F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2018-2019) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 1 February 2019

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 1 February 2019,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Roy Vermeer (The Netherlands), member

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member

Stefano La Porta (Italy), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

on the claim presented by the club,

Club A, Country B

as Claimant

against the player,

Player C, Country D

as Respondent I

and against the club,

Club E, Country D

as Respondent II

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 13 August 2010, the Club of Country D, Club F, and the club of Country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant or Club A) agreed upon a compensation for the transfer of the player from Country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent I or the player), born on 17 September 1988, to the Claimant, in the amount of EUR 2,000,000.

2. On 16 August 2010, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed an employment contract valid as of the date of its signature until 16 August 2015.

3. On 17 August 2010, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club X, until 17 August 2012.

4. On 10 January 2011, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club G, until 31 December 2012.

5. On 15 February 2013, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club H, until 31 December 2013.

6. On 27 February 2013, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract valid as of 15 February 2013 until 31 December 2016.

7. On 15 January 2014, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the Club of Country D, Club J, until 30 December 2014.

8. On 27 January 2015, Club J renewed the loan of the Respondent I, “free of charge”, until 30 December 2015.

9. On 10 February 2015, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract valid as the date of its signature until 31 December 2017.

10. On 18 January 2016, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of 15 January 2016 until 31 December 2018.

11. Clause 2 of the contract established: “[The Claimant] agrees to compensate the player’s services with a monthly salary representing the equivalent in Currency of Country B of EUR 16,666, payable within the first 10 days of the following month, being the usual place of payment the facility of [The Claimant].”.

12. Moreover, in Clause 4 of the contract, it was agreed between the parties that “The [Respondent I] may unilaterally cancel this contract by payment of an indemnification equal to EUR 15,000,000”.

13. On 18 January 2016, the Respondent I, the Claimant and the club of Country D, Club E (hereinafter: the Respondent II or Club E), signed a loan transfer agreement (hereinafter: the loan agreement) valid as of 5 January 2016 until 31 December 2016. In so doing, the parties agreed on a loan transfer fee, corresponding to the amount of USD 100,000.

14. According to Clause 4 of the loan agreement, the Respondent II was responsible for the Respondent I’s salary during the validity of said agreement.

15. Clause 5 of the loan agreement established:

“Termination

5.1 Upon expiry of this agreement, [the Respondent I] will be bound by the terms of [the contract] and [the Respondent I] must return to [the Claimant] within 72 hours of such expiry.

…

5.3 [The Respondent II] and [the Respondent I] herein acknowledge and agree that are obliged to terminate this agreement upon a written request of [the Claimant] if, at any time:

a. An offer of USD 2,500,000, or more is received by [the Claimant] or [the Respondent II] in relation to the definitive transfer of [the Respondent I] to another football club whether in Country B or internationally on a permanent basis; and

b. [The Claimant] is inclined to accept the offer.

For clarity, should [the Respondent II] receive a transfer offer it must provide full details of such offer to [the Claimant] within 2 business days of receipt of such transfer offer.

5.4 [the Respondent II] shall have a right of first refusal over [the Respondent I] for any acceptable transfer offer provided that:

a. [The Respondent II] agrees to pay [the Claimant] the full amount of the acceptable transfer offer on the same terms and conditions as provisionally agreed between [the Claimant] and the other football club; and

b. [The Respondent II] confirms in writing to [the Claimant] that it has agreed a new employment contract with [the Respondent I] within 2 business days of receiving notice by [the Claimant] that the transfer offer is an acceptable offer.

…

5.8 If [the Respondent II] fails to do so or in any way delays the return of [the Respondent I] to [the Claimant]:

a. [The Respondent II] shall be liable to pay losses and damages set out in clause 5.9;

b. [The Claimant] shall be entitled to unilaterally terminate this agreement and [the Respondent I] shall be entitled to terminate the [Respondent II] employment contract signed with [the Respondent II] with just cause, irrespective of whether this is during the Country D season or the so-called «protected period» without any sort of consequence (compensation or sporting sanctions) for [the Respondent I] or [the Claimant].

5.9 Without prejudice to the above, [the Claimant] will be entitled to receive compensation of EUR 20,000 per day, until [the Respondent II] has fully accomplished its obligation. [The Respondent II] acknowledges and agrees that the sum set out above represents a genuine and reasonable pre-estimate of [the claimant’s] loss arising from [the Respondent II’s] delay in question”.

16. Moreover, it was established by the parties in Clause 6 of the contract that “If [the Claimant] did not receive any transfer offer, [the Respondent II] will also be granted an option to buy 100% of the federative rights and economic rights of [the Respondent I] arising from [the contract] (the buy option), provided that [the Respondent II] expresses its willing to do so in writing to [the Claimant] until 30 October 2016 and pay the amount of USD 2,500,000 to [the Claimant], as compensation…”.

17. Clause 18.3 of the loan agreement stipulated that “The party that breaches any terms of this agreement shall compensate the innocent party for any resulting loss or damage, particularly in relation to losses resulting from the impossibility of transferring [the Respondent I]”.

18. On 12 December 2016, the Respondent I sent the Claimant a letter requesting information about his future after the expiry of the loan agreement. The letter reads as follows: “I urge [the Claimant] to furnish me – within 72 hours as of receipt of the present communication – with a formal position with respect to the continuation of my career after the end of [the loan agreement] with [the Respondent II], taking into especial consideration that I have never trained, played or even visited the facilities of [the Claimant] in the past 6 years.

To that regard, it seems to be undisputed that [the Claimant] has no sporting interest in retaining my services as a footballer and in this particular I also request [the Claimant] to consider – within the same deadline granted above – a mutual termination with immediate effect of any and all contractual relationship might existing between us.”.

19. In this regard, on 14 December 2016, in response to the letter dated 12 December 2016, the Claimant replied the following: “[the Claimant] confirms you that has at all times maintained interest in you. We have continuously followed your performance and sportive growth during the past years and [the Claimant] is happy with it…. For this reason, and in order to continue developing your sportive career, you and we, have mutually agreed in several occasions to accept several loans to Country D club and renew the employment contract between [the Claimant] and you.

…

Therefore, we take advantage of this contact that you made to inform you that, following the [loan agreement], we want you to return and play with [the Claimant] during the next season, since our team needs a player of your conditions.

The Country B tournament ended last weekend and now the players and coaching staff are on holidays. So we will let you know as soon as we have the exact date of commencement of the preseason training in the city of Club A (probably around 16 January 2017).

We are looking forward to seeing you on January, following the termination of the [loan agreement], in order to join us, start working with the team and preparing for next tournament.”.

20. Subsequently, on 22 December 2016, the Respondent I sent the Claimant another letter in reply to the correspondence dated 14 December 2016, by means of which the Respondent I stated that “… [the Claimant] alleges inter alia to have always maintained a sporting interest in [the Respondent I] and requests him to join the club for the very first time after more than 5 years of employment relationship in order to finally start training and playing for [it].

… the terms contained therein do not reflect the reality of [the Claimant] or the usual business activities of [the Claimant] in terms of sham registration of various players in the last years for economic purposes only.

Furthermore, the player would like to remind you that the subsequent renewal of his employment contract has always been imposed by [the Claimant] as a condition for him to be loaned to other clubs and, more importantly, to be ultimately able to play football, what seems to be a common practice of [the Claimant].

For the above, and in view of the fact that the player has never received one single month salary from [the Claimant], we insist that [the Claimant] has effectively never been interested in counting with the services of [the Respondent I] and that the mutual termination of [the contract] is imperative at this stage.”.

21. In continuation, on 30 December 2016, the Claimant replied to the Respondent I’s letter dated 22 December 2016, stating, inter alia, that “… We have a contractual right to require the player to join [the Claimant] and the player’s obligation to play football exclusively for [the Claimant] cannot be derogated without [the Claimant’s] prior written consent.

… We do not engage in unlawful arrangements of any kind. [The Claimant] paid a substantial transfer fee of two million Euros to acquire the services of the player from Club F in 2010. Further, in 2013, [the Claimant] paid the player compensation for the period between the end of the loan with Club G and the commencement of the loan transfers… We have made a substantial investment in the player and have a genuine interest in ensuring that [the Respondent I] fulfils his contractual obligations to [the Claimant]. The terms of the player’s various employment contracts, reflected the agreement reaches by both parties at the time they were signed, consented to and affirmed by the player. Neither the player nor his agent(s) or other professional advisors raised any objections at the time of entering into any such binding contracts.

…

Your allegation that the renewal of the player’s employment contract was a condition of his being loaned to other clubs without merit. No representations of any sort whatsoever were made as such. It was never agreed that [the Claimant] would retain the player for economic purposes only. The player has affirmed and consented freely to the renewal of his employment contract with [the Claimant] four times since his transfer to the club in 2010 and we strongly refute any suggestion that [the Claimant] retains the registration of players merely to loan them to other clubs, other Country D players form part of the current [Claimant’s] squad who also did not play for [the Claimant] immediately following their registration, but who have now been playing for [the Claimant] for a long time.

…

It is our view that the player wishes to unilaterally cancel his employment contract. We would like to reiterate that [the Claimant] has no intention of terminating its contract with the player.

If the player wishes unilaterally to cancel his contract with [the Claimant], he may do so in accordance with the terms of the contract by payment of an indemnification equal to fifteen million Euros to [the Claimant]. Otherwise, we expect the player to respect and fully comply with his contractual obligations to the club.”.

22. On 9 January 2017, the Respondent I unilaterally terminated the contract in writing. The termination letter reads as follows: “In this respect, we reaffirm the player’s understanding that all communications previously sent by [the Claimant], seem to have been sent merely on a pro forma basis and bear not connection with the reality of facts, notably with [the Claimant’s] well-known business activities as well as with the background of the labour relationship between the parties. Our client therefore objects in full any and all further statements contained on your latest reply.

In light of the above, this is to notify [the Claimant] that the player no longer considers himself bound to the existing employment contract between the parties, which hereby terminated with just cause and with immediate effect.”.

23. The Claimant on its part, on 10 January 2017, rejected the Respondent I’s unilateral termination of the contract by means of a letter in which it stated: “For the reasons already set out in our previous correspondence, the player has no just cause for terminating his playing contract with [the Claimant]. As explained in our letter dated 30 December 2016 to you, the arguments advised to the player to advance in this regard to date are without merit and are denied full by [the Claimant].

Just cause for termination under art. 14 of the Regulation on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) will apply primarily where a club has failed to pay a player his salary over a prolonged period. There can be no suggestion that [the Claimant] has failed to comply with its contractual obligation to the player…

…

The player was registered with [the Respondent II] for the entirety of the 2016 season, rather than [the Claimant], and he was never eligible to be selected by [the Claimant] during this period as a result of his temporary transfer to Club E. As such, art. 15 [of the Regulations] will not apply and the player was not entitled at any point to terminate his contract under art. 15.

…

For the avoidance of doubt, we do not accept that by your letter of 9 January 2017 the player has terminated his contract with [the Claimant], whether on grounds of just cause or sporting just cause or for any other reason. As such, [the Claimant] requires the player to continue to perform his contract with the club and we have notified the (Football Federation of Country B) [Football Federation of Country B] of the same.”.

24. On 12 January 2017, the Respondent I and the Respondent II signed an employment contract valid as from the date of the signature until 31 December 2020.

25. According to the contract signed between the Respondent I and the Respondent II, the Respondent I was entitled to receive a monthly remuneration in the amount of 79,200 for the first year, 87,120 for the second year, 95,832 for the third year and 105,415 for the fourth year.

Claim of the Claimant

26. On 17 February 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent I and the Respondent II for breach of contract. The Claimant requested to be awarded compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 2,500,000 plus interest, as well as to be paid the amount of EUR 600,000 plus interest regarding specificity of sport, to impose sporting sanctions on the Respondent I and the Respondent II, and to be reimbursed with legal costs in connection with the present matter.

27. In this respect, according to the Claimant, on 5 January 2017 it contacted the Respondent I asking him to join the Claimant’s pre-season trainings in accordance with the contract and offering him assistance with the necessary arrangements to facilitate his relocation in Country B.

28. Subsequently, the Claimant stated that, on 11 January 2017, the club of Country P, Club N (hereinafter: Club N), contacted it in order to transfer the Respondent I on a definite basis. In this regard, Club N offered EUR 1,500,000 as transfer compensation, plus the amount of EUR 250,000 as bonus in case Club N qualified to the group stage of the UEFA Champions League during the validity of the player’s contract, and the amount EUR 250,000 as bonus if the Respondent I played 50 official games with Club N.

29. In line with the above, the Claimant sustained that, regardless that the offer received from Club N was less than the amount by means of which the Claimant valued the Respondent I on the loan agreement i.e. USD 2,500,000, it was willing to accept the offer to mitigate the loss given the circumstances of the Respondent I’s intention to terminate the contract.

30. On its claim, the Claimant held that “It is clear that the [Respondent I] has not terminated [the contract] with just cause or sporting just cause. On contrary, the player’s purported termination, executed with the connivance of and / or induced by [the Respondent II], is a cynical and calculated manoeuvre in order that [the Respondent II] could avoid the buy option under the loan agreement and secure the services of the player for free instead of paying [the Claimant] the agreed sum of USD 2,500,000.”.

31. In particular, the Claimant referred to arts. 14 and 15 of the Regulations and emphasized that, in order to terminate a contract with alleged just cause on the grounds of art. 14, the existence of a serious breach of the contract obligations by the Club A needed to exist, and that in this sense, the Respondent I was always compensated either by the Claimant or the club to which he was loaned.

32. Regarding art. 15 of the Regulations, the Claimant sustained that there is no basis to terminate the contract with alleged sporting just cause, as the Respondent I did not follow the formalities, and that it is evident he was on loan in a different club during the season previous season.

33. Furthermore, the Claimant made reference to a press release dated 12 January 2017, by means of which according to the Claimant, the Respondent I’s agent acknowledged the unilateral termination of the Respondent I without just cause. The press release reads as follows: “The negotiation was solved after and impasse with [the Claimant], holder of the player’s rights. According to Mr Agent O, the player with the number 44 on his shirt was able to rescind the agreement he had with [the Claimant] and is free to continue at [the Respondent II].

According to the abovementioned agent, a fine must be paid to the club of Country B. Such fine value will be determined by FIFA, as explained by Agent O…

… the [Respondent I’s] agent also declared that the player was coveted by the International club, as well as clubs of Country M and Country P” .

34. Consequently, the Claimant argued that the Respondent I breached the contract, and therefore, it is entitled to compensation in accordance with art. 17 of the Regulations.

35. Subsequently, the Claimant recalled the press release dated 20 October 2016, in which allegedly the Respondent I’s agent stated the following:

“all seems to indicate that the [Respondent I] will continue at [the Respondent II] next season.

We’re negotiating. [The Respondent I’s] part with [The Respondent II] is already arranged. What still has to be done is between [the Respondent II] and Club A. But everything indicated that he has to stay.”.

36. As a result of the above, the Claimant sustained that the fact that the Respondent II knew all the details of the contract and loan agreement, made it induce the Respondent I to breach the contract. Thus, the Claimant held that “[The Respondent II] should be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the compensation on the player’s behalf”.

37. In this regard, the Claimant held that “In the circumstances there is a «necessary logical nexus» between the buy option fee that [the Claimant] would have been able to achieve had it not been for the breach. The starting point for and order of compensation should be to order the player and / or Club E to pay the sum of USD 2,500,000 compensation for the breach of [the contract]”.

38. Moreover, the Claimant requested to impose sporting sanctions on the Respondent I and the Respondent II, as it stated that the breach occurred during the protected period of the contract.

39. Regarding the additional payment requested in the amount of EUR 600,000 corresponding to the specificity of sport, the Claimant requested to take into account the following facts to determine the aforementioned amount:

a. “The fact that the player had benefitted from over 6-years employment by [the Claimant], and chose to terminate [the contract] when there was two years left to run on it;

b. The timing of the breach and the inference that it was timed to benefit Club E and the player at [the Claimant’s] expense;

c. The fact there was obviously no, even remotely arguable, grounds for terminating [the contract] and the termination occurred with no respect at all for the principle of stability of contract;

d. The fact the termination occurred during the protected period (and indeed early in the protected period); and

e. The fact that had the [Respondent I] terminated [the contract] lawfully [the Respondent I] would have been obliged to pay [the Claimant] the sum of EUR 15,000,000.”.

Reply of the Respondent I

40. In his reply, the Respondent I rejected the claim and underlined the fact that, he deems having terminated the contract with just cause “due to the clear absence of sportive interest by [the Claimant] - a South American club specializing in bridge transfers…”.

41. In this respect, the Respondent I held that in 2009, the Claimant was taken over by investors who after that moment, allegedly turned it into “a mere host-club and started operating a new market trend in South America: the so-called bridge transfers transactions”. In this context, the Respondent I provided press releases about the Claimant’s situation and transfers during the last years which headlines read as follows: “[Club A] the club of Country B that hides a tax haven of transfers in Europe; The soccer club with 200 fans earns USD 14 million from transfers; and Everything you need to do about South America’s middle man club - [Club A]”.

42. In this regard, the Respondent I submitted a list of 15 players who were transferred on the basis of an alleged circumvention of the Regulations, and by means of which, according to the Respondent I “[The Claimant] is reported to have a player-trading income circa two times the average of first division teams in Country B”.

43. Moreover, the Respondent I sustained that “Not every player / asset acquired by Club A since 2009 has immediately turned into an attractive business opportunity for [the Claimant]. Many of them have been put in a sports limbo for years, being repeatedly loaned amongst different club and force to extend their contract with Club A under the threat of being prevented from playing football”.

44. This being mentioned, the Respondent I referred to all the above-mentioned players and emphasized that they all have a common characteristic, which is that neither him, nor them have ever trained or played with the Claimant, fact which according to him, demonstrated Club A’s lack of interest in his services as a football player.

45. Furthermore, the Respondent I argued that in 2010 he signed a first employment contract with the Claimant since at the moment the Claimant’s practices were unknown and that he only renewed his contract with the Claimant, as a consequence of the, alleged, constant threats he received from the Claimant, since allegedly in case he did not sign the new contract, he will not only not be loaned to another club, he will also be deprived from chances to play football.

46. Subsequently, according to the Respondent I, after having received many abuses from the Claimant and due to a clear lack of interest from it to establish an ordinary employment relationship with him, he decided to confront the Claimant by means of a letter dated 12 December 2016 (cf. point I.18 above), in which he requested the possibility of a mutual termination of the contract, as he did not want to renew the contract once again, or experience a period of inactivity as a result of the alleged threats.

47. As a consequence of the above, the Respondent I deemed that he terminated the contract with just cause “fully convinced that [the Claimant] never had any sporting interest in retaining his services as a football player”. In this regard, the Respondent I referred to the CAS jurisprudence, as well as to the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO), which establishes that “…whether there is good cause for termination of contract depends on the overall circumstances of the case…”.

48. Moreover, according to the Respondent I, the multiple renewals of the employment contract with Claimant, were repeatedly imposed as imperial condition, therefore the contract is invalid. In this context, the latter referred to art. 29 par. 1 of the SCO in which it is established that “if a party has entered into a contract under duress from the other party or a third party, he is not bound by that contract”.

49. In addition, the Respondent I subsidiary requested that the contract is to be considered invalid on the grounds of unfair advantage established in art 21 par. 1 of the SCO, as according to the Respondent I, the Claimant took advantage of the Respondent I’s necessity or inexperience to attain a benefit that is disproportionate to the performance it offers.

50. The Respondent I argued that he could no longer be expected to rely in good faith of the employment relationship with the Claimant.

51. Concerning the request for compensation, the Respondent I made a subsidiary request by means of which he referred to the offer of Club N, sustaining that the conditional payments cannot be taken into consideration under the purposes of art. 17 of the Regulation. Furthermore, the Respondent I stated that “in line with the well-established jurisprudence of CAS, [the Respondent I] understands that all amounts saved by [the Claimant] from 17 august 2010 to 31 December 2018, shall be deducted from any compensation might fixed by the FIFA DRC in the context of the present dispute. Having for instance considered the proposal of Club N i.e. EUR 1,500,000, no compensation would be due”. Having said that, the Respondent I submitted the following calculations:

 From 17 August 2010 until termination i.e. 9 January 2017:

o Time elapsed: 6 years, 4 months and 24 days

o Monthly salary: EUR 16,666

o Total amount saved: EUR 16,666 x 76 + EUR 16,666 *24/30 = EUR 1,279,948.80

 From 10 January 2017 until the original expiry date i.e. 31 December 2018:

o Time elapsed: 1 year, 11 months and 22 days

o Monthly salary: EUR 16,666

o Total amount saved: EUR 16,666 x 23 + EUR 16,666 *22/30 = EUR 395,539.73)

52. In so doing, the Respondent I referred to the requested amount on the grounds of specificity of sport claimed by the Claimant. In this respect, the Respondent I recalled the award of the case “Player Q” in which, inter alia, it was established that “The specificity of sport is not an additional head of compensation nor a criterion allowing to decide in equity, but a correcting factor which allows the panel to take into consideration other objective elements which are not envisaged under the criteria of art. 17 of the Regulations”. Hence, the Respondent I argued that an analysis of the present case would speak in favour of his rights.

53. With regard to the sporting sanctions requested by the Claimant, the Respondent I held that when a contract is extended, “the restart of the protected period of a contract is in fact subject to two cumulative conditions, which are not present in casu: first, the contract has to be renewed; and second, this renewal must also provide for an extension of the contractual term…

Worth to note, in the present case, the last two contractual extensions between the parties were not followed by a renewal of any terms of [the contract]. Remarkably, despite the player’s good performance in 2012, 2014 and 2015, the contractual extensions that followed these seasons never improved his financial situation”, therefore, according to the Respondent I no sporting sanctions should be imposed in connection with the termination of the contract.

Reply of the Respondent II

54. In its reply, the Respondent II rejected the claim of the Claimant and that it allegedly induced the Respondent I to terminate the contract.

55. First, the Respondent II recalled certain facts and in particular referred to an email dated 4 January 2016, received from the Claimant, by means of which the Respondent II and the Claimant entered into negotiations in order to transfer the Respondent I on a temporary basis. The email reads as follows:

“…

Attached for your considerations, the draft for the loan of [the Respondent I].

Bear in mind that the same is only a draft so far. The loan of the athlete is conditional to: (i) the renewal of the employment contract between [the Claimant] and [the Respondent I]; and (ii) the effective agreement and signing of a final contract for the loan among [the Respondent I], [the Claimant] and [Respondent II]...”.

56. Furthermore, according to the Respondent II, the Claimant was inflexible in negotiating the terms of the loan agreement as it wanted to be similar to all the previous the previous loan agreements signed by the Claimant to transfer the Respondent I on a temporary basis.

57. In this respect, the Respondent II held that despite of all the speculations in the press, it never attempted to negotiate the purchase option established in the loan agreement to transfer the Respondent I on a definite basis.

58. Moreover, it sustained that on 12 December 2016, after the last match in the season, the Respondent II notified the Respondent I a notice which reads as follows: “We communicate you that during the period between 12 December to 30 December 2016 you will enjoy 19 days of holidays, since the end of your contract is scheduled for 31 December 2016, you do not have to come back for activities at the CAT (Technical and Administrations Centre) of [the Respondent II]”.

59. In this regard, the Respondent II stated that on 11 January 2017 it was informed by the Respondent I, that he had terminated the contract with just cause and that he would be pleased to re-join the Respondent II for the 2017 season.

Hence, the Respondent II emphasized that “after studying the matter in detail with the player’s representatives, [the Respondent II] concluded that the player indeed had just cause to terminate [the contract] with Club A.

On the basis of such understanding, on 12 January 2017, [the Respondent II] concluded a 4 year employment contract with the [the Respondent I]…”.

60. Subsequently, according to the Respondent II, the Claimant has been, allegedly, engaging in transfers that have been abusing the contractual rights of the players, obliging them to extend their employment contracts against their will. Moreover, the Respondent II recalled the email received by the Claimant on 4 January 2016 in which the Respondent I was conditioned to be transferred to the Respondent II (cf. point I.55. above).

61. Therefore, the Respondent II held that given the circumstances of the present matter, the unlawful conduct of the Claimant and the different definitions of a “just cause termination”, the Respondent I had a fair and legitimate cause to terminate the contract.

62. Nevertheless, the Respondent II made a subsidiary request by means of which it emphasized that in case the FIFA DRC considers that the contract was terminated without just cause, the compensation shall be calculated based in the principle of positive interest and the alleged proposal received from Club N.

63. In this regard, the Respondent II sustained that it shall be taken into account all the salaries saved by the Claimant following the termination of the contact to reduce the compensation.

64. Furthermore, the Respondent II referred to the requested amount on the grounds of specificity of sport claimed by the Claimant, and argued that in case the FIFA DRC awards any additional amount, the practice consolidated in the “Player R and Player Q” awards should be followed.

65. Finally, the Respondent II made a subsidiary request in respect to the sporting sanctions in which it mentioned that, if the Respondent I is found to have terminated the contract within the protected period and the Respondent II is to be considered that it induced the Respondent I to terminate the contract, the FIFA DRC is not obliged to impose sporting sanctions, arguing that it is to the free discretion of the DRC after evaluating the circumstances on a case by case basis.

Replica of the Claimant

66. In its replica, the Claimant rejected the Respondent I’s and the Respondent II’s arguments, and insisted on its claim.

67. In this context, the Claimant referred to the Respondent I’s allegation by means of which he referred to other players, and stated that, “the player’s answer fails to explain how these factual allegations, if proven, would negate any element of any cause of action pleaded by [the Claimant]”. In this respect, the Claimant sustained that during the period from 2010 until 2016, it signed around 136 professional players, which meant that the players mentioned by the Respondent I only represent around the 10% of the players transferred, emphasizing that in particular it had made “sportive use of the majority of the 136 players transferred”.

68. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Respondent I’s argumentation about the change of administration in 2009 had to be denied, sustaining that this situation took place 6 years before FIFA prohibited any third-party ownership, therefore, the Claimant stated that it cannot be considered that it was made to evade any restrictions implemented by FIFA.

69. In this regard, the Claimant sustained that “nothing in [the Claimant’s] player transfer activity is prohibited by [the Regulations] or Swiss Law”.

70. In addition, the Claimant alleged that it has never threatened any players in order to oblige them to renew his contract. Subsequently, it questioned that the Respondent I was not able to prove any evidence to support his allegation regarding the alleged threats as well as his allegations in relation to the alleged “lack of interest” from the Claimant or the existence of a “never-ending contract” with it.

71. On that basis, the Claimant sustained that “it is denied that [the Claimant] warned the player that he would be unable to play in Country B or abroad if he declined to extend his contract with [the Claimant]. On the contrary, [the Claimant’s] position was that the player could return to play for [the Claimant] for the remainder of his contract, but that any agreement for a further loan to a foreign club would have to be accompanied by an extension of [the contract]”.

With those considerations in mind, the Claimant asserted that the real intention of it was to effectively engage the Respondent I’s services.

72. In particular, the Claimant rejected the Respondent II’s argumentation in connection with the “inducement of the player’s breach”, and emphasized that even though the Respondent II can prove that it did not induce the breach of the contract, it would still need to be “jointly and severally liable”.

73. Concerning the conditional payments established in the Club N offer, the Claimant recalled art. 17 of the Regulations, and denied that no conditional payments may be taken into consideration to calculate the compensation.

74. Furthermore, the Claimant rejected the Respondent I’s request to calculate the compensation for breach of contract by reducing the wages that the Claimant allegedly saved by transferring the Respondent I on a temporary basis. In this respect, it held that most of the wages used on the Respondent I’s calculation (cf. point I.51 above) are based on previous employment contracts and not on the contract, which is the basis of the present matter. Moreover, the Claimant sustained that the wages do not represent a saved amount; they serve as a compensation for temporary transferring the player free of charge.

75. Having said that, the Claimant insisted that it was entitled to USD 2,500,000 as compensation.

Duplica of the Respondent I

76. In his duplica, the Respondent I reiterated his arguments.

77. In this regard, the Respondent I referred to the statement of the Claimant in which it mentioned that the goal of the Claimant was to strengthen its squad for the 2017 season, and held that the Claimant did exactly the contrary by transferring players and not seeking for new players or an alleged substitute for the player after terminating the contract.

78. Moreover, the Respondent I stated that the purchase option established in the loan agreement cannot be considered valid and a parameter for the calculation of the Respondent I’s market value. In this context, he sustained that “the option in question was negotiated one year prior to the termination of [the contract] with a fixed validity until 30 October 2016, and therefore no longer valid in January 2017” as well as that said amount was high and disproportionate.

79. After being requested by FIFA, the Respondent I confirmed that he has not signed any new employment contract.

Duplica of the Respondent II

80. In its duplica, the Respondent II reiterated its comments made on its reply to the claim.

81. Finally, the Respondent II held that it would not make sense to consider that it induced the termination of the contract as it cooperated to return the ITC to Country B when the loan agreement expired.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the Chamber or the DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 February 2017. Consequently, the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2017 and 2018 editions of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Club of Country B, a player of Country D, as well as a club of Country D, and where there has been an ITC request and a claim from an interested party in relation to said ITC request.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 17 February 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. First of all, the DRC acknowledged that, on 13 August 2010, the Claimant and the club of Country D, Club F, signed a transfer agreement by means of which the parties agreed upon a compensation for the transfer of the Respondent I to the Claimant in the amount of EUR 2,000,000.

6. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber took note of the following uncontested facts:

- On 16 August 2010, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed an employment contract valid as of the day of the signature until 16 August 2015;

- On 17 August 2010, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club X, until 17 August 2012;

- On 10 January 2011, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to club of Country D, Club G, until 31 December 2012;

- On 15 February 2013, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club H, until 31 December 2013;

- On 27 February 2013, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract valid as of 15 February 2013 until 31 December 2016;

- On 15 January 2014, the Respondent I was loaned, “free of charge”, to the club of Country D, Club J, until 30 December 2014;

- On 27 January 2015, the club of Country D, Club J, renewed the loan of the Respondent I, “free of charge”, until 30 December 2015;

- On 10 February 2015, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract calid as of the dater of its signature until 30 December 2017; and

- On 18 January 2016, the Respondent I and the Claimant signed a new employment contract i.e. the contract, valid as of 15 January 2016 until 2018.

- On 18 January 2016, the Respondent I, the Claimant and the Respondent II signed a loan transfer agreement i.e. the loan agreement, by means of which the Claimant and the Respondent II agreed upon a transfer fee corresponding to USD 100,000, in order to temporary transfer the Respondent I to the Respondent II.

7. In this regard, the Chamber duly considered the financial terms of the contract at the basis of this dispute, which are in casu contained in clause 2 of the contract, by means of which it was agreed that the Respondent I was entitled to receive from the Claimant “a monthly salary representing the equivalent of EUR 16,666…”.

8. Moreover, the DRC analysed clause 4 of the contract which reads as follows: “The [Respondent I] may unilaterally cancel this contract by payment of an indemnification equal to EUR 15,000,000”.

9. In continuation, the members the DRC noted the contents of the loan agreement. In this context, the DRC acknowledge that in clause 4 of the loan agreement the Claimant and the Respondent II agreed that the latter was responsible for the Respondent I’s salary during the validity of the loan agreement.

10. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled clause 5 of the loan agreement by means of which it was established the following:

“Termination

5.1 Upon expiry of this agreement, [the Respondent I] will be bound by the terms of [the contract] and [the Respondent I] must return to [the Claimant] within 72 hours of such expiry.

…

5.3 [The Respondent II] and [the Respondent I] herein acknowledge and agree that are obliged to terminate this agreement upon a written request of [the Claimant] if, at any time:

c. An offer of USD 2,500,000, or more is received by [the Claimant] or [the Respondent II] in relation to the definitive transfer of [the Respondent I] to another football club whether in Country B or internationally on a permanent basis; and

d. [The Claimant] is inclined to accept the offer.

For clarity, should [the Respondent II] receive a transfer offer it must provide full details of such offer to [the Claimant] within 2 business days of receipt of such transfer offer.

5.4 [the Respondent II] shall have a right of first refusal over [the Respondent I] for any acceptable transfer offer provided that:

c. [The Respondent II] agrees to pay [the Claimant] the full amount of the acceptable transfer offer on the same terms and conditions as provisionally agreed between [the Claimant] and the other football club; and

d. [The Respondent II] confirms in writing to [the Claimant] that it has agreed a new employment contract with [the Respondent I] within 2 business days of receiving notice by [the Claimant] that the transfer offer is an acceptable offer.

…

5.8 If [the Respondent II] fails to do so or in any way delays the return of [the Respondent I] to [the Claimant]:

c. [The Respondent II] shall be liable to pay losses and damages set out in clause 5.9;

d. [The Claimant] shall be entitled to unilaterally terminate this agreement and [the Respondent I] shall be entitled to terminate the [Respondent II] employment contract signed with [the Respondent II] with just cause, irrespective of whether this is during the Country D season or the so-called «protected period» without any sort of consequence (compensation or sporting sanctions) for [the Respondent I] or [the Claimant].

5.9 Without prejudice to the above, [the Claimant] will be entitled to receive compensation of EUR 20,000 per day, until [the Respondent II] has fully accomplished its obligation. [The Respondent II] acknowledges and agrees that the sum set out above represents a genuine and reasonable pre-estimate of [the claimant’s] loss arising from [the Respondent II’s] delay in question”.

11. In addition to that, the Chamber observed that in clause 6 of the loan agreement the parties agreed on a purchase option. Said clause states the following: “If [the Claimant] did not receive any transfer offer, [the Respondent II] will also be granted an option to buy 100% of the federative rights and economic rights of [the Respondent I] arising from [the contract] (the buy option), provided that [the Respondent II] expresses its willing to do so in writing to [the Claimant] until 30 October 2016 and pay the amount of USD 2,500,000 to [the Claimant], as compensation…”.

12. In this respect, the DRC took note that clause 18.3 of the loan agreement provided that “The party that breaches any terms of this agreement shall compensate the innocent party for any resulting loss or damage, particularly in relation to losses resulting from the impossibility of transferring [the Respondent I]”.

13. Having established the above, the members of the DRC paid due consideration to the fact that on 9 January 2017, the Respondent I terminated the labour relationship with the Claimant in writing. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Respondent I argued having just cause to terminate the contract as a result of alleged business activities of the Claimant and the background of the labour relationship he had with the Claimant i.e. 4 renewals of the employment relationship, having been loaned 5 times and never having been registered with the Claimant.

14. On that basis, the Chamber further acknowledged that on 17 February 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent I and the Respondent II in front of FIFA, alleging that the Respondent I terminated the contract without just cause on 9 January 2017. In that regard, the Claimant requested compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 2,500,000 plus interest; to be paid the amount of EUR 600,000 plus interest regarding specificity of the sport; as well as to impose sporting sanctions on the Respondent I and the Respondent II and to be reimbursed with the legal costs regarding the present matter.

15. The members of the Chamber acknowledged that it is at this juncture that the parties have divergent positions. In fact, while the Claimant considered that the Respondent I did not have just cause to terminate the employment relationship, the Respondent I, on the other hand, sustained having just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract.

16. On that basis, the DRC took note that the Respondent I alleged having terminated the employment relationship with the Claimant with just cause, since according to him, the Claimant never showed interest in his professional sporting services for more than 5 years. Moreover, the members of the DRC considered important to note that the Respondent I stated that the Claimant took advantage of him in view of the Claimant’s business activities related only to economic purposes and not to sporting purposes. In this context, the Respondent I underlined that the multiple loans were always subject to the renewal of his employment contracts with the Claimant, and that therefore, all the renewals were allegedly signed under duress.

17. Equally, the DRC acknowledge that the Respondent II recalled the email dated 4 January 2016 (cf. point I.55. above), received from the Claimant, and held that the renewal of the loan agreement, on 18 January 2016, was subject to the renewal of the Respondent I’s employment contract with Club A. In addition to that, the Respondent II deemed that the Claimant was inflexible to negotiate any terms of the loan agreements the parties signed.

18. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber concluded that underlying issue in the dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant, was to determine whether the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent I has been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the player. In this regard the members of the Chamber, also underlined that, subsequently, if it were to found that the employment relationship was terminated by the Respondent I without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the financial and/or sporting consequences arising from the breach of the relevant employment contract without just cause.

19. With those considerations in mind, the members of the Chamber referred to the Respondent I’s argumentation concerning the alleged lack of interest in his professional sporting services, and in this respect, wished to underscore that, according to the principle of contractual stability, the unilateral termination of a contract must be considered as an absolute last resort. In this context, the Chamber unanimously considered that the argumentation of the player regarding Club A’s alleged lack of sporting interest cannot be followed in this specific matter, in view of the documentation in file, in particular the letters of 14 and 30 December 2016 (cf. points I. 19. and I. 21. above), in which the player is requested to join the Claimant.

20. In continuation, with regard to the Respondent I’s alleged signature of the employment contracts with the Claimant under duress due to the business activities of the Claimant related to economic purposes rather than to sporting purposes, the DRC first emphasized on the burden of proof principle contained in art. 12. Par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof and concurred that it was clearly up to the Respondent I to provide compelling evidence demonstrating that, the employment contracts were, in fact, signed under duress.

21. Moreover, the Chamber considered important to highlight that from the documentation on file, it can be concluded that the Respondent I did not have any claims regarding the several renovations of the employment contracts and / or the multiple loans before the loan agreement and the contract were signed, as said facts remained uncontested.

22. In light of the above, the members of the DRC came to the unanimous conclusion that on 9 January 2017 the Respondent I unilaterally terminated the employment relationship with the Claimant without any valid cause that would justify the termination.

23. Having established that the player did not have just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract on 9 January 2017, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the consequences of such breach of contract by the player.

24. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber took into account the particular circumstances of the matter a stake. In this regard, the Chamber unanimously deemed important to stress that the behaviour of all the parties involved in the present matter could be seen as bad faith in view of their personal interests. Nevertheless, the majority of the Chamber lent emphasis on the principle of contractual stability and established that the measure provided for by the Regulations concerning in specific compensation for breach of contract without just cause serve as a deterrent aimed at discouraging the early termination of employment contracts by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent deciding authorities would set a precedent as well as an inappropriate example towards the football actors.

25. As the result of the above, the majority of Chamber established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent I is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the majority of the DRC decided that the player’s new club i.e. the Respondent II, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. Moreover, the majority of the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Respondent I’s new club is independent from the question as whether the new club has induced the contractual breach or any kind of involvement by the new club. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the DRC and has been repeatedly confirmed by the CAS.

26. Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation breach of contract in the present matter. In so doing, the DRC firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party.

27. In application of the relevant provision the DRC held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the relevant employment contract between the Respondent I and the Claimant contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon and amount of compensation for breach of contract.

28. In this respect, the Chamber referred to clause 4 of the contract by means of which the Respondent I was able to unilaterally terminate the contract against payment of EUR 15,000,000, however, the members of the DRC concluded that said clause cannot no be considered as valid as it is clearly disproportional.

29. Furthermore, the DRC took into account clause 6 of the loan agreement, which is considered by the Claimant as the basis of the compensation requested on its claim, by means of which a buyout option, payable to the Claimant, was established for the Respondent II.

30. After having analysed clause 6 of the loan agreement, the majority of Chamber concluded that said clause cannot be taken into account as in said agreement there was no clause in favour of the Respondent I and more important, the basis of the present dispute is the contract and not the loan agreement which remains uncontested that was naturally expired on 31 December 2016.

31. Consequently, the majority of the members of the DRC determined that the amount of compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The DRC recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this context, the Chamber emphasized beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years.

32. In continuation, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim to receive the amount of EUR 600,000 as specificity of sport, as it failed to provide the Chamber with any objective evidence on which such amount could be based.

33. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to the offer made by the club of Country P, Club N, on 11 January 2017 for the transfer of the Respondent I, as it has been confirmed in several CAS decisions on this matter that offers made by third parties may be relevant for the evaluation of the damage suffered by the club. In this context, the members of the Chamber recalled art. 12. Par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof and considered that said offer cannot be considered as a parameter to calculate compensation for breach of contract as the Claimant failed to provide conclusive evidence that could confirm that it accepted the offer and not only that it was willing to accept the offer from the aforementioned club of Country P.

34. Hence, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the DRC turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this regard the members of the DRC deemed important to underline that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both, the existing contract and the new contract(s), in the calculation of the amount of compensation.

35. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Respondent I under the terms of both the employment contract signed with the Claimant on 18 January 2016, and the one with the Respondent II on 12 January 2017, for the period of 2 seasons that was remaining since the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent I until its expiry, i.e. from 10 January 2017 until 31 December 2018.

36. In line with the above, the Chamber noted that, as per the employment contract signed with the Claimant, the Respondent I was entitled, inter alia, to a monthly salary in the amount of EUR 16,666. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber observed that said contract was to run for 24 months more i.e. until 31 December 2018, after the breach of contract occurred on 9 January 2017, for a total of EUR 399,984.

37. Moreover, the DRC equally took note that of the Respondent I’s monthly remuneration with his new club i.e. the Respondent II, which corresponded to 1,995,840, or approximately EUR 463,443, as from January 2017 until December 2018.

38. In so doing, the DRC recalled that the remuneration paid by the Respondent II is particularly relevant insofar as it reflects the value attributed to his services by his new club at the moment the breach of contract occurs and possibly also provides an indication towards the player’s market value at that time.

39. Taking into account the aforementioned elements, the Chamber concluded that the average remuneration of EUR 431,713 for the time remaining of the relevant contract should be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract payable to the Claimant.

40. To that end, the DRC decided that after having considered all the above mentioned objective elements as well as the specificities in the matter at hand, the total amount of EUR 431,713 was to be considered reasonable and justified as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

41. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber decided that the Respondent I has to pay the amount of EUR 431,713 as compensation for breach of contract to the Claimant, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of the date of the claim i.e. 17 February 2017, until the date of effective payment, taking into account the Claimant’s petition and the DRC’s constant jurisprudence in this regard.

42. Furthermore, the members of the DRC decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Respondent II shall, be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned amount of compensation for breach of contract.

43. Finally, the Chamber decided that the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs is rejected in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence.

44. The DRC concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

*****

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent I, Player C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as form the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 431,713, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 17 February 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent II, Club E, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation.

4. In the event that the amount plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned point 2. is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent I and the Respondent II, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

CH-1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal Officer

Encl. CAS directives