F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – solidarity contribution/ contributo di solidarietà – (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 15 October 2019

Decision of the

Single Judge of the sub-committee of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC)

passed on 15 October 2019,

by Joseph Antoine Bell (Cameroon),

Single Judge of the sub-committee of the DRC,

on the claim presented by the club,

Club A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding training compensation in connection with the Player E

I. Facts of the case

1. According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS) as well as the player passports issued by the Football Association of Country F, the Football Association of Country B, the Football Association of Country G and the Football Association of Country H, we have noted that the player, Player E (hereinafter: the player), born on 9 September 1994, was transferred on a loan basis by the club of Country F, Club L, to clubs in Country F, Country G and Country H as well as to the club of Country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), where he was registered from 11 February 2015 until 5 August 2015.

2. The sporting season in Country B runs from 1 July until 30 June of the following year.

3. Furthermore, according to the information contained in TMS, on 27 January 2017, the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), registered the player as a professional player following a transfer from Club L.

4. Also according to TMS, the Respondent belonged to the category 2 (indicative amount of USD 30,000 per year within UEFA) at the time the player was registered with it.

5. On 23 August 2018, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA asking to be awarded training compensation for the subsequent transfer of the player as a professional to the Respondent. In particular, the Claimant requested USD 15,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as from the due date.

6. In its claim, the Claimant referred to the jurisprudence of the DRC and explained that it is entitled to receive training compensation as the period of registration of the player with the club of origin, Club M, and the period of registration of the player with the Claimant on loan shall be considered one timeframe, entitling the Claimant to receive training compensation although it is not the player’s former club stricto sensu.

7. In its reply, the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant arguing that no transfer took place as it engaged the player when he was out of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the Claimant was not the player’s former club. Finally, the Respondent maintained that the player joined the club on a temporary basis and, as such, no training compensation is due.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the sub-committee of the DRC

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the sub-committee of the DRC (hereinafter: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 23 August 2018. Consequently, the 2018 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in light of arts 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2019). In accordance with art. 3 of Annexe 6 in conjunction with art. 24 par. 3 and art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Single Judge is competent to decide on the present dispute relating to training compensation between clubs belonging to different associations handled through TMS.

3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016, 2018 and 2019) and considering that the player was registered with the Respondent on 27 January 2017, the 2016 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Single Judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the Single Judge entered into the substance of the matter. The Single Judge started by acknowledging the facts of the case as well as the documentation on file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Single Judge recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS).

5. In this regard, the Single Judge recalled that the player, born on 9 September 1994, was registered with the Claimant as a professional on a loan basis from Club L for the period between 11 February 2015 and 5 August 2015.

6. In continuation, the Single Judge took note that the Claimant asserted that it was entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of USD 15,000, indicating that the player was transferred as a professional from Club L to the Respondent before the end of the season of his 23rd birthday and that the period that the player was registered with Club L, as well as with the Claimant itself on loan, should be considered as one entire timeframe.

7. Subsequently, the Single Judge observed that the Respondent rejected the claim of the Claimant arguing that no transfer took place as it engaged the player when he was out of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the Claimant was not the player’s former club. Finally, the Respondent maintained that the player joined the club on a temporary basis and, as such, no training compensation is due.

8. Having established the above, the Single Judge referred to the rules applicable to training compensation and stated that, as established in art. 20 of the Regulations as well as in art. 1 par. 1 of Annexe 4 in combination with art. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21 when a player is registered for the first time as a professional before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday or when a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations, whether during or at the end of his contract, before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday (emphasis added). Based on the clear wording of the aforementioned provision, the Single Judge pointed out that training compensation is due regardless of whether the player transfers during or at the end of his contract. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that the first argument of the Respondent cannot be upheld.

9. Furthermore, the Single Judge referred to art. 10 par. 1 of the Regulations, which stipulates that professionals may be loaned to another club on the basis of a written agreement between the professional and the clubs concerned. Moreover, the last sentence of said article stipulates that any such loan is subject to the same rules as apply to the transfer of players, including the provisions on training compensation and the solidarity mechanism.

10. With due consideration to the above, the Single Judge stressed that one of the aims of the last sentence of art. 10 par. 1 of the Regulations is to ensure that training clubs which register a player on a loan basis also benefit from the solidarity mechanism and training compensation, provided that the relevant prerequisites in the pertinent provisions of the Regulations are fulfilled. This approach is also in line with the DRC’s well-established jurisprudence that all clubs which have in actual fact contributed to the training and education of a player as from the age of 12 are, in principle, entitled to training compensation for the timeframe that the player was effectively trained by them.

11. In other words, the Single Judge emphasised that the nature of the player’s registration with a club claiming training compensation, i.e. on a definite or on a temporary basis, is in fact irrelevant with respect to the question as to whether such club would be entitled to receive training compensation for the period of time that the player was effectively trained by that club.

12. In this respect and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge deemed it essential to emphasise that, as to the liability to pay training compensation, the analogy established in art. 10 par. 1 of the Regulations could not be extended to the case in which a player is loaned to a club and thus is not being definitively transferred to the latter club. In other words, the transfer of a player from the club of origin to the club that accepts the player on loan, as well as the return of the player from the club that accepted him on loan to the club of origin, do not constitute a subsequent transfer in the sense of art. 3 par. 1 sent. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations. The Single Judge was eager to point out that it could not have been the intention of the legislator of the relevant regulatory provision (i.e. art. 10 par. 1 of the Regulations) to trigger the consequences of art. 3 par. 1 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations on the occasion of a transfer on a loan basis and, thus, potentially deprive the loan of its essential flexibility and, in connection with the training and education of players, its purpose of providing young players with the opportunity to gain practical experience in another club in order to develop in a positive way, personally and, eventually, also for the benefit of the player’s new club.

13. Following the above, the Single Judge pointed out that the obligation to pay training compensation thus arises in case a player is definitively transferred from one club to another club belonging to a different association, but not when he is temporarily transferred to another club while still being contractually bound to his club of origin (yet, with the effects of the relevant contract being temporarily suspended), such as a loan. Hence, the relevant entitlement can only be claimed towards a new club that acquires the services of a player on a definitive and permanent basis subject to the fulfilment of the prerequisites established in art. 20 and Annexe 4 of the Regulations.

14. What is more, and while recalling that art. 3 par. 1 sent. 3 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations stipulates that “In the case of subsequent transfers of the professional, training compensation will only be owed to his former club for the time he was effectively trained by that club”, the Single Judge pointed out that, within the framework of loans and for the purposes of the rules governing training compensation, the period of time that the player was registered with the Claimant on loan and the period of time that the player was registered with Club L, should be considered as one entire timeframe. Any other interpretation would lead to the situation in which clubs accepting a player on loan would never be entitled to receive training compensation, even if they contribute to the training and education of players.

15. On account of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent is liable to pay training compensation to the Claimant in accordance with art. 20 and Annexe 4 of the Regulations.

16. Turning his attention to the final argument of the Respondent that it engaged the player on a temporary basis, the Single Judge referred to the information available in the TMS, according to which the Respondent engaged the player “permanently, out of contract”. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent’s argument cannot be upheld.

17. Having established the above, the Single Judge proceeded to the calculation of training compensation, the Single Judge referred to art. 5 par. 1 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which stipulates that, as a general rule, it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself.

18. In continuation, the Single Judge recalled that the player was born on 9 September 1994 and was registered with the Claimant during the relevant period as from 11 February 2015 until 5 August 2015.

19. Equally, the Single Judge recalled that the sporting season in Country B ran from 1 July until 30 June of the following year.

20. Furthermore, and considering art. 3 par. 1 sent. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which stipulates that the amount payable is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the period of training that the player spent with each club, the Single Judge concluded that the effective period of time to be considered in the matter at stake corresponds to 5 months of the season of the player’s 20th birthday as well as 1 month of the season of the player’s 21st birthday.

21. Consequently, in light of the above-mentioned considerations and considering the amount claimed by the Claimant, the Single Judge decided to accept the Claimant’s claim and held that the Respondent is liable to pay the amount of USD 15,000 to the Claimant as training compensation in relation to the registration of the player with the Respondent.

22. Moreover, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim as well as art. 3 par. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to pay interest at 5% p.a. over the amount payable as training compensation as of 27 February 2017 until the date of effective payment.

23. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the DRC relating to disputes regarding training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25’000 are levied. It is further stipulated that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and, in accordance with Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute.

24. In respect of the above, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is USD 15,000 related to the claim of the Claimant. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 5,000 (cf. table in Annexe A of the Procedural Rules).

25. As a result and taking into account that the Claimant is the successful party in the proceeding, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 3,000, which shall be borne by the Respondent.

*****

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the sub-committee of the DRC

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of USD 15,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 27 February 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 3,000 are to be paid by the Respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. TMS XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under point 2. above is to be made and to notify the Single Judge of the sub-committee of the DRC of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Sub-committee of the DRC:

__________________________________

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer