F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2013-2014) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2014, in the following composition: Sunil Gulati (USA), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Luis Bedoya (Colombia), member Pare Salmon (Tahiti), member on the claim presented by the players’ agent Players’ Agent S, from country I as “Claimant” against the player Player O, from country N as “first Respondent” and the club Club W, from country E as “second Respondent” regarding a claim for commission

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2013-2014) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2013-2014) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2014, in the following composition: Sunil Gulati (USA), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Luis Bedoya (Colombia), member Pare Salmon (Tahiti), member on the claim presented by the players’ agent Players’ Agent S, from country I as “Claimant” against the player Player O, from country N as “first Respondent” and the club Club W, from country E as “second Respondent” regarding a claim for commission I. Facts of the case 1. On 28 June 2010, the player O (hereinafter: the first Respondent) signed a “letter of authorization” (hereinafter: the mandate) which provided as follows: “I Player O [i.e. the first Respondent] […] confirms that this letter serves as an exclusive mandate to Players’ Agent S [a players’ agent licensed by the country I Football Association, hereinafter: the Claimant] and Mr G, CEO/Director of XY Management & Projects […] to act and negotiate with Club W [hereinafter: the second Respondent] (country E). It is clear that this exclusivity lasts for one month (30 days) from the day of signing”. 2. On 1 August 2010, the first Respondent signed again the same mandate which contained the same terms and included possible negotiations with the second Respondent as well as other clubs. 3. On 2 November 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the first and the second Respondent. In this respect, the Claimant alleged that, based on the mandates, he had “addressed the club [i.e. the second Respondent] and offered the player [i.e. the first Respondent]” to the latter but that “during the mandate period, the club […] decided to engage the player (offered by the agent [i.e. the Claimant]) without the agent evolvement and the player was transferred and registered in the club for a long term contract”. In this respect, the Claimant provided copies of emails he claims to have sent to the second Respondent, by means of which he was proposing the services of the first Respondent as well as other players to the second Respondent. 4. In response to his emails, the Claimant explained to have received a letter from the second Respondent on 2 September 2010 in which the latter stated that as the relevant mandate was between the Claimant and the first Respondent, this had “nothing to do with the club [i.e. the second Respondent]” and in which the second Respondent alleged that the first Respondent had already signed “a representation agreement with an Authorised Agent dated 7th January 2009 which was filed and lodged with the country E FA”. 5. On account of the above, the Claimant alleged that the first and second Respondent had “clearly breached their commitments” towards him and that, therefore, they should be requested to pay an amount representing “10% of the transaction sums, estimated by the agent [i.e. the Claimant] of no less than 5 million euros (500,000 euros)” as well as EUR 250,000 for “his reputation damages”. 6. On 27 September 2011, the Claimant reiterated his claim and asked FIFA to pass a formal decision, arguing that the second Respondent had stated in its letter dated 2 September 2010 (cf. par. 4 above) that the first Respondent had used the services of another licensed players’ agent. 7. On 11 January 2013, the second Respondent responded to the claim of the Claimant and rejected it entirely. In this respect, the second Respondent claimed that it had been contacted by a total of four “agents” during the month of July 2010 “all of whom claimed to be representing the player” and that the Claimant “was one of the 4 and there was some limited contact at that early stage”. The second Respondent further alleged that the first Respondent had chosen to use the services of another licenced players’ agent, Mr D, who had allegedly provided a signed representation agreement dated 1 August 2010 and with whom they had started negotiations which had led to the signature by the first Respondent of an employment contract with the club on 20 August 2010. 8. The second Respondent further argued that even if the mandate was valid, an assumption which was denied by the latter, the first Respondent had signed a two-year representation agreement with the licensed players’ agent Mr F on 7 January 2009. In this respect, the second Respondent added that “Both Mr D and the Player [i.e. the first Respondent] signed a compromise agreement with Mr F to cancel this outstanding representation agreement” and that, therefore, the Claimant “would not have been permitted to act in any event”. 9. On 13 May 2013, the first Respondent provided his response to the claim and also vigorously rejected it, claiming, first of all, that “there was no valid contract” between him and the Claimant as the mandate did not meet “the requirements of FIFA or the FA; and/or […] The Player [i.e. the first Respondent] had an existing valid representation agreement with Mr F” which was only terminated on 19 August 2010, “at which point Mr D took over as the Player’s agent”. 10. Furthermore, the first Respondent argued that the Claimant had “performed no relevant services under the contracts” and had therefore played no material role in the signature of his employment contract with the second Respondent. In this respect, the first Respondent denied that the Claimant had introduced him to the second Respondent and that the information the Claimant had sent to the second Respondent via emails “was already in the public domain”. 11. In an unsolicited correspondence, sent after the closure of the investigation, the Claimant reiterated that he “was the only agent who held a valid exclusive representation agreement signed by the player [i.e. the first Respondent]” and that it had “contacted the club [i.e. the second Respondent] in regard to the player, fulfilled the club’s specific requests to provide more information about the player, started negotiating the player terms and presented to the club his exclusive mandate”. The Claimant added that whether Mr F “had or had not a valid authorization is irrelevant” as the first Respondent had concluded a mandate with him, and that, in any event, the alleged representation agreement between the latter and Mr F had never been submitted during the course of the proceedings. 12. Moreover, the Claimant argued that although the mandate did not mention the percentage of commission, he was in any event entitled to 3% “of the player’s [i.e. the first Respondent] contract”, which, according to him, represented EUR 135,000. II. Considerations of the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Bureau) analysed which procedural rules are applicable to the matter in hand. In this respect and since the claim of the Claimant was lodged with FIFA on 2 November 2010, the Bureau concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the present matter (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Bureau analysed which edition of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations should be applicable. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 39 par. 4 of the Players’ Agents Regulations, and again considering that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 2 November 2010, the current edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the present matter. 3. Furthermore, with regard to its competence and while referring to art. 34 par. 6 of the 2013 edition of the FIFA Statutes, the members of the Bureau pointed out that according to art. 30 par. 2 of the Regulations, FIFA is competent to deal with international disputes in connection with the activities of players’ agents. 4. In this respect, the Bureau underlined that the present matter concerned a dispute opposing a players’ agent duly licensed by the country I Football Association to a country N football player as well as an country E football club, regarding an alleged outstanding commission. Consequently, the Bureau held that it was competent to decide on the present matter which had a clear international dimension. 5. Its competence and the applicable regulations having been established and entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Bureau acknowledged the abovementioned facts as well as the documentation submitted by the parties and contained in the file. In particular, the Bureau noted that the Claimant had signed two “exclusive” mandates with the first Respondent, the first one on 28 June 2010, valid for “one month (30 days) from the day of signing”, and the second one on 1 August 2010, also valid for “one month (30 days) from the day of signing”. In this respect, the members of the Bureau underlined that both mandates contained the same terms. 6. In continuation, the Bureau noted that the Claimant had argued that although he had contacted the second Respondent and “offered the player [i.e. the first Respondent]”, the second Respondent, “during the mandate period”, had “decided to engage the player [i.e. the first Respondent] (offered by the agent [i.e. the Claimant]) without the agent involvement”. Consequently, the Claimant deemed that both the first and second Respondent had “breached their commitments” towards him and should be requested to pay an amount representing “10% of the transaction sums”, which according to the Claimant, amounted to EUR 500,000, plus an additional amount of EUR 250,000 for “his reputation damage”. 7. As to the first Respondent, the Bureau underlined that he deemed that no commission was due since the Claimant had “performed no relevant services under the contracts” and had thus played no material role in the signature of his employment contract with the second Respondent. Furthermore, the first Respondent argued that there was “no valid contract” between him and the Claimant as he was already being represented by another players’ agent at the time the employment contract was signed with the second Respondent. 8. Turning to the arguments of the second Respondent, the members of the Bureau noted that the latter had explained that although “there was some limited contact at that early stage”, the Claimant was one of a total of four “agents” who had all contacted the second Respondent in order to propose the services of the first Respondent. The second Respondent further alleged that the negotiations which had eventually led to the signature of the first Respondent’s employment contract, had in fact been initiated with Mr D, the agent also mentioned in the first Respondent’s submission. 9. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Bureau deemed that they would have to address the questions of whether the first and second Respondent had breached the “mandates” in any way and whether the Claimant could rely on the two “mandates” he had signed with the first Respondent in order to claim compensation from the latter and the second Respondent. 10. In this context, the members of the Bureau were keen to underline that said “mandates” stipulated that the Claimant’s obligation was to “act and negotiate with Club W [i.e. the second Respondent]” an employment contract on behalf of the first Respondent. In this respect, the Bureau carefully analysed if, on the basis of the documentation provided by the Claimant, it could be established that the latter had been able to successfully prove that his work had been causal to the conclusion of the employment contract between the first and second Respondent. 11. With the aforementioned in mind and and as a preliminary remark, the Bureau pointed out to the content of art. 20 par. 1 of the Regulations which stipulates that “The amount of remuneration due to a players’ agent who has been engaged to act on a player’s behalf is calculated on the basis of the player’s annual basic gross income […] that the players’ agent has negotiated for him in the employment contract” and stated that, in view of the aforementioned provision, as well as on the basis of the well-established jurisprudence developed by the Players’ Status Committee in similar cases, a players’ agent’s activity must be, as a general rule, causal to the conclusion of an employment contract. 12. Furthermore, the members of the Bureau underlined that in accordance with art. 22 par. 3 of the Regulations, “Every players’ agent shall ensure that his name, signature and the name of his client appear in any contracts resulting from transactions in which he is involved”. In this regard, the Bureau explained that the aforementioned provision aimed at easing the players’ agent’s position with regard to the proof of his involvement in the signing of a particular agreement. In this context, the Bureau noted that the Claimant had not provided any documentary evidence established that his name had ever been mentioned in the relevant employment contract signed between the first and second Respondent. 13. This established, the Bureau went on to state that although it can be accepted that a players’ agent, whose name and signature do not appear on the relevant contractual document, might be able to prove his involvement in a particular transaction by other documentary means, such evidence has to be conclusive and substantial. In fact, the Bureau held that, as a general rule, the omission of the players’ agent’s name and/or his signature in a contract rather speaks for his non-involvement in a particular transaction. 14. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Bureau carefully took into account the documentation provided by the Claimant in support of his allegation that he had “contacted the club [i.e. the second Respondent]” and had “started negotiating the player terms and presented to the club his exclusive mandate” and concluded that the only documentary evidence provided in the matter were copies of emails apparently sent to the second Respondent and in which the Claimant was proposing the services of the first Respondent. 15. Having analysed said documentation, the members of the Bureau were eager to emphasise that the Claimant had, apart from these emails sent at a preliminary stage, not been able to provide any first-hand evidence that he had been directly in touch with the second Respondent and, more importantly, had led the negotiations with the latter up to the moment the relevant employment contract was signed between the first and the second Respondent. 16. In the opinion of the Bureau, even if the Claimant could provide evidence that he had started the negotiation of the relevant employment contract, an allegation which was denied by both the first and the second Respondent, this did not prove in itself that he had in fact negotiated the final terms of the employment contract on behalf of the first Respondent. 17. In this context, the Single Judge referred to the legal principle of the burden of proof, mentioned in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, and according to which a party deriving a right from an asserted fact has the obligation to prove the relevant fact. 18. Taking into account the above, the Bureau referred once again to the well-established jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee and reiterated that the players’ agents’ activity must be causal in concluding an employment contract, otherwise the player concerned does not owe the agent any commission. Consequently, and since it could not be established on the basis of the evidence submitted by the Claimant that the latter had played a decisive role during the negotiations which had led to the signature of the employment contract between the first and second Respondent, the Bureau decided to reject the claim for commission lodged by the Claimant against the first Respondent. 19. In continuation and as far as the claim of the Claimant against the second Respondent is concerned, the Bureau was keen to stress that, as the second Respondent had no contractual relationship with the Claimant at all, it could therefore not be requested to pay anything to the latter. As a result, the members of the Bureau decided that any claim against the second Respondent should also be rejected for lack of legal basis. 20. Furthermore, the Bureau held that the request of the Claimant to be awarded an amount of EUR 250,000 for his “reputation damages” should also be rejected as such a request was clearly outside the scope of the Regulations and as the Claimant had failed to provide any documentary evidence demonstrating that he had in fact suffered any such “reputation damages”. 21. On account of all of the above, the members of the Bureau unanimously agreed to reject the claim lodged by the Clamant against the first and the second Respondent. 22. Finally, the Bureau referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied and that such costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings. 23. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant against the first and second Respondent has been fully rejected, the Bureau concluded that the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA have to be borne by the Claimant. 24. Moreover and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Bureau held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is above currency of country H 200,000. Therefore, the Bureau concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 25,000. 25. In view of the considerable amount of submissions that had to be analysed as well as considering that a number of factual and legal complexities had to be addressed in the present matter, the Bureau determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 15,000. 26. In conclusion, the amount of currency of country H 15,000 has to be paid by the Claimant to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Players’ Agent S, against the first Respondent, Player O, is rejected. 2. The claim of the Claimant, Plyers’ Agent S, against the second Respondent, Club W, is rejected. 3. The costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 15,000 are to be paid by the Claimant, Players’ Agent S. Given that the latter has already paid the amount of currency of country H 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, Players’ Agent S has to pay the amount of currency of country H 10,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision to the following bank account, with reference to case nr.: ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne - Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives