F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 28 February 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge

passed on 28 February 2020,

by

John Newman (USA)

on the claim presented by the player,

Vincent Faherty, Republic of Ireland,

represented by Mr Loizos Hadjidemetriou

as Claimant

against the club,

PAEEK Keryneias, Cyprus,

represented by Mr George Christofides

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 16 January 2018, the Irish player, Vincent Faherty, (hereinafter: the player or Claimant), and the Cypriot club, PAEEK Keryneias, (hereinafter: The club or Respondent) concluded an employment agreement valid as from 16 January 2018 until 31 April 2018 and 1 September 2018 until 31 April 2019. (hereinafter: the agreement) pursuant to which he was entitled to the following remuneration:

- “From 16/01/2018 until 31/04/2018, a monthly gross salary of EUR 1,165.00 (EUR 1,100.00net) and following the 30th day of each month to the last 31th April 2018, with 90 days grace.”

- “From 01/09/2018 until 31/04/2019, a monthly gross salary of EUR 1,465.00 (EUR 1,400.00net) and following the 30th day of each month to the last 31th April 2019, with 90 days grace”.

2. In addition, according to art. 2.1. of the agreement “the present Contract is regulated by the provisions of the Standard Employment Contract, as these have been agreed between the Cyprus Football Association (CFA) and the Cyprus Footballer’s Union (PASP) and as these provisions have been codified in Annex 1 of the CFA Registration and Transfer of Players Regulations”.

3. Furthermore, art. 2.2. of the agreement stipulated the following: “It is agreed that the club has the absolute right to cancel/terminate the employment at any transfer period/window. This absolute right of the club must be exercised not later than 10 days before the last day of each transfer period/window.”

4. Pursuant to art. 13 of the Standard Employment Contract (hereinafter: the contract) the parties agreed that “any employment dispute between the Club and the Player shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the CFA and shall be resolved according to the applicable regulations of the CFA.”

5. By correspondence dated 21 August 2018, sent on 27 August 2018, the club informed the player about its decision to unilaterally terminate his contract, referring to art. 2.2. of the agreement.

6. With regard to the above, on 28 August 2018, the player informed the club that despite being dated 21 August 2018, the letter was sent on 27 August 2018. Furthermore, he requested the payment of the amount of EUR 11,720 due to the club’s termination without just cause.

7. On 28 November 2018, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract without just cause, requesting the payment of a compensation in the amount of EUR 11,720, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 27 August 2019.

8. In his claim, the player deemed that the club unilaterally terminated the contract without just cause on 27 August 2018.

9. Furthermore, the player argued that the club failed to reply to his correspondence dated 28 August 2018 and further highlighted that “summer transfer window expires on the 31st day of August each year” and therefore, the club breached art. 2.2. of the agreement.

10. In its reply to the claim, the club firstly held that the FIFA DRC has no jurisdiction to decide on the present matter pursuant to the standard employment contract as well as the national DRC Regulations. In particular, the club referred to art. 13 of the standard employment contract as well as art. 22 of the national regulations for the status and transfer of players, and argued that the conditions set out in art. 22 (b) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players are met.

11. In support of its position, the club presented a copy of the “Regulations for the registration and transfer of football players and the DRC procedural regulations 2013” (hereinafter: NDRC Regulations), which include, inter alia, the following:

- Art. 22.1.1: “the Dispute Resolution Committee shall have the competence to adjudicate and/or resolve any financial and or other disputes which may arise between inter alia member clubs of CFA and professional players regarding the employment and stability in their contractual relations”;

- Art. 22.2: “the decisions of the DRC can be appealed before the Appeal Committee of the Dispute Resolution Chamber”;

- Art. 22.4.1: “the Appeal Committee and the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) [hereinafter: NDRC] shall consist of five members and more specifically of the Chairman, Vice- Chairman and three members“.

- Art. 22.4.3 holds that “the two members of the Appeal Committee and [NDRC] respectively will be elected from the Board of Directors of CFA and two members of the Appeal Committee and [NDRC] respectively will be elected by the Pancyprian Football Players' Association. The election procedure must be approved by the CFA. The four elected members of both the Appeal Committee and the [NDRC] respectively will have to elect within 15 days, the Vice-Chairman of the Appeal Committee and [NDRC] respectively. Accordingly the Vice- Chairman and all members will elect the Chairman of the Appeal Committee and the [NDRC] respectively. If the votes are equal, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee will have the casting vote.”

- Art. 22.4.4 reads that “The members elected by the Pancyprian Players’ Association should be reported promptly to the CFA for approval of their appointment from the Council of CFA.”

- Art. 22.4.5 stipulates that “(i)f the Pancyprian Football Players’ Association refuses or fails to elect any member to the [NDRC] within the prescribed period the Council of the [CFA] shall elect the member or members depending of the case”.

12. Furthermore, the club submitted a declaration dated 16 November 2018, submitted on behalf of the CFA, in which it is confirmed that ‘both the Pancyprian Footballers Association and the Cyprus Football Association had proposed the President of the Dispute Resolution Committee’.

13. With regard to the above, the Claimant insisted on FIFA’s competence to deal with the present matter arguing that the Cypriot NDRC is not an independent and impartial arbitration tribunal. In particular, the player referred to Article 22.4.3 of the NDRC Regulations and highlighted that the election of the players’ representatives “must be approved by the council of the CFA”. The player further argued that according to art. 22.4.5 of the NDRC Regulations, the CFA “considers itself as having the ultimate power to manage and decide on the appointment of the NDRC members and the running of the NDRC in the absence of the players’ union”.

14. Moreover, the club rejected the player’s claim and deemed that the parties mutually terminated the contract on 2 March 2018 by signing a document titled “Full payment and release Agreement for 2017 – 2018 & 2018 – 2019”.

15. In addition, the Respondent deemed that “the Club had to register its new players for the season 2018-2019. Therefore, for typical reasons it had to present to the CFA a termination letter, that is why it sent the Claimant a termination letter dated 21 of August 2018”.

16. Consequently, the Respondent argued that the player is not entitled to any compensation as the employment was terminated mutually.

17. In his replica, the player rejected the club’s argument and stressed that he never signed any termination agreement and that the document which was provided by the club is a forgery.

18. In this regard, the player highlighted that in accordance with the aforementioned document the employment was terminated on 2 March 2018, however, he continued to play for the club until 21 April 2018 and he also received, on 20 April 2018, a payment of EUR 3,850 issued by the Respondent.

19. The Claimant further argued that from the wording of the termination letter dated 21 August 2018 and sent on 27 August 2018, it is clear that the employment contract was still running until then.

20. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that despite the arguments put forward by the Respondent regarding the reasons why the termination letter was needed, the Claimant provided a document by means of which the CFA confirmed that said letter was never submitted.

21. In its duplica, the club reiterated its previous position, in particular, that the parties mutually terminated the contract and added that it “failed to retrieve the original version of the document” and therefore did not send it to FIFA, despite being asked to do so.

II. Considerations of the DRC judge

1. First of all, the DRC judge analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 28 November 2018 and decided on 28 February 2020. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.

2. Subsequently, the DRC judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC judge is, in principle, competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment–related dispute with an international dimension between an Irish player and an Cypriot club.

3. At this point, the DRC judge noted that the Respondent objected the admissibility of the present claim, alleging that according to art. 13 of the contract as well as to art. 22 of the national regulations for the status and transfer of players the Cypriot NDRC is competent to adjudicate in the present matter, arguing that the conditions set out in art. 22 (b) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players are met.

4. In this regard, the DRC judge noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter since the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA allegedly does not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. In particular, he referred to art. 22.4.3 of the NDRC Regulations and highlighted that the election of the players’ representatives “must be approved by the council of the CFA”. The Claimant further argued that in accordance with art. 22.4.5 of the NDRC Regulations, the CFA “considers itself as having the ultimate power to manage and decide on the appointment of the NDRC members and the running of the NDRC in the absence of the players’ union” and that, therefore, it cannot provide for fair proceedings.”

5. While analysing whether he was competent to hear the present matter, the DRC judge considered that he should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contains a jurisdiction clause.

6. Having said this, the DRC judge turned their attention to art. 13 of the contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. According to said art. 13, “any employment dispute between the Club and the Player shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the CFA and shall be resolved according to the applicable regulations of the CFA.”

7. In view of the aforementioned clause, the DRC judge was of the opinion that art. 13 of the employment contract makes clear reference to a national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. Therefore, the DRC judge deemed that said article constitutes an arbitration clause.

8. However, the DRC judge wished to stress that, even if the contract at the basis of the present dispute includes an arbitration clause in favour of a national dispute resolution, the Respondent was unable to prove that, in fact, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA meets the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations.

9. In this respect, the DRC judge referred to the general principle of equal representation of players as well as of clubs, and underlined that this principle was one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such.

10. Indeed, this prerequisite is not only mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, but also in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives […]; b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives […].” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal […].

Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list.”

11. Subsequently, the DRC judge acknowledged receipt of the Regulations of the CFA, provided by the Respondent, and began to analyse its content. In this context, the DRC judge noted that, according to art. 22.4 of the aforementioned Cypriot Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA, is composed of 5 members, as follows: a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, one member appointed by the Executive Committee of the CFA and two members appointed by the Pancyprian Football Players’ Association.

12. In view of the aforementioned and taking into account the pre-requisites for the recognition of the jurisdiction of a Dispute Resolution Chamber at a national level stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 and the FIFA NDRC Regulations, the DRC judge considered that, in light of the documentation provided by the CFA and the Respondent, the relevant national deciding body does not appear to be composed of an equal number of players’ and clubs’ representatives, since the representation of the clubs, if any, is not evident.

13. Therefore, the DRC judge concurred that the Respondent was unable to prove that the Dispute Resolution Committee of the CFA had met the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals, as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the above-mentioned Regulations, in FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA NDRC Regulations.

14. In view of the above, the DRC judge established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

15. Having established that he is competent to entertain the present dispute, the DRC judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC judge confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the said Regulations and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 28 November 2018, the June 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

16. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC judge entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC judge started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the DRC judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

17. Having said this, the DRC judge proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances surroundings the present matter, the parties’ arguments as well the documentation on file, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof.

18. In this respect, the DRC judge acknowledged that, on 16 January 2018, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment agreement valid as from 16 January 2018 until 31 April 2018 and 1 September 2018 until 31 April 2019, pursuant to which the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant a monthly net salary of EUR 1,100 for the period as from 16 January 2018 until 31 April 2018 and a monthly net salary of EUR 1,400 as from 1 September 2018 until 31 April 2019.

19. Furthermore, the DRC judge noted that the parties are disputing the alleged existence of a document titled “Full payment and release Agreement for 2017 – 2018 & 2018 – 2019”. According to the Respondent, the said document was signed by the parties on 2 March 2018 and as a consequence it deemed that the parties mutually terminated the contract. The Claimant, for his part, denied such allegations and argued that the document had been forged.

20. In this regard, the DRC judge acknowledged the argument of the Claimant by means of which he highlighted that in accordance with the aforementioned document the employment was terminated on 2 March 2018, however, he continued to play for the club until 21 April 2018 and that he also received, on 20 April 2018, a payment of EUR 3,850 from the Respondent.

21. In this context, the DRC judge deemed it important to firstly recall that, according to the DRC’s well-established jurisprudence, as a general rule, FIFA’s deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the ones concerning falsified signature of documents, and that such affairs fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.

22. In respect of the above, the DRC judge, nevertheless, pointed out that all the documentation remitted would be considered with free discretion. Nonetheless, since the original specimen of the document allegedly forged has not been provided by the Respondent, the DRC judge decided to disregard the document titled “Full payment and release Agreement for 2017 – 2018 & 2018 – 2019”, in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence.

23. The DRC judge further observed that the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA, asserting that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 27 August 2018 and claimed the payment of a compensation in the amount of EUR 11,720, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 27 August 2019.

24. The Respondent, for its part, rejected the Claimant’s claim and argued that the Claimant is not entitled to any compensation.

25. In this respect, the DRC judge was eager to emphasise that only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can be taken in order for an employer to ensure the employee’s fulfilment of his contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only ever be an ultima ratio measure.

26. The DRC judge furthermore noted that the Respondent, in its correspondence of 27 August 2018, deemed that it applied the termination clause contained in art. 2.2 of the agreement, which establishes that “It is agreed that the club has the absolute right to cancel/terminate the employment at any transfer period/window. This absolute right of the club must be exercised not later than 10 days before the last day of each transfer period/window”.

27. In this respect, the DRC judge held that it could not accept said article as being valid, as it provides for a unilateral termination right without any compensation to the benefit of the club only. In addition to the unilateral character of art. 2.2, the application of said article “must be exercised not later than 10 days before the last day of each transfer period/window”. In this regard, according to the Claimant, the “summer transfer window expires on the 31st day of August each year” and therefore, he held that the Respondent also breached art. 2.2. of the agreement. Therefore, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent could not legitimately terminate the contractual relation with the Claimant by making use of art. 2.2 of the employment agreement. Consequently, the DRC judge rejected the Respondent’s argument in this respect.

28. On account of the above, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship with the Claimant on 27 August 2018 and, consequently, must bear the financial and/or sporting consequences of the early termination, in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment agreement.

29. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment agreement, the DRC judge focused his attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the DRC judge decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive an amount of money from the Respondent as compensation for the termination of the contract without just cause in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment agreement.

30. In continuation, the DRC judge focused his attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the DRC firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

31. In application of the relevant provision, the DRC judge held that he first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC judge established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

32. As a consequence, the DRC judge determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The DRC judge recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body.

33. The DRC judge then turned his attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, which criterion was considered by him to be essential. The DRC judge deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows him to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of compensation.

34. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the DRC judge proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract as from its date of termination without just cause by the Respondent, i.e. 27 August 2018, until the end of the contract, and concluded that the Claimant would have received in total EUR 11,200 as remuneration had the contract been executed until its expiry date. Consequently, the DRC judge concluded that the amount of EUR 11,200 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

35. In continuation, the DRC judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC judge, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

36. The DRC judge recalled that the Claimant concluded an employment contract with the Cypriot club Olympias Lympion, valid as from 1 September 2018 until 30 April 2019 and according to which he was entitled to, inter alia, a monthly net salary of EUR 400. The DRC judge acknowledged that, in January 2019, the contract was mutually terminated. However, this employment contract enabled the Claimant to mitigate his damages by EUR 1,600 during said period of time. Therefore, the Claimant shall receive EUR 9,600 as a mitigated compensation.

37. Furthermore, considering the player’s claim for interest and also taking into account the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence, the DRC judge ruled that the club must pay 5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 9,600 as from 28 November 2018 until the date of effective payment.

38. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./15. above, the DRC judge referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

39. In this regard, the DRC judge pointed out that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

40. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC judge decided that, in the event that the Respondent does not pay the amounts due to the Claimant within 45 days as from the moment in which the Claimant, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the Respondent, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

41. Finally, the DRC judge recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

42. The DRC judge concluded his deliberations in the present matter by establishing that the Claimant’s claim is admissible and partially accepted.

III. Decision of the DRC judge

1. The claim of the Claimant, Vincent Faherty, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, PAEEK Keryneias, has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 9,600, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 28 November 2018.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount mentioned under point 3. above.

6. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with point 3. above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

7. In the event that the amount due in accordance with point 3. above is not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

8. The ban mentioned in point 7. above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.

9. In the event that the aforementioned amount is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

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Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note related to the appeal procedure:

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the DRC judge:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer