F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 25 February 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2020,

in the following composition:

Omar Ongaro (Italy), Chairman

Stéphane Burchkalter (France), member

Jerome Perlemuter (France), member

on the claim presented by the club,

FC Vojvodina, Serbia,

represented by Ms Ksenija Damjanovic and Mr Marco del Fabro

as Claimant

against the player,

Dejan Meleg, Serbia,

represented by Mr Mico Petkovic

as First Respondent

and the club,

Kayserispor Kulubu, Turkey,

represented by Mr Sami Dinç

as Second Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 18 January 2016, the Serbian club, FC Vojvodina (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Serbian player, Dejan Meleg (hereinafter: the First Respondent or the player) signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2018 (hereinafter: the employment contract).

2. According to art. 2.1 of the employment contract, the Claimant and the First Respondent agreed upon a “monthly remuneration in the amount of the minimum guaranteed wage (salary) of the Republic of Serbia” .

3. Furthermore, pursuant to art. 2.2 of the employment contract, the player was also entitled, inter alia, to the following:

- “2.200 EUR in Serbian Dinars (according to the medium exchange rate of the National Bank of Serbia) each month, as monthly transfer installment, deducted for the amount of minimum wage as mentioned above”;

- EUR 10,000 “in February 2016, as a transfer installment”;

- EUR 10,000 “in February 2017, as a transfer installment”;

- “for the period starting from July 2017, up until the end of the contract” EUR 3,000 as “transfer installment”.

4. According to art. 11.4 of the employment contract, “in case of a dispute, the parties agree upon the Arbitration/Court of Arbitration of the Football Association of Serbia (FAS). Both the Club and Player agree not to bring any dispute arising out of this Contract before ordinary courts”.

5. On 31 January 2016, by means of a written authorization, the Claimant “exclusively authorize[d] Mr Michael Stankovic to represent [it] and negotiate regarding the transfer of [its] professional football player Dejan Meleg during employment contract with FK Vojvodina, Novi Sad. Minimum transfer fee for the player Dejan Meleg is 300.000 Eur. Authorization is valid during employment contract with FK Vojvodina, Novi Sad”.

6. On 31 January 2017, by means of a different written authorization, the Claimant “exclusively authorize[d] Sascha Hrnjacki & Partner […] to represent [it] and negotiate regarding the transfer of [its] professional football player for Meleg Dejan to Eintracht Braunshweig”.

7. By letter dated 7 February 2017, the Claimant informed Mr Stankovic that it had to “cancel the authorization for the professional football player Dejan Meleg, signed on January 31, 2016”. Such cancellation was informed to Mr Stankovic by means of a letter sent via e-mail.

8. On 22 June 2017, the First Respondent and Mr Stankovic addressed a correspondence to the Claimant, by means of which they informed the latter that the First Respondent had “signed the contract with the Kayserispor from Turkey”. With the same correspondence, the player and Mr Stankovic asked the Claimant to “send necessary instructions and valid account of [the Claimant] on which the interested club from Turkey could pay the prescribed indemnity in accordance with the decision […] dated 31 January 2016 in the amount of 300,000,00 (EUR)”.

9. On 23 June 2017, the Claimant replied that it was “open to all kinds of cooperation and, therefore, [it] invited you on a mutual meeting in Novi Sad in order to orally and together consider all details related to the above mentioned offer”.

10. By letter dated 10 July 2017, the Claimant sent a letter to the Turkish club, Kayserispor Kulubu (hereinafter: the Second Respondent), claiming that the First Respondent “still has a valid and existing contract with FC Vojvodina, which is legally valid until the summer transfer window 2018”. With the same correspondence, the Claimant asked the Second Respondent to inform the First Respondent that he “must start fulfilling his obligations towards FC Vojvodina” in order for the latter not to initiate legal proceedings before FIFA.

11. On 14 July 2017, the First Respondent informed the Claimant in writing that he wanted to “unilaterally terminate the contract with [the Claimant] on the occasion to the problem [he] ha[s] with [the Claimant] regarding [his] transfer to FC Kayseri from Turkey”.

12. On 19 July 2017, the Claimant informed the Second Respondent in writing that it had “received a payment of EUR 300,000” and that it “shall regard this payment as the first instalment, and we will agree on following instalment in due time”.

13. The Claimant lodged a claim against the First Respondent and the Second Respondent in front of FIFA, asking to be awarded compensation in the amount of EUR 926,233, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 June 2017 until the date of effective payment, and that the Second Respondent be held jointly and severally liable.

14. The Claimant maintained that, although it had a valid contract in place with the player, on 22 June 2017, it was informed by him and his alleged agent, Mr Stankovic, that the player had signed an employment contract with the Second Respondent, thus breaching his employment contract with the Claimant.

15. In relation to the above, the Claimant pointed out that – when it received EUR 300,000 on its bank account from the Second Respondent – it was “obliged to inform [the latter] that it would consider the received amount as the first instalment of the compensation”.

16. The Claimant further explained that the “authorization” dated 31 January 2016had been issued only in order to authorise “the agent to represent the Claimant and to negotiate a possible transfer considering a minimum transfer fee of 300.000,00 EUR”. It “did not entitle the agent to terminate the ongoing contract” between the Claimant and the First Respondent. The Claimant further alleged that both the player and Mr Stankovic were aware that such authorization had been withdrawn on 7 February 2017, in any event.

17. Moreover, the Claimant highlighted that it had always paid the player his salaries.

18. The Claimant further pointed out that the second “authorization” dated 31 January 2017 had been issued “limited to only one concrete club FC Eintracht Braunshweig”.

19. Lastly, the Claimant explained that the compensation for the player’s breach of contract without just cause should be calculated as follows:

- The average between remunerations until the expiration date of the former contract and remunerations under a new contract for the same period. In this respect, the Claimant came to an average of EUR 213,000;

- The loss of the player’s services and profit. In this respect, the Claimant maintained that the market value of the player at the moment of the termination of the employment contract with it and the conclusion of the one with the Second Respondent was EUR 2,000,000. That said, the Claimant explained that, in the summer transfer window of 2017, it was expecting “the economic profit in the amount of at least” EUR 1,000,000 from the player;

- The “sports specificity” in the amount of EUR 13,200.

20. From the sum of the above-mentioned amounts, the Claimant deducted the amount of EUR 300,000 that, on 19 July 2017, it acknowledged having received from the Second Respondent. As such, the Claimant concluded that it was entitled to the total amount of EUR 926,233 as compensation for breach of contract.

21. The player firstly contested the competence of the FIFA to hear the present matter. He pointed out that according to art. 11.4 of the employment contract, he and the Claimant had agreed upon the Court of Arbitration of the Serbian Football Association to be competent to resolve any dispute between them arising out of the contract. Moreover, the player specified that he and the Claimant agreed not to bring any disputes before ordinary courts.

22. The player maintained that, in any case, the claim is groundless. He recalled having been a member of the Claimant’s youth academy and having signed on 26 October 2010 a “scholarship player contract” with the Claimant. The player further recalled transferred at a later stage to the Dutch club FC Ajax, with which he signed a professional football contract.

23. The player further alleged that, when his contract with FC Ajax came to a mutually agreed termination, he was offered the possibility to sign another contract with the Claimant. The player maintained that, in the said context, he and the Claimant had agreed upon the signature of an employment contract and “a buy-out clause in the amount of EUR 300,000 to be provided for”.

24. Moreover, the player pointed out that the buy-out clause could not be inserted into the employment contract since in Serbia “players and clubs [are] not free to arrange their basic mutual rights and obligations on their own will”. Consequently, he and the Claimant “had to look after another solution”. In this respect, the player further explained that, on 18 January 2016, the Claimant “committed itself to pay a special bonus to [him] in case of his transfer to a new club during the validity of the [employment contract] for the transfer fee in the amount that exceeds EUR 300,000”.

25. In light of the foregoing and the “authorization” dated 31 January 2016, the player concluded that “the common intention of the parties” was to introduce a clause in the employment contract allowing him to terminate it against the payment of the “predetermined amount of EUR 300,000”.

26. Lastly, the player claimed that – in any case – the Claimant calculated the amount of compensation on the speculative criteria.

27. The Second Respondent, for its part, maintained that it was not possible for it to be aware of the existence of the contract between the Claimant and the First Respondent and that it can only be “held responsible […] for the transfer payment”. Moreover, the Second Respondent pointed out that it had “made its best effort to research the situation” of the First Respondent. The Second Respondent concluded by asking the rejection of the claim in its entirety. In the alternative, should it be decided that the player breached the contract without just cause, the Second Respondent asked that “the claims of the Claimant towards [it] be rejected”.

28. In its replica, the Claimant entirely reiterated the position and requests expressed with its claim.

29. On the competence issue raised by the First Respondent, the Claimant mainly maintained that a local arbitration court cannot rule on the matter at stake due to its international dimension. The Claimant further argued that the player did not have a right to terminate the contract by paying EUR 300,000 as buyout clause also because “the institute of buy-out is not compatible with the Labour Code of the Republic of Serbia”. Moreover, the Claimant pointed out that, while the player terminated the employment contract on 22 June 2017, the Second Respondent paid the amount of EUR 300,000 to the Claimant on 10 July 2017 only.

30. In respect of the above, the Claimant further specified that the amount set in the authorisation dated 31 January 2016 does not have the meaning of an agreed transfer fee and “is obviously not final”. Moreover, the Claimant affirmed that the Second Respondent was obliged to inform it prior to enter into negotiations with the player pursuant to art. 18, par. 3, of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and had the obligation to get proper information about the player’s history and status before concluding an employment contract with him. According to the Claimant, the Second Respondent induced the player in breaching the employment contract, as it ignored the content of its letter dated 10 July 2017.

31. The player, in his duplica, entirely reiterated his position and further stressed that he had just cause to terminate the employment agreement. He further explained the he was entitled to lawfully terminate the employment agreement because the Claimant had only partially fulfilled its financial obligations towards him. Namely, the player submitted that the Claimant failed to deliver payment of approx. EUR 14,260 which were due from January 2016 until July 2017 pursuant to the employment agreement. The player went on to point out that his decision “to terminate the [employment agreement] was justifiable and legal”.

32. Additionally, the player submitted that the Claimant did not suffer any damages and that it “took advantage from the termination of the Contract by the [First] Respondent”. To this extent, the First Respondent was of the position that “the Claimant was rewarded for its misbehaviour by being paid EUR 300,000 by the [Second] Respondent”. In particular, the player emphasized that the Claimant paid the player EUR 45,681.40 vis-a-vis the employment agreement, which according to the player “is six times less than the amount of compensation paid to the Claimant by the Second Respondent”.

33. The Second Respondent, in its duplica, submitted that it had been presented with a letter containing the Claimant’s letterhead dated 31 January 2016, and that such authorization letter was supplemented by an official attestation dated 20 June 2017 “of the local competent authority of the town of Wollerau, Switzerland which carried the stamp and the signature of government officials”. The Second Respondent submitted that it “had justified reasons to consider the letter of authorization issued by FC Vojvodina valid”.

34. The Second Respondent also submitted that it considers the letter which annulled the authorization “to [have been] produced after the transfer of the player to Kayserispor as the player and the agent representing the player at the time [have] submitted the same claims persistently which makes us consider [that] the aforementioned letter of authorization was valid at the time of [the] player’s transfer to Kayserispor”.

35. The Second Respondent further claimed that clubs must act “like prudent merchants” and that the Claimant “has failed to meet with this obligation and set a release clause under the value of the player.” With regards to inducement, it submitted that “it has never engaged in a such act”. The Second Respondent went on to claim that it was approached by the agent of the player with a letter of authority which had carried all the legal aspects of a valid letter of authority”

36. Finally, Kayserispor submitted that it had fulfilled its obligations “arising from the terms set by FC Vojvodina”, especially considering that it had wired EUR 300,000 to the Claimant “as stated in the letter of authorization”. The Second Respondent went further and claimed that the Claimant had accepted such amount and therefore “FC Vojvodina has lost the right to lodge a claim” with regards to the transfer of the player. The Second Respondent finally requested that the claim filed by the Claimant be rejected.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 12 March 2019. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition January 2020) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension.

3. As a consequence, the DRC would, in principle, be competent to decide on a litigation which involves a Serbian club, a Serbian Player, and a Turkish club regarding an employment-related dispute.

4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the First Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of clause 11.4 of the employment contract, which makes reference to the Court of Arbitration within the Serbian Football Association (hereinafter: NDRC of Serbia).

5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by it against the First Respondent and the Second Respondent.

6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the January 2020 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.

7. In this respect, the DRC turned its attention to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle is one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list”.

8. On account of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent, and noted that no evidence has been brought forward to demonstrate that the NDRC of Serbia is compliant with the aforementioned regulations, especially in regards to the principle of equal representation.

9. Based on the foregoing circumstances, the Chamber decided that it cannot be concluded that the NDRC of Serbia fully respects the principle of equal representation and hence cannot be considered an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings. Finally, the Chamber reverted to clause 11.4 of the employment agreement, and concluded that such clause is not an unequivocal and exclusive jurisdiction clause.

10. Therefore, the Chamber concluded it is competent to deal with the matter at hand and that the claim of the Claimant is admissible.

11. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition January 2020), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 12 March 2019, the June 2018 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

12. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and documentation on file. However, the DRC emphasised that in the following considerations, it will refer only to the facts, arguments, and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

13. In doing so, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging that the parties to the dispute had signed the employment contract on 28 January 2016.

14. In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a claim against the First and the Second Respondents maintaining that the First Respondent had breached the contract by terminating it without just cause, on the basis that he signed a new contract with the Second Respondent during the same period of validity as the employment contract.

15. Thereafter, the members of the Chamber took note of the reply of the First Respondent, who alleged that he and the Claimant had agreed upon “a buy-out clause in the amount of EUR 300,000 to be provided for”, but that such clause could not be inserted into the employment contract since in Serbia “players and clubs [are] not free to arrange their basic mutual rights and obligations on their own will”.

16. In this sense, the members of the Chamber observed the First Respondent’s argument, according to which the Claimant “committed itself to pay a special bonus to [him] in case of his transfer to a new club during the validity of the [employment contract] for the transfer fee in the amount that exceeds EUR 300,000”, and that such document, together with the authorization dated 31 January 2016, denotes that “the common intention of the parties” was to introduce a clause in the employment contract allowing him to terminate it against the payment of the “predetermined amount of EUR 300,000”.

17. What is more, the Chamber also took note of the position of the Second Respondent, who maintained that it was not possible for it to be aware of the existence of the contract between the Claimant and the First Respondent, and that it can only be “held responsible […] for the transfer payment”. Moreover, the Second Respondent pointed out that it had “made its best effort to research the situation” of the First Respondent. The Second Respondent concluded by asking the rejection of the claim in its entirety. In the alternative, should it be decided that the player breached the contract without just cause, the Second Respondent asked that “the claims of the Claimant towards [it] be rejected”.

18. Further, the Chamber observed that by means of a written authorization dated 31 January 2016, the Claimant authorized Mr Michael Stankovic to represent it and negotiate the transfer of the player for a minimum transfer fee of EUR 300,000, and that on 7 February 2017, such authorization was revoked.

19. Lastly, the DRC took note that on 19 July 2017, the Claimant acknowledged having received from the Second Respondent a payment of EUR 300,000.

20. In this respect, the members of the Chamber took into account that the First Respondent has, as established above, deemed that the parties have agreed on a “buy-out clause”. However, after a careful analysis of the contents of the relevant contract, the DRC deemed that this was not the case. In particular, the Chamber emphasised that there is no provision in the employment contract establishing a right for the player to terminate the contract for a specific, clearly predetermined amount.

21. Based on the aforementioned the Chamber had no other option than to consider that the player had no contractually stipulated right to prematurely terminate the contract. Therefore, he had terminated the contract without just cause by means of the letter dated 22 June 2017.

22. The DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant for breach of contract. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the player’s new club, i.e. the Second Respondent, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach.

23. Having stated the above, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period.

24. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. By examining the contents of the employment agreement, the Chamber concluded that no such clause exists.

25. In continuation, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, the specificity of sport, and other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

26. In order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the members of the Chamber first turned their attention to the financial terms of the former contract and the new contract of the player. The members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the relevant compensation should be calculated based on the average fixed remuneration, i.e. excluding any conditional or performance related payment, agreed by the player with his former club and his new club, as well as considering the period of time remaining on the contract signed between the player and the former club.

27. In continuation, the Chamber observed the other objective criteria and elements brought forward by the parties. In particular, the Chamber emphasized that as per the authorization granted by the Claimant on 31 January 2016, it agreed to receive the amount of EUR 300,000 for the transfer of the player.

28. In light of the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the list of objective criteria foreseen by article 17 para. 1 of the Regulations is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party, the Chamber concluded that the amount of compensation for breach of contract owed to the Claimant is EUR 300,000.

29. As a consequence, the Chamber decided that the First Respondent player has to pay the amount of EUR 300,000 as compensation for breach of contract to the Claimant. Furthermore, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Second Respondent shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned amount of compensation.

30. Nevertheless, and without losing sight of its conclusion that the First Respondent terminated the employment contract without just cause, the Chamber duly observed that the Claimant admitted having received from the Second Respondent, on 19 July 2017, the amount of EUR 300,000. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that since the compensation due to the Claimant has already been paid, the Claimant’s claim shall be rejected.

31. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, it addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the player in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations.

32. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the letter revoking the authorization dated 31 January 2016 was sent to the player’s agent, Mr Stankovic, on 7 February 2017, and that such document was not addressed to the player himself.

33. Additionally, the Chamber observed that with the assistance of said agent, the player at all times maintained that the authorization was still valid, which indicates that he might have been deceived by his representative, or at least not made aware of the revocation.

34. Given the aforementioned situation and the particularities of the case at hand, the Chamber concluded that no sporting sanctions shall be imposed on the player and on the Second Respondent.

35. Finally, the DRC decided that the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs and expenses is rejected, in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s longstanding respective jurisprudence.

36. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, FC Vojvodina, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. It is established that the First Respondent, Dejan Meleg, has terminated his employment relationship with the Claimant without just cause.

4. The claim of the Claimant for compensation for breach of contract is rejected.

5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

*****

Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)

Avenue de Beaumont 2, CH-1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer