F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 25 February 2020

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 February 2020,

in the following composition:

Omar Ongaro (Italy), Vice-Chairman

Stéphane Burchkalter (France), member

Jerôme Perlemuter (France), member

on the claim presented by the club,

Desportivo 1° Agosto, Angola,

represented by Mr Domingos Silva Alves

as Claimant

against the player,

Osvaldo Pedro Capemba, Angola

represented by Mr Breno Costa Ramos Tannuri

as Respondent 1

and the club,

CD Trofense, Portugal

as Respondent 2

regarding an employment-related dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 6 February 2018, the Angolan player, Osvaldo Pedro Capemba (hereinafter: the player or the Respondent 1) and the Angolan club, Primeiro de Agosto (hereinafter: Primeiro de Agosto or the Claimant) and the legal guardian of the player signed a “Contrato de Aprendizagem Desportiva de Futebol” (“Sporting Leaning Agreement”) contract (hereinafter: the agreement or the contract), for the following duration “This Agreement is of a fixed duration and its commencement, for all legal purposes, will begin on February 6, 2018 and will be in effect for four (4) sporting seasons, ending on 31st of January 2022, and may be renewed if it is in the interest of the parties”.

2. Art. 1 of the agreement defined the object of the contract as follows:

“1. The CLUB as a trainer undertakes to carry out the sports training of the TRAINEE, integrating in its training levels, having for the purpose the human structural and needed technical resources for the provision of sports training, appropriate to human development, technical and professional development of the TRAINEE.

2. The TRAINEE undertakes to provide, with regularity and punctuality, the training tasks of football with zeal and diligence, in representation and under the authority and direction of the CLUB, observing the instructions of the people in charge of his training and as well as to regularly perform the football activity of the CLUB, integrating the teams of the age group corresponding to his age.

3. The TRAINEE declares to have proven to have completed sixteen (16) years of age and is therefore able to be a party to this contractual learning relationship, under the CLUB guidance and authorization of his legal guardian who declares his express authorization in signature in this contract.”.

3. In accordance with art. 2 of the agreement, the player was entitled to the following:

“Retribution:

1. For the exercise of its activity, the CLUB undertakes to pay the TRAINEE, the monthly amount corresponding to its category, in the year of entry or for which he was registered at the beginning of the season. In addition to subsidies or support that are timely fixed.

2. For the category of insiders, the CLUB will pay the TRAINEE the amount corresponding to Twenty Five Thousand Kwanzas (25,000.00 AKZ) per month (note: approx. EUR 97);

3. For the youth category the CLUB will pay the TRAINEE the amount corresponding to Thirty Five Thousand Kwanzas (35,000.00 AKZ) per month (note: approx. EUR 135);

4. For the junior category the CLUB will pay the TRAINEE the amount corresponding to Fifty Thousand Kwanzas (50,000.00 AKZ) per month (note: approx. EUR 193)”.

4. Art. 6 of the agreement further provided that “The tax obligations provided for in the Law (IRT - Income Tax and Social Security) will be paid by the TRAINEE, and the CLUB shall deduct from his remuneration as established by law.”.

5. Art. 3 of the agreement further entitled the player to “medical and pharmaceutical assistance”.

6. In accordance with art. 4.1.b) of the agreement, the Primeiro de Agosto had to pay the player “in due time the agreed amount”.

7. Art. 4.2.f) of the agreement provided that the player should “not engage in any other professional of business activity without authorization from [Primeiro de Agosto]”.

8. In accordance with art.8 of the agreement:

“The contract may be terminated under the following conditions:

(a) Revocation at any time by agreement of the parties;

b) Final transfer upon payment of the termination clause;

c) Dismissal with just cause promoted by the Club;

d) Termination for cause at the initiative of TRAINEE;

e) It is considered just cause the breach of the obligations by the Club or the duties of conduct,

or others, which is obliged to the TRAINEE under this contract.”

9. Article 10 of the agreement provided the following:

“1. If any national or foreign club wishes to acquire the trainee's final pass under this contract, he/she must pay the transfer clause of Two hundred million Kwanzas (200,000,000.00 AKZ). (note: approx. EUR 775,810)

2. The TRAINEE and any other club with whom he wishes to sign a contract shall be subject to

the obligation under the Rules of Procedure and Transfer of the FIFA player to pay compensation for training to the CLUB when he signs the his first professional contract and whenever he is transferred between clubs of different associations, either during or at the end of his contract, until he is twenty-three (23) years old.”

10. Art. 14 of the agreement provided the following:

“1. The Parties shall seek dialogue through the settlement of all disputes arising from the

interpretation and performance of this Agreement in accordance with the principles of good

faith.

2. If there is no understanding hereby, the parties shall refer the dispute to arbitration in

accordance with the FIFA Statutes;

3. Arbitration shall be subject to the procedures set forth by Law 16/03 of 25 July - Law on

voluntary arbitration, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal composed of three arbitral choosing the

parties a single arbitral that will choose a third to preside;

4. The arbitration shall be chosen from persons with a minimum of five years of sports

management experience, preferably licensed in law;

5. The Arbitral Tribunal shall function in Luanda and its decisions shall be final and binding, and the parties shall hereby waive any appeal.”

11. The player was born on 10 January 2002.

12. On 6 February 2018, the player and Primeiro de Agosto signed the contract.

13. On 4 September 2019, the Portuguese club, CD Trofense (hereinafter: Trofense or the Respondent 2) contacted Primeiro de Agosto via letter, informing Primeiro de Agosto that it was “ready to pay the buy-out clause stipulated in the Football Sports learning Contract (“contract”) between the player and the club in the amount of AOA 200,000,000”. The letter further provided that in case no banking details were received from Primeiro de Agosto to Trofense, Trofense would “be required to transfer the amount to the Angolan Football Federation” and added that it would be waiting for the reply of Primeiro de Agosto.

14. On 9 September 2019, Primeiro de Agosto lodged a claim against the player and Trofense in front of FIFA for breach of contract.

15. Allegedly on 4 October 2019, Trofense announced a pre-agreement with the player on its Facebook page.

16. On 28 January 2020, Trofense entered a transfer instruction in TMS to engage the player permanently (out of contract).

17. On 9 September 2019, Primeiro de Agosto lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the player and Trofense club for breach of contract, requesting the following Angolan Kwanza (AOA) 200,000,000 and EUR 800,000 corresponding to:

a) From the player:

 AOA 200,000,000 (approx. EUR 775,810) corresponding to “the amount of the termination clause stipulated in article 10” of the contract;

 Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the player.

b) From Trofense:

 EUR 800,000 “for sports, financial and image losses”;

 Sporting sanctions to be imposed on both the player and Trofense

 Legal costs and fees at the expense of the player and Trofense.

18. According to Primeiro de Agosto, as of August 2019, the player was absent from trainings and left the club’s premises without authorization.

19. Primeiro de Agosto held that it tried to contact the player and his parents but to no avail.

20. Primeiro de Agosto argued that the player had breached the contract by leaving the club and had been induced by Trofense to do so. In this regard, Primeiro de Agosto held that following the offer of Trofense, to which it did not reply, the player was nevertheless announced on Trofense’s facebook page as a new player.

21. Primeiro de Agosto underlined that Trofense did not pay any of the amounts provided in art. 10 of the agreement.

22. According to Primeiro de Agosto, the player was a minor when the alleged breach occurred, and consequently no transfer could have occurred.

23. In conclusion, Primeiro de Agosto held that both Trofense and the player should be held liable for the payment of compensation for breach of contract.

24. In reply to the claim of Primeiro de Agosto, the player and Trofense (hereinafter collectively called the Respondents) contested the competence of FIFA arguing that art. 14 of the agreement specified that in case of dispute, only an arbitral tribunal located in the city of Luanda would be competent. The player and Trofense argued that such arbitral tribunal would then follow the Angolan law and as such would be “compliant with the fundamental premises of the due process and principles of law”.

25. The player and Trofense held that in application of art. 22 of the FIFA RSTP “without prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress before a civil court for employment-related dispute”, the parties to the agreement specifically choose an arbitral tribunal located in Luanda to be competent.

26. The player and Trofense considered that “It is thus undisputed that the parties by choosing the referenced national arbitration tribunal, it will act as a local ordinary court and, consequently, fulfils within one of those pre-conditions, which automatically set aside the competence of the decision-making bodies of FIFA.”

27. On the substance, the Respondents held that the object of the contract was not for it to be an employment contract of a professional football player, but only for the player to be trained. They held that “the aim of the parties was to establish the minimum elements regarding the training and education” of the player by Primeiro de Agosto.

28. In this regard, the Respondents held that “it is necessary to have a proper employment (written) contract with a view to fulfil within the pre-conditions of the aforementioned quoted FIFA rules. It will be only within this context that a status of a player will change, i.e. from amateur to professional”.

29. The Respondents further held that the player never played any professional match with Primeiro de Agosto.

30. Trofense held that the player could not be considered a professional player since his salary in Primeiro de Agosto was equivalent to EUR 46 per month and that such compensation “is less than the bare minimum required to survive and sustain himself and his family in Angola”.

31. The player argued that he stopped attending trainings since he knew that Trofense was trying to pay the amount provided in art. 10 of the agreement (which both Respondents considered to be a buyout), and as such considered that by paying the buyout, he was automatically released from the original contract.

32. On any eventual compensation, the player argued that only training compensation could be due to Primeiro de Agosto, but no compensation for breach of the contract, since the parties were not tied by a professional contract. In this regard, the player considered that the training compensation that could be claimed by Primeiro de Agosto against the new club should be EUR 15,833.

33. The Respondents argued that the amount provided in art. 10 of the agreement is potestative and that art. 10 is a buyout clause and as such cannot be used for the calculation of compensation for breach of contract. In this regard, the player underlined that Primeiro de Agosto failed to provide its banking details to Trofense and that consequently it should be able to claim that amount as well as an additional compensation of EUR 800,000 which according to the player, is not even substantiated.

34. If the player and the new club were to be considered in breach of the contract, then the player considered that the reasonable compensation due to Primeiro de Agosto would be AOA 750,000 (approx. EUR 1,840) as it represents the residual value of the contract (from September 2019 to February 2022 – AOA 25,000 x 30) and that should the DRC decide to take into account the new contract of the player as well, then the mitigation could not be higher than EUR 28,590.

35. According to the information currently available on the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 28 January 2020, Trofense entered into TMS the transfer instruction to permanently transfer the player (out of contract free of payment) and on the same day the Portuguese Football Association requested the ITC of the player.

36. On 30 January 2020 the Angola Football Association rejected the ITC request arguing that “there has been no mutual agreement regarding early termination of the employment contract between the former club and the professional player”.

37. On the same day, the Portuguese FA disputed the rejection of the ITC. On 14 February 2020, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorized the provisional registration of the player and on the same day, the player was registered by the Portuguese FA.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 9 September 2019. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2018; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2020) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns a dispute between an Angolan club, an Angolan player and a Portuguese club in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC request.

3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondents contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies stating that civil court should be competent in application of art 14 of the agreement which stated that :

“1. The Parties shall seek dialogue through the settlement of all disputes arising from the

interpretation and performance of this Agreement in accordance with the principles of good

faith.

2. If there is no understanding hereby, the parties shall refer the dispute to arbitration in

accordance with the FIFA Statutes;

3. Arbitration shall be subject to the procedures set forth by Law 16/03 of 25 July - Law on

voluntary arbitration, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal composed of three arbitral choosing the

parties a single arbitral that will choose a third to preside;

4. The arbitration shall be chosen from persons with a minimum of five years of sports

management experience, preferably licensed in law;

5. The Arbitral Tribunal shall function in Luanda and its decisions shall be final and binding, and the parties shall hereby waive any appeal.”

4. On the basis thereof, the Respondents argued an arbitral tribunal in Luanda was competent.

5. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter.

6. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Chamber recalled that the Respondents made reference to civil court and to art. 22 of the Regulations which states in that matter that “Without prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress before a civil court for employment-related disputes […]”.

7. In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract.

8. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause.

9. Having examined the relevant provision, the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that art. 14 does not constitute a clear and specific jurisdiction clause in favour of an arbitral tribunal in Luanda, since it only referred to the arbitration and not civil court. What is more, the DRC was of the unanimous opinion that said art. 14 was not specific enough in the sense that it mentioned FIFA.

10. On account of all the above, the Chamber did not consider art. 14 to be a clear and specific jurisdiction clause and as such, it established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

11. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2020) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 9 September 2019. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the June 2019 version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

12. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

13. From the outset, the DRC noted that the Claimant and the Respondent 1 signed an the agreement on 6 February 2018, valid as from the date of signature until 21 January 2022, but the Respondent 1 and 2 contested that the agreement was an employment contract for a professional football player but was mainly an agreement for the Claimant to train the Respondent 1. The Chamber further noted that according to the Respondents, the player was not a professional as he never played an official match and was not paid enough to be considered a professional player and that in any case, at the date of signature of said agreement, the player was a minor.

14. In this context, the DRC deemed that the main issue at stake in this current matter was to determine if a valid employment contract had been signed by the parties and in that case, by which party had it been breached and the consequence of said eventual breach.

15. Firstly, the Chamber recalled that in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship, the remuneration and the signature of both parties.

16. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Respondents held that the name of the agreement prevented it to be an employment contract as it was named “sporting Learning agreement”. In this matter, the DRC highlighted that the name of the document was irrelevant as long as it contained the essentialia negotii of an employment contract. In this sense, the DRC attached importance in thoroughly analyzing the agreement in question. The Chamber noted that said document was signed by the relevant parties and even the legal guardian of the player, but also contained the duration of the agreement and a remuneration of the player subject to local taxes.

17. Not only that, but the DRC also observed that said agreement contained in its art. 8 and 10 clauses by means of which the future transfer of the player was to be regulated. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent 2 had intended to acquire the services of the player by paying to the Claimant the amount provided in art, 10 of the agreement, contradicting its stance in these proceedings. Indeed, the Chamber remarked that since the Respondent 2 was willing to pay an amount to acquire the services of the player, then it meant that the Respondent 2 was also of the opinion that the player was bound to the Claimant via an employment contract.

18. After a careful study of the contract presented by the Claimant, the DRC concluded that in principle, said contract contained all such essential elements.

19. Secondly, the Chamber focused its attention to the second argumentation of the Respondents with regard to the validity of the agreement as an employment contract. In this respect the Chamber observed that the Respondents were of the opinion that no legally binding employment contract could have signed because the player was a minor at the time of the signature.

20. In this regard, the DRC took note that the contract had been signed on 6 February 2018 and that it was undisputed that at that time, taking into account the date of birth of the player (10 January 2002), the player was 16 years old.

21. In this respect, the DRC found it of the outmost importance to recall art 18 par. 2 of the Regulation provided inter alia “[…] Players under the age of 18 may not sign a professional contract for a term longer than three years. Any clause referring to a longer period shall not be recognized”. The DRC further recalled that the duration provided in the contract was for 4 sporting season, as from 6 February 2018 until 31 January 2022.

22. With this in mind, the DRC found that the contract provided for a duration longer than the one authorized by the Regulations was of the opinion that the length of the contract should therefore, and since the player was a minor when signing it, be reduce to the maximum of 3 years, meaning until 6 February 2021.

23. With regard to the argumentation of both Respondents, the DRC recalled that with regard to its Regulations, the fact that the player was a minor when signing the contract did not render said contract to be invalid. Moreover, the DRC underlined that said contract had not only been signed by the player but also by his legal representative, as he was a minor.

24. Taking into account all of the above, the Chamber was unanimously of the opinion that the Claimant and the Respondent were validly tied by an employment contract containing all the essentialia negotii, signed on 6 February 2018 and valid as 6 February 2018 until 6 February and with a progressive remuneration of minimum AOA 25,000 to AOA 50,000.

25. Having established that a valid and legally binding employment contract had been in force between the Claimant and the Respondent, the Chamber went on to analyse whether such contract had been breached and, in the affirmative, which party is to be held liable for breach of contract.

26. At this point, the Chamber recalled the claim of the Claimant according to which, the Respondent 1 had left the Claimant and joined the Respondent 2 without any authorization and that the Respondent 2 had intended to lift, what it considered to be, the buy out cause contained in art. 10 of the contract but had not performed the payment. The DRC noted that the Claimant deemed that the player had breached the contract and that Trofense had induced him to do so and requested compensation to the player in the amount of AOA 200,000,000 and EUR 800,000 from Trofense.

27. On the other end, the Chamber noted that the Respondent 2 acknowledged having made an offer in writing to the Claimant to acquire the player and had informed the Claimant that it was willing to pay the amount provided in art. 10 of the contract and that should the Claimant not provide its banking details, the Respondent 2 would proceed to the payment via the Angolan Football Federation.

28. The Respondent 1 for its part held that it was aware that the Respondent 2 was willing to pay the amount provided in art. 10 of the contract and stopped attending trainings with the Claimant as he considered that the Respondent 2 by paying this amount, automatically released him from the original contract.

29. The Chamber highlighted that it remained uncontested that the player left the Claimant prior to the end of the contract during August 2019. At the same time, it remained uncontested that the Respondent 2 did not pay the amount provided in art. 10 of the contract.

30. From the chronology of the events as recalled by the parties and the submissions on file, the DRC formed the belief that all the parties considered art. 10 of the contract to be a clause by means of which, pending the payment of AOA 200,000,000 to the Claimant, the Respondent 2 could acquire the services of the Respondent 1. This is even more clear from the argumentation of both Respondents as recalled previously.

31. With this in mind, the DRC was of the firm opinion that pending the payment of the amount provided in art. 10, the player should have remained with the Claimant as he was bound by the employment contract. Saying that, the DRC deemed that the contract had been unilaterally terminated by the player leaving the Claimant.

32. As a consequence of the aforementioned conclusion, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the player is liable to pay compensation to Primeiro de Agosto. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the new club shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation.

33. The members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period.

34. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by either contractual party in the event of breach of contract. Upon careful examination of said contract, the members of the Chamber assured themselves that this was not the case in the matter at stake.

35. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable in the case at stake had to be assessed in application of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber stated beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter

36. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that the contract contained art. 10 par.1 in accordance with which “If any national or foreign club wishes to acquire the trainee's final pass under this contract, he/she must pay the transfer clause of Two hundred million Kwanzas (200,000,000.00 AKZ)” , and that from the wording of said article, the Claimant was willing to let go of the player for AOA 200,000,000. At the same time, the Chamber further recalled that on 4 September 2019, the Respondent 2 had informed the Claimant that it was willing to pay AOA 200,000,000 to acquire the player and that at the same time, the player considered that by intending to pay that amount, the Respondent 2 was acquiring his services, and that he was no longer bound by the contract with the Claimant.

37. Consequently, the Chamber was of the firm opinion that the amount of AOA 200,000,000 contained in art. 10 par.1 of the contract could be taken as an objective criteria of the amount on which all the parties agreed that the player’s services could be retained by another club.

38. Taking into account this objective criteria and the specific facts of the matter at hand, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the total amount of AOA 200,000,000 was to be considered a reasonable and justified compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

39. As a consequence, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the player must pay the amount of AOA 200,000,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, in accordance with art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Respondent 2 is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation.

40. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./11. above, the DRC judge referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

41. In this regard, the DRC pointed out that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

42. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the DRC decided that, in the event that the Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 do not pay the amounts due to the Claimant within 45 days as from the moment in which the Claimant, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the Respondent 1 and 2, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the Respondent 2 and a restriction from playing in official matches up until the due amount is paid and for a maximum duration of six months shall be imposed on the Respondent 1, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

43. Finally, the DRC recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

44. Finally, the Chamber concluded its deliberations by rejecting any further claim lodged by the Claimant.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Desportivo 1° Agosto, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent 1, Osvaldo Pedro Capemba, has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of the contract in the amount of AOA 200,000,000.

3. The Respondent 2, CD Trofense, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 must pay the amount mentioned under point 2 above.

6. The Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with point 2 above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

7. In the event that the amount due in accordance with point 2. above is not paid by the Respondent 1 and/or the Respondent 2 within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2:

a. The Respondent 1 shall be restricted from playing in official matches up until the due amount is paid and for a maximum duration of six months (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

b. The Respondent 2 shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

8. The restriction and ban mentioned in point 7. above will be lifted immediately and prior its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.

9. In the event that the aforementioned sum is still not paid by the end of the restriction from playing of six months of the Respondent 1 or the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods of the Respondent 2, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

*****

Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the DRC. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note related to the appeal procedure:

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Emilio Garcia Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer