F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2020-2021) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 29 July 2020
Decis ion of the
Bureau of the Play ers ' S tatus Committee
pas sed on 29 July 2020,
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning Coach A
COMPOSITION:
Raymond Hack (South Africa), Chairman
José Luis Andrade (Portugal), member
Stefano La Porta (Italy), member
CLAIMANT:
Coach A, Country A
Represented by
RESPONDENT:
Football Association B, Country B
Represented by
I. FACTS
1. According to the Claimant Coach A (hereinafter: Coach A or the Claimant), the Coach C
from Country A, on 5 October 2019, received a message from the Football Association B
(hereinafter: the Football Association or the Respondent) with, inter alia, the following
conditions:
“PRIMERA.OBJETO
El Seleccionador, Coach C se compromete a prestar sus servicios como Seleccionador
Absoluto para la Football Association B en calidad de Primer Entrenador de la selección
absoluta masculina de la Football Association B.
(…)
SEGUNDO. PLAZO DE DURACIÓN
Este contrato tendrá vigencia desde el día de la fecha de la firma hasta el 30 de
septiembre de 2021.
(…)
TERCERA. RETRIBUCIÓN ECONÓMICA
Como retribución económica por los servicios prestados por el Entrenador, la Football
Association se compromete a abonarle todas las cantidades netas que a continuación se
especifican
(…)
3.1. Salario base
La cantidad neta de 72.000 EUROS (6.000€) al mes en concepto de mensualidad, abonadas
por meses vencidos, a pagar dentro de los primeros diez (10) días de cada mes.
(…)
SEXTA. RESOLUCIÓN
Este contrato se resolverá por las siguientes causas:
Por cumplimiento del plazo temporal pactado. En este caso el Seleccionador no tendrá
derecho a percibir del Club indemnización alguna al haber cumplido ambas partes lo
pactado en el contrato en el tiempo establecido para ello.
Por resolución unilateral de la Football Association:
La Football Association podrá dar por terminado el Contrato con el Seleccionador en
cualquier momento de la duración del mismo, debido a que la naturaleza de este
Contrato es la base de una relación de confianza mutua.
En caso de resolución unilateral por parte de la Football Association por cualquier causa,
incluida la del punto b) 1, el Seleccionador tendrá derecho a percibir como indemnización
el salario base que hubiese percibido hasta la terminación del plazo contractual
inicialmente pactado y que no hubiera percibido ya al momento de la resolución.
(…)
SÉPTIMA -Contratación de ayudantes:
El Seleccionador propondrá a Football Association la contratación de hasta tres ayudantes
de su confianza, que serán contratados por la Football Association con un salario base
máximo de 72.000 € (6.000€ mensuales) netos de retenciones fiscales y cotizaciones
sociales del Country B, sin perjuicio de las primas que en su caso se establezcan por la
Football Association.
Los contratos de los ayudantes estarán vinculados al del Seleccionador y se extinguirán
automáticamente al mismo tiempo que quede resuelto, cualquiera que fuese la causa, el
presente contrato.
(…)
Si la terminación de los contratos de los ayudantes se debe a la decisión unilateral de
Football Association no basada en motivos disciplinarios, los contratos de los ayudantes
terminaran en la misma fecha que el Entrenador y los ayudantes tendrán derecho a
percibir una compensación igual al salario base que hubiesen percibido hasta la
terminación del plazo contractual inicialmente pactado y que no hubieran percibido ya
al momento de la resolución.”
DÉCIMA. LEGISLACIÓN APLICABLE
Este contrato se rige por las clausulas estipuladas en el mismo y en su defecto por
la legislación del Country B y por la normativa de la CAF y la FIFA.
DUODÉCIMA.FUERO
Para cualquier duda o controversia que pudiera surgir, en relación al cumplimiento e
interpretación del presente contrato, ambas partes se someten expresamente al arbitraje
de los Órganos Jurisdiccionales de la Football Association, en especial la Comisión
de Apelación, sin perjuicio del posterior recurso a los órganos correspondientes de la CAF
y la FIFA y la apelación, en su caso, a la corte de arbitraje del TAS/CAS con sede en
Lausana.
Free translation into English:
"FIRST. OBJECT
The Coach, Coach C accepts to provide his services as Senior Coach for the Football
Association as Head Coach of the men's senior team of the Football Association.
(...)
Second. VALIDITY PERIOD
This contract will be effective from the day of the date of signature
until 30 September 2021.
(...)
Third. ECONOMIC REMUNERATION
The Football Association undertakes to pay all net amounts as specified below as a
remuneration for the services provided by the Coach, (...)
3.1. Base salary
The net amount of EUR 72,000 (EUR 6.000 per month) paid in arrears, to be paid within
the first ten (10) days of each month.
(...)
Sixth. Termination
This contract will be terminated for the following reasons:
For the fulfillment of the agreed time period. In this case, the Coach will not be entitled
to receive compensation from the Club at any time as both parties have complied with
the agreement within the established.
Seventh -Hiring of assistants:
The Coach C will propose to Football Association the hiring of up to three assistants of
his trust, who will be hired by Football Association with a maximum base salary of EUR
72.000 (EUR 6,000 per month) net of tax withholdings and Country B’s social contributions, without prejudice to the premiums that may be established by Football
Association.
The contracts of the assistants will be linked to that of the Coach C and will automatically
terminate at the same time that this contract is terminated, whatever the cause.
(…)
If the termination of the assistant contracts is due to the unilateral decision of the
Football Association not based on disciplinary reasons, the assistant’s contracts will end
on the same date as the Coach C and the assistants will be entitled to receive
compensation equal to the base salary that they would have received until the end of the
initially agreed contractual term and that they had not already received at the time of
resolution. "
By unilateral termination from the Football Association:
The Football Association may terminate the Contract with the Coach C at any time during
the duration of the Contract, insofar the nature of this Agreement a relationship of
mutual trust.
In the event of a unilateral termination by the Football Association for any reason,
including point (b) 1, the Coach C shall be entitled to receive as compensation the base
salary which he would have received until the end of the contractual term initially agreed
and which he had not already received at the time of the decision.
(...)
Tenth. APPLICABLE LAW
This contract is governed by the clauses stipulated therein and, if not, by the laws of
Country B and by the regulations of CAF and FIFA.
Twelfth. JURISDICTION
For any doubt or controversy that may arise, in connection with the performance and
interpretation of this contract, both parties shall expressly refer to arbitration by the
Courts of the Football Association and, in particular, to its the Appeal Commission,
without prejudice to a subsequent appeal before the relevant bodies of CAF and FIFA, as
well as to an appeal, where appropriate, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(TAS/CAS), based in Lausanne.
2. On 15 October 2019, the Coach C sent an email to the Respondent with the following
contents:
“Te escribo porque tras haber aceptado el cargo como seleccionador nacional de Country
B hace una semana, y al estar trabajando desde el lunes 7 de octubre de 2019 al frente
del combinado nacional, aún no hemos firmado el contrato que me habéis propuesto y
enviado.
Como sabes ya hemos dirigido al combinado nacional en dos encuentros, uno de ellos en
City D ante Country E ante la presencia de la FIFA. De igual forma estuvimos concentrados
varios dias en Country A y Country F junto con el presidente de la Football Association.”
Te llamaba con la intención de conocer cuándo se va a resolver esta situación.”
Free translation into English
"I am writing to you because having accepted the position as national coach of the
Football Association B a week ago, and after working since Monday, October 7, 2019
as the Head of the national team, we have not yet signed the contract that you have
proposed and sent me.
As you know, we have already managed the national team in two matches, one of them
in City D against Country E in the presence of FIFA. Likewise, we were meeting
during several days in Country A and Country F together with the President of the
Football Association.
I was calling you with the intention of knowing when this situation is going to
be solved."
3. On 25 October 2019, the Head Coach received a letter from the Respondent with the
following contents:
“Estimado Coach C,
Te remitimos la presente para confirmarte que por parte de la Football Association
(Football Association B) damos por terminadas las negociaciones para tu eventual
incorporación como Seleccionador nacional masculino absoluto.
Desde la Football Association B queremos agradecerte tu disposición, así como tu ayuda
durante el último partido amistoso que celebramos, con un magnífico resultado y aunque
finalmente no hayamos podido ponernos de acuerdo en todos los detalles y no hayamos
firmado el contrato, esperamos poder cruzar nuestros caminos en el futuro”.
Free translation into English
"Dear Coach C,
We send you this letter to confirm that on behalf of the Football Association B, we have
decided to terminate the negotiations leading to your possible hiring as the Senior Coach
of the national men's team.
On behalf of the Football Association, we want to thank you for your availability, as well
as for your help during the last friendly match we held, which ended with a great result.
Although we have finally not been able to agree on all the details and have not signed
the contract, we hope to be able to cross our paths in the future."
4. On 30 October 2019, the Head Coach, also acting on behalf of his entire team sent the
following correspondence to the Respondent:
“En respuesta a su comunicación del pasado 25 de octubre, en la que me informaban de
su decisión de resolver la relación contractual que me unía a la Football Association B, les
comunico lo siguiente:
Las partes mantenían una relación contractual que expiraba el 30 de septiembre
de 2021.
La resolución de la relación contractual se da por decisión unilateral de la Football
Association B.
Desde que asumí el puesto he venido realizando las funciones típicas del cargo de
Seleccionador Nacional Masculino Absoluto, habiendo incluso dirigido el encuentro con
la selección de Country E el pasado 13 de octubre, donde fui anunciado como tal.
En función de lo anterior, les hago partícipes de mi intención de reclamar por la
indemnización que en virtud de la relación contractual existente entre ambos me
corresponde. Concretamente les remito a la cláusula sexta del contrato:
“SEXTA. RESOLUCIÓN
1. En caso de resolución unilateral por parte de la Football Association por cualquier
causa, incluida la del punto b) 1, el Seleccionador tendrá derecho a percibir como
indemnización el salario base que hubiese percibido hasta la terminación del plazo
contractual inicialmente pactado y que no hubiera percibido ya al momento de la
resolución.”
En base a ello, me corresponde percibir de la Federación a la que usted representa la
cantidad 72.000€ por cada año que resta del contrato, sumando un total de 144.000€
hasta el 30 de septiembre de 2021.
Es mi intención evitar un procedimiento contencioso para el cobro de la cantidad
reclamada, por ello les informo de mi disponibilidad de entablar una negociación para el
cobro de la totalidad de la deuda. Si en el plazo prudencial de 5 días no tengo noticias
suyas, le comunico que pondré el asunto en manos de mis representantes legales para
que inicien las acciones que derecho me amparan.”
Free translation into English
"In response to your communication of 25 October, in which I was informed about your
decision to terminate the contractual relationship that bound me to the Football
Association, I inform you of the following:
The parties had a contractual relationship expiring on 30 September 2021.
The termination of the contractual relationship was performed by a unilateral decision
of the Football Association.
Since taking up the position I have been performing the standard functions of the
position of Senior Coach of the Men's National Team, having even led the march with
the Country E national team on 13 October [2019], where I was even presented as such.
In view of the foregoing, I inform you of my intention to claim compensation as
contractually agreed. In particular, I refer you to clause six of the contract:
"SIXTH. Termination
In the event of a unilateral termination by Football Association for any reason, including
point (b) 1, the Coach shall be entitled to receive as compensation the base salary which
he would have had received until the end of the contractual term initially agreed and
which he had not already received at the time of the decision.
On this basis, I shall receive the amount of EUR 72,000 for each year remaining from the
contract, that is, EUR 144,000 in total, until 30 September 2021.
I have the intention to avoid a litigation in order to collect the claimed amount,
Consequently, I inform you of my availability to enter into a negotiation for the collection
of the entire debt. If I do not hear from you within the reasonable period of time of 5
days, I will instruct my legal representatives to initiate the relevant legal actions”
5. On 13 November 2019, the official website of the Respondent announced that Coach G
became its national coach.
6. The Claimant stated that he remained unemployed afterwards.
7. On 2 January 2020, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent,
and requested to establish the following:
1) The Respondent terminated the employment contract without characterized just
cause on 25 October 2019.
2) The Respondent has to pay the Claimant outstanding salary as follows:1.693,54
Euro net plus 5% p.a. from 25 October 2019 until the date of effective payment.
3) The Respondent has to pay the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in
the amount of 65.403,22 Euro net plus 5% p.a. from 25 October 2019 until the
date of effective payment.
8. In addition, the Claimant requested the payment of 5% interest.
9. The Claimant attached a statement signed on 10 December 2019 by the Head Coach,
Coach C, stating the following:
“•I was the Head Coach of the Football Association B (“the Football Association”) during
the period 4 October –25 October 2019.
•On 4 October 2019, I personally recruited Coach A to work as assistant coach to the
Football Association and duly informed the latter to that effect.
•The employment conditions agreed between the assistant coach and the Football
Association, were those I reflected in the employment contract that I exchanged with the
Football Association on 6 October 2019, in particular, the assistant’s coach salary was of
2.500 Euros net per month.”
10. On 12 February 2020, the Respondent replied to the claim.
11. As a preliminary matter, the Respondent rejected the competence of FIFA, arguing that
the matter should be referred to its “Comisión de Apelación” (in English, Appeal
Committee).
12. As to the substance, the Respondent explained that the Head Coach was only proposed
to replace the previous national coach of Football Association, and that his name was
proposed by an intermediary.
13. In this respect, the Respondent stated that said intermediary has no employment
relationship with Football Association B and that she acts on his/her own behalf. In other
words, according to the Respondent, she lacks any capacity to contract on behalf of
Football Association.
14. The Respondent further explained that throughout this process at no time there was
any direct contact between the Claimant and any representative of the Football
Association with the capacity to sign on its behalf.
15. In this respect, the Respondent stated that no representative of the Football Association
knew about the Claimant, Coach A until the receipt of the claim lodged before FIFA.
16. According to the Respondent, any assistant coach shall be hired via a separate contract,
and that the Head Coach could only propose his assistants, but not hire them.
17. As a result, according to the Respondent, the claimant, Coach A, was never hired by the
Football Association to be the assistant coach of its National Team. According to the
Respondent “the only contractual relationship that the [Claimant] has been able to prove
is the one between him and his friend Coach C, who expressly claims to have hired him.
Therefore, any claim that the claimant intends to make against his employer should be
made against Coach C and, in no case, against the Football Association.”
18. However, the Respondent acknowledged that Head Coach actually conducted some
training and that he was temporarily given with his position
during a match played against Country E on October 13, 2019.
19. According to the Respondent, the participation of the Head Coach in this match was
merely carried out as a test and in order to have a first approach of his working methods.
20. The Respondent stated that, it finally decided to hire Coach G, with whom it carried
parallel negotiations.
21. Therefore, the Respondent insisted that the Claimant never concluded any contract
with the Football Association and that all the facts set out by him “are nothing more than
a sequence of unilateral actions that, under no circumstances, can imply the existence of
an agreement of wills.”
22. In sum, the Respondent made the following requests for relief:
- To declare that no employment relationship has been concluded between the Football
Association B and the [Claimant]
-Consequently, dismiss all the requests made by the Claimant concerning compensation
for the breach without just cause of his alleged employment contract.
- Order the Claimant to pay the costs of the proceedings, if any.
23. The Claimant was invited to provide a further position in relation to the competence.
24. In this respect, the Claimant insisted in the competence of FIFA and argued that with
regards to the Appeal’s Committee, article 64 par. 3 of the Football Association’s Statutes
establish that: “la comisión de apelación es competente para tratar las decisiones de la Comisión Disciplinaria y de la Comisión de Ética que los reglamentos no establezcan como
definitivas en virtud del reglamento correspondiente de la Football Association.”
Free translation into English: "The appeal commission is competent to deal with the
decisions of the Disciplinary Commission and the Ethics Commission that the regulations
do not establish as final by virtue of the corresponding regulation of the Football
Association."
25. As a result, the Claimant considered that neither of the above organs of the Football
Association are competent ratione materiae to hear contractual-related disputes
between coaches and clubs/national associations with an international dimension. Their
purview is strictly limited to disciplinary and ethics procedures as it stems from the
Statutes and from the documents submitted by the Respondent. Therefore, according to
the Claimant, “whether the members of these committees are allowed to belong to
another organ of the Football Association is superfluous and irrelevant and this second
argument must be disregarded from the outset. No other tribunal competent to
adjudicate contractual disputes exists within the Football Association.”
26. In addition, the Claimant referred to the principle of autonomy of arbitration
agreements “as enshrined in article 178 par. 3 of the Swiss Private International Law Act,
which states the following: “La validité d’une conventiond’arbitrage ne peut pas être
contestée pour le motif que le contrat principal ne serait pas valable ou que la
convention d’arbitrage concernerait un litige non-encore né.” [in English: The arbitration
agreement cannot be contested on the grounds that the main contract is not valid or that
the arbitration agreement concerns a dispute which had not as yet arisen.]
27. Therefore, the Claimant argued that “According to the principle of autonomy (or
separability doctrine), the arbitration agreement stands alone regardless of the validity
of the contract in which the agreement is inserted. Thus, in short, a party (i.c. the
Respondent) cannot object to an arbitration clause based on the assertion that the
underlying contract is null and void or that it was never signed.
II. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PLAYERS' STATUS COMMITTEE
1. First of all, the Bureau of the Players' Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to
as the Bureau or the PSC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at
hand. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the
Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.
2. Subsequently, the Players' Status Committee referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules and observed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art.
22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Players' Status
Committee is competent to deal with employment-related disputes between a club or an
association and a coach of an international dimension.
3. As a result, the Bureau understood that, in principle, it is competent to deal with the
present dispute between a Country A coach and the Football Association B.
4. However, in this respect, the Players' Status Committee noted that the Respondent
rejected the competence of FIFA on the basis of art. 12 of the contract, which stipulates
the following:
12. JURISDICTION
For any doubt or controversy that may arise, in connection with the performance and
interpretation of this contract, both parties shall expressly refer to arbitration by the
Courts of the Football Association and, in particular, to its the Appeal Commission,
without prejudice to a subsequent appeal before the relevant bodies of CAF and FIFA, as
well as to an appeal, where appropriate, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAS/CAS),
based in Lausanne.
5. Conversely, the Players’ Status Committee took note that the Claimant insisted in the
competence of FIFA.
6. In view of the dissent between the parties, and without yet entering into the examination
of the validity of the alleged contract that is at the basis of the dispute, the Bureau first
wished to specify that, in accordance with art. 22 c) of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, it is competent to hear disputes as the one at stake “unless an
independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level”.
7. As a result, the Bureau observed the contents of art. 12 of the alleged contract and noted
that it is clearly drafted, as it refers to the “Appeal Commission” of the Football
Association, the Bureau considered that, in application of the principle
of interpretatio cessat in claris, that the contents of said jurisdiction clause are
sufficiently clear.
8. Thereafter, the Bureau went on to examine whether the “Appeal Commission” of the
Football Association can be considered as an independent arbitration tribunal
guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level in the sense of art. 22 c) of the
Regulations
9. In this respect, the Bureau analyzed the documentation gathered during the course of t
he investigation, and noted that article 64 par. 3 of the Football Association
Statutes establish that: “la comisión de apelación es competente para tratar las decisiones
de la Comisión Disciplinaria y de la Comisión de Ética que los reglamentos no establezcan
como definitivas en virtud del reglamento correspondiente de la Football Association.”
Free translation into English: "The appeal commission is competent to deal with the
decisions of the Disciplinary Commission and the Ethics Commission that the regulations
do not establish as final by virtue of the corresponding regulation of the Football
Association."
10. After duly examining the contents of the aforementioned article, the Bureau came to the
unanimous conclusion that, from the documentation on file, it cannot be established
whether the “Appeal Commission” of the Football Association is an arbitration tribunal dealing with contractual (employment-related) disputes, but that its scope of competence
is only related to disciplinary and ethics issues.
11. In view of the above, the Bureau understood that, since the “Appeal Commission” could
not be understood as an arbitration tribunal dealing with contractual (employmentrelated)
disputes, FIFA and its Players’ Status Committee are competent to hear the
present dispute, in accordance with art. 22 c) of the Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players.
12. In continuation, the Players' Status Committee analysed which edition of the Regulations
of the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable to the present matter. In this
respect, the Players' Status Committee confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1
and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering the date
of the claim, the October 2019 edition of the aforementioned regulations
(hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand.
13. With the above having been established, the Bureau entered into the substance of the
matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the
documents contained in the file. However, the Bureau emphasized that in the
following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence
which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
14. Within this context, the Bureau understood that the present matter shall be examined by
taking into account also the discussions in the proceedings related to the Head Coach,
Coach C (cf. Ref. xxxx), to which the Claimant, Coach A is an assistant coach. The
aforementioned is due to the fact that only one employment contract – the validity of
which is still to be established – regulated the employment relationship of Coach A and
Coach C to the Football Association. Both disputes were decided on the occasion of the
same meeting on 29 July 2020.
15. In this respect, the Bureau recalled that, according to the Claimant, the Head Coach,
Coach C, concluded an employment contract with the Respondent valid as from on 5
October 2019, to which he was also part as an assistant.
16. Conversely, the Bureau observed that the Respondent, both in this matter as well as in
the matter xxx, denied having signed any contract with the Head Coach, as the
negotiations never evolved to the point of a common agreement on the final terms of an
employment contract.
17. In view of the dissent between the parties, the Bureau considered that, at this point, it
shall carefully examine the documentation and evidence provided by the parties during
the course of the investigation.
18. In this respect, the Bureau observed that the Head Coach and the Claimant provided with
their claims an unsigned copy of the disputed contract.
19. In relation to said document, the Bureau noted that, in principle, the longstanding
jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee strongly favors the submission of a
mutually signed contract as the primary evidentiary basis to establish that the parties entered into an employment relationship. However, the Bureau also wished to underline
that, in specific and well-determined situations, there are other evidentiary circumstances
that may sufficiently prove the existence of a contractual relationship. The Bureau
recalled in this respect that, indeed, the conclusion of a contract requires a mutual
expression of intent by the parties, and this intent may well be express or implied.
20. In view of the above, the Bureau recalled the main sequence of events that are at the
basis of the present dispute:
On 5 October 2019, the Claimant received a copy of the alleged contract.
On 13 October 2019, the Claimant acted as Assistant Coach of the representative team
of Country B during a friendly match against Country E, and which was held in Country
F.
On 15 October 2019, the Head Coach, acting on behalf of the entire coaching team,
sent an email to the Respondent, complaining that the contract was not yet signed,
despite the coaching team having started to work since the previous week.
On 25 October 2019, the Head Coach received a letter from the Respondent by means
of which the latter terminated the “negotiations” with the entire team.
On 13 November 2019, the official website of the Respondent announced that Coach
G became its national coach.
21. In relation to the aforementioned sequence of events, the Bureau understood that the
receipt of a copy of the alleged contract on 5 October 2019 followed by the participation
of the Claimant in a friendly match on 13 October 2019, is a sufficient indication of a
contractual relationship having been formed.
22. Moreover, the Bureau observed from the documentation on file Claimant was never
informed or advised that the aforementioned sequence of events had to be understood
as part of the negotiation of the contract, up until the 25 October 2019.
23. In this respect, the Bureau further wished to underline that, in contract law, there is
an implied agreement of good faith. Accordingly, the parties are generally presumed to
deal with each other in an honest and fair manner, with the aim of not harming the
rights of the other party.
24. In view of the above, and with the aforementioned sequence of events in mind, the
Bureau concluded with the support of the majority of its members, that the Head Coach
and the Respondent could rely in good faith that he was bound by a valid and binding
contract with the Respondent. The Bureau understood that the contract became valid
and binding between the parties by conclusive behavior.
25. As a result, the Bureau established, in accordance with the documentation on file, that
the aforementioned contract was valid as from 5 October 2019, i.e. when the Head Coach
received the contract from the Respondent until 30 September 2021.
26. Subsequently, the Bureau observed that specifically in relation to the assistant coaches
team the contract contained the following provisions:
Sevent -Hiring of assistants:
The Coach will propose to the Football Association the hiring of up to three assistants of
his trust, who will be hired by the Football Association with a maximum base salary of
EUR 72.000 (EUR 6,000 per month) net of tax withholdings and Country B social
contributions, without prejudice to the premiums that may be established by the Football
Association.
The contracts of the assistants will be linked to that of the Coach and will automatically
terminate at the same time that this contract is terminated, whatever the cause.
27. Moreover, the Bureau further noted that Mr Coach C provided a statement confirming
that the Claimant was part of his team as an assistant coach, which is in line with his
participation in the two matches played by the national team with his participation.
28. In view of all of the above, and after duly analyzing the documentation on file, the
Bureau understood that the Claimant was integrated into the contractual relationship
that already existed between the Head Coach and the Respondent. In particular, the
Bureau understood that the Claimant, Coach A, was part of the same team, together with
the Head Coach, and that the conditions for the termination of the contract were
inherently linked to the termination of the contract with the Head Coach. As a result, the
Bureau concluded that the assistant (i.e. the Claimant) was bound to the association by
the same contractual relationship as his Head Coach, and that, as a result, he is concerned
in the same manner by the possible early termination of the contract.
29. Subsequently, the Bureau recalled, as it already established in the related decision, that
it has remained undisputed that the Respondent sent a correspondence to the Head
Coach, on 25 October 2019, by means of which it decided to “interrupt the
negotiations”.
30. Thus, considering that the parties were already under an employment contract since 5
October 2019, the Bureau noted that said letter could only be understood as a unilateral
termination of the contract by the association.
31. Within this context, the Bureau was eager to emphasise that only a breach or misconduct
which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other words, only
when there are objective criteria, which do not reasonably permit to expect a
continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be
terminated prematurely. A premature termination of an employment contract can only
ever be an ultima ratio measure.
32. On account of the above, and after duly examining the contents of the correspondence
of 25 October 2019, the Bureau observed that the Respondent failed to provide any
substantive motivation to justify the unilateral termination of the contract. As a result,
the Bureau considered that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause.
Thus, as expressed in the previous paragraphs, the Respondent shall pay compensation to
the Claimant.
33. In continuation, the Bureau focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the
Bureau firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Players’
Status Committee, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due
consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further
objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the
Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the
existing contract up to a maximum of five years.
34. In application of the relevant provision, the Bureau held that it first of all had to clarify
as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which
the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the
contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Bureau observed
that the contract established the following conditions for the payment of compensation
under the scenario of a unilateral termination by the Respondent, and specifically for the
case of the assistants:
If the termination of the assistant contracts is due to the unilateral decision of the
Football Association not based on disciplinary reasons, the assistant’s contracts will end
on the same date as the Coach C and the assistants will be entitled to receive
compensation equal to the base salary that they would have received until the end of the
initially agreed contractual term and that they had not already received at the time of
resolution. "
35. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Bureau proceeded with the calculation of the monies
payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract until 30 September
2021.
36. In this regard, the Bureau noted that, following clause 7 of the contract, the assistants
were entitled to a total remuneration of EUR 72,000 per year.
37. However, the Bureau noted that the Head Coach was the responsible for the allocation
of the remuneration payable by the association to the entire coaching team and
confirmed that the assistant’s coach salary was of EUR 2,500 net per month.
38. Therefore, the Bureau understood that the residual value of the contract amounts to EUR
60,000, detailed as follows:
- Monthly salaries of October, November and December 2019 (EUR 2,500 each)
amounting to EUR 7,500;
- EUR 30,000 for the year 2020 (12*EUR 2,500);
- EUR 22,500, as monthly salaries from January to September 2021 (EUR 2,500*9).
39. In continuation, the Bureau verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of
which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the
constant practice of the Players’ Status Committee, such remuneration under a new
employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation
to mitigate his damages.
40. In this respect, the Bureau noted that the Claimant declared that he remained
unemployed following the termination of the contract.
41. As a result, and after duly taking note that the Claimant was unable to mitigate his
damages, the Bureau decided that the amount of payable compensation shall amount to
the residual value of the contract, i.e. EUR 60,000.
42. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the
specificities of the case at hand, the Bureau decided that the Respondent must pay the
amount of EUR 60,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, which it
considered as reasonable and justified on the basis of the relevant contractual provisions.
43. In addition, and taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the longstanding
jurisprudence in this respect, the Bureau decided to award 5% interest p.a. on said
amount as from the date of the claim until the date of effective payment.
44. Furthermore, the Bureau of the Players' Status Committee referred to the payable
procedural costs. In this respect, the Bureau took note of the Covid-19 Football Regulatory
Issues – FAQ, published on 11 June 2020 which establish that, given the current
circumstances, for any claim lodged prior to 10 June 2020 which has yet to be decided,
the maximum amount of the procedural costs shall be equivalent to any advance of costs
paid.
45. Thus, given that, at the beginning of the proceedings, the Claimant paid the amount of
CHF 2,000 as an advance of costs, and given the outcome of the matter, the Bureau
decided that the Respondent shall pay said amount of CHF 2,000 as procedural costs.
46. Finally, the Bureau concluded its deliberations by rejecting any further request made by
the parties.
III. DECISION OF THE PLAYERS' STATUS COMMITTEE
1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is admissible.
2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification
of this decision compensation in the amount of EUR 60,000 plus interest of 5% p.a. as from
2 January 2020 until the date of effective payment.
4. Any further claim of the Claimant is rejected.
5. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned
number 3. plus interest is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time
limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the
account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Single Judge
of the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.
7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 2,000 are to be paid by the
Respondent to FIFA (cf. note relating to the payment of the procedural costs below).
For the Players' Status Committee:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a
party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or
a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football As sociation
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland
www.fifa.com | legal.fifa.com | psdfifa@fifa.org | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777