DECISIONI DI GIUSTIZIA SPORTIVA • F.I.F.A. - CAMERA DI RISOLUZIONE DELLE CONTROVERSIE - CONTROVERSIE DI LAVORO

• Data decisione: 6 dicembre 2018 • Stagione sportiva: 2018/2019

F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2018-2019) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 6 December 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 6 December 2018,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Eirik Monsen (Norway), member

Jerome Perlemuter (France), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 1 January 2016, the player from Country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the day of the signature of the contract until 31 December 2017.

2. According to clause 3 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled, inter alia, to the following:

a. A monthly salary in the amount of Currency of Country D 368,500 payable “on the fifth date of the next month”;

b. A daily allowance in the amount of Currency of Country D 500 “for practicing upon the actual times of practicing”;

c. A monthly housing allowance in the amount of Currency of Country D 20,000;

d. A monthly allowance for a car rental in the amount of Currency of Country D 20,000;

e. A sign on fee in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,500,000;

f. 3 round flight tickets to Country B “during the 2016 and 2017 seasons or the value in cash from the tickets”;

g. “Club will support visa for the [Claimant] by labour law”.

3. Clause 5 of the contract established that: “The [Respondent] shall pay monthly wage and others in [clause 3] in full payment within timeline. In case the [Respondent] fails to implement any of payments in [clause 3], the [Claimant] shall give one month notice to the [Respondent]. If such date is overdue, the [Claimant] may terminate the [contract] at any time.”.

4. Furthermore, clause 11 of the contract provided the following: “This agreement may be terminated as follows:

11.1 This agreement is valid for a period of 1 year from the date of the signing of the contract by the [Respondent] and the [Claimant] and the term may be extended for an additional period.

(…)

11.3 The [Respondent] may terminate [the contract] at any time, by sending a written termination notice to the other party with 1 month in advance following:

a. [The Claimant] has less working hours than the specific period and cause severe damage to the [Respondent];

b. [The Claimant] is at fault that set out [clause] 6;

c. [The Claimant] does not has any progressivity that set out in clause 6.5;

d. [The Claimant] is not capable of carrying out his duties that set out in section 6 by prohibited to competition more than 3 months;

e. [The Claimant] is not been selected for playing that set out in [clause] 9; and

f. [The Claimant] is not capable to play football due to results of a medical examination which ha cause is not related to football…”.

5. Moreover, according to the Claimant, the contract had an annexe by means of which it was agreed with the Respondent “to raise (10%) the monthly wage for the season 2017 in the amount of Currency of Country D 405,350.”.

6. In this context, the contract does not contain a clause regarding the financial consequences in case of breach of contract.

7. On 5 July 2016, the Claimant was loaned to the club of Country D, Club E. In this context, the duration of the loan was set as from the signature of the loan transfer agreement until 31 December 2016, period in which the Claimant was, inter alia, entitled to receive a monthly salary in the amount of Currency of Country D 200,000 “which [Club E] will pay directly to [the Claimant]”.

8. On 1 November 2016, the Respondent sent a letter (hereinafter: the termination notice) to the Claimant that reads as follows:

“[The Respondent’s] Board has decided to terminate [the contract] dated [1 January 2016] between [the Claimant] and [the Respondent] for two years period from 1 January 2016 until 31 December 2017.

Termination by the Club shall be effectuated by delivering to the [Claimant] written notice of the [Respondent’s] intent to terminate the [contract], which notice shall be effective upon the earlier of the date for 30 days after [the Claimant] has receipt of such notice.

[The Respondent] shall pay to [the Claimant] Currency of Country D 1,050,000.

Upon the payment, the [Claimant] should release, either as part of the contract or by virtue of a separate agreement, the [Respondent] from any further liability or responsibility.

By terminating [the contract], [the Claimant] agrees that this amount will constitute full settlement of any and all claims that [the Claimant] might otherwise assert against the [the Respondent]...”. The termination notice is signed on behalf of the Respondent by Club Manager F, bearing the Respondent’s letterhead.

9. On 19 December 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA, requesting the total amount of Currency of Country D 12,255,070. Said amount is broken down as follows:

Currency of Country D 2,492,000 as outstanding remuneration, plus interests as of the respective due dates:

- Currency of Country D 1,500,000, corresponding to the “signing fee”;

- Currency of Country D 737,000, corresponding to the outstanding salaries of September and October 2016;

- Currency of Country D 80,000, corresponding to housing and car rental allowances;

- Currency of Country D 25,000, corresponding to the daily allowances for September 2016 and October 2016; and

- Currency of Country D 150,000, corresponding to “the visa for the family plus additional administrative costs”.

Currency of Country D 9,763,070 as compensation for breach of contract, plus interests as of the date the claim:

- Currency of Country D 737,000, corresponding to the salaries of November 2016 and December 2016;

- Currency of Country D 4,864,200, corresponding to the salaries of January 2017 until December 2017;

- Currency of Country D 280,000, corresponding to the housing allowances as from November 2016 until December 2017;

- Currency of Country D 280,000, corresponding to the rental car allowance as from November 2016 until December 2017;

- Currency of Country D 175,000, corresponding to the daily allowance as from November 2016 until December 2017;

- Currency of Country D 240,000, corresponding to the flight tickets, the Claimant calculated the round trip from City G to City H in the amount of Currency of Country D 80,000;

- Currency of Country D 377,385, corresponding to legal fees;

- Currency of Country D 377,385, corresponding to moral damages; and

- Currency of Country D 2,432,100, corresponding to “specificity of sport”.

Furthermore, the Claimant requested the imposition of sporting sanctions against the Respondent.

According to the Claimant, the parties agreed on the annexe “to raise (10%) the monthly wage for the season 2017 in the amount of Currency of Country D 405,350”, therefore, the Claimant requested the aforementioned amount for the months of January 2017 until December 2017.

10. In this regard, in his claim, the Claimant deemed that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the contract without just cause on 1 November 2016. In addition to that, the Claimant sustained that after he returned to the Respondent for an evaluation of his performance with Club E, the president of the Respondent informed the Claimant that his services were no longer needed.

11. Subsequently, the Claimant argued that before the Respondent, allegedly, unilaterally terminated the contract on 1 November 2016, it had already failed to pay the Claimant the monthly salaries of September and October 2016, as well as the sign on fee. In this respect, the Claimant emphasized that, “despite the persistent failure of the club to pay his salaries, the player always remained available for the club with professionalism and good faith”.

12. On 10 March 2017, the Respondent sent the Claimant a letter. Said letter reads as follows:

“I was informed by Mr J that you have been terminated by Club Manager F. I would like to use this opportunity to make you clear that Club Manager F has no legal authority to issue such letter or to enter into any engagement with third parties without prior permission from the [Respondent].

I have seen your correspondence with Mr J and I have found that you want us to compensate you so many things. As the president of the [Respondent], I make decision as follows:

I. In this particular case and as agreed in the contract… you appeal to Club C and if you can’t find any justice from the Respondent you have to settle our case to the Football Association of Country D (Football Association of Country D). I have checked with the [Respondent]. I am reported you did not follow the contract.

II. After investigating your case, I am on behalf of the [Respondent] decide to pay you Currency of Country D 1,080,000, which Mr J clarified, to you already.

III. You have to resume for training and deliver your services to [the Respondent] within 30 March 2017. If you can’t return to join the [Respondent] within the said date, I am regret to inform you in advance that the [Respondent] have to terminate your contract without any further payment rather than agreed in point II.

IV. If you return to [the Respondent] within said date as stated in point 3 both you and [the Respondent] have to follow the contract strictly.”.

13. By means of a letter dated 10 March 2017, the Claimant replied to the abovementioned letter, by means of which he held, that:

“First of all we note that the existence of the termination letter dated 1 November 2016, is not contested. Also we note that the [Respondent] confirms that this termination letter was handed to the [Claimant], however 4 months after the initial letter, the [Respondent] claim the person who signed the termination letter had «no permission to do so».

(…)

Concerning your letter dated 10 March 2017, we refer to the relevant CAS and FIFA DRC’s jurisprudence which stated that in principle, an agreement between two parties or a letter directed towards another party does not have to follow any specific form.

(…)

The [Claimant] could in good faith assume that this person was duly authorized to act and sign on the [Respondent’s] behalf.

(…)

Please note that the [Claimant] has officially submitted a claim against the [Respondent] before the FIFA DRC…”.

14. On 17 March 2017, the claim was sent to the club via the Football Association of Country D. After several requests from the FIFA administration to confirm the date in which the claim was forwarded to the club, on 25 July 2017, the Football Association of Country D stated that “[it] did receive the documents relative to the [present matter] from FIFA via courier, however, the documents has not been received by the related personnel in the [Football Association of Country D].

Our association deeply apologized for the inconvenience cause in relation to this matter and would like to ensure you that we shall deliver all documents relative to [the Respondent’s] dispute with [the Claimant] with no failure in the future.”.

15. On its reply to the claim, the Respondent emphasized that the Claimant, allegedly, agreed to return to the Respondent. In this respect, the Respondent gave the Claimant a time limit to re-join the Respondent until 30 April 2017, otherwise the Respondent would understand that the Claimant has the intention to terminate the contract. In this context, the Respondent stated that “If [the Claimant] decides not to present at [the Respondent], the [Respondent] needs to terminate his contract without payment to cover his salary of April 2017 since he is out of duty since March 2017”.

16. In line with the above, the Respondent further argued that on 31 March 2017, it deposited a cheque in the Football Association of Country D in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,350,000, corresponding to the Claimant’s salaries until 30 March 2017, in order to be collected by the Claimant. On that basis, the Respondent deemed that as a result of having paid the Claimant his salaries until the month of March 2017, the Claimant cannot be considered dismissed.

17. In continuation, the Respondent referred to its letter dated 10 March 2017, and held that “the termination letter did not bound the parties. In other words, the issuer of the termination letter did not have any authority so the termination could not be in effect.”. To that end, the Respondent maintained that only one person, Person K, is authorized to sign on behalf of the Respondent.

18. With regard to the Claimant’s request for the reimbursement of the costs for “the visa for the family plus additional administrative costs”, the Respondent stated that in accordance with the contract it was only responsible for bearing the costs of the Claimant’s visa, and not the family’s visa.

19. In addition to that, the Respondent recalled its obligation of buying the Claimant 3 round flight tickets to Country B “during the 2016 and 2017 seasons or the value in cash from the tickets”, and argued having paid the costs of 1 round ticket from City H to City G on 16 January 2016, and from City G to City H on 1 November 2016, as well as a round trip to Country L in February 2016.

20. On 25 July 2017, the Respondent submitted unsolicited correspondence by means of which it argued that “on 1 November 2016, the team manager sent the termination letter to warning the validity of the contract and offer the payment as 3 months of the [Claimant’s] salary in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,050,000 as liquidated damages according to Labour Law of Country D, for the balance of the duration of the [employment relationship].

(…) according to [clause 11 of the contract], it was valid for a period of 1 year from the date of the signing of the contract by the [Respondent] and the [Claimant] and the term may be extended for additional period.

In support of its assertion, we draw your attention to the termination letter dated 1 November 2016, first paragraph in accordance with which [the Respondent’s] board has decided to terminate [the contract] and according to paragraph 3 and 4 which [the Respondent] shall pay to [the Claimant] Currency of Country D 1,050,000 and upon this payment [the Claimant] should release, either as part of the contract.

In view of all the above, the team manager considered that this contract was anyway no longer valid, according to its [clause 11]. He did not intend to breach the contract. He only sent a written termination notice to [the Claimant] with one month in advance before the contract would be expired on 31 December 2016.”.

21. In view of the content of the Football Association of Country D’s correspondence dated 25 July 2017, the FIFA administration informed the parties that it would be up to the relevant decision body to take into consideration the unsolicited correspondence submitted by the Respondent.

22. After being requested by FIFA, the Claimant confirmed that on 7 July 2017, he signed a contract with the Club of Country D, Club M, valid as from 1 June 2017 “until the end of 2017 season”, according to which he is entitled, inter alia, to receive a monthly salary corresponding to the amount of Currency of Country D 130,000. In this regard, according to the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the relevant football season in Country D followed the calendar year.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 December 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2015, 2017 and 2018 editions of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on

19 December 2016, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Single Judge recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in TMS.

5. First of all, the DRC acknowledged that, on 1 January 2016, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment contract valid as from the date of the signature until 31 December 2017.

6. In this context, the members of the Chamber duly considered the financial terms of the contract at the basis of this dispute, which are in casu contained in clause 3 of the contract. In this regard, the Chamber took note that the Claimant was entitled to receive the following:

a. A monthly salary in the amount of Currency of Country D 368,500 payable “on the fifth date of the next month”;

b. A daily allowance in the amount of Currency of Country D 500 “for practicing upon the actual times of practicing”;

c. A monthly housing allowance in the amount of Currency of Country D 20,000;

d. A monthly allowance for a car rental in the amount of Currency of Country D 20,000;

e. A sign on fee in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,500,000;

f. 3 round flight tickets to Country B “during the 2016 and 2017 seasons or the value in cash from the tickets”;

g. “Club will support visa for the [Claimant] by labour law”.

7. Moreover, the DRC observed that according to the Claimant, the contract had an annexe by means of which it was agreed “to raise (10%) the monthly wage for the season 2017 in the amount of Currency of Country D 405,350.”.

8. In continuation, the DRC further acknowledged that on 5 July 2016, the Claimant was transferred on a temporary basis to the club of Country D , Club E, until 31 December 2016, period in which the Respondent and Club E agreed that the later would pay the Claimant’s monthly salary directly to him.

9. Furthermore, the Chamber duly noted that on 1 November 2016 the Respondent sent the Claimant a letter signed by Club Manager F as the Respondent’s Manager, stating the following:

[The Respondent] shall pay to [the Claimant] Currency of Country D 1,050,000.

Upon the payment, the [Claimant] should release, either as part of the contract or by virtue of a separate agreement, the [Respondent] from any further liability or responsibility.

10. Subsequently, the members of the DRC acknowledged that on 19 December 2016 the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent, wherein it alleged that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause by means of its letter dated 1 November 2016.

11. In view of the foregoing, the members of the Chamber were of the unanimous decision that given the particular circumstances of the present case, in particular the fact it is not clear when the claim was forwarded to the club by The Football Association of Country D, it would take into account all the submissions provided by the club.

12. To that end, the Chamber referred to the Respondent’s argumentation. In this regard, the DRC noted that the Respondent held that the letter dated 1 November 2016 did not terminate the employment relationship due to the following arguments:

- The letter was signed by an unauthorized person with no legal authority to issue such letter;

- The Respondent contacted the Claimant on March 2017 offering to re-join the Respondent;

- The contract cannot be considered terminated since it allegedly paid the Claimant’s salary until March 2017; and

- The letter’s intention was to notify the Claimant that the contract was about to expire and not a termination itself.

13. On account of the aforementioned, the DRC proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the present matter, the parties’ arguments as well as the documentation on file, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right in the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof.

14. Hence, the Chamber turned its attention to the main arguments invoked by the Claimant and the Respondent. At this point, the members of the Chamber considered that the first issue in the matter at stake was to determine if the letter dated 1 November 2016 is, indeed, considered a termination letter.

15. With those considerations in mind, the DRC recalled the Respondent’s arguments regarding the letter dated 1 November 2016, and concluded that none of the Respondent’s arguments could be followed, and the letter dated 1 November 2016 is considered a termination letter, taking into account that:

- According to the Chamber’s long-standing jurisprudence, as well as the the principle of good faith, the Claimant could reasonably believe, in good faith, that the person signing the termination letter on behalf of the Respondent was legally authorized to sign it. Equally and in accordance with the aforementioned principle of burden of proof, the DRC outlined that the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence demonstrating that the Claimant was aware of the situation outlined by the Respondent at the moment in which the termination letter was notified.;

- The Respondent could not expect the Claimant to re-join after not having sent any further communication to the Claimant for 4 months after the termination letter;

- There is no documentation or evidence on file that would indicate that the Claimant gave his consent to the Respondent in order for it to deposit his payment at The Football Association of Country D. Furthermore, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber remarked that in any case, such deposit does not constitute in itself a proof of effective payment to the Claimant; and

- The wording of the termination letter leaves no room for interpretation, it is a unilateral termination notice in which no reason was specified apart from the fact that the contract clearly established that it was valid for a period of 2 years.

16. Consequently, the members of the DRC unanimously concurred that the contract was terminated on 1 November 2016 by the Respondent.

17. Applying that reasoning to the case, the Chamber considered that the following issue in the present matter is to establish if the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated by the Respondent with or without just cause.

18. In this context, the members of the Chamber emphasized that the validity of the grounds by means of which a contract was terminated, and if it occurs with just cause must be determined on a case by case basis.

19. In so doing, the Chamber wished to point out that the Respondent did not put forward any particular reason in its termination letter that could justify or can be considered as a just cause for the early termination of the contract on 1 November 2016.

20. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent did not had just cause to terminate the employment contract on 1 November 2016 and, therefore, decided that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause.

21. Consistently with the above, the DRC concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Nevertheless, the members of the DRC recalled the fact that the Claimant was on loan from July 2016 until December 2016 with Club E, therefore, in accordance with the DRC’s jurisprudence the effects of the contract with the Respondent i.e. the club of origin, are suspended during the duration of the loan.

22. Moreover, the members of the Chamber referred to the Claimant’s request for the visa costs, and unanimously decided, on the grounds of art. 12 par. 3, that the Claimant’s request cannot be followed as no conclusive evidence was provided that could sustain his request and the contract clearly provides that the club will only support the Claimant’s visa costs and not his family. As a result, the DRC decided that the Claimant is only entitled to the sing on fee as outstanding remuneration.

23. In this regard, the Chamber determined that the Claimant is entitled to outstanding remuneration in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,500,000 corresponding to the sign on fee.

24. Furthermore, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as well as the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the DRC determined that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the outstanding amount as of the due date i.e. 2 January 2016.

25. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned to the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

26. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

27. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.

28. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the compensation however, it first recalled the alleged annexe of the contract by means of which it was agreed “to raise (10%) the monthly wage for the season 2017 in the amount of Currency of Country D 405,350.”. In this context, the members of the DRC referred to the principle of burden of proof and pointed out that the Claimant only provided an unsigned copy of the alleged annexe of the contract which cannot make the members of the DRC conclude that indeed, the player was entitled to a raise of his salary for the 2017 season. Consequently, the Chamber decided that compensation shall only be calculated on the basis of the contract.

29. Hence, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Respondent until the regular expiry of the contract amounts to Currency of Country D 5,502,000, and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

30. In continuation, the DRC verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been able to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the Chamber, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

31. In the light of this, the Chamber remarked that the Claimant informed FIFA that following the early termination of the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute, he signed a new employment contract on 7 July 2017 with the club of Country D, Club M, valid as from 1 June 2017 “until the end of the 2017 season” i.e. December 2017, according to which the Claimant would be remunerated with a monthly salary corresponding to the amount of Currency of Country D 130,000.

32. To that end, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of Currency of Country D 4,142,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract without just cause, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation.

33. Subsequently, as regards the Claimant’s claim pertaining to air tickets, the Chamber concurred that the Claimant did not provide conclusive evidence that the price for the flight ticket from City G to City H was indeed Currency of Country D 80,000, therefore, on the basis of the information provided by FIFA Travel and referring to the relevant terms of the employment contract, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of CHF 2,750.

34. Furthermore, considering the Claimant’s claim for interest and also taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the Chamber ruled that the Respondent must pay 5% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amounts (cf. points II.33 and II.34) as of the date on which the claim was lodged i.e. 19 December 2016, until the date of effective payment.

35. Moreover, the DRC referred to the Claimant’s request for additional compensation and legal costs. In this context, the members of the DRC established that the request of the Claimant cannot be granted as there is no contractual basis in this regard.

36. Finally, the members of the Chamber concluded their deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

*****

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of Currency of Country D 1,500,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 2 January 2016 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amounts of Currency of Country D 4,142,000 and CHF 2,750, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 19 December 2016 until the date of effective payment.

4. In the event that the amounts plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned points 2. and 3. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

CH-1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal Officer

Encl. CAS directives