F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2011-2012) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2011-2012) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach L, from Country M as “Claimant / Counter-Respondent” against the club Club S, from Country T as “Respondent / Counter-Claimant” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2011-2012) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2011-2012) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach L, from Country M as “Claimant / Counter-Respondent” against the club Club S, from Country T as “Respondent / Counter-Claimant” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. The coach L (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent or simply: the Claimant) and the club S from Country T(hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter- Claimant or simply: the Respondent) concluded an employment agreement (hereinafter: the agreement) that was valid from 5 July 2010 until 5 July 2011 and which provided for the Claimant to inter alia receive from the Respondent, as remuneration, the total amount of USD 1,200,000 payable as follows: USD 480,000 “after signing the contract”; USD 240,000 on 5 November 2010; USD 240,000 on 15 January 2011; USD 185,000 on 25 March 2011 and “every month an amount of 5.000 USD (…) for 11 months starting July 2010”. Furthermore, the agreement also provided for the Claimant to receive from the Respondent several bonuses depending on the achievements of the latter. Finally, art. 8.4 and 8.5. of the agreement stated, respectively, that “If the CLUB terminates the Contract unilaterally before the expiry date, it has to pay all the amount of the contract until the end of the contract to The Coach” and “if the HEAD COACH wants to leave the CLUB before the expiry of the Contract, he is obliged to return all the amounts he has received from the club.” 2. By correspondence dated 16 October 2010 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the Claimant terminated his contractual relationship with the Respondent with immediate effect claiming, inter alia, that the latter had breached the agreement by only paying him USD 100,000 out of USD 480,000 that were due as signing on fee. 3. On 14 December 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent requesting from the latter the payment of USD 1,070,000, plus 5% interests as of 16 October 2010 as well as the reimbursement of unspecified “costs in connection with the present proceedings including attorney fees”. Furthermore, the Claimant requested FIFA to impose the costs of the proceedings on the Respondent. 4. In this respect, the Claimant maintained that, although he had fulfilled “all his obligations and duties entirely”, he had only received from the Respondent USD 100,000 on 14 September 2010, USD 15,000 on 5 October 2010 and “three times USD 5’000.-”. Furthermore, the Claimant alleged that the following payments due in accordance with the agreement were still outstanding: USD 365,000, corresponding to the “rest payment July 2010” (i.e. USD 480,000 due - USD 115,000 paid); USD 240,000, corresponding to the amount due on 5 November 2010; USD 240,000 corresponding to the amount due on 15 January 2011, USD 185,000 corresponding to the amount due on 25 March 2011, as well as the remaining 8 monthly installments of USD 5,000 each, corresponding to the total amount of USD 40,000. 5. As to the facts of the case, the Claimant explained having written to the Respondent on 6 October 2010 in order to inform the latter that if he had not received the outstanding amount of USD 380,000 within seven days, he would have to terminate the agreement. Besides, the Claimant elucidated that, in response thereto, the Respondent, on 11 October 2010, had notified him that because he was “not performing his duties and obligations” as per the agreement, its management had decided “to penalize” him by deducting the following amounts from his salary: “15% of the total contract amount for not fulfilling and providing training schedules for the youth Levels and the necessary professional assistance”; “10% of the total contract amount for holding media interview without the clubs consent” and “5% of the total contract amount for also not proceedings training schedules for the 1st senior team”. As to that, the Claimant contested the Respondent’s allegations and stressed that even if he “would not have fulfilled his duties, the Respondent would not be entitled not to pay the salary overdue.” 6. Likewise, the Claimant mentioned that, on 16 October 2010, considering that the amount of USD 380,000 was still outstanding, he had terminated its contractual relationship with the Respondent. In this connection, the Claimant further specified that “the fact that a player or coach has not received his salary (or a part of it) for a period of three months entitles him to terminate the Employment Agreement, particularly because persistent non-compliance with the financial terms of the Contract could severally endanger the position and the existence of the player or coach concerned.” 7. On account of the above, the Claimant was of the opinion that he had just cause to terminate the agreement and that the Respondent, as “party (…) responsible for and at the origin of the termination” was “liable to pay compensation for damages suffered as a consequence of the early termination of the contract.” 8. In conclusion, the Claimant referred to the agreement and stressed that the Respondent had to pay him the “whole value of the Contract” as well as the bonuses “for the matches the Respondent did win up to now”. 9. In its response dated 16 April 2011, sent after the investigation phase had already been closed by FIFA, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety and lodged a counterclaim against the latter. In this respect, the Respondent requested from the Claimant the payment of unspecified compensation “due to breach of contract without just cause” as well as the reimbursement of USD 130,000. Furthermore, the Respondent requested FIFA to condemn the Claimant “to compensate all the damages due to breach of contract” and to impose the costs of the proceedings on the latter. 10. In this regard and first of all, the Respondent explained that it had not been able to provide a response to the claim of the Claimant within the deadline originally established by FIFA due to “circumstances completely out of our control such as change of Managing director of the club” and “the new year holiday in country T.” 11. In continuation, the Respondent accused the Claimant of having breached the contract by “Leaving (…) without permission or written ascertion about the contract breach (..)” and stressed that it had only received the termination letter after the Claimant had already left. As to that, the Respondent added that, thereby, the Claimant also failed to “fulfill supervising the activities of the youth levels and instructing the coach of youth levels to do his best to teach the players of these teams to enable them to play for the first team in short future”. In this context and as proof of its allegation, the Respondent provided FIFA two undated correspondence of its “directors of youth level team”, i.e. Mr H, to the manager of the Respondent. In one of the relevant translations of the said correspondence, Mr H requested Mr M to make “some arrangements in order to which Mr. L (coach L) could supervise the training of youth, teenagers, and other teams.” In the second translation, Mr H stated that “according to the letter on 1389/5/15 [i.e. the previous correspondence], in which the coach of elementary teams had asked Mr L (coach L) to be present in the games and the training of these teams and due to his agreement, I will have to say that unfortunately he have not done anything yet (..). So I will kindly ask you to take the best measures at once for this issue.” 12. In addition, the Respondent specified that, in accordance with the contract, it had provided the Claimant with a “suitable residence with necessary equipment and furniture payment of the domestic utilities (..)” and that, consequently it had “fulfilled his obligations and duties according to the employment agreement.” Furthermore and although admitting that a first instalment in the amount of USD 100,000 had only been paid to the Claimant in October 2010, the Respondent underlined that the latter had not been “entitled to terminate the employment contract in the case of just cause”. As to that, the Respondent explained having assumed that the first instalment in the amount of USD 240,000 had to be paid “until 5th of November 2010 (within three month)”. Furthermore, the Respondent alleged that it had gone through “severe financial problems” and added that, in its opinion, its “violation has not persisted for a long time or be cumulated over a certain period of time”. 13. In continuation, the Respondent mentioned that, in accordance with the contract, “the first payment” of USD 480,000 was due after the contract’s signature and pointed out that there was “no qualification to the time of payment as like “immediately”” and consequently “we should interpret the context narrowly instead of broadly.” Consequently, the Respondent was of the opinion that it had “permitted 4 month to pay the first instalment.” 14. On account of all the above, the Respondent considered that the agreement had not been terminated for just cause and that, in line with the agreement, the Claimant had to reimburse all the amounts received until the termination of the contract. 15. Finally, the Respondent claimed that the Claimant had given an interview to the press causing “direct harm” and provided FIFA with a copy of the relevant document. As a consequence, the Respondent argued that the Claimant also had to pay compensation. 16. In his subsequent submission dated 17 June 2011, the Claimant adhered to his original claim and contested the receivability of the Respondent’s response as well as of the counterclaim of the latter arguing that they had been submitted too late, i.e. after the expiry of the deadline given by FIFA. 17. In addition, the Claimant stressed that the first instalment due in accordance with the agreement and amounting to USD 480,000 had to be paid “immediately after signing of the employment agreement”. Furthermore, the Claimant claimed that neither his “media interview, nor any other act, resulted in a violation of his duties respectively the employment contract.” 18. In its last correspondence dated 18 July 2012, the Respondent reiterated the content of its previous statement. In addition, the Respondent requested from the Claimant the further payment of USD 100,000, allegedly corresponding to the amount paid “to employ another head coach for the rest of the previous season”. 19. In his final statement, the Claimant reiterated the content of his previous submissions and stressed that he had never breached the agreement and that he had always fulfilled his contractual obligations. Furthermore, the Claimant maintained that the Respondent had “never suffered damage” and that “the amount (…) paid to the new head coach could never be a loss.” 20. Asked about his labour situation during the period from October 2010 until July 2011, the Claimant explained that although he had “taken all reasonable measures and actions” he had not been able to find a job during that period and remained unemployed. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 December 2010, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at sake which concerns an employment-related dispute of an international dimension between a coach from Country M and an club from country T. 3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2009 and 2010 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 14 December 2010. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations). 4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. 5. In doing so and first of all, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent had provided its response to the claim of the Claimant as well as lodged a counterclaim against the latter only after the relevant deadline given by FIFA had expired and after the investigation phase of the present matter had already been closed. Furthermore, the Single Judge took note that the receivability of said response as well as of the counterclaim in question had been vehemently contested by the Claimant. 6. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Single Judge held that the first issue to be addressed in the present dispute was whether the response of the Respondent as well as its counterclaim against the Claimant could be taken into account at all. 7. In this context, the Single Judge emphasized that it falls within his scope of discretion to analyse, on a case by case basis, whether submissions from parties after the expiry of the respective time limit can be taken into account when passing a decision on the matter. After having carefully read the whole documentation provided by the Respondent, the Single Judge reasoned that, considering its relevance for the outcome of the dispute, and taking into account the specificities of the present matter, he must take the Respondent’s counterclaim into account when deliberating on the present matter. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that the entire documentation presented by the Respondent in connection with the present dispute, including the counter- claim of the latter against the Claimant, had to be considered although it had not been submitted within the original deadline given by FIFA. 8. After having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to analyse the documents included in the file as well as the different submissions of the parties. 9. In this respect, the Single Judge particularly took note of the fact that the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment agreement (hereinafter: the agreement) which was originally valid from 5 July 2010 until 5 July 2011 and which provided for the Claimant to inter alia receive from the Respondent, as remuneration, the total amount of USD 1,200,000 as follows: USD 480,000 “after signing the contract” (hereinafter: the signing on fee); USD 240,000 on 5 November 2010; USD 240,000 on 15 January 2011; USD 185,000 on 25 March 2011 and “every month an amount of 5.000 USD (…) for 11 months starting July 2010”. Furthermore, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Claimant had also been entitled to receive from the Respondent several bonuses depending on the results of the latter. Besides, the Single Judge remarked that, as stated in the agreement: “If the CLUB terminates the Contract unilaterally before the expiry date, it has to pay all the amount of the contract until the end of the contract to The Coach” and “if the HEAD COACH wants to leave the CLUB before the expiry of the Contract, he is obliged to return all the amounts he has received from the club” (hereinafter: the penalty clauses). 10. In addition, the Single Judge acknowledged that, by correspondence dated 16 October 2010 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the Claimant had terminated his contractual relationship with the Respondent arguing that the latter had breached the agreement by not fully complying with its financial duties, and more concretely, by not paying him the entire amount due as signing on fee. In this context, the Single Judge additionally observed that, before terminating the agreement and by correspondence dated 6 October 2010, the Claimant had put the Respondent in default and informed the latter that, in case on non-payment within the given deadline, he would have terminated its contractual relationship with it. Finally, the Single Judge noted that, in its response thereto dated 11 October 2010, the Respondent had accused the Claimant of not having performed his duties in accordance with the agreement and specified that, his salary had therefore been reduced. 11. In the light of the above, the Single Judge deemed that the question at the centre of the present dispute was whether the Claimant had just cause to terminate the employment contract with the Respondent or not. 12. In this regard and first of all, the Single Judge remarked that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had alleged that he had just cause to terminate his contractual relationship with the Respondent prematurely following the non-payment by the Respondent of part of the signing on fee. Furthermore and in the same context, the Single Judge observed that, for its part, the Respondent, although admitting that the Claimant had not received the whole amount payable as signing on fee, had contested the latter’s entitlement to prematurely terminate the agreement, arguing that it had fully complied with its contractual obligations. In addition, the Single Judge noted that, in the Respondent’s opinion, the signing on fee was only payable four months after the conclusion of the agreement. 13. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Single Judge stressed that the agreement at the basis of the present dispute was valid as of 5 July 2010 and clearly provided for the Claimant to inter alia receive from the Respondent the amount of USD 480,000 “after signing the contract”, i.e. after the conclusion of the relevant document. 14. Considering the aforementioned and taking into account that the relevant wording of the agreement was unmistakable, the Single Judge concluded that the provision related to the signing on fee did not leave any room for interpretation and, consequently, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it clearly did not provide the Respondent with a four months deadline to proceed to the payment. 15. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge recalled that the Claimant had asserted that at the moment the Claimant had terminated the employment contract on 16 October 2010, the Respondent had been in default of part of the signing on fee, i.e. the amount of USD 380,000. In this regard, the Single Judge duly noted that the Respondent had recognised not having paid the said amount on the date the Claimant had terminated the contract, although having been put in default by the Claimant on 6 October 2010. 16. In view of the above and bearing in mind his constant practice, the Single Judge considered that, in the present case, the Respondent’s failure to pay to the Claimant a substantial portion of the signing on fee due had to be considered a serious violation of the terms of agreement. Hence, the Single Judge established that the Respondent, by not paying to the Claimant the amount in question, had clearly breached the agreement. 17. On account of the above, considering that the relevant breach of contract had already lasted more than three months when the Claimant terminated the agreement as well as taking into account that the latter had duly put the Respondent in default before terminating their contractual relationship, the Single Judge concluded that, at the time the termination letter was addressed by the Claimant to the Respondent, the breach of contract perpetrated by the Respondent had already reached such level that justified a unilateral termination of contract by the Claimant. 18. On account of all the above, the Single Judge resolved that the Claimant had terminated the relevant employment contract with just cause on 16 October 2010. 19. In addition and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge was eager to emphasize that a club is not entitled to penalize a coach by unilaterally reducing his contractually agreed salary only because it is not entirely satisfied with the performances of the latter. Such unilateral decision of the Respondent indeed constituted an unacceptable modification of the contractual terms, which in principle require the acceptance of the counterparty. 20. Having established the above-mentioned, the Single Judge went on to assess the potential financial consequences of the breach of the contractual relationship by the Respondent which had finally led to the premature termination of the agreement. 21. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge analysed the first part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for payment of outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 365,000, corresponding to part of the signing on fee (i.e. USD 480,000 - USD 100,000 - USD 15,000) due in July 2010 under the agreement. 22. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that, according to the agreement, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent USD 480,000 after the conclusion of the agreement. Furthermore, the Single Judge stressed that it was undisputed that the Claimant had only received USD 100,000 on 14 September 2010 and USD 15,000 on 5 October 2010. 23. In view of the above, and taking into account the legal principle of Pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, as well as bearing in mind that the Respondent had not contested the allegation made by the Claimant that USD 365,000 out of USD 480,000 due as signing on fee had not yet been paid, the Single Judge concluded that the Claimant is entitled to receive from Respondent outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 365,000, together with 5% interest per year on the relevant amount as from 16 October 2010. 24. After having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to deal with the second part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for payment of the following amounts stipulated in the agreement: USD 40,000, corresponding to 8 times USD 5,000, USD 240,000, corresponding to the amount due 5 November 2010, USD 240,000, corresponding to the amount due on 15 January 2011 and USD 185,000, corresponding to the amount due on 25 March 2011. In this regard, the Single Judge recalled that according to the respective well-established jurisprudence, the party in breach of contract shall pay compensation to the party having suffered from said breach. 25. In continuation, the Single Judge observed that the employment contract does contain a clause related to compensation for breach of contract. However, said clause only refers to compensation being due only in case of termination of the contract by either of the parties without just cause, whereas, in casu, the matter pertains to a termination by the Claimant with just cause. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the compensation clause could not be applied in the present matter and that the amount of compensation had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria. 26. In view of the above, the Single Judge first of all noted that, according to the information provided by the Claimant, he had been unemployed during the period between October 2010 and July 2011. 27. On account of the above, bearing in mind his constant practice and considering that as a consequence of the breach of contract committed by the Respondent, the Claimant had found himself without any employment between October 2010 and July 2011, the Single Judge concluded that the financial loss which the Claimant had suffered had lasted at least during the mentioned period of time. Hence, and additionally taking into consideration that the agreement was terminated at the beginning of October 2010, the Single Judge decided that in casu the amount of USD 705,000, corresponding to the Claimant’s entitlements under the agreement between October 2010 and July 2011 (i.e. USD 5,000 x 8 months + USD 240,000 due on 5 November 2010 + USD 240,000 due on 15 January 2011 + USD 185,000 due on 25 March 2011), constituted a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract. 28. In view of the above, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent had to pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 705,000 as compensation, together with an interest of 5% per year on the said amount as from the date of the present decision, i.e. as from 24 April 2012. 29. In continuation and with the regard to the last part of the Claimant’s claim, i.e. his request for payment of an unspecified amount of bonuses “for the matches the Respondent did win up to now”, the Single Judge observed that such request had not been accompanied by any documentary evidence. Consequently and bearing in mind the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules which stipulates that the burden of proof has to be carried by the party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact, the Single Judge concluded that this part of the Claimant’s claim could not be granted for lack of proof. 30. After having deliberated on the Claimant’s claim against the Respondent, the Single Judge went on to consider the counter-claim of the Respondent, by means of which the latter had inter alia requested from the Claimant the payment of unspecified compensation for breach of contract as well as the reimbursement of USD 130,000. As to that and first of all, the Single Judge recalled that such requests were based on the Respondents assumption that the Claimant had terminated the agreement without just cause. 31. Therefore and considering the fact that the Single Judge had established that the Claimant had had just cause to the terminate the agreement, the latter ruled that the aforementioned requests of the Respondent had to be rejected. 32. Furthermore and with regard to the second part of the Respondent’s counter- claim, i.e. its request for compensation in connection with an interview that the Claimant had allegedly given to the press and which had apparently caused “direct[h]arm” to the Respondent, the Single Judge noticed that the latter had failed to provide evidence indicating that it had indeed suffered any kind of damage. Consequently, the Single Judge ruled that the last request of the Respondent had to be rejected due to lack of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 33. In view of all the above, the Single Judge decided that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 365,000 together with 5% interest per year on the said amount as of 16 October 2010, as well as USD 705,000 as compensation for breach of contract together with 5 % interest per year on the said amounts as of 24 April 2012. Furthermore, the Single Judge held that the counter-claim of the Respondent against the Claimant is rejected. 34. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 35. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is partlially accepted, that the counter-claim of the Respondent is rejected and that the latter is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 36. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is above CHF 200,001, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000. 37. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 15,000. 38. Consequently, the amount of CHF 15,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, coach L, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, Coach L, outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 365,000, as well as 5% interest per year on the said amount from 16 October 2010 until the date of effective payment, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach L, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 705,000, as well as 5% interest per year on the said amount from 24 April 2012 until the date of effective payment, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 4. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach L, are rejected. 5. If the aforementioned sums, plus interest, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. The counter-claim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, is rejected. 7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 15,000 are to be paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows: 7.1. The amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid to FIFA. Considering that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, already paid an amount of CHF 3,000 as advance of costs, the latter has to pay the amount of CHF 7,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision to the following bank account with reference to case nr. xxxxxxx3: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 7.2. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid to the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, Coach L. 8. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach L, is directed to inform the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club S, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under point 2, 3 and 7.2. are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives