F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2020-2021) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 20 November 2020
Decision of the
Single Judge of the Players' Status Committee
passed on 20 November 2020,
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the coach BRUNO MIGUEL DA
CRUZ VICENTE
BY:
Roy Vermeer (Netherlands)
CLAIMANT:
BRUNO MIGUEL DA CRUZ VICENTE,
Angola
Represented by 14 Sports Law
RESPONDENT:
UD VILAFRANQUENSE, Portugal
Represented by Abreu & Associados
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
1. On 1 August 2019, Mr Bruno Miguel Da Cruz Vicente, of Angolan nationality (hereinafter:
Claimant), and the Portuguese club, UD Vilafranquense (hereinafter: Respondent) signed an
employment contract (hereinafter: contract) valid until 30 June 2020.
2. Clause 1.2 of the contract stipulates that the contract would be automatically renewed for 2
more sporting seasons, unless one of the parties notifies the other his/its intention not to renew
it, in writing, and a with a previous notice of 30 days before the expiry of the contract.
3. According to clause 5.1 of the contract, the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant, inter
alia, a monthly salary of EUR 2,700, payable by the last day of the month. Moreover, in
accordance with clause 5.5 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to a monthly allowance
of EUR 500; and in accordance with clause 5.6, the Claimant was entitled to the reimbursement
of the expenses incurred by him in order to carry out his professional activities.
4. Furthermore, clause 6.1 of the contract provided the Claimant would be entitled to a bonus of
EUR 5,000 in case the Respondent remains in the second league.
5. Art. 11 provides the following:
“11.1 In addition to the clauses herein, the FIFA regulations are directly applicable to this
Contract, namely, the provisions of Article 15 of the Disciplinary Code, as well as the Regulation
on the Status and Transfer of Players approved by FIFA.
11.2. All disputes arising from the interpretation, performance or non-compliance of this contract
will be settled by the Players' Status committee of FIFA (PSC-FIFA). The decision of merit by PSCFIFA
can only be challenged before the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS), in Lausanne,
Switzerland, under the terms of the applicable FIFA regulations. If PSC-FIFA considers that FIFA
bodies are incompetent to settle the dispute, so all disputes arising from the interpretation,
execution or non-compliance of this contract will be settled, exclusively and definitively, by the
Arbitration Court for Sport, based in Lisbon.”
6. On 11 March 2020, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 16,200,
corresponding to the monthly salaries as from August 2019 until January 2020, granting the
Respondent a 15 days’ deadline to remedy the default.
7. Subsequently, in view of the lack of payment, the Claimant terminated the contract in writing
on 28 March 2020.
II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FIFA
8. On 17 April 2020, the Claimant filed the claim at hand before FIFA. A summary of the
position of the parties is detailed below.
a. The claim of the Claimant
9. The Claimant requested outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of
contract in the total amount of EUR 122,709.57, plus 5% interest as from the respective
due dates, broken down as follows:
Outstanding remuneration: EUR 24,909.57
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of August 2019 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of September 2019 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of October 2019 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of November 2019 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of December 2019 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of January 2020 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 3,200 corresponding to the monthly salary of February 2020 (EUR 2,700 + EUR
500);
EUR 2,509.57 corresponding to the moneys incurred by the Claimant within the scope
of his professional activity.
Compensation for breach of contract: EUR 97,800
EUR 16,000 corresponding to the residual value of the contract during the season
2019/2020;
EUR 38,400 corresponding to the value of the contract during the season 2020/2021;
EUR 38,400 corresponding to the value of the contract during the season 2021/2022.
EUR 5,000 as “performance-related bonus” due to the permanence of the club in the
second league at the end of the season 2019/2020.
10. According to the Claimant, by means of his letter dated 11 March 2020, he put the
Respondent in default of payment of EUR 16,200, corresponding to the monthly salaries as
from August 2019 until January 2020, granting the Respondent a 15 days’ deadline to
remedy the default. Subsequently, in view of the lack of payment, the Claimant terminated
the contract in writing on 28 March 2020.
11. In this context, the Claimant stressed that, despite him complying with his contractual
obligations, the Respondent did not pay him any moneys since the beginning of the
contract. In addition, the Claimant incurred expenses in order to perform his professional
activity, i.e. EUR 2,509.57, which the Respondent should reimburse him.
12. Moreover, as to the bonus request, the Claimant explained that the amount of EUR 5,000
payable in case the club remained in the second league upon conclusion of the 2019/2020
season “shall be confirmed before the end of the proceedings initiated with the claim
hereunder”.
b. Procedural aspects
13. On 25 August 2020, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, Mr Johan van Gaalen,
passed a decision with respect to the present matter under the assumption that the Respondent
had not replied to the claim. The findings of said decision were notified to the parties on 31
August 2020.
14. After the notification of the findings, the Respondent insisted on the fact that it had, in fact,
replied to the claim and that it had filed a counter-claim. After checking its records, the FIFA
administration realised that it had in fact received a reply from the Respondent.
15. In light of this situation, the FIFA administration reverted to the parties in a letter dated 9
September 2020, informing them that the Single Judge, referring to art. 14 par. 5 of the Rules
Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Chamber, had decided that his decision of 25 August 2020 shall be annulled in light of an
obvious mistake having occurred and that the investigation of the matter should be reopened.
c. Position of the Respondent
16. In reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent first challenged the competence of FIFA to deal
with the present dispute.
17. According to the Respondent, the Claimant was hired as a Technical Coordinator / Sports
Director and not as a coach. In this regard, the Respondent made the following statement: “the
Respondent globally agrees with the translation of the Employment Contract into English
exception made to the translation of the Portuguese words “Trabalhador” and “Empregador”
by, respectively, “Coach” and “Club” since the correct translation of the Portuguese words
“Trabalhador” and “Empregador” into English is, respectively, “Employee” and “Employer” and
not “Coach” and “Club”. The translation into Portuguese of the word “coach” is “treinador”.
18. With respect to the Claimant’s specific functions, the Respondent provides the following
translation of art. 2 of the employment contract:
“2. Professional Category
2.1. The EMPLOYEE will have the generic functions associated with the position of
Technical Coordinator, which include specific functions and tariffs for coordinating and
supervising the training of the professional Football team of the Club, as well as
coordinating, together with the EMPLOYER's Administration, the sports strategy for each
season (including, among others, the identification of resources to retain and/or hire, the
definition of player profile, game model, priorities in the coordination of professional football
and youth football -formation), and also the sports management of the EMPLOYER including the supervision of all administrative tasks to comply with sports regulations, namely licensing
processes, compliance with rules for participation in competition or games, etc...”
19. The Respondent, therefore, underlined that the Claimant’s functions were, materially, the
functions of a Sports Director whose role was to liaise with the administration and the coach
and technical staff, and his responsibilities included the sports management of the club, i.e. the
supervision of all administrative tasks to comply with sports regulations, namely licensing
processes, compliance with rules for participation in competitions or games, etc.
20. The Respondent insisted on the fact that the Claimant was not part of the coaching staff,
referring in particular to art. 2.2 of the employment contract, which provides: “In the exercise
of his duties, the EMPLOYEE enjoys technical autonomy vis-à-vis main coach, working under
the direct guidance of the EMPLOYER’s Administration”.
21. The Respondent further explained that the Claimant was registered before the Portuguese
League as Sports Director for the season 2019/2020.
22. The Respondent also referred to another written statement from the LFPF indicating the list of
the entire coaching staff, where the Claimant does not appear.
23. With respect to the jurisdiction clause in the employment contract, the Respondent deems that,
although it refers to the competence of the FIFA Players’ Status Committee, the latter deciding
body may itself determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular case or not. The Respondent
concludes that in fact the Portuguese Sports Arbitration Court or the Portuguese labour courts
would have jurisdiction, while FIFA does not have jurisdiction and the claim should therefore be
deemed inadmissible.
24. As to the merits of the dispute, the Respondent underlined that, in fact, the Claimant did not
even perform the activity of a Technical Coordinator / Sports Director. Indeed, the Respondent
explained that the Claimant was hired by former Board members of the club on 1 August 2019,
at a time where the club was facing some financial difficulties. In this context, the Claimant
allegedly approached the Respondent to offer them a loan in the amount of EUR 62,000
(hereinafter: the loan), in exchange for which the Respondent would sign an employment
contract with him. The former shareholders allegedly accepted such offer and the Claimant thus
signed the contract.
25. The Respondent held that “this context probably helps to understand how the Claimant
accepted to continue to work for the Respondent without receiving any salary, has
alleged by him, since August 2019 having only notified the Respondent for payment for the
first time in 11 March, 2020”.
26. When a new management was appointed in January 2020, the new management team
allegedly realised that the Claimant was in fact not performing the duties for which he had been
hired. Instead, according to the Respondent, his duties were essentially of an administrative
nature, dealing with administrative and financial matters at the offices of the Respondent, including payment of salaries of football players and staff as well as other administrative
functions.
27. The new Board members allegedly spoke with the Claimant and the parties agreed that the
contract would be revised so that it would be adjusted to the administrative functions of
the Claimant, including his salary among other conditions and the repayment of the loan.
28. Although the Claimant allegedly agreed to these new terms at first, the latter finally refused to
sign an amendment to the contract.
29. The Respondent reimbursed the Claimant the amount of the loan. However, the Claimant
refused to honour his part of the agreement by signing a new employment contract.
30. The Respondent expressed the view that it did not act in any improper way by not paying the
Claimant the salaries originally agreed upon in the employment contract concluded on 1 August
2019.
31. Indeed, the Respondent alleged that the contract executed between the parties shall be, under
Portuguese mandatory law, considered as an indefinite term contract in view of the fact that it
does not comply with the legal requirements of validity of a fixed term employment contract,
and thus, different rules with respect to just cause and compensation apply.
32. The Respondent concludes that, contrary to what the Claimant claims, he is not entitled to
receive any indemnification from the Respondent considering the inexistence of just cause for
the termination of the employment contract. The Respondent deems that the Claimant
“terminated the employment contract unlawfully since he intentionally infringed the most
elementary and nuclear duties of an employment relationship and intentionally created a
situation of non-payment of salaries to then move forward with the present Claim (…) As a
consequence, considering the inexistence of just cause for termination it is the Claimant
that shall pay to the Club compensation for non-compliance with the 30 days prior notice period
for termination which the Portuguese Law stipulates for terminations of no term employment
contracts by employees”.
33. Furthermore, the Respondent stated that “should the Claimant be entitled to any
compensation for termination of an employment agreement with just cause, the compensation
due shall be determined by the judge between 15 and 45 days of base salary per each year of
employment (fraction of year to be calculated in proportion), considering the amount of the
employee’s salary and the level of illegality of the employer’s behaviour, with a minimum
amount corresponding to 3 months of base salary (and seniority payments, if existing),
as stipulated in article 396 of the Portuguese Labour Code.”
34. With respect to the bonus, the Respondent argued that such amount cannot be taken into
consideration in the calculation of compensation since the Claimant was no longer employed
when it was confirmed that the club would remain in the second league.
35. In conclusion, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim entirely.
36. Notwithstanding and in light of the fact that, according to the Respondent, the Claimant
terminated the employment without just cause, the Respondent referred to article 401 of the
Portuguese Labour Code, “which stipulates that if the employee does not observe the prior
notice period he shall pay to the employer an indemnification in the amount of the base salary
corresponding to the period lacking”.
37. The Respondent’s requests for relief were the following:
1. “To immediately determine that the FIFA PSC has no jurisdiction to decide the present
dispute and therefore immediately terminate the current proceedings;
2. If the present procedure happens to continue – what the Respondent merely considers
for this purpose on an hypothetical basis – (i) to reject the present Claim determining
that the Claimant did not have just cause to terminate the Employment Contract on 28
March 2020 which means that it was the Claimant that unlawfully terminated the
Employment Contract and, as a consequence, no compensation for termination of
contract is due to the Claimant (ii) to determine that the Claimant has to pay to the
Respondent the amount of EUR 2,314.28 plus interests at 5% p.a. until the date of
effective payment; (iii) To determine that in the translation into English of Exhibits 3
and 4 of the Claimant where it is written “COACH” it shall be read “EMPLOYEE””.
d. Claimant’s position on competence and reply to the Respondent’s
counterclaim
38. In reply to the Respondent’s challenge to FIFA’s jurisdiction over the present matter, the
Claimant first highlighted that he had had a long career, between 1999 and 2010, as a coach
prior to joining the Respondent.
39. Furthermore, the Claimant underlined that when he was hired by the Respondent, it was agreed
that he would have a double function, that of a coach and of an administrator, supervising
aspects relating to player recruitment and retention, as well as supervising compliance and
regulatory. However, the President of the Respondent allegedly informed the Claimant that they
would have to remove express references to his position as a coach in the employment contract,
in order to avoid any conflict with the Head Coach at the time. In this regard, the Claimant
alleged that “the Respondent committed a lapse and left a reference to COACH (“TREINADOR”)
rather than EMPLOYEE (“EMPREGADO”) in Clause 7.1. of the Employment Agreement”.
40. The Claimant stated that he was in fact hired and exercised a dual function in the first few
months of the contract, until the new management of the Respondent came in and decided to
get rid of him. In this regard, the Claimant provided several affidavits from Mr Filipe José Moreira
Oliveira (Head Coach from March 2019 until February 2020), Mr José da Paz Pereira Batista dos
Reis (Assistant Coach from August 2019 until February 2020) and Ms Inês Carolina Cassola de
Almeida Gonçalves (Physical Therapist from April 2017 until February 2020), as well as from Mr
Luiz Carlos Andrade, the former President of the Board of Directors of the Respondent.
41. The Claimant further referred to the jurisdiction clause, which clearly states that FIFA is
competent in case of disputes. Equally, the Claimant insisted that the RSTP are applicable to the
present matter, in accordance with art. 11.1 of the employment contract (cf. point 15. below).
42. In reply to the Respondent’s counter-claim, the Claimant denied the Respondent’s allegations
regarding the context of his hiring and highlighted that the Respondent’s allegations in this
regard are unproven. In particular, the Claimant questioned the reason why he would have
signed an employment contract for an amount of EUR 115,200 as a means of securing a loan
of EUR 62,000.
43. This being said, the Claimant confirmed that there were negotiations between the parties to
amend, initially, and later to terminate the employment contract; however, such negotiations
were never linked to, nor did they hinge upon, the success of any other negotiations and namely
of the reimbursement of any amounts. In this respect, the Claimant underlined that no formal
offer was extended to him.
44. With respect to the loan, the Respondent explained the following: “the Respondent informed
the Claimant that it had entered into a Partnership Agreement with an Angolan investor,
whereby the latter would invest amounts of money in the team’s activities and in exchange gain
the right to a percentage of the sale of the Respondent’s players (…) the Respondent directly
asked the Claimant whether he maintained a bank account in Angola, and whether he would
be in a position to receive funds from an Angolan bank account and transfer the exact same
amount from one of his Portuguese bank accounts into the Club’s Portuguese bank account.
The Claimant, aware of the very significant struggles experienced by everyone at the club, which
included several remunerations in arrears, acquiesced. As a result, the truth behind the
“reimbursement” is much more prosaic and plausible than the speculative and unsubstantiated
drivel made up by the Respondent, with the sole purpose of discrediting its former employee”.
45. Finally, the Claimant maintained his initial claim that, at the time he terminated the employment
contract, the amount of EUR 22.900,00 remained outstanding for more than 30 days as
remuneration and living allowances, accrued by EUR 2.500,00 as reimbursement of expenses
incurred on account of the Respondent.
46. With respect to the counter-claim, the Claimant rejected the application of Portuguese law and
therefore rejected the counter-claim, which is based on Portuguese law.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER
a. Competence and applicable legal framework
47. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter referred to as Single
Judge) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took
note that the present matter was presented to FIFA on 17 April 2020 and submitted for decision
on 25 August 2020. Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the June 2020 edition of the
Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution
Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules
is applicable to the matter at hand.
48. Subsequently, the Single Judge took note of the Respondent’s challenge of his jurisdiction to
deal with the present dispute. Indeed, the Respondent argued that the Claimant was hired as
a Technical Coordinator / Sports Director and not as a coach. In this regard, the Respondent
referred to the wording of the employment contract, which, contrary to the translation of the
contract as provided by the Claimant, refers to the latter party as “employee” and not as
“coach”. Equally, the Respondent referred to art. 2 of the contract, which describes the
Claimant’s functions. Finally, the Respondent underlined that the Respondent had been
registered before the Portuguese League as Sports Director for the season 2019/2020.
49. The Claimant, for his part, explained that he was hired to perform a dual function, that of a
coach and of an administrator, supervising aspects relating to player recruitment and retention,
as well as supervising compliance and regulatory. The Claimant provided several affidavits in
support of his position (cf. par. I.40. above). The Claimant also explained that his duties of coach
were voluntarily not disclosed in the contract, allegedly, in order to avoid any conflict with the
head coach at the time.
50. Having analysed in depth the issue of his competence in this matter, the Single Judge first
recognised that both parties seem in agreement on the fact that the employment contract does
not refer to the Claimant as a “coach” but rather merely as an “employee” of the Respondent.
The Single Judge also paid due consideration to art. 2 of the employment contract, which
describes the Claimant’s functions.
51. Thus, the Single Judge determined that the Claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to
the real nature of his duties, i.e. (partly) those of a coach, given that the contract rather refers
to the duties of a Technical Coordinator.
52. In this context, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant had provided several affidavits from
former members of the coaching staff as well as from the President of the club at the time of
his hiring, which all corroborate his allegations. These affidavits all concur that the Claimant
had, partly, been performing the duties of a coach, describing, in particular, the fact that the
Claimant was conducting some training sessions on a regular basis.
53. The affidavits appeared credible to the Single Judge and may therefore be taken into account.
Furthermore, the fact that the parties had, in the contract, agreed upon the jurisdiction of FIFA
and the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players as applicable law is, in the Single
Judge’s opinion, a further indication that the Respondent had intended to employ the Claimant
as a coach.
54. In light of the above, the Single Judge held that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the
Claimant did effectively perform the duties of an assistant coach and therefore, the present
matter consists in an employment-related dispute between an Angolan coach and a Portuguese
club, for which he is competent (cf. art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules as well as . 23 par. 1
and 4 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players,
edition October 2020).
55. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the
substance of the matter. In this respect, the Single Judge duly noted that, in support of its
counter-claim, the Respondent had maintained that Portuguese law should be applicable.
56. In this regard, the Single Judge noted, however, that the contract explicitly mentioned, in its
art. 11.1. that FIFA Regulations, and the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players in
particular, shall be applicable.
57. In view of the above, the Single Judge confirmed that Portuguese law is not applicable in the
context of the present dispute and that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Player (edition October 2020), and considering that
the present claim was lodged on 17 April 2020, the March 2020 edition of said regulations
(hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
b. Burden of proof
58. The Single Judge recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of
the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact
shall carry the respective burden of proof. Likewise, the DRC stressed the wording of art. 12
par. 4 of the Procedural Rules, pursuant to which it may consider evidence not filed by the
parties.
59. In this respect, the Chamber also recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of
the Regulations, FIFA’s judicial bodies may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to
the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in
TMS.
c. Merits of the dispute
60. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC
entered into the merits of the dispute. In this respect, the DRC started by acknowledging all the
above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file. However, the
DRC emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments
and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at
hand.
i. Main legal discussion and considerations
61. The foregoing having been established, the Chamber moved to the substance of the matter,
and took note of the fact that the parties strongly dispute whether the Claimant terminated the
contract with or without just cause.
62. Indeed, on the one hand, the Respondent held that, in January 2020 when a new management
took over the club’s management, they realised that the Claimant was not performing the
duties for which he was hired, namely those of a Sports Director, but that his role was a more
administrative one. The Respondent would have then offered the Claimant to sign a new
employment contract and to negotiate a new salary, which would be more in keeping with his
actual duties.
63. The Respondent further held that the Claimant ultimately refused to sign a new employment
contract, then proceeded to demand the payment of his salaries and to unilaterally terminate
the employment contract.
64. The Claimant, on the other hand, held that, while there were negotiations between the parties
to amend, and later on, terminate their employment relationship, no formal offer had been
extended to him. As previously described, the Claimant insisted on the fact that he had been
performing some coaching duties in accordance with what had been agreed upon with the
Respondent’s former management. Furthermore, at the time he terminated the contract, he
had not receive any salary since the start of the contractual relationship.
65. The Single Judge went on to determine that the context in which the Claimant loaned an
amount of EUR 62,000 to the Respondent appears irrelevant to the issue at stake, this is,
whether the Claimant terminated the contract with or without just cause.
66. Having in mind the parties’ respective positions, the Single Judge first of all established that it
had remained uncontested that the Claimant had, at the time of the contract’s termination, not
received any salary for at least 7 months, this is, between August 2019 and February 2020.
67. Furthermore, the Respondent had not provided any evidence of having offered a new contract
to the Respondent, nor did the latter substantiate its claim that the Respondent had not been
performing his duties.
68. With these considerations in mind, the Single Judge found that, without having received salary
for a substantial amount of time, and with no prospect of the situation being remedied despite
the Claimant having sent the Respondent a default notice on 11 March 2020, the latter could
legitimately have lost his confidence in the continuation of the employment relationship.
Furthermore, the Single Judge could not find any evidence of any fault on the Claimant’s part
in the performance of his duties towards the Respondent.
69. In view of the above, the Single Judge, referring to the well-established jurisprudence in similar
cases where a club has not paid a coach his salary for a substantial amount of time, and the
coach has duly put the club in default, concluded that the Claimant terminated the contract
with just cause on 28 March 2020. Thus, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early
termination of the contract.
70. On account of the above, taking into account the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda and the
Claimant’s claim, the Single Judge concluded that the Claimant is entitled to receive outstanding
remuneration up to the termination of the contract.
71. In this regard, the Single Judged emphasised that, according to the contract, the Claimant was
entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 2,700 as well as a “subsistence” allowance of EUR 500.
72. As established previously, it is uncontested that the Claimant did not receive any remuneration
for 7 months, that is, from August 2019 until February 2020. Furthermore, and since the
Claimant terminated the contract at the very end of March 2020, the Single Judge deemed that
also the month of March 2020 shall be included in the outstanding remuneration due to the
Claimant.
73. In conclusion, the Respondent shall pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 25,600 as outstanding
remuneration, plus 5% interest as follows:
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 September 2019 until the date of
effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 October 2019 until the date of effective
payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 November 2019 until the date of
effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 December 2019 until the date of
effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 January 2020 until the date of effective
payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 February 2020 until the date of
effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 March 2020 until the date of effective
payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 April 2020 until the date of effective
payment.
74. As to the amount of EUR 2,509.57 corresponding to the moneys incurred by the Claimant
within the scope of his professional activity, the Single Judge decided to reject such request
as it is not sufficiently substantiated and the documentary evidence provided by the
Claimant was partly not translated.
75. In continuation, the Single Judge focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the Single Judge firstly
recapitulated that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, the
amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in
the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country
concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the
remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the
new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years.
76. In application of the relevant provision, the Single Judge held that it first of all had to clarify as
to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the
parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual
parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Single Judge observed that the
contract does not contain such a clause.
77. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Single Judge considered that the amount of payable
compensation shall be calculated in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status
Committee. In view of the above, the Single Judge proceeded with the calculation of the monies
payable to the coach under the terms of the employment contract until its original date of
expiry.
78. In particular, the Single Judge reiterated that, according to the contract, the coach was entitled
to a monthly salary of EUR 2,700.
79. Moreover, the Single Judge emphasised that, with regard to the EUR 500 “subsistence”
allowance, the contract provided that this allowance corresponded to costs to be “presented
later, on the invoices”. In that sense, the Single Judge understands that the spirit of this
allowance is to reimburse costs incurred by the Claimant whilst providing his services. Therefore,
the Single Judge determined that this allowance shall not be taken into account in the
assessment of the compensation due to the Claimant.
80. In continuation, and as to the time remaining under the contract at the time it was terminated,
the Single took into consideration clause 1.2 of the contract, which stipulates that the contract
would be automatically renewed for 2 more sporting seasons, unless one of the parties notifies
the other his/its intention not to renew it, in writing, and a with a previous notice of 30 days
before the expiry of the contract.
81. In this regard, the Single Judge found that the parties’ intention when entering into the contract
were to have a relationship lasting up until 30 June 2022. Thus, as such, the residual period
until the expiry of the contract is to be seen as from April 2020 until June 2022.
82. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of EUR
72,900 (EUR 2,700 x 27 months between April 2020 and June 2022) shall be considered the
basis for the calculation of the compensation for breach of contract.
83. In continuation, the Single Judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment
contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which she would
have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice, such
remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation
of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the coach’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.
84. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that the coach remained unemployed until today.
85. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Single Judge decided
that the Respondent must pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 72,900 as compensation for
breach of contract, amount which is considered by the Single Judge as fair and proportionate.
86. In addition, and taking into account the longstanding jurisprudence in this respect as well as
the Claimant’s request, the Single Judge decided to award 5% interest p.a. over the
aforementioned amount as from the date of claim.
87. With respect to the Claimant’s claim for EUR 5,000 representing a bonus in light of the club
staying in the second league at the end of the season 2019/2020, the Single Judge decided to
reject such claim due to a lack of evidence of the occurrence of the respective event giving rise
to the bonus.
88. Finally, the Single Judge concluded that, in light of the outcome of the present dispute, the
Respondent’s counterclaim has to be rejected, whereas any further claims of the Claimant are
rejected.
d. Costs
89. The Single Judge referred to article 18 par. 1 ii. of the Procedural Rules (edition June 2020),
according to which “For any claim or counter-claim lodged prior to 10 June 2020 which has yet
to be decided at the time of this temporary amendment, the maximum amount of procedural
costs levied shall be equivalent to any advance of costs paid”.
90. Accordingly, the Single Judge decided that, in light of the factual and legal complexities of this
matter, the Respondent, who is the party at fault, shall pay procedural costs in the amount of
CHF 3,000, which corresponds to the amount paid by the Claimant as advance of costs.
IV. DECISION OF THE SINGLE JUDGE OF THE PLAYERS' STATUS
COMMITTEE
1. The claim of the Claimant, Bruno Miguel Da Cruz Vicente, is admissible.
2. The claim of the Claimant, Bruno Miguel Da Cruz Vicente, is partially accepted.
3. The Respondent, UD Vilafranquense, has to pay to the Claimant, the following amounts:
- EUR 25,600 as outstanding remuneration plus interest as follows:
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 September 2019 until the
date of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 October 2019 until the date
of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 November 2019 until the
date of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 December 2019 until the
date of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 January 2020 until the date
of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 February 2020 until the date
of effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 March 2020 until the date of
effective payment;
5% interest p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,200 as from 1 April 2020 until the date of
effective payment;
- EUR 72,900 as compensation for breach of contract without just cause plus 5% interest
p.a. as from 17 April 2020 until the date of effective payment.
4. Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.
5. The Claimant is directed to immediately and directly inform the Respondent of the relevant bank
account to which the Respondent must pay the due amounts.
6. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with this
decision to psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if applicable, into one of the official FIFA languages
(English, French, German, Spanish).
7. In the event that the amount due, plus interest as established above is not paid by the Respondent
within 30 days, as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the
Respondent, the following consequences shall arise:
In the event that the payable amount as per in this decision is not paid within the granted
deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee.
8. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 3,000 are to be paid by the Respondent
to FIFA.
For the Players' Status Committee:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a
party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a
redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland
www.fifa.com | legal.fifa.com | psdfifa@fifa.org | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777