.

31. Finally, the club alleged that it incurred in extra costs for replacing the player with the Player of Country B, Player L, transferred on loan from the Club of Country M, Club N. Said costs were quantified in the total amount of USD 140,000 broken-down as follows: USD 70,000 for the loan fee and USD 70,000 for the new player’s salary, calculated until 28 July 2017. In this regard, the club submitted copy of the relevant loan agreement, valid as of 26 January 2017 until 25 January 2018, signed by the new player, the club and Club N.

32. On account of the above, the club amended its counter-claim and requested the total amount of USD 477,500, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 28 November 2016, broken-down as follows:

a) USD 202,500, corresponding to the remaining value of the contract, with an expected rise of 35%;

b) USD 135,000 as further compensation calculated upon the criterion of the “specificity of sport”, corresponding to the equivalent of six monthly salaries plus the expected 35% rise;

c) USD 140,000 as costs borne by the club for the replacement of the player.

Finally, the club requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the player.

33. In his final comments to the club’s counterclaim, the player reiterated that he terminated the contract with just cause and, consequently, the counter-claim had to be rejected. The player also acknowledged having concluded a new employment contract with the Club E on 4 January 2017 (hereinafter: the new contract).

34. The new contract was valid “as of the date of joining the club in the January transfer window for the sports season 2016/2017” until “the end of the sports season of Football Association of Country F 2016/2017 or 30 June 2017 whichever is closer”. According to the new contract, the player was entitled to a total salary of USD 50,000, payable in equal monthly salaries at the end of each month.

35. In this respect, the player explained that he suffered an injury on 7 February 2017 and eventually entered into a “mutual termination agreement” with Club E.

36. Upon request of the FIFA administration, Club E submitted its comments on the present affair and pointed out that, pursuant to art. 13 of the new contract, the player “acknowledges that he is released from any obligations with any football federation or any other club and in case any obligation are existing in the present or in future, the player personally shall bear them and he is releasing Club E thereof”.

37. Moreover, Club E affirmed that the player signed a document titled “assurance” where he guaranteed that he had no obligations towards Club C preventing him from joining Club E. The latter also emphasised that, within the same document, the player undertook to be liable towards Club E in case of breach of the aforementioned “assurance”.

38. Furthermore, Club E affirmed that the “mutual termination agreement” was signed on 20 February 2017 and, on the same date, the player left Club E.

39. On account of the above, Club E requested the rejection of the counter-claim or, alternatively, the player to reimburse Club E any compensation it should be ordered to pay to Club C in case of termination of the contract by the player without just cause.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as: the Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 7 November 2016. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2015; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2. in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and Club of Country D, with the intervention of a Club of Country F.

3. At this point, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that, contrary to the information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 1 June 2018, by means of which the parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member M refrained from participating in the deliberations of the case at hand due to certain personal circumstances and, in order to comply with the prerequisite of equal representation of the club’s and player’s representatives, also the member N refrained from participating. Thus, the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations.

4. Reverting to the issue of its competence, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contested FIFA’s jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the player, alleging that the competent body to deal with any dispute deriving from the relevant employment contract is the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Association of Country D, in accordance with art. 13 point 10 of the contract.

5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, and sustained that the NDRC of Country D is not an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.

6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA is, in principle, competent to hear an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension. Nevertheless, the parties may explicitly opt in writing for such dispute to be decided by an independent arbitration tribunal that has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. Any such arbitration clause must be included either directly in the contract or in a collective bargaining agreement applicable on the parties. The independent national arbitration tribunal must guarantee fair proceedings and respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.

7. In this context, the DRC turned its attention to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle is one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list”.

8. With the aforementioned principles in mind, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and noted that, according to the same, the chairman and the vice-chairman of the NDRC of Country D are appointed by the board of directors of the Football Federation of Country D.

9. As a consequence, the Chamber was of the opinion that the club failed to prove that the NDRC of Country D indeed respects the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.

10. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

11. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 7 November 2016, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

12. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

13. First, the Chamber noted that the parties entered into an employment contract valid as from 29 July 2016 until 28 July 2017, providing a monthly salary for the player in the amount of USD 16,666.

14. Moreover, the members of the Chamber observed that it remained undisputed that the player left the club on 28 October 2016 and eventually, on 30 October 2016, he sent to the club a letter by means of which he put the latter in default of payment of three monthly salaries, namely for the months from August to October 2016, giving it a two days’ deadline in order to remedy the default. Furthermore, the DRC took note that, on 2 November 2016, the player terminated the contract.

15. Bearing in mind the above, the members of the Chamber took note that the player requested outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 49,998, corresponding to the monthly salaries as from August until October 2016, and USD 133,328 as compensation for breach of contract.

16. In continuation, the Chamber took note of the reply of the club, which affirmed that it paid to the player his monthly salary for August and submitted the relevant payment receipts containing the alleged signature of the player. Consequently, according to the club, when the player sent his default notice, only the salary for the month of September 2016 was outstanding. Moreover, the club maintained that the default notice sent by the player was invalid as it was not allegedly including a power of attorney empowering the player’s representative and, what is more, it could not take notice of it on time.

17. On account of the aforementioned arguments, the club averred that the player terminated the contract without just cause and as such it lodged a counter-claim for breach of contract against the player, requesting the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the amount USD 477,500.

18. In continuation, the members of the Chamber took note of the position of the player’s new club, Club E, which maintained that, according to the employment contract it concluded with the player, the latter released his new club from any liability for any obligations towards any other club. What is more, Club E maintained that the player signed a document whereby he assured the intervening party that he had no obligations towards the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and undertook to be liable towards Club E in case of breach of such “assurance”.

19. In view of the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Chamber highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the diverging position of the parties, was to determine whether, on 2 November 2016, the contract had been terminated by the player with or without just cause and to determine thereafter the consequences of said termination.

20. In this context, the Chamber was eager to emphasise first that, according to its well established jurisprudence, only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other words, a contract may be terminated prematurely only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit one to expect the continuation of the employment relationship. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employee to ensure the employer’s fulfilment of his contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only be an ultima ratio.

21. Moreover, the Chamber referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. Thus, it is up to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to substantiate and provide documentary evidence with regard to alleged circumstances which, according to the player, justified his decision to terminate the contract.

22. Having established the above, the Chamber proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the present matter and, in so doing, turned its attention to the fact that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent contested the authenticity of his signature on the payment receipts submitted by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as proof of payment of the salary for the month of August 2016, and affirmed that the said signature had been forged.

23. In this respect, the Chamber emphasised that, as general rule, it is not the competent body to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the alleged forgery of a signature or a document, but that such affairs rather fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.

24. The DRC also recalled that all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and therefore focused its attention on the relevant original payment slips submitted by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as well as the other documents containing the player’s signature. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures, the DRC had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, the signatures seem to be alike.

25. In view of the above, and based on the documentation currently at its disposal, the Chamber unanimously came to the conclusion that, unless proven otherwise by a decision of the competent national criminal authority, it had to consider that the payment of the salary for the month of August 2016 had effectively been made to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent.

26. Having stated the above, the Chamber further observed that, indeed, on the date the player put the club in default (i.e. on 30 October 2016), only the salary for the month of September 2016 was outstanding, being the salary for the month of October payable until 31 October 2016 only. Therefore, the members of the Chamber concurred that, when the player put the club in default of payment, the outstanding remuneration due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was equal to one monthly salary only.

27. Moreover, the DRC wished to emphasise that it remained undisputed that the player indeed sent a default notice to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant granting a time limit of 48 hours in order to remedy the default. In this context, the members of the Chamber wished to emphasise that the purpose of a default notice is to make aware the defaulting party of its delay in the compliance of its obligations and to grant it a reasonable period of time for said party to remedy the default. In casu, the DRC was of the opinion that a 48 hours’ time-limit to cure a default does not provide the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity to do so.

28. In view of the all aforementioned circumstances, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that, at the time of the unilateral termination of the contract by the player, there were no objective circumstances which would have prevented, in good faith, the continuation of the employment relationship. As such, the DRC held that the player terminated the contract without just cause on 2 November 2017.

29. Prior to establishing the consequences of the termination of the contract without just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that it had to address the issue of any unpaid remuneration at the moment the contract was terminated by the player.

30. In this regard, the Chamber observed that it remained uncontested that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not receive the salary for the months of September and October 2016. Consequently, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant has to pay the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the corresponding amount of USD 33,332.

31. In addition, taking into consideration the player’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the members of the Chamber decided to award the Claimant / Counter-Respondent interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the outstanding amount of USD 33,332, as requested by the player:

- as of 1 October 2016, on the amount of USD 16,666;

- as of 1 November 2016, on the amount of USD 16,666.

32. Subsequently, having established that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the contract without just cause, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay compensation for breach of contract to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous content of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the player’s new club, i.e. Club E, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the mentioned compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the intervening party is independent from the question as to whether the new club has committed an inducement to contractual breach or any other kind of involvement by the new club. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber that was repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

33. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.

34. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the player and the club contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation for breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the said employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

35. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years.

36. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the to the essential criterion relating to the fees and expenses paid by the club for the acquisition of the player’s services insofar as these have not been amortised over the term of the relevant contract. In this regard, the DRC observed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had not specifically included any of these costs in its claim and, thus, it established that, as it had no indications at its disposal regarding possible fees and expenses paid or incurred by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for the acquisition of the player, it could not further consider that criterion in the specific case at hand.

37. The Chamber further noted that in its calculation of the amount of compensation the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had included costs relating to the acquisition of another player that allegedly replaced the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant failed to provide documentary evidence in order to establish, at the Chamber’s satisfaction, a direct nexus between the loss of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s services and the hiring of the new player. Therefore the Chamber decided not to take into consideration the transfer fee allegedly paid in connection with said transfer, let alone the new player’s salary, in order to determine the payable compensation.

38. Consequently, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that the only objective criteria in the present matter in order to establish the amount of compensation to be paid by the player was the financial terms of the former contract and the new contract for the same period of time, the value of which constitutes an essential criterion in the calculation of the amount of compensation in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the fixed remuneration payable to the player under the terms of both the employment contract signed with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, i.e. Club C, and the one signed with the intervening party, i.e. Club E, for the period that was remaining since the unilateral termination of the contract by the player until its expiry, i.e. from 2 November 2016 until 28 July 2017.

39. In this regard, the Chamber noted that, as per the employment contract signed with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the player was entitled to a monthly remuneration in the amount of USD 16,666 for the remaining contractual period, i.e. a total fixed remuneration of USD 149,994.

40. Equally, the DRC took note of the player’s remuneration under the terms of his employment contract with his new club, i.e. the intervening party, which corresponds to a monthly remuneration in the amount of USD 10,000 for the remaining contractual period, i.e. a total fixed remuneration of USD 90,000.

41. Taking into account the above, the Chamber concluded that, for the relevant period, the player’s average remuneration amounts to USD 119,997.

42. On account of the above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that, in application of the aforementioned criteria, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant would be entitled, in principle, to a compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 119,997.

43. Notwithstanding the above, the members of the Chamber, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the present matter, wished to emphasise that, at the time of the termination of the contract, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was in breach of its obligations towards the player. In particular, the members of the DRC recalled that the player did not receive the payment of his salaries for the months of September and October 2016.

44. As a consequence thereof, the members of the Chamber concluded that it is fair and reasonable to reduce the compensation for breach of contract due to the club accordingly. In this respect, the Chamber also considered that the sequence of events of the present matter appears to show that the club did not attribute too much value to the player’s services. In particular, the fact that the club only reacted once it was notified of the player’s claim.

45. On account of the above-mentioned considerations, and of the specific circumstances of the case, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is entitled to receive the amount of USD 33,332 as compensation for breach of contract, which is considered by the DRC a reasonable and justified amount.

46. In continuation, and with regard to the club's request for interest, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, in accordance with the long-standing jurisprudence of the Chamber in this regard, is entitled to 5% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amount as of 12 December 2016.

47. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent / Counter -Claimant are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Player A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 33,332, plus 5% interest p.a. as follows:

a) as of 1 October 2016 on the amount of USD 16,666 until the date of effective payment;

b) as of 1 November 2016 on the amount of USD 16,666 until the date of effective payment.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected.

5. The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is partially accepted.

6. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent has to pay to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 33,332, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 12 December 2016 until the date of effective payment.

7. The intervening party, Club E, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation for breach of contract.

8. Any further counterclaim lodged by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected.

9. In the event that the aforementioned amounts plus interest are not paid by the respective parties as provided above within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

10. The parties are directed to inform their counterparties immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl.: CAS directives