F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2013, by Mr Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach C, from country I as “Claimant” against the club Club S, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2013, by Mr Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach C, from country I as “Claimant” against the club Club S, from country R as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 15 July 2009, Coach C, from country I (hereinafter: “the Claimant”) and the Club S, from country R (hereinafter: “the Respondent”) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: “the contract”), valid from 25 June 2009 until 24 June 2011. 2. The contract provided that the Claimant’s remuneration would be as follows: • point J lit. 1, “Base gross monthly salary 60,500 currency of country R (equivalent of 10,000 euro)“; • point J lit. 2 (c), “other increases (gratification) equivalent in currency of country R of 1.000 euro for each obtained victory on own field, and equivalent in currency of country R of 2.000 euro for each away obtained victory”; • point J lit. 4, ”Pay day of the 30th of the current month”; • point L (e), “if the coach is dismissed during one season, he shall benefit of the salary until the end of the season in progress”; • point L (h), “if he qualifies the team in UEFA Champions League groups, the coach shall benefit of a bonus of 400.000 euro value, even if he is dismissed before 3 phases until the termination of the championship, only if the team occupies the first place”; • point L (l), “if at the end of the first season the team is on the second position and the coach dismissed, he shall benefit of a bonus of 60.000 euro”. 3. Point O of the contract stated in its English translation that “The conflicts related to the signing execution, amendment, suspension or termination of this individual labour contract shall be solved by a materially and territorially competent court”. Moreover, the original version of the contract written in language of country R mentioned at the end of its point O the following acronyms: “FRF, LFP or FIFA”. 4. On 13 October 2009, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent requesting the total amount of EUR 121,000 for breach of contract, as follows: a) EUR 10,000 as outstanding salary for the month of September 2009; b) EUR 90,000 as salaries corresponding to the rest of the 2009/2010 season (October 2009 until June 2010) in accordance with point L (e) of the contract; c) EUR 6,000 as bonus (cf. point J lit. 2 (c) of the contract) for the three “away matches” that the Respondent had won; d) EUR 15,000 as bonus allegedly mentioned in the Respondent´s internal regulations for the latter’s qualification for the UEFA Europa League. 5. On 11 March 2011, the Claimant amended his claim and requested from the Respondent an additional “compensation” for breach of contract amounting between EUR 31,000 and EUR 44,000 as well as argued that the aforementioned compensation should be based on the results that the team had achieved during the remaining part of the sporting season after his dismissal. 6. As to the circumstances of the alleged breach of contract, the Claimant stated that on 17 September 2009, after a match against Club T, he was approached by an official of the Respondent (Mr G) who had informed him orally that his services were no longer required. Moreover, the Claimant stated that his dismissal had come as a total surprise as he had never been previously informed by the Respondent that his work was not satisfactory. The Claimant further explained that his dismissal and the appointment of a new coach (Mr M) were reported in the press as from 18 September 2009. 7. The Claimant then stated that on 24 September 2009, he had received a letter from the country R Football Federation informing him that, by fax dated 19 September 2009, the Respondent had informed the country R Football Federation that he was no longer its coach and that a new coach had been appointed. 8. On 13 April 2011, the Respondent presented its position to the claim and stated that the “contractual relationship between the coach and club were running normally until 18.09.2010 [rect: 2009], the date at which the Coach C was not present at the club to fulfil its obligations under the contract”. Consequently, the Respondent deemed that it did not have any financial obligation towards the Claimant as the latter had decided to terminate the contract. 9. In addition, the Respondent stated that in accordance with art. 267 of the country R Labour Code, it had started disciplinary proceedings against the Claimant. In this respect, the Respondent enclosed to its submission the following documents: a) Report made by the “Team Manager” dated 28 September 2009 mentioning the absence of the Claimant as from 18 September 2009 without justification; b) Decision dated 29 September 2009 establishing a commission to investigate the “misconduct” of the Claimant; c) Notification dated 29 September 2009 to the Claimant asking him to present himself at the Respondent´s headquarters on 5 October 2009 “in order to take part in the disciplinary investigation”; d) Minutes dated 5 and 9 October 2009 informing the Claimant that the date of the meeting would be postpone until 14 October 2009; e) Summary of the disciplinary investigation date 15 October 2009; f) Decision dated 16 October 2009 by means of which “starting with the date of 10/16/2009, they cancel the individual employment contract of Coach C (…) according to 61 paragraph 1 letter “a” corroborated with art. 264 paragraph 1 letter “f” in Law no. 53/2003 (Labour Code)”. Art. 3 of the decision states: “The employee may challenge this decision on the cancellation of his individual employment contract by a complaint addressed to the country R Court within 30 calendar days following the communication in conformity with the provisions of art. 268 paragraph 5 in Law 53/2003 and of art. 57 in the Statutes of the country R Football Federation”. 10. Finally, the Respondent stated that according to country R law, labour disputes should be settled exclusively by the competent country R civil courts and that, therefore, the FIFA Players’ Status Committee was not competent to hear the present matter. 11. On 19 December 2011, the Claimant rejected the Respondent´s allegation regarding the lack of competence of FIFA and that the present matter should be decided by a country R civil court. 12. Furthermore, the Claimant stated that the documents presented by the Respondent were issued long after his dismissal was reported in the media and notified to him by the country R Football Federation. 13. Finally, the Claimant argued that the Respondent had not even alleged to have made any effort whatsoever to contact him during his alleged “absence” from the Respondent and reiterated that he had been dismissed by the Respondent on 17 September 2009 immediately after the match against Club T. Therefore, the Claimant deemed that it was obvious that the Respondent had terminated the contract unilaterally and without just cause and that he should thus be compensated for the said breach. 14. In spite of being provided an opportunity to do so by FIFA, the Respondent did not submit any further statements. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players´ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players´ Status Committee (hereinafter: “the Single Judge”) analysed which Procedural Rules are applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the 2012 and 2008 editions of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 13 October 2009, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: “the Procedural Rules”) is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2012, 2010 and 2009 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 13 October 2009. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2009 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: “the Regulations”) is applicable to the case in hand as to the substance. 3. The applicable regulations having been established, the Single Judge went on to assess whether he was competent to hear the present matter and recalled that the Respondent had argued in its submissions that FIFA was not competent to deal with the dispute since according to country R law, labour disputes should be decided only by the competent national courts. 4. In this context, and while noting that no other claim was lodged by any other party in front of another deciding body, the Single Judge considered if, on the basis of the documentation and information on file, a specific jurisdiction clause had been agreed upon between the parties. 5. The Single Judge then focused his attention to point “O” of the contract, which, in its English translation, stated that in case of conflict between the parties in connection with the contract a “materially and territorially competent court” would be the deciding body to decide on the relevant matter. However, the Single Judge noted that the original version of the contract which was signed by the parties and written in country R language mentioned in addition to the aforementioned and at the end of the sentence in its point O, the following acronyms “RFR, LFP or FIFA”. In this respect, the Single Judge was keen to underline that the original contract written in country R, which was signed by the parties and thus represented the binding document between the them, did not contain a specific exclusive jurisdiction clause for a particular national body since point “O” of the contract also referred to FIFA as one of the deciding bodies to which the parties could revert in case of dispute. 6. Consequently, based on art. 3 par. 2 of the Procedural Rules in conjunction with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 and art. 22 c) of the Regulations and in view of the jurisdiction clause contained in point “O” of the original contract signed by the parties which also granted competence to the FIFA deciding bodies, the Single Judge concluded that he was competent to deal with the present matter since it concerned a dispute between an country I coach and a country R club. 7. Having established his competence, the Single Judge turned his attention to the substance of the present matter and carefully considered and analysed the arguments and documents presented by the parties during the investigation. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge reiterated that the contract the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded was valid from 25 June 2009 and until 24 June 2011. 8. Furthermore, the Single Judge also noted that, on 17 September 2009, the Claimant alleged having being informed “orally” by the Respondent of its intention to terminate their contractual relationship. 9. Moreover, the Single Judge took note of the Respondent´s allegation with regard to the Claimant´s absence on 18 September 2009. 10. In addition, the Single Judge acknowledged that the country R Football Federation had informed the Claimant by letter dated 24 September 2009 that the Respondent had notified the country R Football Federation via fax dated 19 September 2009 about a change in its staff, i.e. that the Claimant was replaced by a new coach. 11. The Single Judge then pointed out that both parties had diverging positions in relation to the matter at stake. On the one hand, the Claimant alleged that the Respondent had terminated the contract unilaterally and without just cause and that he should be compensated for the said breach. On the other hand, the Respondent stated that the Claimant had terminated the contract by being absent from the trainings and, as a consequence, deemed that it did not have any financial obligations towards him. 12. At this stage, the Single Judge stated that from the evidence on file, it appears that the contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent had not encountered any problems until 17 September 2009 but that two days later, i.e. on 19 September 2009, the Respondent had informed the country R Football Federation that the Claimant was no longer its coach. 13. In this context, the Single Judge deemed appropriate to underline that the termination of an employment contract, as a general rule, has to be the “ultimate ratio” in a labour relationship and that parties to a contract have to try their best to maintain their contractual relationship. 14. In this respect, the Single Judge remarked that the Respondent had not provided any evidence showing its interest in the continuation of their employment relationship with the Claimant after the alleged absence of the latter from the squad on 17 September 2009 but had instead notified the country R Football Federation the following day that the employment relationship had been brought to an end. In this context, the Single Judge added that if the Respondent was, as it appears to be claiming, still interested in the services of the Claimant on the day of his alleged absence, it should have at least tried to contact him and asked him to reintegrate the club. 15. Furthermore, the Single Judge acknowledged that the documentary evidence provided by the Respondent during the course of the present investigation was related to disciplinary measures and proceedings started after the Respondent had informed the country R Football Federation about the termination of the contract. 16. In view of all the above, the Single Judge concluded that the contract had been unilaterally terminated by the Respondent without just cause on 17 September 2009 and that the Claimant was thus entitled to compensation for termination of his employment contract without just cause. 17. Before calculation the amount of compensation for breach of contract, the Single Judge analysed whether the Claimant was entitled to any outstanding salary or bonuses. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that based on the evidence on file it was uncontested that the Respondent had paid in full the salaries to the Claimant until the end of August 2009. 18. In continuation, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Claimant was claiming a bonus for three wins in the “country R Championship” amounting to EUR 6,000 and for the qualification for the UEFA Europa League in the amount of EUR 15,000 in accordance with the Respondent´s internal regulations. 19. In this regard, the Single Judge stated that in accordance with point J lit. 2 (c) of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to EUR 2,000 net for every victory by the team in an “away” match, as well as EUR 1,000 net for every victory by the team in a “home” match. In this respect, the Single Judge pointed out that the Respondent had not contested such allegation. As a result, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent owed the Claimant EUR 6,000 net for the three “away” victories in the country R Championship. 20. In continuation, the Single Judge focused his attention to the Claimant´s claim of EUR 15,000 as bonus for the qualification for the UEFA Europa League and noted that this bonus was not mentioned in the contract but that, according to the Claimant, such bonus was mentioned in the internal regulations of the Respondent. In view of the fact that the Claimant had failed to provide the internal regulations in question during the investigation and while referring to the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules according to which “any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant was not entitled to receive the bonus for an amount of EUR 15,000. 21. Turning his attention to the compensation payable for the unilateral termination without just cause by the Respondent, the Single Judge referred to the content of the point L (e) of the contract which stated that “if the coach is dismissed during one season, he shall benefit of the salary until the end of the season in progress”. 22. In this respect, the Single Judge pointed out that since the amount of compensation was contractually agreed by the parties, said amount of compensation should therefore be awarded to the Claimant as per point L (e) of the contract which expressly provided for an amount equivalent to the remaining value of the season in course. 23. Consequently, and taking into account that the season in course was valid until June 2010, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant was entitled to his salary for the period from September 2009 until June 2010 as compensation for the unilateral termination without just cause by the Respondent of the contract and that such an amount represented ten monthly salary payments of EUR 10,000 each, i.e. a total of EUR 100,000. For the sake of good order, the Single Judge underlined that the salary of September 2009 was also part of the aforementioned compensation as it was due at the end of the month in question (cf. point J lit. 4 of the contract), i.e. after the termination by the Respondent of the contract. 24. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant was also claiming an “additional compensation” in light of the results that the team had achieved during the remaining part of the sporting season, i.e. the 2009/2010 season. The Single Judge pointed out that, as a general rule, coaches are entitled to receive bonuses for results achieved while they are still working for their respective clubs. In this regard, the Single Judge underlined that since the contract was terminated on 17 September 2009 and the requested additional compensation was related to the results achieved during the rest of the season, i.e. when the Claimant was no longer working for the Respondent, the Claimant should not be entitled to receive any additional compensation. 25. In view of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Single Judge decided that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 106,000 representing the amount of EUR 6,000 as bonuses and the amount of EUR 100,000 as compensation for breach of contract. 26. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings. 27. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. The amount in dispute to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 165,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 25,000. 28. Considering that, in the case in hand, the responsibility of the failure to comply with the employment contract can entirely be attributed to the Respondent and taking into account the particular circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 17,000 and held that such costs have to be borne by both parties. 29. In conclusion, the amount of currency of country H 2,000 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of currency of country H 15,000 by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players´ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach C, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, Coach C is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club S, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach C, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision the following amounts: • EUR 100,000 as compensation for termination of the employment contract; • EUR 6,000 as outstanding bonuses. 4. If the aforementioned sums are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% per year will apply as of expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, Coach C, are rejected. 6. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 17,000 are to be paid within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows: 6.1 The amount of currency of country H 2,000 has to be paid by the Claimant, Coach C. Given that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of currency of country H 4,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, Coach H, is exempted from paying the abovementioned costs of the proceedings. 6.2 The amount of currency of country H 13,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, Club S, to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XX-XXXXX: 6.3 The amount of currency of country H 2,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, Club S, directly to the Claimant, Coach C. 7. The Claimant, Coach C, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club S, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under points 3 and 6.3 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives